APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

I concur in the majority’s decision to affirm the Trial Court. I agree the authorization form was so insufficient as not to allow the medical providers to obtain medical records from the other providers. I, however, continue to adhere to the position as stated in my dissent in Parks v. Walker, 585 S.W.3d 895, 900 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2018) that if a medical authorization form along with other information provided to the healthcare providers is sufficient to enable them to obtain a plaintiff’s records simply by asking, then there is substantial compliance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121(a)(2)(E).

This is a case involving the breach of an oral contract to provide excavation work and materials for an airport construction project in Bolivar, Tennessee. The trial court awarded $128,058.09 in favor of the subcontractor against the project’s general contractor. On appeal, the general contractor argued that the oral contract existing between the parties included the subcontractor sharing in certain surveying and testing costs incurred on its scope of work on the project, that it was entitled to a credit for these costs, and that, ultimately, the trial court miscalculated its award of damages. We affirm the trial court’s finding that there was no agreement existing between the parties for the subcontractor to incur any surveying or testing costs and that, as a result, the general contractor was not entitled to a credit for these expenses against the balance of the moneys it owed the subcontractor. However, because the order contains insufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law as to why the trial court included an additional $5,593.40 in the final judgment beyond the damages sought in the complaint, we vacate that portion of the final judgment and remand the case to the trial court with instructions to reduce the judgment against the general contractor from $128,058.09 to $122,464.69.

The non-biological parent of a child born by artificial insemination to a woman with whom the non-biological parent had maintained a long term relationship and who had lived with the child, holding herself out as one of the child’s parents, filed a petition to establish her parentage of the child and to set a parenting schedule; the petition was dismissed on the basis that she lacked standing; the trial court also awarded the petitioner visitation with the child. Upon our review, we affirm the dismissal of the petition and vacate the order setting visitation.

This opinion is stuck in the past. In my opinion, Obergefell v. Hodges, ___ U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015), altered the way we must interpret many statutes relating to marriage and parentage. In Obergefell, the United State Supreme Court legalized samesex marriage in the entire United States. It has met with resistance, just like Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), and other United States Supreme Court cases that required society to alter its thinking about its institutions.

Ashley Carver, Movant, appeals from the summary dismissal of her Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36 motion to correct what she claims is a clerical error concerning pretrial jail credits. In a one sentence order, the trial court summarily dismissed the “Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence” without making any findings. Because this was a Rule 36 motion to correct an alleged clerical error, not a Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 motion to correct an illegal sentence, we vacate the order dismissing the motion and remand for further consideration by the trial court.

This is a healthcare liability action. In her medical authorizations, the plaintiff left blank lines as to who was authorized to receive the patient’s records from the medical providers and others receiving notice. The defendants claimed that the authorizations were not HIPAA1-compliant, as required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26- 121(a)(2)(E). The plaintiff responded that by construing the pre-suit notice packet materials as one cohesive document, all of the elements required by the statute are present and that the defendants had at their disposal all of the information necessary to obtain the patient’s medical records. The plaintiff further asserted that the failure of the defendants to attempt to obtain the records precludes any demonstration of prejudice to them. The trial court determined that the plaintiff’s statutory notice failed to substantially comply with the requirements of Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm.

The Petitioner, Casey Colbert, challenges the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, wherein he attacked his jury convictions for first degree felony murder and attempted aggravated robbery. On appeal, the Petitioner raises numerous grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel, including that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to conduct reasonable investigation; failing to call various witnesses; failing to impeach and thoroughly cross-examine the State’s witnesses; failing to present viable alibi and third-party perpetrator theories of defense; failing to object to the co-defendant’s surprise testimony placing the Petitioner at the scene when notice of alibi had been given; and failing to object to improper closing argument by the State at trial. In addition, he raises allegations of newly discovered evidence and prosecutorial misconduct. Having reviewed the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we are constrained to agree with the Petitioner that the post-conviction court failed to make sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law to enable appellate review of his claims. According, we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court and remand this case for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The Davidson County Grand Jury indicted the defendant, Clarence William Groves, for aggravated child abuse resulting in serious bodily injury (Count 1), aggravated child abuse by use of a deadly weapon or dangerous instrumentality (Count 2), aggravated child neglect (Count 3), and criminal impersonation (Count 4). On the first day of trial, the defendant entered a guilty plea to the misdemeanor criminal impersonation charge in Count 4. Following a jury trial, the defendant was convicted as charged in Counts 1 and 2 and was convicted of the lesser included offense of child neglect in Count 3. Thereafter, the trial court imposed an effective sentence of twenty-one years for all four counts. On appeal, the defendant argues: (1) the State violated his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent; (2) the State committed prosecutorial misconduct during its closing arguments; and (3) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions. We affirm the judgments of the trial court in Counts 1, 2, and 3; however, because the record shows that the defendant entered a guilty plea to the criminal impersonation charge in Count 4, we dismiss for lack of jurisdiction the portion of the defendant’s appeal challenging the sufficiency of the evidence supporting that conviction.

The Defendant, Bryan James Nicholas Milam, pleaded guilty to multiple offenses over the course of three years, and in each case the trial court sentenced him to alternative sentences, including Community Corrections. Following multiple violations of the terms of his release, the trial court revoked the Defendant’s Community Corrections sentence and ordered him to serve the remainder of his total effective fifteen-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it revoked his Community Corrections sentence and ordered him to serve the remainder of his sentence in confinement. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The Defendant, Antwon Young, was convicted after a jury trial of two counts of first degree felony murder; two counts of attempted second degree murder, a Class B felony; two counts of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, a Class C felony; one count of attempted especially aggravated robbery, a Class B felony; eight counts of attempted aggravated robbery, a Class C felony; and one count of aggravated assault, a Class C felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39 12-101, -13-102, -13-202, -13-210, -13-402, -13-403, -17-1324(b), -17-1324(i)(1). The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of life, to be served partially consecutively to the Defendant’s sentence in Shelby County case numbers 15-05135 and 15-109300. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions; (2) the trial court erred by denying his motion for a mistrial after a reference was made to the Defendant’s being previously incarcerated; (3) the trial court erred by not allowing evidence of a witness’s gang affiliation; and (4) the trial court erred by sustaining the State’s objection during counsel’s closing argument. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court, but remand for the correction of clerical errors in the judgments in Counts 1, 2, 5 and 15.

In 2011, a Davidson County jury convicted the Petitioner, Henry Floyd Sanders, of five counts of aggravated sexual battery and four counts of rape of a child, and the trial court sentenced him to forty years of incarceration. The Petitioner appealed his convictions to this court, and this court and our supreme court affirmed the judgments. State v. Sanders, 452 S.W.3d 300 (Tenn. 2014); State v. Henry Floyd Sanders, No. M2011-00962-CCA-R3-CD, 2012 WL 4841545 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Oct. 9, 2012). Subsequently, the Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, claiming that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel, which the
post-conviction court denied after a hearing. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

This appeal stems from a dispute involving real property that Plaintiff acquired online. The property was previously purchased in a foreclosure action by one of the defendants. The previous owners were holdover occupants of the property. After purchasing the property, Plaintiff signed a real estate purchase contract and closed approximately two and one-half months thereafter. Due to delays in litigation involving the holdover occupants, Plaintiff was unable to take possession of the property for nearly two years after purchasing it online. In this case, Plaintiff brought suit against NationStar Mortgage, LLC; U.S. Bank, N.A.; Auction.com, LLC; and WFG National Title Insurance Company on several contract-related claims and alleged violations of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. Auction.com and WFG were dismissed prior to trial. The remaining defendants moved for summary judgment on all of the claims, which the trial court granted in part and denied in part. A jury trial was held on the remaining claims. At the close of Plaintiff’s proof at trial, the defendants moved for a directed verdict, which the court again granted in part and denied in part. One claim under the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act went to the jury, which found in favor of Plaintiff and awarded a verdict of $250,000. The parties filed separate post-trial motions. The trial court granted the defendants’ motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and denied the other requests of the parties or found them to be moot. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the decisions of the trial court and remand.

Following a jury trial, the plaintiff was awarded a substantial verdict against the defendant for both compensatory and punitive damages. After the defendant’s motion for a new trial was denied, he appealed to this Court. The defendant now argues, among other things, that the trial court erroneously excluded his expert psychologist from testifying at trial and, further, that the trial court erroneously allowed certain prejudicial evidence against him to be admitted. For the reasons stated herein, we vacate the jury’s verdict and the trial court’s judgment entered in this matter and remand the case for a new trial.

Petitioner, Merle Aaron Degroat, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition. Petitioner argues that he was denied effective assistance of counsel when his trial counsel failed to adequately consult with him prior to his guilty pleas to initiation of a process intended to result in the manufacture of methamphetamine and burglary of a motor vehicle. Following a review of the briefs of the parties and the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A jury convicted the Petitioner, Freddie Lewis Osborne, of sale of a controlled substance within 1000 feet of a Drug-Free School Zone (“DFSZ”), and the trial court sentenced him as a Range II, multiple offender to thirty-two and a half years of incarceration. The Petitioner contested his conviction by direct appeal, post-conviction petition, and by petition for habeas corpus relief. Subsequently, he filed a “Petition for Sentencing Relief,” which the trial court denied by written order. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the trial court erred because the Petitioner had: (1) sufficiently stated a claim for re-opening his petition for post-conviction relief; (2) stated a claim that the application of the DFSZ Act violated his right to equal protection; and (3) sufficiently stated a claim for the correction of an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

I again find myself in disagreement from my learned colleagues as to the application of res judicata. Because I cannot conclude that Defendant met its burden to show all the elements of the defense, I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion.

This appeal arose from a dispute involving an unpaid promissory note. In May 2014, Plaintiff filed its first suit for breach of contract. The trial court dismissed the case under Rule 41.02 for failure to prosecute. Opposing the dismissal, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Reconsider. The trial court denied Plaintiff’s motion and stated the dismissal was neither “with nor without prejudice” and that Plaintiff was “welcome to refile.” Relying on the trial court’s statements, Plaintiff declined to appeal and filed a second action. Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss the second suit, arguing it is barred by res judicata. The trial court granted Defendant’s motion and denied Plaintiff’s subsequent Motion to Reconsider. We agree with the trial court’s dismissal of this suit and subsequent denial of Plaintiff’s Motion to Reconsider. We therefore affirm the circuit court’s decision and remand.

This appeal concerns the trial court’s grant of a directed verdict in favor of the plaintiffs concerning their claim for surreptitious recording of their conversations, namely wiretapping. We affirm.

The grandparents of a minor child filed a petition seeking to terminate the parental rights of the child’s biological mother. Following a bench trial, the trial court terminated the mother’s parental rights, determining that clear and convincing evidence existed to establish two statutory grounds for termination: (1) abandonment by failure to visit and (2) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume legal and physical custody of or financial responsibility for the child. The trial court also determined by clear and convincing evidence that termination was in the child’s best interest. The mother has appealed. Following our thorough review of the record, we modify the trial court’s judgment to include a determination of clear and convincing evidence of the additional statutory ground of persistence of the conditions leading to the child’s removal from the mother’s custody. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects, including the termination of the mother’s parental rights.

Appellants, a doctor and a medical clinic, challenge a final order of the Tennessee Commissioner of Health imposing monetary fines and costs. The order followed the investigation and prosecution of numerous violations of state statutes and regulations governing pain management clinics. After review of an initial decision from an administrative law judge, the Commissioner’s Designee found three additional violations and increased the assessment of civil penalties and costs issued in the initial ruling. Appellants argue that the new violations were not supported by substantial and material evidence and were arbitrary and capricious under the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act. Further, they argue that the increase in penalties and costs was arbitrary and capricious. Because the decision appealed was supported by substantial and material evidence and neither arbitrary nor capricious, we affirm.

The Madison County Grand Jury indicted Defendant, Jamarian Cortez Jordan, for aggravated robbery, and a jury convicted Defendant as charged. The trial court sentenced Defendant to ten years’ incarceration with an eighty-five percent release eligibility. On appeal, Defendant argues (1) that the trial court erred by failing to suppress Defendant’s confession, (2) that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, (3) that Defendant did not have a fair and impartial jury, (4) that the trial court erred in refusing to allow Defendant’s mother to testify at trial as to Defendant’s disability, (5) that Defendant should have received the minimum sentence, and (6) that the trial court erred in denying Defendant’s motion for new trial. After a thorough review of the record and applicable case law, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The Defendant-Appellant, Deangelo Love, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of first degree felony murder and criminal attempt aggravated robbery, for which he received an effective sentence of life imprisonment. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant raises the following issues for our review: (1) whether the trial court erred in denying the Defendant’s challenge under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986); (2) whether the trial court erred in allowing the State to bolster a witness’s testimony with a prior consistent statement; (3) whether the trial court erred in denying the Defendant’s request for an alibi instruction; and (4) whether the Defendant is entitled to relief under the cumulative error doctrine. After a thorough review of the relevant facts and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Chad Everette Henry, pleaded guilty to voluntary manslaughter and driving under the influence (“DUI”). Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed consecutive sentences of twelve years for the voluntary manslaughter conviction and eleven months and twenty-nine days with forty-five days’ confinement for the conviction of DUI, second offense. The Defendant argues on appeal that the trial court imposed an improper sentence and that his plea to DUI was not knowingly and voluntarily entered. After a review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Robert Simmons, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his pro se petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner maintains that he timely filed his petition and is entitled to a hearing. After a review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the post-conviction court’s summary dismissal of the petition.

Petitioner, Torrance Johnson, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of error coram nobis in which he challenged his 1997 conviction for first-degree felony murder in the perpetration of a robbery. After a review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court.