APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Paul Kolb, Movant, pled guilty on November 18, 2011, to rape of a child, rape, incest, and aggravated sexual battery. Pursuant to a plea agreement, the trial court imposed an effective sentence of twenty-five years at one hundred percent service. On April 10, 2018, Movant filed a Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 motion to correct what he claimed was an illegal sentence in Count 1, rape of a child. The trial court determined the sentence was not illegal and dismissed the motion. We affirm.

Defendant, James Greenlee Davis, Jr., was convicted by a jury of possession of a controlled substance with intent to sell within a
drug-free zone, possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver within a drug-free zone, and criminal trespass. The trial court sentenced Defendant to twenty-year sentences for each of the drug convictions and to a thirty-day sentence for the criminal trespass conviction. The trial court merged the drug convictions, and ordered the trespass sentence to be served concurrently to the drug sentence. The trial court denied Defendant’s motion for new trial. Defendant argues the trial court erred by (1) denying the motion to suppress; (2) certifying Donna Roach as an expert; and (3) admitting the Knoxville-Knox County KUB Geographic Information Systems (”KGIS”) map in to evidence. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Defendant, Ricky Lakino Covington, appeals from the trial court’s revocation of his probation. Upon our review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal concerns the termination of a mother’s parental rights. Janae M. (“Mother”) is the mother of Ava M., Camille W., and Michael W., III (“the Children”).1 Tommy G. (“Grandfather”) and Glenda G. (“Grandmother”) (“Grandparents,” collectively) are the Children’s paternal grandparents. When Mother was incarcerated in 2014, Grandparents received custody of the Children. A few years later, Grandparents filed a petition in the Circuit Court for Hamblen County (“the Trial Court”) seeking to terminate Mother’s parental rights. After a trial, the Trial Court found that the grounds of failure to support and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody were proven against Mother, and that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the Children’s best interest. Mother appeals arguing, among other things, that the Trial Court wrongly applied two different four-month periods for the ground of failure to support. Grandparents raise their own separate issue of whether the Trial Court erred in not finding the additional ground of failure to visit. We hold, inter alia, that although the Trial Court erred in applying two different four-month determinative periods for failure to support, the error was harmless in this case. We affirm.

The petitioner, Wali Muhammad, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, which petition challenged his 2017 Shelby County Criminal Court guilty-pleaded convictions of aggravated assault and aggravated robbery. In this appeal, the petitioner claims, as he did below, that he is entitled to post-conviction relief because his guilty pleas were not knowingly, voluntarily, or intelligently entered. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This wrongful-death action arises out of the death of a Lemay Concrete employee who was struck and killed by a third party’s cement-mixer truck while acting in the course and scope of his employment. The issues in this appeal are post-settlement disputes concerning an attorney’s fee lien filed by the plaintiffs’ first attorney, a subrogation lien filed by the employer’s workers’ compensation carrier, and the assessment of postsettlement discretionary costs against the carrier. The employee’s family instituted this action after agreeing to pay their first attorney 33% of the gross recovery or “a reasonable attorney’s fee” if they discharged him before recovering. While the action was pending, the insurance carrier paid workers’ compensation benefits to the family and, after declining a settlement offer of $400,000, the plaintiffs discharged their attorney. The plaintiffs then retained substitute counsel. Months later, the wrongful-death claim was settled for $1,350,000. The plaintiffs then sought to void their first attorney’s fee agreement and requested the trial court deduct a portion of their substitute counsel’s fees from the carrier’s subrogation lien. The trial court referred all issues to a special master. The special master found the fee agreement was valid and recommended a fee of $133,333—or 33% of $400,000, the amount of the last “firm offer” secured during the first attorney’s representation. The special master’s report contained no findings and identified no factors relied upon in determining that $133,333 was a “reasonable fee,” other than finding the amount would be one-third of the last “firm offer” obtained by the first attorney. The special master also found the carrier’s own counsel protected its subrogation lien and, thus, recommended that the carrier not be liable for any portion of the plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees. The trial court adopted verbatim the special master’s findings and recommendations. Additionally, the court assessed post-settlement discretionary costs against the carrier in lieu of a deduction for plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees. This appeal followed. We have determined that the fee awarded to the plaintiffs’ first attorney was not based on the relevant legal principles or applicable facts because the trial court’s ruling was based entirely on the special master’s recommendation—which addressed only one of the guidelines in Tennessee Rule of Professional Conduct 1.5(a) 05/19/2020 - 2 - for determining what a reasonable fee is. Therefore, we vacate the fee awarded to the plaintiffs’ first attorney and remand this issue to the trial court to award “a reasonable fee” that is based on the relevant facts and factors. We also reverse the trial court’s ruling that the workers’ compensation carrier was not liable for any portion of the plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees and remand this issue for apportionment of the fees incurred by the plaintiffs’ attorneys. Accordingly, we also reverse the assessment of discretionary costs against the workers’ compensation carrier and remand this issue for reconsideration.

This is an appeal of the trial court’s decision to summarily dismiss a claim of vicarious liability against the owner of the vehicle that was involved in a fatal vehicular accident. The driver of the vehicle was the son and employee of the vehicle owner, and it is alleged that the driver was acting in the course and scope of his employment with the vehicle owner at the time of the collision. The owner of the vehicle filed for summary judgment, and the trial court found the affidavits and deposition testimony of the owner and his son refuted the prima facie evidence of vicarious liability created by Tenn. Code. Ann. §§ 50-10-311 and -312 that the son was acting in the course and scope of his employment at the time of the collision. The plaintiff appeals contending that summary judgment was not proper because the owner and his son were interested witnesses and their credibility was at issue. We agree. It is undisputed that the son’s employment necessitated his travel on the road where the collision occurred, and whether the son had deviated from the defendant’s business prior to the collision is a material fact that is in dispute. For this reason, we reverse the trial court’s grant of summary judgment and remand for further proceedings.

This is a premises liability action in which the plaintiff filed suit against the defendant convenience store for personal injuries resulting from her slip and fall near the gasoline pump. The trial court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, holding that the plaintiff failed to establish that the defendant caused or created or should have discovered with reasonable diligence the condition that caused her fall. The plaintiff appeals. We reverse the trial court’s decision. We remand this case for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The Defendant, Johnny James Parrish, was convicted by a Greene County Criminal Court Jury of two counts of aggravated assault, a Class C felony, for which he is serving an effective fifteen-year sentence as a Range III, persistent offender. See T.C.A. § 39-13- 102(a)(1) (2014) (subsequently amended). On appeal, he contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions, (2) the State made an inadequate election of offenses, (3) the trial court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial based upon the victim’s not having been sequestered before he testified, (4) the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b) regarding a prior bad act of the Defendant toward the victim, and (5) he is entitled to a new trial due to cumulative errors. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Kurt Douglas Brown, was convicted by a Campbell County Criminal Court jury of unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, a Class C felony. See T.C.A. § 39-17-1307 (2014) (subsequently amended). The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range II offender to eight years’ confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred (1) by admitting as evidence the 9-1-1 recording and his previous voluntary manslaughter conviction and (2) by determining that his previous aggravated assault conviction was a crime of violence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendants, Derrick Darnell Moore and Demichael Tyrone Moore, were convicted by a Davidson County Criminal Court jury of first degree felony murder and especially aggravated robbery. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-202 (2018) (first degree murder); 39-13-403 (2018) (especially aggravated robbery). Defendant Derrick Moore was also convicted of criminally negligent homicide, which the trial court merged into the felony murder conviction. See id. § 39-13-212 (2018) (criminally negligent homicide). Defendant Demichael Moore was also convicted of second degree murder, which the trial court likewise merged into the felony murder conviction. See id. § 39-13-210 (2018) (second degree murder). The trial court sentenced Defendant Derrick Moore to concurrent terms of life imprisonment for felony murder and twenty years for especially aggravated robbery. The trial court sentenced Defendant Demichael Moore to consecutive terms of life imprisonment for felony murder and thirty-two years for especially aggravated robbery. On appeal, the Defendants contend that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support their convictions, (2) the trial court violated the rules of evidence and their confrontation rights by admitting as substantive evidence a recording of a conversation in which the Defendants were implicated in the offenses, and (3) the State engaged in prosecutorial misconduct during its rebuttal closing argument. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

In 2014, a Hickman County jury convicted the Petitioner, Robert G. Thornton, Jr., of two counts of rape, and the trial court merged his convictions and sentenced him to twelve years of incarceration. The Petitioner appealed his convictions to this court, and we affirmed the judgments. State v. Robert G. Thornton, Jr., No. M2015-01895-CCA-R3-CD, 2017 WL 2704123 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, June 22, 2017), no perm. app. filed. The Petitioner then filed a petition for post-conviction relief, claiming that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel, which the post-conviction court denied after a hearing. We affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

The Petitioner appeals the summary denial of his third petition for writ of habeas corpus, in which he challenged his extradition to Mississippi. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

A Shelby County jury convicted the defendant, Jocquez Parham, of second-degree murder (Count 1), seven counts of attempted second-degree murder (Counts 2-8), and possession of a firearm during the commission of attempted second-degree murder (Count 9), for which the trial court imposed an effective sentence of eighty-eight years. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions and argues the trial court erred in failing to designate Antonio Tibbs as an accomplice and in failing to charge the jury accordingly. After our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Defendant, Anthony Olivo, was convicted, after a jury trial, of first degree murder during the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate a theft, first degree murder during the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate a robbery, attempted especially aggravated robbery, felon in possession of a firearm, and felon in possession of a handgun. The trial court merged the two first degree murder convictions and sentenced Defendant to life in prison. The trial court sentenced Defendant to twelve-years for the attempted especially aggravated robbery, eight-years for the felon in possession of a firearm conviction, and to four-years for the felon in possession of a handgun conviction. The two possession convictions were merged. The trial court ordered that the sentences be served consecutively for a total effective sentence of life in prison plus twenty years. Defendant filed a motion for a new trial which was subsequently denied. Defendant appeals the judgment of the trial court by arguing that the trial court erred in denying the motion in limine regarding prejudicial statements made by Mario Brodnax, that the trial court erred in denying the motion to bifurcate the felon in possession of a handgun charge, and that the evidence was insufficient to support Defendant’s convictions. After our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The parties entered into a mediated agreement, which was incorporated into their divorce judgment. Following the entry of the judgment, Husband filed a timely motion to alter or amend the parties’ agreement, alleging a mutual mistake. The trial court granted the motion and reformed the agreement to impose additional obligations on Wife. Following our review, we reverse.

The Petitioner, Richard Hatchel, appeals as of right from the Tipton County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner contends that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel due to trial counsel’s failure to file a motion to suppress his two police statements. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, Michael Wayman, pleaded guilty to sale of a Schedule II controlled substance (Count 1) and delivery of a Schedule II controlled substance (Count 2). The trial court merged the two counts and imposed a sentence of nine years’ incarceration. On appeal, the defendant argues the trial court erroneously denied his request for alternative sentencing. Following our review, we affirm the judgements of the trial court.

Defendant, Jay Aaron Jackson, was convicted by a Davidson County jury of one count of coercion of a witness, two counts of domestic assault, and one count of domestic assault by extremely offensive or provocative physical contact. The trial court sentenced Defendant, as a Range II multiple offender, to an effective sentence of seven years, eleven months, and twenty-nine days’ incarceration. On appeal, Defendant asserts that: (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the indictment based on a violation of Rule 16 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure and Brady v. Maryland; (2) the trial court erred by permitting the State to elicit impermissible and prejudicial evidence in violation of Rule 404(b) of the Tennessee Rules of Evidence; (3) the evidence was insufficient to support Defendant’s convictions for coercion of a witness and one count of domestic assault; (4) the trial court erred in sentencing Defendant as a Range II multiple offender; and (5) the trial court erred by instructing the jury on flight. Following a thorough review, we affirm the convictions for coercion of a witness (Count 1), domestic assault (Count 3), and domestic assault by extremely offensive or provocative physical contact (Count 4) and reverse the conviction for domestic assault (Count 2). Because the sentence in Count 2 was ordered to be served concurrently with Count 1, we affirm the effective sentence of seven years, eleven months, and twenty-nine days’ incarceration.

The Defendant, Gerald Sluder, pleaded guilty to aggravated assault. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the parties agreed to a five-year sentence with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered the Defendant to serve one year in confinement and the remainder on supervised probation. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred in imposing a sentence of split confinement. Upon review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Wayne Keith Wallen, appeals the denial of his Rule 36.1 motion. Though conceding the challenged sentence has expired, the defendant, relying on Summers v. State, 212 S.W.3d 251 (Tenn. 2007), argues the trial court erred in dismissing his petition. The trial court, relying on State v. Brown, 479 S.W.3d 200 (Tenn. 2015), found that the defendant’s sentence had expired and that the defendant’s claim required relitigating the case in order to determine whether the sentence was illegal which is not proper under Rule 36.1. Thus, the trial court denied the defendant’s motion. Upon our review of the record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In 1999, a jury convicted the Petitioner, Rudolph Munn, of killing his college roommate, Andrew Poklemba. State v. Munn, 56 S.W.3d 486, 489 (Tenn. 2001). This court affirmed his conviction of first-degree premeditated murder, see State v. Rudolph Munn, No. 01C01-9801-CCA-00007, 1999 WL 177341, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 1, 1999); however, a dissenting judge would have remanded the matter for a new sentencing hearing. Id. (Tipton, dissenting). The Tennessee Supreme Court agreed that a new sentencing hearing was necessary and held, inter alia, that the Petitioner had a lawful expectation of privacy, and thus, police secret videotaping of the Petitioner’s communications with his parents constituted an illegal seizure under the federal and state constitutions, as well as under the federal and state wiretapping statutes. Munn, 56 S.W.3d 486. Upon remand in 2002, the Petitioner received a sentence of life without parole. Sixteen years later, on November 13, 2018, the Petitioner filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis, arguing that one of his trial counsel was “slightly biased” based upon his “unequivocal ties” to the university attended by the Petitioner and the victim at the time of the offense. The Petitioner further alleged that he was entitled to due process tolling of the statute of limitations because he became aware of these ties on or about November 17, 2017. Two days after the petition was filed, it was summarily dismissed by the coram nobis court as untimely and unsupported by due process considerations to toll the statute of limitations. The Petitioner now appeals, and upon our review, we affirm.

The petitioner, William E. Eakes, III, appeals the denial of his petition for writ of error coram nobis by the Davidson County Criminal Court, arguing the trial court erred in dismissing the petition because newly discovered evidence exists in his case. After our review, we conclude the petition is untimely and does not present a cognizable claim for coram nobis relief. Accordingly, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The defendant, Glen Allen Donaldson, appeals his Hamilton County Criminal Court jury conviction of second degree murder, arguing that the trial court erred by excluding certain evidence, admitting into evidence a life photograph of the victim, and denying the defendant’s requested jury instructions on self-defense and provocation; that he was prejudiced by the cumulative effect of trial errors; that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction; and that his sentence was excessive. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Defendant, Bruce D. Mendenhall, was convicted by a jury of first degree premeditated murder and abuse of a corpse, for which he received sentences of life and two years, respectively. His sentences were ordered to be served consecutively to one another, as well as to two prior consecutive sentences from Davidson County of life imprisonment for murder and thirty years for three counts of solicitation to commit murder. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the following: (1) the trial court’s reliance on the doctrine of collateral estoppel to deny his various motions to suppress certain evidence, wherein he raised threshold constitutional issues; (2) the trial court’s denial of his motion to exclude 404(b) evidence and the failure to redact his police statement accordingly; (3) the trial court’s denial of his motion to continue based upon the State’s late disclosure of surveillance footage from the truck stop; (4) the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions; and (5) the imposition of consecutive sentencing. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.