APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Petitioner, Dontavious Hendrix, was convicted of second-degree murder and subsequently sentenced to twenty-five years. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-210(a)(1). Following denial of his direct appeal, the Petitioner filed a petition seeking postconviction relief, alleging that trial counsel was ineffective based on the following grounds: (1) implementing an inappropriate trial strategy by allowing Monderrius Miller to testify on behalf of the defense; (2) failing to properly advise the Petitioner of his right to testify on his own behalf; and (3) failing to interview potential witnesses. Following our review, we affirm.

The trial court dismissed the complaint filed by the pro se appellant for failure to state a claim and denied his motion to vacate the dismissal. We affirm.

On January 5, 2017, the Montgomery County Grand Jury indicted Defendant, Joshua W. Chambers, for first degree premeditated murder of the victim, Richard Gibeau, and employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. Defendant claimed he killed the victim in self-defense. On May 24, 2018, a jury convicted Defendant of second degree murder. The jury did not reach a verdict on the firearm charge. On November 21, 2017, after the victim was killed but before Defendant’s trial, the Tennessee Supreme Court issued State v. Perrier, holding “that the legislature intended the phrase ‘not engaged in unlawful activity’ in the self-defense statute [Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-11-611] to be a condition of the statutory privilege not to retreat when confronted with unlawful force and that the trial court should make the threshold determination of whether the defendant was engaged in unlawful activity when he used force in an alleged self-defense situation.” 536 S.W.3d 388, 392 (Tenn. 2017). The trial court instructed the jury using Tennessee Pattern Instruction 40.06(b) as it existed before it was amended to comply with Perrier. The instruction given to the jury erroneously required the jury, rather than the trial court, to determine if Defendant was engaged in unlawful activity. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred by giving an improper jury instruction on self-defense. The State concedes error in the self-defense instruction but claims the error was harmless. Defendant also claims the trial court erred by granting the State’s motion to amend the indictment on the day of trial, by permitting the admission of prejudicial evidence, by denying Defendant’s Motion for Judgment of Acquittal and Motion for a New Trial, and by submitting an incorrect verdict form to the jury. After a thorough review of the record and applicable case law, we find that the trial court committed reversible error by improperly instructing the jury on self-defense. Thus, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for a new trial. 

Over twenty years ago, a Knox County jury found Petitioner, Jeffrey T. Siler, Jr., guilty of first degree felony murder. At the advice of his trial counsel and prior to the jury trial, the then seventeen year old Petitioner pled guilty to attempted especially aggravated robbery which formed the basis for the felony murder charge. Petitioner received an eight-year sentence for the attempted especially aggravated robbery charge to be served concurrently with the life sentence for the felony murder charge. Petitioner’s convictions were affirmed on direct appeal. See State v. Jeffrey T. Siler, No. E2000- 01570-CCA-R3-CD, 2001 WL 387088 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 17, 2001) perm. app. denied (Tenn. June 20, 2014) (“Siler I”). On February 13, 2009, Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief. The post-conviction court summarily dismissed the petition as untimely. This Court reversed the post-conviction court and remanded for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether due process tolled the statute of limitations and to consider Petitioner’s claims regarding his mental condition. See State v. Jeffrey T. Siler, No. E2009-00436-CCA-R3-PC, 2010 WL 1444511 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 12, 2010), no perm. app. filed (“Siler II”). After conducting a hearing, the post-conviction court determined that the statute of limitations should have been tolled and that Petitioner was entitled to a full hearing on his petition for post-conviction relief. After conducting a full evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief and dismissed the petition. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner, Larry Braswell, appeals from the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the habeas corpus court erred in dismissing the petition, rather than granting relief. We affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

After the defendant, Donald Hyberger, caused a motor vehicle accident, a Davidson County grand jury indicted him for reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon (count 1), driving under the influence, third offense (count 2), and driving under the influence, per se, third offense (count 3). The defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence of a blood draw obtained while he was hospitalized after the accident. After the trial court denied the motion, the defendant pled guilty to driving under the influence, per se, third offense but reserved a certified question of law pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure regarding the motion to suppress the blood draw. Upon our review, we conclude the defendant failed to properly certify the question of law pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2). Accordingly, this Court is without jurisdiction, and the appeal is dismissed.

This appeal arises from detainer warrants sought by a decedent’s son seeking to remove a surviving spouse from a house. The trial court granted possession of the property to the son. We find it necessary to vacate the trial court’s ruling and to remand the matter for more in-depth findings of fact and conclusions of law.

The pro se petitioner, Eugene Spivey, appeals from the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Following our review, we affirm the ruling of the trial court.

A Shelby County grand jury indicted the defendant, LaDarius Berry, for attempted second degree murder (count 1), aggravated assault (count 2), employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony (count 3), and reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon (count 4). After trial, a jury convicted the defendant as charged in counts 2, 3, and 4 and found him guilty of the
lesser-included offense of attempted voluntary manslaughter in count 1. The trial court merged the defendant’s convictions in counts 1 and 2 and imposed an effective twelve-year sentence. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions and the sentencing imposed by the trial court. After our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court, but remand the case for the specific purposes of entry of amended judgments as to counts 1 and 2 to reflect the non-merger of the offenses as well as the determination by the trial court as to whether the sentences in counts 1 and 2 should be served consecutively or concurrently.

A Shelby County jury convicted the defendant, Antwon Young, of aggravated robbery and especially aggravated kidnapping, for which he received an effective sentence of thirty years. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions and asserts the State made two improper statements during closing argument. After reviewing the record and considering the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Shelby County grand jury indicted the defendant, Rashari Jones, for attempted first degree murder, aggravated assault while acting in concert with two or more persons, and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. Following a trial, a jury found the defendant guilty of attempted voluntary manslaughter, aggravated assault, and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and the trial court imposed an effective sentence of six years in confinement followed by four years of supervised probation. On appeal, the defendant contends the trial court erred in allowing the State to cross-examine the defendant regarding his whereabouts preceding the shooting, in finding the defendant was engaged in unlawful activity and omitting the “no duty to retreat” language from the self-defense instruction, and in failing to merge his convictions for attempted voluntary manslaughter and aggravated assault. We conclude that although the self-defense instruction was erroneous, the error was harmless. Therefore, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Eric Wooten, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief arguing the post-conviction court erred in dismissing his petition as untimely. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A preferred-service employee with the Department of Children’s Services was terminated for accessing a case file involving her sister and sending an email to the case manager assigned to her sister’s case and the case manager’s supervisor, with a copy to her sister. The employee ultimately appealed her termination to the Board of Appeals of the Department of Human Resources, which modified her termination to a suspension without pay and reinstated her with back pay. The Department appealed to chancery court, which affirmed the Board’s determination. Upon a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court and remand the case to the Board of Appeals for further proceedings.  

This appeal concerns whether a city councilman is disqualified from office because he also is employed by his city’s municipal school system. Ronald C. Young (“Young”) ran against E.T. Stamey (“Stamey”) for a seat on the Clinton City Council. Stamey, the incumbent, won. Afterward, Young filed suit in the Chancery Court for Anderson County (“the Trial Court”) against Stamey as well as the Anderson County Election Commission and its members (“the Commission”). Young alleged that, pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 7-51-1501 and the Clinton City Charter, Stamey is disqualified from being a city councilman because he works for Clinton City Schools (“CCS”), albeit in a noninstructional capacity. The Commission filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, and Stamey filed a motion for summary judgment. The Trial Court granted both motions. Young appeals. We hold, first, that Stamey is not a city employee. We hold further that even if Stamey is a city employee, as a noninstructional public school employee he is allowed to run for city council pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-5-301. Finally, we hold that Young failed to state a claim against the Commission, which acted solely in its ministerial capacity in certifying the election results. We affirm.

Defendant, Waynard Quartez Winbush, was convicted of various drug offenses and sentenced to an effective sentence of twenty-three years. On appeal, Defendant argues that: (1) he received ineffective assistance of counsel; (2) the trial court erred by failing to sever prejudicial offenses; (3) the trial court erred by failing to grant a new trial based on prosecutorial misconduct; (4) the trial court erred by failing to include lesser-included offenses in the jury instructions; (5) the trial court erred by failing to grant a new trial based on newly discovered evidence; (6) the trial court erred by failing to dismiss the case based on a violation of Defendant’s right to a speedy trial; (7) the trial court erred by failing to grant a new trial after failing to rule on Defendant’s pretrial motions; (8) the trial court erred by allowing the State to improperly introduce evidence; (9) the trial court erred by failing to grant a new trial based on witness perjury; (10) the evidence was insufficient to sustain the convictions; (11) the trial court erred by instructing the jury on the lesser-included offense of simple possession for conspiracy; and (12) the trial court erred by failing to grant a new trial based on cumulative errors. After conducting a full review of the record, we determine that Defendant is entitled to relief from his convictions for conspiracy in Counts 3 and 4 because the instructions given to the jury did not match the charges in the presentment, and we vacate Defendant’s convictions as to those counts. As to the remaining arguments, we find Defendant is not entitled to relief. Consequently, we reverse the judgments of the trial court in part and affirm the judgments in part. 

Harold D. Doss, Jr., and Johnathan Lamar Hathaway filed separate petitions for post-conviction relief. Because Petitioners were tried together, the post-conviction court conducted a single post-conviction hearing and denied relief as to both Petitioners. Discerning no error, we affirm.

In this divorce matter, the parties engaged in protracted litigation concerning the initial amount of the father’s child support obligation before the trial court set the amount of child support to be paid. Meanwhile, the father sought a modification of his child support obligation. The trial court determined that its order entered on January 27, 2014, was final as to the amount of the father’s initial child support obligation because the order left no remaining issues to be determined. The father has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

In this action involving injuries allegedly caused by the defendant medical providers’ failure to provide a safe examination table, the trial court determined that the plaintiff’s negligence claim was actually a health care liability claim and granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint with prejudice for failure to provide written pre-suit notice to the defendants within the one-year statute of limitations pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-26-121(a) (Supp. 2019) of the Tennessee Health Care Liability Act (“THCLA”). The plaintiff has appealed, conceding that he failed to provide written presuit notice but asserting that his claim should not have been dismissed because it was not a health care liability claim. Having determined that the trial court properly found that the plaintiff’s claim was a health care liability action, we affirm the dismissal of this matter. However, having also determined that the proper sanction for the plaintiff’s failure to provide pre-suit notice under the THCLA was dismissal without prejudice, we modify the trial court’s dismissal of the claim to be without prejudice.

The Petitioner, Mateem Hudson, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction of second degree murder and resulting sentence of twenty-three years in confinement. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the postconviction court.

The Petitioner, Carlos Smith, filed a petition for post-conviction relief in the Shelby County Criminal Court, seeking relief from his convictions of two counts of attempted second degree murder, one count of aggravated robbery, one count of especially aggravated burglary, one count of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, two counts of aggravated assault, and one count of being a felon in possession of a handgun and resulting effective sentence of one hundred twenty years. After an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief, and this court affirmed the denial except for one issue: whether trial counsel were ineffective for failing to advise the Petitioner that he was a career offender, which resulted in his rejecting a plea offer. Regarding that issue, this court remanded the case to the post-conviction court because that court failed to making any findings. Upon remand, the post-conviction court concluded that the Petitioner was not entitled to relief. On appeal, the Petitioner maintains that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial attorneys failed to inform him of his career offender status. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A Hamilton County jury convicted the Petitioner, Reginald D. Tumlin, of two counts of child abuse, one count of criminally negligent homicide, and one count of aggravated child neglect. On appeal, this court affirmed the convictions. State v. Reginald D. Tumlin, No. E2013-01452-CCA-R3-CD, 2014 WL 7073752, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, Dec. 15, 2014), perm. app. denied (Tenn. May 14, 2015). The Petitioner timely filed a petition for post-conviction relief, claiming that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. The Petitioner maintains on appeal that his attorneys’ representation was deficient and he was prejudiced by the deficiencies. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner, Willie James Bradley, appeals from the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s summary denial of his petition for
post-conviction relief and his “motion to change order.” The Petitioner contends that his due process rights were violated because the trial court did not inform him that he was subject to lifetime community supervision as a result of his guilty plea. The Petitioner also argues that his judgments were improperly changed by extra-judicial agencies. Following our review, we affirm.

Petitioner, Anthony James Zonneville, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. Following a jury trial, Petitioner was convicted of possession with intent to sell or deliver .5 grams or more of cocaine in a drug free zone and simple possession of alprazolam. Petitioner contends on appeal that the trial court erred in denying the petition for post-conviction relief because he was denied effective assistance of counsel. Following a review of the briefs and the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The petitioner, George Oviasojie, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received effective assistance of counsel prior to and during his guilty plea hearing. Upon our review of the record, arguments of the parties, and pertinent authorities, we affirm the denial of the petition.

Defendant, Carl S. Dixon, was indicted by the Washington County Grand Jury for aggravated assault. Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of reckless aggravated assault. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Defendant to serve two years, to be suspended on probation, and ordered Defendant to pay the victim $600 in restitution at the rate of $25 per month. Defendant’s sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court’s order of restitution was proper when Defendant’s only source of income was Social Security Supplemental Security Income. Having reviewed the record and the applicable authority, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.