APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Defendant, Elizabeth Lynn Schmitz, appeals her convictions by a Dickson County jury of attempted theft of property over $500 and hindering a secured creditor. The trial court sentenced Defendant to two-years for hindering a secured creditor and a concurrent term of eleven months and twenty-nine day for the misdemeanor theft, suspended to probation. On appeal, Defendant argues the evidence was insufficient to support either conviction when the evidence demonstrated that the subject property of both offenses was her own car. Defendant also claims the trial court gave incomplete instructions to the jury. After a full review, we conclude that Defendant is entitled to relief as to the attempted theft of property conviction because Defendant cannot be convicted of attempted theft of something she owned, and we vacate the conviction as to that count. As to the remaining count of hindering a secured creditor, we confirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Putnam County grand jury indicted the defendant for possession of a Schedule II controlled substance with intent to sell or deliver, possession of a Schedule IV controlled substance with intent to sell or deliver, and simple possession of a Schedule II controlled substance. After trial, a jury convicted the defendant of all counts. On appeal, the defendant challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained from a warrantless search of his girlfriend’s vehicle. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and dismiss the indictments against the defendant.

This is a case involving the propriety of retroactive child support. Following the death of the Respondent and notwithstanding the Petitioner’s stated efforts to have an administrator ad litem appointed and thereafter substituted in the Respondent’s stead, the trial court dismissed this case. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the dismissal should be set aside.

This is an appeal of an order terminating a mother’s parental rights. The trial court found that three grounds for termination were proven against the mother and concluded that terminating her rights was in the minor child’s best interests. Although we vacate one ground for termination due to the trial court’s failure to consider all required elements of the statutory ground, we otherwise affirm the termination order.

This appeal follows the trial court’s entry of an order of dismissal. Because the notice of appeal was not timely filed, we dismiss the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

The pro se Petitioner, Joshua P. Holt, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in finding that he received effective assistance of counsel and that his guilty pleas were knowing and voluntary. Following our review, we affirm the dismissal of the petition.

This is a constructive trust case. The plaintiff, who had recently purchased a twelve-acre tract of real property, filed a complaint for ejectment against the defendants, his uncle and cousin by marriage, who were residing in and claiming ownership of a block house and a two-acre parcel of the twelve-acre tract. The defendants, however, requested—and the trial court ultimately imposed—a constructive trust in favor of defendant uncle against the two-acre parcel and the block house. Finding that the plaintiff purchased the entire twelve acres with notice that the defendant uncle had a beneficial interest in the two-acre parcel and block house, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The decedent’s daughter filed suit to set aside conveyances of her father’s property made pursuant to a durable power of attorney. The trial court granted summary judgment in the petitioner’s favor, holding that the decedent lacked the mental capacity to enter into any legal agreement on the date the durable power of attorney was executed. Because we conclude that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to this question, we reverse the entry of summary judgment and remand for such further proceedings as may be necessary and consistent with this opinion.

The Petitioner, Michael Hart, appeals the Madison County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition requesting DNA analysis of evidence pursuant to the Post-Conviction DNA Analysis Act of 2001. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner, James Snipes, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, seeking relief from his conviction of first degree felony murder and resulting life sentence. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel and that he is entitled to a second post-conviction evidentiary hearing due to post-conviction counsel’s deficient performance at the first hearing. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the
post-conviction court.

A Davidson County jury convicted the defendant, Shermond Dewayne Dillard, Jr., of aggravated robbery, for which he received a
ten-year sentence. On appeal, the defendant argues the trial court should have granted a new trial based on the admission of irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial testimony and improper closing argument by the State. The defendant also contends the trial court erred in sentencing him. After reviewing the record and considering the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I join the majority in affirming the defendant’s conviction of aggravated robbery and ten-year sentence, but I write separately to dissent from the majority’s conclusion that the trial court did not err by allowing testimony about the stolen rental car.

Appellant challenged the trial court’s ruling that determined when interest began to accrue on a promissory note. Appellant argues that the trial court issued a sua sponte ruling without allowing additional evidence to be presented. Because Appellant failed to meet its burden to show reversible error, we affirm the trial court’s ruling.

The Defendant, Christopher Ray Rickman, pleaded guilty to the offense of possession with intent to deliver .5 grams or more of methamphetamine, a Schedule II controlled substance. As a condition of his plea, the Defendant expressly preserved a certified question of law pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2)(A) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure, stemming from his denied motion to suppress. After thorough review, we conclude that the certified question does not meet the requirements of Rule 37(b)(2)(A) and State v. Preston, 759 S.W.2d 647 (Tenn. 1988), and, as a result, this court is without jurisdiction to consider the appeal. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.

This is a premises liability action in which the plaintiffs, a husband and wife, filed suit against the defendant grocery store for personal injuries and other damages resulting from the wife’s slip and fall in the parking lot. The trial court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, holding that the plaintiffs failed to establish that the defendant owed a duty of care to maintain the parking lot, which was owned and operated by a third party. The plaintiffs appeal. We reverse the decision of the trial court.

The Defendant, Tremaine Wilbourn, appeals his convictions for first degree premeditated murder, carjacking, employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and possession of a firearm while having a prior felony conviction involving the use or attempted use of violence, for which he received an effective sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole plus thirty-eight years. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction for first degree premeditated murder; (2) the trial court erred in prohibiting defense counsel from referencing a prior shooting during opening statements; (3) the trial court erred in excluding evidence of the Defendant’s reason for turning himself in to the United States Marshals Service; and (4) the prosecutor improperly utilized a gun as a demonstrative aid and made improper comments during closing arguments. Upon reviewing the appellate record, the parties’ briefs, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Appellant, Kenneth Lloyd Hill, was convicted in the Davidson County Criminal Court of possessing a firearm while having a prior conviction for a felony involving the use or attempted use of force, violence, or a deadly weapon, a Class C felony, and the trial court sentenced him as a Range III, persistent offender to fifteen years in confinement. On appeal, the Appellant contends that the trial court erred by refusing to sever the offense from the remaining offenses for which he was on trial and that the trial court committed various sentencing errors. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Aggrieved of his Hamilton County Criminal Court jury convictions of felony murder in the perpetration of aggravated child abuse and aggravated child abuse, the defendant, Rhasean Lowry, appeals. The defendant alleges that the trial court erred by denying his motion to disqualify the Hamilton County District Attorney General’s Office, by admitting into evidence photographs taken during the victim’s autopsy, by refusing to provide a jury instruction on facilitation as a lesser included offense of felony murder and aggravated child abuse, and by denying his motion for new trial based upon the admission of certain testimony. He also contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. Discerning no error, we affirm.

I join the majority in all issues except the issue regarding the trial court’s denial of Defendant’s request for the trial court to charge facilitation as a lesser included offense of felony murder. As to that issue, I concur in results only.

This appeal arises from a conservatorship action in which an attorney ad litem was appointed to represent the respondent. The dispositive issue is whether the trial court had the discretion to assess all or any portion of the fees of the attorney ad litem to a party other than the respondent when Tenn. Code. Ann. § 34-1-125(b) states “[t]he cost of the attorney ad litem shall be charged against the assets of the respondent.” The trial court ruled that it did not have the discretion to deviate from the clear mandate in the statute. We affirm.

Defendant, Christopher Allen Smith, filed a Rule 35 Motion for Modification of Sentence. The trial court held a bifurcated hearing where it denied Defendant's Rule 35 motion and revoked Defendant's probation, ordering his two eight-year consecutive sentences into execution. Defendant now appeals the trial court's denial of his Rule 35 Motion for Modification of Sentence. After a thorough review of the record and applicable case law and discerning no error, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

The petitioner, Eddie H. Pittman, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus, which petition challenged his 2015 Madison County Circuit Court jury conviction of reckless aggravated assault. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Defendant entered a guilty plea to one count of sexual exploitation of a minor via electronic means pursuant to pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970), with the sentence to be determined by the trial court. The trial court denied the Defendant’s request for judicial diversion and sentenced him to four years of supervised probation with thirty days to be served in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the trial court erred in denying diversion because it considered an irrelevant factor and because its factual findings were against the weight of the evidence. He also argues he was entitled to full probation. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the trial court’s sentencing decisions and remand for correction of the judgment form.

The Petitioner, Christopher Brown, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, in which he challenged his convictions for one count of first degree premeditated murder and three counts of aggravated assault and his effective sentence of life imprisonment plus ten years. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that: (1) post-conviction counsel had a conflict of interest that disqualified him from representing the Petitioner at the hearing; (2) trial counsel provided ineffective assistance; and (3) post-conviction counsel was ineffective at the post-conviction hearing. Upon reviewing the record and the applicable law, we conclude that the Petitioner is entitled to a new hearing based upon post-conviction counsel’s conflict of interest.

I respectfully dissent from the majority’s opinion, concluding that post-conviction counsel had an actual conflict of interest and granting a new hearing, because I conclude that the issue is waived.