APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant, Kendall Allison Clark, pleaded guilty in the Criminal Court for Hamblen County to driving under the influence (DUI), a Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. § 55- 10-401 (2018). The trial court sentenced the Defendant to eleven months, twenty-nine days suspended to probation after forty-eight hours in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant presents a certified question of law regarding the legality of the traffic stop. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Marilda Evon Green, appeals from the Jefferson and Grainger County Circuit Courts’ orders revoking her probation based upon her guilty plea to a separate charge of aggravated statutory rape and reinstating her effective six-year sentence. The Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by requiring her to serve the balance of her sentence in custody and subsequently denying her motions to reduce the sentence and petitions for early release. Following our review, we affirm.

Rodney Darnell Robinson ("Defendant") was convicted in Davidson County Criminal Court of two counts of child abuse, five counts of aggravated sexual battery, four counts of rape of a child, two counts of sexual battery by an authority figure, two counts of rape, and one count of attempted rape of a child, for which he received an effective sentence of sixty years' incarceration. On appeal, Defendant contends that: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; (2) he was denied the effective assistance of counsel; (3) the trial court erred by allowing trial counsel to proceed while "clearly ill"; (4) the trial court failed to remedy statements made during voir dire by a potential juror, thereby depriving Defendant of a fair trial; (5) the trial court erred in allowing cumulative testimony in the cross-examination of Defendant; (6) the trial court erred in allowing improper leading questions to a witness; (7) the trial court erred in the admission of certain evidence; (8) the trial court erred in the exclusion of certain evidence; (9) there was an appearance of bias from the trial judge that violated Defendant's due process rights; and (10) cumulative error requires a new trial. Following a thorough review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A police department seized a car after citing its owner for driving on a revoked license.  Following the issuance of a forfeiture warrant and a contested case hearing, the Tennessee Department of Safety and Homeland Security forfeited the owner’s interest in the car.  The car owner petitioned for judicial review, contending that the forfeiture violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.  The chancery court denied the petition after determining that there were no constitutional violations.  We affirm.

We granted review to determine whether a doctor is qualified to testify in a health care liability case as an expert witness under Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26- 115(b) when the doctor was not licensed to practice medicine in Tennessee or a contiguous state within one year of the alleged injury or wrongful conduct, but was practicing under a licensure exemption. Section 29-26-115(b) provides that a doctor is competent to testify as an expert witness only if the doctor is licensed to practice medicine in Tennessee or a contiguous state and the doctor was practicing medicine in Tennessee or a contiguous state during the year before the date of the alleged injury or wrongful conduct. We hold that under Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-115(b), a doctor, who was permitted to practice medicine in Tennessee under a statutory licensure exemption but was not licensed to practice medicine in Tennessee or a contiguous state during the year before the date of the alleged injury or wrongful conduct, does not meet the requirements of section 29-26-115(b) to testify as an expert witness in a health care liability action. We reverse and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings.

This is a breach of contract action involving a commercial lease. The plaintiff filed suit for non-payment of rent. The defendant claimed that it was not liable because it provided notice of early termination pursuant to the terms of the contract. The plaintiff moved for summary judgment, claiming that notice was not provided within the time set forth in the contract. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff. We affirm.

This action involves a maternal grandmother’s objection to the denial of her petition for custody of her minor grandchild and his adoption by his foster parents. We affirm.

A father appeals the modification of a parenting plan, contending that the circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to the modify the plan because the mother’s petition raised allegations that the children were abused and neglected, which the juvenile court had exclusive jurisdiction to hear. Concluding that the circuit court retained subject matter jurisdiction over the post-divorce petition, we affirm the judgment.

The petitioner, John Alan Chapman, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received the effective assistance of counsel at trial. After our review of the record, briefs, and applicable law, we affirm the denial of the petition.

A mother whose parental rights to her daughter were terminated appeals the court’s best interest determination. Upon our review of the evidence, we affirm the trial court’s holdings that clear and convincing evidence existed to sustain three grounds for termination and that termination is in the child’s best interest.

The Defendant, Kevin E. Trent, was convicted in 2015 upon his guilty plea of vehicular homicide by intoxication, a Class B felony.  See T.C.A. § 39-13-213 (2010).  The Defendant pleaded guilty as a Range I, standard offender and agreed to an eight-year sentence.  The manner of service of his sentence was reserved for the trial court’s determination.  On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by imposing incarceration rather than an alternative sentence.  We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for the entry of an amended judgment reflecting the sentence of split confinement of time served and the remainder on probation.  Upon remand, the trial court is to determine the appropriate conditions of probation. 

Mother sought a judgment for child support arrears tracing back to January 2010. Relief was denied when it was determined that a prior order suspending child support in January 2010 had been a final order. Having determined that the order suspending child support was not a final order and was entered in error, we hereby reverse the dismissal of the case and remand for further proceedings.

The Defendant, Edward Dean, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of attempted second degree murder, a Class B felony; employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, a Class C felony, and unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, a Class C felony. He was sentenced by the trial court as a Range I offender to twelve years at 30% for the attempted second degree murder conviction, ten years at 100% for the employment of a firearm conviction, and six years at 30% for the unlawful possession of a firearm conviction. The trial court ordered that the sentences be served consecutively, for an effective sentence of twenty-eight years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence in support of his attempted second degree murder and unlawful possession of a firearm convictions and argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his statement to police, in limiting the testimony of a defense witness physician, in failing to give the jury an instruction on diminished capacity, and in failing to give sufficient weight to mitigating factors in sentencing. Following our review, we affirm the judgments in Counts 1 and 2 but reverse the judgement in Count 3.

The Defendant, Floyd Pete Lynch, was convicted by a Hancock County Criminal Court jury of violating the sexual offender registry, a Class E felony.  See T.C.A. § 40-39-208 (2018).  He received a sentence of four years’ confinement.  On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction.  We affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

We granted permission to appeal in order to clarify the procedure circuit courts must follow when an original defendant in general sessions court appeals an adverse general sessions judgment to circuit court but then fails to appear for the de novo circuit court trial to prosecute his appeal.  In this case, when the defendant/appellant failed to appear in circuit court to prosecute his appeal, the circuit court dismissed the appeal and remanded the case to the general sessions court for execution of the general sessions judgment.  We hold this was error.  Under Tennessee Code Annotated sections 27-5-106 and -107, the circuit court should have instead entered its own default judgment against the defendant/appellant in the amount of the general sessions judgment, subject to execution in the circuit court, and assessed costs against the defendant/appellant and his sureties.  We also hold that, after the circuit court dismissed the appeal and remanded to general sessions court, the circuit court had subject matter jurisdiction under Rules 59 and 60 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure to grant the defendant/appellant’s timely motion to set aside its prior order.  The decision to grant or deny the defendant/appellant’s post-judgment motion was within the circuit court’s discretion.  Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.  

This appeal arises from an action filed by Robert F. Clark (“Plaintiff”), seeking a declaratory judgment and damages against Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Company (“Tennessee Farmers”). Plaintiff applied for a homeowner’s insurance policy with Tennessee Farmers upon his purchase of improved real property. The effective date of the policy was to begin on May 29, 2013, the original date of the closing for the sale of the property. The closing of the real property was rescheduled to an earlier date. A leak occurred after the actual closing on the property but before the date of the original closing and the stated effective date of the homeowner’s insurance policy. Determining that Tennessee Farmers had not been notified of the change and that Plaintiff had signed an authorization for work on the property, the Trial Court granted Tennessee Farmers’ motion for summary judgment. We affirm the Trial Court’s finding that the leak occurred prior to the effective date of the policy. However, we reverse the Trial Court’s grant of summary judgment upon our determination that genuine issues of material fact exist to preclude summary judgment on other issues.

The pro se Defendant, Todd Alan Schmeling, was convicted by a Warren County Circuit Court jury of facilitation of possession of .5 grams or more of methamphetamine with intent to deliver, a Class C felony; facilitation of possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, a Class E felony; simple possession of marijuana, a Class A misdemeanor; and possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor, and was sentenced to an effective term of eight years as a Range II offender in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant argues that: (1) his due process rights were violated by his lack of access to updated law books in preparation for trial and appeal; (2) he was improperly prosecuted on the possession of a firearm charge; (3) Lieutenant Mara committed “official misconduct” and “official oppression” by a statement he made during the traffic stop; (4) the trial court erred in denying his motion for production of Lieutenant Mara’s statements; (5) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction for facilitation of possession of .5 grams or more of methamphetamine with intent to deliver; (6) his rights to due process and exculpatory evidence were violated vis-à-vis the testing of the drugs by the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation (“TBI”); (7) the State made an improper closing argument; (8) the trial court committed plain error in its jury instruction on possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony; (9) the notices of enhanced punishment filed by the State were deficient; and (10) the trial court erred in sentencing him. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Patrick Lewis LaForce, appeals as of right from the Cumberland County Criminal Court’s order summarily denying his petition for post-conviction relief as untimely. The State has filed a motion to affirm by memorandum opinion the judgment of the trial court. Following our review, we conclude that an opinion in this case would have no precedential value and affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals.

The Petitioner, Ercil K. Gates-Rayford, appeals the denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion asking this Court to affirm pursuant to Court of Criminal Appeals Rule 20. Said motion is hereby granted.

Brandon Blount, Petitioner, was convicted of one count of aggravated burglary acting in concert with two or more other persons and possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony after a jury trial. He was sentenced to an effective sentence of eleven years. Petitioner’s convictions and sentences were affirmed on direct appeal. See State v. Brandon Blount, No. W2015-00747-CCA-R3-CD, 2016 WL 3131355 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 26, 2016), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Sept. 26, 2016). Petitioner subsequently sought post-conviction relief on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. Petitioner appeals, arguing that the post-conviction court improperly denied post-conviction relief. Because we determine that Petitioner has failed to establish that trial counsel was ineffective, we affirm the judgment of the criminal court.

This is a healthcare liability action resulting from the death of a child. The defendants moved to dismiss the action for failure to comply with the notice requirements set out in Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121(a)(2)(E). The trial court agreed with the defendants and dismissed the action without prejudice. The plaintiffs appeal the dismissal to this court. We affirm.

The trial court terminated a mother’s parental rights to her child on the grounds of abandonment by failure to support, abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home, and substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan. The trial court terminated a father’s parental rights to his child on the grounds of abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home and substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan. The trial court also found that termination of the mother’s and father’s parental rights was in the best interest of the child. Finding clear and convincing evidence in support of the trial court’s determinations, we affirm.

This appeal arises from the divorce of Susan Smith Rawls (“Wife”) and Daniel Wexler Rawls (“Husband”). Wife sued Husband for divorce in the Circuit Court for Knox County (“the Trial Court”). After a trial, the Trial Court, inter alia, divided the marital estate and awarded Wife alimony and child support. Husband appeals to this Court raising a host of issues. However, Husband’s brief is non-compliant with the Rules of the Tennessee Court of Appeals and the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure to such a degree that his issues are waived. Wife raises an additional issue of her own as to whether Husband is obligated, either by an oral contract he allegedly entered into or through promissory estoppel, to pay the college expenses of one of the parties’ adult children. The evidence does not preponderate against the Trial Court’s finding that Husband never committed to pay these college expenses. Wife also requests an award of attorney’s fees incurred on appeal. We decline to grant such an award. We affirm the Trial Court.

The Petitioner, Jawaune Massey, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions of two counts of first degree premeditated murder, two counts of first degree felony murder, one count of especially aggravated robbery, one count of possessing twenty-six grams or more of cocaine for resale, one count of conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery, and one count of maintaining a dwelling where controlled substances are used or sold and his resulting effective sentence of two consecutive life terms.  On appeal, the Petitioner contends that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the Petitioner’s wearing a stun vest at trial.  Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This is an appeal from the judgment in a personal injury action in which the plaintiff sought to recover damages incurred in a motorcycle accident. Following the plaintiff’s failure to comply with the defendant’s discovery requests, the trial court sanctioned the plaintiff by prohibiting him from introducing a portion of the defendant’s deposition testimony at trial. The case was tried before a jury with the sanctions in place, and the jury returned a verdict in the defendant’s favor. This appeal followed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.