APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Appellant/employee brought this retaliatory discharge case against Appellee, his former employer. Appellant alleged that he was fired in retaliation for claiming workers’ compensation benefits. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the employer, finding that Appellant failed to meet his burden to show a causal connection between the filing of his workers’ compensation claim and the termination of his employment. In the alternative, the trial court found that Appellee provided legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for its decision to terminate Appellant’s employment, and Appellant failed to meet his burden to show that the proffered reasons were pretext. Discerning no error, we affirm and remand.

This appeal arises from Shelby County’s decision to terminate Appellee’s employment for non-compliance with the County’s residency requirement. The Civil Service Merit Board (“CSMB”) reversed the termination of Appellee’s employment and reinstated him with back pay. On appeal, the Shelby County Chancery Court affirmed the CSMB’s ruling. Finding no error, we affirm the decision of the Chancery Court.

The Petitioner, Porscha J. Medaries, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of her petition for post-conviction relief in which she challenged her conviction for attempted first degree murder. On appeal, the Petitioner alleges that she received ineffective assistance of counsel and that her guilty plea was not knowingly entered. After a review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A Knox County jury convicted the Defendant, Buford Trammell, of six counts of rape, three counts of statutory rape by an authority figure, one count of solicitation of a minor, one count of casual exchange of a controlled substance, and one count of sexual battery by an authority figure. After merging the appropriate convictions, the trial court ordered an effective sentence of twenty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that there is insufficient evidence to sustain the jury’s verdict and that the trial court erred when it imposed consecutive sentences. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

A Davidson County Criminal Court Jury convicted the Appellant, Cory Lamont Batey, of one count of aggravated rape, a Class A felony; two counts of attempted aggravated rape, a Class B felony; one count of facilitation of aggravated rape, a Class B felony; and three counts of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony. After a sentencing hearing, he received a fifteen-year sentence to be served at one hundred percent for the aggravated rape conviction and concurrent eight-year sentences for the remaining convictions for a total effective sentence of fifteen years. On appeal, the Appellant contends that the trial court improperly instructed the jury on the mens rea for the offenses and erred by instructing the jury that voluntary intoxication was not a defense to aggravated rape; that the trial court erred by failing to dismiss the superseding indictment because it violated double jeopardy; that the trial court improperly admitted hearsay evidence regarding a codefendant’s statements and conduct; and that the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions. The State argues that the trial court erred during sentencing by considering ex parte letters and emails written on the Appellant’s behalf and requests that this court remand the case to the trial court for a new sentencing hearing. We conclude that the State should not have issued a superseding indictment charging the Appellant with aggravated rape in count four but that plain error does not require a retrial on that count. Accordingly, finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal arises from Appellant’s lawsuit against his former attorney, Appellee, for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and double billing. The trial court dismissed Appellant’s lawsuit on its finding that his claims were barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This is an appeal from the denial of a motion for recusal.  After carefully reviewing the record provided by the pro se appellant, we affirm the decision of the trial court denying the motion for recusal. 

Following a nonsuit by the original plaintiff, one of the original defendants was granted a default judgment with respect to his counterclaim.  The original plaintiff thereafter moved to set the default judgment aside after the entry of final judgment, and later, attempted to re-file its previously nonsuited claims.  After the trial court denied the motion to set aside and entered an order striking the original plaintiff’s re-filed claims, this appeal followed.  We reverse the denial of the motion to set aside and vacate the default judgment. The striking of the re-filed claims is affirmed.

Father appeals the trial court’s decision allowing Mother to relocate with the parties’ daughter from the Memphis area to Blytheville, Arkansas. Father also appeals the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees to Mother. Applying the amended version of Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-6-108 based on the parties’ stipulation, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that relocation was in the child’s best interest. We also affirm the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees but decline to award attorney’s fees on appeal.

This appeal involves a petition for contempt and to modify a permanent parenting plan.  Having carefully reviewed the record before us, we conclude that the notice of appeal was not timely filed.  Because the notice of appeal was untimely, we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

This is an appeal in a divorce proceeding, wherein the mother contends that the trial court erred in awarding the father the divorce on the ground of inappropriate marital conduct and in its holdings as to the factors at Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-6-106 in naming the father the primary residential parent.  Father appeals the court’s ruling on a motion he filed seeking to further specify the parents’ responsibilities relative to the transportation of the children.  Upon consideration of the record, we vacate that portion of the judgment that holds that factors (11) and (12) at section 36-6-106(a) are not applicable and remand the case for further consideration in that regard and, if necessary, to reconsider the designation of the primary residential parent; in all other respects we affirm the trial court’s judgment. 

A jury convicted the Defendant, Kelley Hufford, of conspiracy to commit first degree murder, first degree premeditated murder, first degree felony murder, two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, three counts of aggravated kidnapping, and tampering with evidence for the abduction and homicide of her boyfriend. On appeal, the Defendant raises only a challenge to the territorial jurisdiction of the court, alleging that the evidence did not establish that the crimes occurred in Tennessee. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the evidence established that the trial court had territorial jurisdiction, and we affirm the convictions, remanding for merger of the kidnapping offenses.

An insured sued for breach of contract after his insurance company denied payment for a surgical procedure. The insurance company moved for summary judgment, arguing that the insured could not establish a breach of contract because the procedure was excluded from coverage in the medical benefits plan. The trial court granted summary judgment to the insurance company and dismissed the complaint. Because the insurance company was entitled to a judgment of dismissal as a matter of law based on the undisputed facts, we affirm.

Wife/Appellant appeals the trial court’s denial of relief on her post-divorce petition for contempt and breach of contract. The parties’ MDA awarded Wife 50% of Husband/Appellee’s FERS Supplement, which was subsequently terminated due to Husband’s yearly earned income being in excess of the FERS cap of $15,120.00. Because the parties’ MDA did not preclude Husband from earning income in excess of the cap, and did not include a provision for such occurrence, the trial court properly denied Wife’s petition. Although the trial court sua sponte modified child support to award an additional amount equal to the lost FERS Supplement, it did so in error. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s grant of Husband’s motion to alter or amend the award of additional child support. Because the MDA allows the prevailing party to recover attorney’s fees and expenses, we reverse the trial court’s denial of Husband’s reasonable fees and expenses, and remand for determination of same, and for entry of judgment thereon. Reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded.

This is the second appeal of a case involving a father’s petition to modify the parties’ parenting plan, wherein he requested that he be named the primary residential parent.  At the close of father’s proof during the initial trial, mother moved for a directed verdict.  Finding that father’s evidence was insufficient to establish a material change in circumstances, the trial court granted mother’s motion and dismissed father’s petition.  Father then appealed to this Court.  We concluded that father did present sufficient evidence to establish a material change.  Accordingly, we reversed the judgment of the trial court and remanded the case so that mother could present her evidence.  Following the entry of this Court’s decision—but prior to the remand trial on father’s first petition—father filed a second petition to modify the parenting plan, raising new allegations.  The parties agreed to consolidate the two matters and further agreed to a bifurcated trial in which the remand trial on father’s first petition would be conducted first, followed by a trial on father’s second petition.  Additionally, the parties agreed to a timeframe regarding the presentation of evidence, whereby mother, during the remand trial on father’s first petition, would be limited to evidence that arose prior to the date of the initial trial; all evidence arising after that date would be covered in the trial on father’s second petition.  Ultimately, the trial court found that father proved a material change in circumstances and that it was in the best interest of the child that he be named the primary residential parent.  Consequently, the trial court mooted father’s second petition.  Mother appealed.  We affirm.

Father appeals the trial court’s decision to terminate his parental rights on grounds of abandonment by an incarcerated parent and failure to manifest a willingness and ability to assume custody. The evidence at trial showed that due to Father’s repeated criminal conduct, including two instances where Father fled the State to escape justice, he has had no contact with his daughter for approximately 95% of the child’s life. Because we conclude that the evidence was clear and convincing as to both grounds for termination and best interest, we affirm.

This appeal involves a constitutional challenge to two Tennessee statutes that are part of Tennessee’s campaign finance law.  Prior to trial, the chancery court granted several motions in limine that effectively excluded all of the testimonial and documentary evidence proffered by the State in defense of the statutes.  With no evidence presented by the State, the trial court concluded that the State failed to meet its burden of proof as to the constitutionality of the two statutes.  Consequently, the trial court held that Tennessee Code Annotated sections 2-10-117 and 2-10-121 violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, section 19 of the Tennessee Constitution.  The State appeals.  The State first argues that the trial court abused its discretion by excluding the State’s evidence.  Additionally, the State argues that the constitutional challenge to one of the statutes has become moot due to a statutory amendment.  Finally, the State argues that the remaining statute is constitutional.  For the following reasons, we affirm and remand for further proceedings.   

This appeal arises from an acrimonious dispute between former friends over real property. William M. Pruitt and his wife Shirley J. Pruitt (“the Pruitts,” or “Mr. Pruitt” and “Mrs. Pruitt”) live in a house next to three parcels of land once owned variously by Mr. Pruitt’s stepfather and mother, both of whom died intestate. J. Philip Harber (“Mr. Harber”), former attorney for the Pruitts, paid Mr. Pruitt’s fellow heirs for quitclaim deeds with the aim of acquiring their interests in the subject parcels. Mr. Harber then filed a petition in the Chancery Court for Anderson County (“the Trial Court”) to determine the interests of the parties and sell the three parcels. The Trial Court found in favor of Mr. Harber and ordered a partition by sale for division. The Pruitts appealed to this Court. On appeal, the Pruitts rely on several theories to argue that Mr. Harber never acquired an interest in the land. The Pruitts argue further that, even if Mr. Harber acquired an interest, the Trial Court should have applied the doctrine of unclean hands to deny him his requested relief because he sued them out of spite. We find and hold, inter alia, that Mr. Pruitt is but one of many heirs to his deceased parents’ land; that the other heirs never lost their interests in the land; and, that the other heirs were at liberty to sell their interests in the land to Mr. Harber, which they did. Although there is considerable evidence that Mr. Harber was motivated by spite in bringing this action, that alone does not compel application of the unclean hands doctrine, particularly as fraud is not alleged. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the Trial Court.

In this healthcare liability action, the defendants filed a motion for a qualified protective order allowing them to conduct ex parte interviews with some of the plaintiffs’ treating healthcare providers pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121(f). After the trial court granted the qualified protective order allowing the interviews, plaintiffs’ counsel wrote a letter to plaintiffs’ treating providers concerning the interviews. The defendants then filed a joint motion for sanctions asserting that the letters sent by plaintiffs’ counsel violated the trial court’s order by attempting to prevent the treating providers from participating in the interviews. The trial court granted monetary sanctions against the plaintiffs and their counsel and ordered plaintiffs’ counsel to send retraction letters to plaintiffs’ treating providers. The plaintiffs appeal. We have determined that the order on appeal is not a final order and, therefore, dismiss the appeal.

Appellant appeals the trial court’s order quashing its attachment and garnishments, whereby Appellant sought payment of its judgment from interpleaded funds that were owed to Appellee. Affirmed.

Plaintiff Wilmington Savings Fund Society brought this action for foreclosure on property owned by defendants Reginald Hall and Rhonda Hall, requesting that the trial court declare its debt from a loan secured by deed of trust to have priority over debts allegedly owed by the Halls to other named defendants. The trial court granted plaintiff summary judgment and Reginald Hall appealed. Plaintiff argues on appeal that the trial court’s judgment was not final and therefore this Court does not have jurisdiction. We hold that the trial court did not adjudicate all of the claims raised by the parties. Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed for lack of a final judgment.

Loring Justice and Kim Nelson are the divorced parents of a minor child. They have been in litigation over the child since 2004. This appeal arises from a lawsuit filed by Mr. Justice (plaintiff) against Ms. Nelson, Robert Bodine, and two unidentified coconspirators (defendants). In his original complaint, plaintiff alleged that defendants were liable for: conspiracy to commit the crime of extortion, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and tortious interference with parental rights. Defendants filed motions to dismiss, which the trial court granted. Exactly thirty days later, plaintiff filed an amended complaint. He alleged additional facts and new causes of action, including: fraud, coercion, attempted tortious interference with parental rights, and violations of the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act. Defendants filed a “response” to the amended complaint. They argued that the court should deny plaintiff leave to amend his original complaint. The court treated defendants’ “response” as a motion to dismiss the amended complaint, which the court then granted. We hold that the court erred when it treated defendants’ “response” as a motion to dismiss the amended complaint. We also hold that the court failed to provide adequate justification for dismissing the amended complaint sua sponte. Accordingly, we vacate the order of dismissal and remand for further proceedings.

This appeal concerns a healthcare liability action filed by Jennifer Moore-Pitts and David Pitts ("Plaintiffs") in the Knox County Circuit Court ("Trial Court") against Carl A. Bradley, DDS, MAGD ("Defendant"). Defendant filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' action on the basis of noncompliance with Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-26- 121(a)(2)(E), which requires that pre-suit notice include a HIPAA-compliant medical authorization allowing the healthcare provider receiving the notice to obtain complete medical records from every other provider that is sent a notice.' Approximately forty healthcare providers, including Defendant, received pre-suit notice from Plaintiffs. On the medical authorization provided to Defendant, Plaintiffs left blank the name of the individual or entity authorized to make the disclosure of medical records to Defendant but provided an attachment of the names and addresses of the other providers receiving notice. The Trial Court found that Plaintiffs' medical authorization provided to Defendant was not sufficient to allow Defendant to obtain Ms. Moore-Pitts' s medical records from the other providers who received the pre-suit notice. As such, the Trial Court found that Plaintiffs could not rely on Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-26-121(c) to extend the statute of limitations for 120 days. Because Plaintiffs' action was filed one year and 118 days after the cause of action accrued, the Trial Court determined that Plaintiffs' action was untimely. The Trial Court, therefore, granted Defendant's motion to dismiss. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the Trial Court.

After a trial, a Davidson County jury found Defendant, Brijesh Mukesh Desai, guilty of theft of services valued at $1,000 or more but less than $10,000. The trial court sentenced Defendant as a Range I standard offender to four years in the Tennessee Department of Correction with a release eligibility of thirty percent. On appeal, Defendant argues that his conviction violates his constitutional right not to be imprisoned for a civil debt, that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, that the indictment was fatally flawed, and that the trial court improperly admitted evidence at trial. After a thorough review of the record and applicable case law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.