APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Upon remand from this Court in a previous appeal, the trial court conducted a bench trial on a claim of common law adverse possession initiated by the plaintiff concerning a onequarter ownership interest in an unimproved 7.18-acre tract of real property located in Bradley County, Tennessee. In its final order, the trial court dismissed the plaintiff’s action in its entirety upon finding that although the plaintiff had presented evidence that preponderated in favor of adverse possession, the evidence did not rise to the level of the clear and convincing standard required to establish ownership through adverse possession. The plaintiff has appealed. Having determined that the plaintiff demonstrated adverse possession of the property interest at issue by clear and convincing evidence, we reverse.

This appeal arose from post-divorce litigation concerning the trial court’s distribution of marital assets, specifically the distribution of the marital portion of the husband’s federal government pension to the wife. In its divorce decree entered on August 10, 2004, the trial court awarded to the wife “1/2 of [the husband’s] Administrative Law Judge Government Pension through the date of this Final Decree.” Upon the husband’s appeal, this Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment in all respects, including the trial court’s award to the wife of one-half of the marital portion of the husband’s pension. Dowden v. Feibus, No. E2004-02751-COA-R3-CV, 2006 WL 140404 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 18, 2006) (“Dowden I”). The husband sought no further judicial review at that time. Following his retirement from federal employment on May 1, 2017, the husband received correspondence concerning the calculation of the wife’s portion of his pension from the federal government’s Office of Personnel Management (“OPM”). On August 2, 2018, the husband filed a “Motion for Clarification and/or Relief from Judgment” contending, inter alia, that OPM miscalculated the portion of his pension that would be diverted to the wife because the trial court’s final decree was “too vague” and did not “provide sufficient guidance to OPM to allow them to correctly compute” the wife’s interest in the pension. On December 6, 2018, the trial court entered an order finding that there was “no lack of clarity” in its final decree and denying the husband’s motion. The husband has appealed. Having determined that the trial court did not err in denying the husband’s motion, we affirm the judgment of the trial court and remand to the trial court for enforcement of the judgment. We decline to award attorney’s fees on appeal to the wife.

The Defendant, Johnny David Key, was convicted upon his guilty pleas of vehicular homicide, a Class B felony, and vehicular assault, a Class D felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-213 (vehicular homicide) (2018), 39-13-106 (vehicular assault) (2018). The plea agreement called for Range I sentences of eight and four years, respectively, to be served concurrently, with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. After a sentencing hearing, the court ordered that the Defendant serve his effective eight-year sentence in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying alternative sentencing. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Courtney B. Mathews, appeals from the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, wherein he challenged his jury convictions for four counts of first-degree felony murder and one count of especially aggravated robbery. On appeal, the Petitioner’s issues center around (1) an ex parte communication between the trial judge and trial counsel that took place at the trial judge’s residence; (2) trial counsels’ inadvertent disclosure of the unredacted timeline to the co-defendant’s defense team that contained attorney-client privileged information; (3) the lack of any jury instructions on lesser-included offenses for the felony murder counts; (4) the Petitioner’s alleged absence during the issuance of the supplemental jury instruction on criminal responsibility and when the trial judge answered jury questions; and (5) cumulative error. After a thorough review of the record, we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court. We conclude that due to trial counsels’ various deficiencies, there has been a complete breakdown in the adversarial process during the Petitioner’s motion for new trial proceedings. While the Petitioner’s convictions remain intact, the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The Madison County Grand Jury indicted Defendant, Chriteris Allen, in two separate indictments, each containing four counts. In Case Number 18-1445, Defendant was indicted for aggravated robbery in count one, aggravated sexual battery in count two, aggravated burglary in count three, and especially aggravated kidnapping in count four. In Case Number 18-1446, Defendant was indicted for aggravated burglary in count one, especially aggravated kidnapping in count two, aggravated robbery in count three, and aggravated rape in count four. Defendant submitted an open guilty plea on all counts. The trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of forty-four years at one hundred percent. On appeal, Defendant argues that his sentence is excessive. After a thorough review of the record and applicable case law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The State of Tennessee appeals the Knox County Criminal Court’s denial of its motion pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. The State sought to correct the six-year sentence the trial court previously imposed for the Defendant’s two merged convictions for theft of property valued at $1,000 or more but less than $10,000. See T.C.A. §§ 39-14-103 (2014) (theft); 39-14-105 (2014) (subsequently amended) (grading of theft). On appeal, the State contends that the six-year sentence is illegal because the trial court improperly sentenced the Defendant pursuant to the amended version of the grading of theft statute, which became effective after the commission of the offense. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Appellants appeal the trial court’s grant of Appellees’ Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02 motions in this declaratory judgment action. The trial court dismissed Appellants’ complaint on the ground that Appellants had no standing to seek a declaratory judgment interpreting a contract, to which Appellants were neither parties nor third-party beneficiaries. We affirm the dismissal of Appellants’ complaint for declaratory judgment on the ground that the complaint is barred as res judicata.

The majority chooses to affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the complaint filed by EPE on the basis of the doctrine of res judicata. Because I conclude that an essential element of the doctrine of res judicata has not been established, I must respectfully dissent.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Donald Dodd, of second degree murder as charged, and the trial court imposed a sentence of twenty-five years at one hundred percent release eligibility. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-210, 40-35-501(i). On appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

We granted this appeal to determine whether a surety remains obligated under a bond agreement entered on the defendant’s arrest for driving under the influence second offense when a subsequent indictment charged the defendant with driving under the influence fourth offense.  We conclude that sureties remain obligated pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated sections 40-11-130(a)(1), -138(b) and this Court’s holding in Young v. State, 121 S.W.2d 533 (Tenn. 1938).  We hold, therefore, that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it entered the final judgment of forfeiture against Rader Bonding Company, Inc. (“Rader”) for the total amount of the bond and declined to grant Rader’s motion to alter or amend.  Accordingly, we reverse that portion of the Court of Criminal Appeals’ decision holding that Rader should have been relieved from forfeiture on the $7,500 bond in connection with the defendant’s DUI charge and affirm its conclusion that Rader remains obligated on the $2,500 bond in connection with the defendant’s driving on a revoked license charge.

The Appellant, Andrew K. Johnston, filed a pro se motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1, and the Bedford County Circuit Court summarily denied the motion. On appeal, the Appellant contends that the twenty-seven-year sentence he received pursuant to his guilty plea to second degree murder is illegal because it is outside the maximum range of punishment for a Range I offender convicted of a Class A felony. Based upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, James R. Baysinger, pleaded guilty to reckless homicide, a Class D felony. See T.C.A. § 39-13-215 (2018). Pursuant to the plea agreement, the trial court was to determine the length and the manner of service. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to two years and ordered him to serve five months, followed by four years’ probation. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the court erred by denying his requests for judicial diversion and full probation. We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case to the trial court for a new sentencing hearing.

The defendant, Reuben Eugene Mitchell, was convicted of one count of arson and one count of presenting a false or fraudulent insurance claim.  The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the defendant’s arson conviction but reversed his conviction for presenting a false or fraudulent insurance claim.  We granted the State’s application to appeal to address whether the proof at trial was sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction for presenting a false or fraudulent insurance claim.  Our review leads us to conclude that the evidence was sufficient.  Accordingly, we reverse in part the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals and reinstate the defendant’s conviction for presenting a false or fraudulent insurance claim. 

The defendant, Robbie Joe Kilgore, appeals the order of the trial court revoking his probation and ordering him to serve his original three-year sentence in confinement. Upon review of the record, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the defendant violated the terms of his probation, and the imposed sentence is proper. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The defendant, Howard Hose Horton III, entered open pleas to one count of aggravated assault and one count of felony vandalism, and the trial court sentenced the defendant to an effective sentence of eight years’ incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant argues the sentence imposed by the trial court was excessive. After reviewing the record and considering the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

In this post-divorce matter, the mother appeals the award of attorney fees to the father, who prevailed in his opposition to the mother’s request to relocate out of state. The mother gave notice to the father that she wanted to move to Arizona while the parties’ competing petitions to modify the parenting plan were pending. The trial court denied the mother’s request to relocate and awarded attorney fees to the father as the prevailing party in the relocation matter. As for the petitions to modify the parenting plan, the court ruled that the mother was the prevailing party and awarded to the mother the attorney fees she incurred in the modification matter. The mother appeals contending she should have been awarded fees in both matters as the “overall” prevailing party. Alternatively, the mother contends the trial court erred by awarding the father attorney fees solely on the basis he was the prevailing party in the relocation matter. Having found the trial court identified and properly applied the most applicable legal principles and that the award of attorney fees to the father was within the range of acceptable alternative dispositions, we affirm.

A Knox County jury convicted the Defendant, Reginald Bernard Wilson, of resisting arrest, and the trial court sentenced the Defendant to ninety days of unsupervised probation. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the trial court erred when it denied his request for a jury instruction on self-defense and that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction for resisting arrest. After review, we conclude that the trial court erred when it failed to instruct the jury as to self-defense. We, therefore, reverse the judgment of conviction and remand for a new trial.

The defendant, William Kevin Kennedy, appeals the revocation of the sentence of probation imposed for his 2016 Sullivan County Criminal Court convictions of solicitation of a minor and attempted aggravated sexual battery, claiming that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel at the revocation hearing. Because the interests of justice do not require the waiver of the timely filing of the notice of appeal in this case, the appeal is dismissed as untimely.

The defendant, Matthew Douglas Nattress, appeals the order of the trial court revoking his probation and ordering him to serve his original ten-year sentence in confinement. Upon review of the record, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the defendant violated the terms of his probation, and the imposed sentence is proper. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

This appeal arises from a lawsuit over a car accident. Heather P. Hogrobrooks Harris (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se, sued Jimmie L. Smith (“Defendant”) in the Circuit Court for Shelby County (“the Trial Court”) for diminution in the value of her vehicle, medical expenses, pain and suffering, loss of use of her vehicle, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. On several occasions over the course of the case, Plaintiff failed to show up to court. When Plaintiff failed to appear for trial, the Trial Court granted a continuance with a warning that, should Plaintiff fail to appear again, her case would be dismissed. Plaintiff subsequently failed to appear, and the Trial Court dismissed her case with prejudice for lack of prosecution, as it warned it would. Plaintiff appeals to this Court, arguing among other things, that the Trial Court Judge was biased against her and that the Trial Court erred in dismissing her case. First, we find no evidence whatsoever that the Trial Court Judge was biased against Plaintiff. Second, Plaintiff’s stated reasons for failing to show up for trial, that it was cold and rainy that day and her car was old and unreliable, respectfully will not suffice. We find no abuse of discretion in the Trial Court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s case for lack of prosecution. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court.

The Petitioner, Voltaire Younger, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief in which he challenged his guilty pleas to the possession of heroin with the intent to deliver and possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony.  The Petitioner received an effective sentence of fifteen years.  On appeal, the Petitioner alleges that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty pleas were not voluntarily entered.  After a review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. 

The Appellant filed suit complaining that the Department of Children’s Services denied him an administrative hearing concerning the determination that he was a child abuser. The trial court ultimately dismissed the Appellant’s petition for review, noting that there had already been a prior judicial determination, by clear and convincing evidence, that the Appellant had committed severe child abuse. We affirm.

Employee filed a motion asking the trial court to require Employer to provide additional treatment for a work-related injury she suffered in March 2007. The trial court granted Employee’s motion and denied Employer’s motion to appoint a neutral physician. Employer’s appeal has been referred to this Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 51, '1.  After reviewing the evidence in the record and the parties’ arguments, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.