APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

After father engaged in abusive conduct, mother petitioned for an order of protection. The trial court granted an ex parte order precluding father from contacting mother and their two minor children and set a hearing. Following a bench trial, the trial court held that the minor children were domestic abuse and sexual assault victims; it extended the order of protection for one year. The court permitted father supervised visitation with his biological daughter once every other week, and awarded mother child support. The court deviated from the amount of support required by the child support guidelines, and instead awarded mother $200 per week. The court did not state the amount of support that would have been ordered under the guidelines nor a justification for the variance. Father appeals. We affirm the extension of the order of protection for one year. We vacate the portion of the trial court’s order requiring father to pay excess child support, and remand to the trial court with instructions to make the requisite findings, pursuant to applicable law, and consistent with this opinion.

This appeal arises from a post-divorce dispute over child custody wherein the father filed a petition to modify the permanent parenting plan. Following a hearing in October 2017, the Trial Court found that a material change in circumstance existed and implemented a temporary parenting plan, determining that plan to be in the child’s best interest. Thereafter in April 2018, the Trial Court converted that temporary parenting plan into a permanent parenting plan upon its determination that the temporary plan appeared to be working satisfactorily. Mother appeals to this Court. Because the Trial Court did not conduct a best interest analysis or make the required statutory finding of best interest, we vacate the April 2018 judgment of the Trial Court and remand for further proceedings as necessary. We affirm the Trial Court in all other respects.

The plaintiff filed a premises liability action against a premises owner alleging that the premises owner was liable for injuries the plaintiff sustained after falling down a staircase located on the premises owner’s property. The trial court denied the premises owner’s motion for summary judgment but granted permission to pursue an interlocutory appeal. Because the plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence of an essential element of his claim, we reverse the decision of the trial court.  

The petitioner, Darion Merriweather, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, which petition challenged his
guilty-pleaded conviction of carjacking, alleging that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel and that his guilty plea was not entered into knowingly and voluntarily. Because the record establishes that counsels’ performance was deficient and that the petitioner’s guilty plea was unknowing and involuntary, we reverse the denial of post-conviction relief, vacate the petitioner’s guilty plea, and remand for trial.

In this procedurally complex and litigious case, the Petitioner, Jeffery Yates, was convicted in three sets of convictions, 1993, 1994, and 2003, of: (1993) especially aggravated kidnapping, attempted aggravated robbery, and aggravated kidnapping, receiving an effective eighteen-year sentence; (1994) five counts of aggravated assault, receiving a ten-year concurrent sentence; and (2003) aggravated robbery, receiving a thirty-year Range II sentence. The Petitioner has repeatedly and unsuccessfully challenged his convictions and sentences. In this, his latest challenge, the Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief challenging his 2003 convictions. He contended that he had received the ineffective assistance of counsel and that the trial court had improperly amended his judgment of conviction. The post-conviction court summarily dismissed the petition, concluding that the grounds for relief had clearly been waived because they had not been raised in the Petitioner’s prior petition for post-conviction relief. In the alternative, the trial court stated that, if it considered the petition as a motion to re-open the prior post-conviction proceeding, the Petitioner had failed to meet his burden of proof. We affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

In 1998 and 1999, the Petitioner pleaded guilty to three different drug offenses. State v. Antonio Clifton, No. W2016-00175-CCA-R3-CD, 2016 WL 6427862, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Oct. 31, 2016), no Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application filed. Several years later, the Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus and a motion to correct an illegal sentence, both of which were denied based on the fact that his sentences had expired. The Petitioner filed this, his second petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The habeas corpus court denied the petition for failure to comply with procedural requirements and because the Petitioner’s sentence had expired. On appeal, we affirm the habeas corpus court’s judgment.

The Defendant, Brewston Cole, pleaded guilty to possession of over .5 grams of a Schedule VI controlled substance with the intent to sell, and the trial court sentenced him to a two-year term of supervised probation. The Defendant reserved a certified question of law pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2) as to whether the warrantless search of the Defendant’s vehicle was lawful based on the length of the traffic stop. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

This is an accelerated interlocutory appeal as of right, pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B, from the trial court’s denial of a motion for recusal. The plaintiff contends the trial judge should be disqualified because a lawyer with the Lewis Thomason law firm, which represents the defendant in this action, provided a letter of recommendation on behalf of the trial judge in support of the judge’s application for appointment to a vacancy on the Court of Appeals of Tennessee. Plaintiff also contends the trial judge should be disqualified because the judge failed to disclose “the extrajudicial relationship.” Having reviewed the petition for recusal appeal, pursuant to the de novo standard as required under Rule 10B § 2.01, we find that the lawyer who provided the letter of recommendation has no involvement in this case, and that lawyer merely has a de minimis interest in the outcome of this case because the law firm representing the defendant is one of the larger multi-city firms in this state. Based on these facts and the relevant legal principles, we find no basis to conclude that the trial judge’s impartiality might be reasonably questioned. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s decision to deny the motion for recusal.

Plaintiff sued defendant-company and its employee for damages to its real property when the defendant-company’s tractor-trailer collided with the plaintiff’s residential properties while the truck was unmanned. The plaintiff raised claims of negligence, gross negligence, recklessness, trespass, negligent hiring, negligent entrustment, and punitive damages. A jury trial occurred, and the trial court granted the defendants’ motion for a directed verdict as to all but the plaintiff’s negligence claim. The jury later awarded the plaintiff $185,000.00 for the diminution in value to the real property. Both parties appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

Petitioner, Steven Padgett King, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief, in which he sought application of the rule announced in Ward v. State, 315 S.W.3d 461 (Tenn. 2010). We reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court and remand to the post-conviction court for a new evidentiary hearing to determine whether Petitioner is entitled to relief pursuant to Ward.

This is an appeal from an order dismissing the plaintiff’s complaint as to one of two defendants. Because the order appealed does not dispose of all the plaintiff’s claims, we dismiss the appeal for lack of a final judgment.

This is an appeal in a proceeding to modify an agreed parenting plan, which was incorporated into a decree when Mother and Father finalized their divorce in Arizona in 2016. Prior to the entry of the decree, the Mother and their three minor children moved to Montgomery County, Tennessee, with Father’s consent when he obtained temporary employment in Kuwait. The agreed parenting plan provided that by July 15, 2017, Mother, Father, and the children would relocate to a mutually agreed upon location or, in the event a location could not be agreed upon, to either Raleigh, North Carolina, Norfolk, Virginia, or Augusta, Georgia. Upon his return from Kuwait in June 2017, Father moved to Augusta, Georgia. Mother petitioned the Circuit Court of Montgomery County to modify custody in October 2017; Father counter-petitioned for contempt and enforcement of the Arizona decree. After a hearing, the court enrolled the Arizona decree, found that there was a material change of circumstance requiring modification of the decree, adopted a parenting plan submitted by Mother, and modified Father’s child support. Father appeals; upon our review we have determined that the evidence does not support the court’s a finding of a material change of circumstance. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment and remand the case for entry of an order that the children be relocated in accordance with the final decree.  

This action involves the termination of a father’s parental rights to his minor children. Following a bench trial, the trial court found that clear and convincing evidence existed to support the statutory ground of severe child abuse and that termination was in the best interest of the children. We affirm.

The Petitioner, Reginald Lamon Goldsmith, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that the post-conviction court abused its discretion in failing to appoint post-conviction counsel and summarily dismissing the petition. Following our review, we affirm the summary dismissal of the petition as time-barred and conclude that the Petitioner has waived his due process claim.

A Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B petition for recusal appeal was filed in this Court after the trial court denied a motion for recusal. For the reasons stated herein, we reverse the trial court’s denial of the motion and remand the case for reassignment to a different judge.

A Davidson County Jury in Case No. 2017-C-1591 convicted Defendant, Rashida Tyquisha Groomster, of theft of property over $1,000 in value. She also pled guilty to theft of property less than $1,000 in value in Case No. 2017-B-1407. The trial court initially imposed an effective one-year sentence to be served in confinement. However, an amended judgment was subsequently entered indicating that Defendant was to serve her effective one-year sentence on community corrections. On appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction for theft of property over $1,000 in value, that the trial court improperly denied her request for judicial diversion, and the trial court erred by denying alternative sentencing. After a careful review of the record, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

This action involves the termination of a father’s parental rights to his minor children. Following a bench trial, the trial court found that clear and convincing evidence existed to support the statutory ground of abandonment by an incarcerated parent. The court further found that termination was in the best interest of the children. We affirm.

This appeal involves a motorcycle/vehicle collision that occurred when a vehicle exited from a restaurant parking lot and collided with the plaintiffs’ motorcycle on a public highway. The plaintiffs filed a negligence and premises liability claim against the property owner, the restaurant owner, and the franchisee. The trial court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment and noted that the defendants did not owe a duty of care to the plaintiffs, effectively negating an essential element of the plaintiffs’ claim. The plaintiffs appeal. We affirm the grant of summary judgment by the trial court.

In this personal injury action arising from an automobile accident, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant upon finding that the plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate service of process in the originally filed action, which had been dismissed, such that the plaintiffs’ refiled action was barred by the applicable statute of limitations. The plaintiffs have appealed. Having determined that, pursuant to the version of Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 4.04(11) in effect at the time that the initial complaint was filed, the plaintiffs demonstrated valid service of process of the initial complaint, we reverse the grant of summary judgment to the defendant and grant partial summary judgment to the plaintiffs concerning the affirmative defenses of ineffective service of process and expiration of the statute of limitations. We remand this action for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

This is a termination of parental rights case, focusing on the minor child of the mother/appellant. The child was placed in the legal custody of the petitioner/appellee on November 8, 2016, based upon the trial court’s finding that the child was dependent and neglected while in the mother’s care. On June 7, 2018, the petitioner filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of the mother. Following a bench trial, the trial court found that statutory grounds existed to terminate the parental rights of the mother upon its finding by clear and convincing evidence that (1) the mother had abandoned the child by willfully failing to provide financial support and (2) the conditions leading to the child’s removal from the mother’s home persisted. The court further found by clear and convincing evidence that termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest. The mother has appealed. Having determined that the statutory ground of persistence of the conditions leading to removal was not proven by clear and convincing evidence, we reverse the trial court’s finding as to this ground. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects, including the termination of the mother’s parental rights to the child.

Defendant, Clarence Reed Julian, pled guilty to criminal simulation in exchange for a sentence of two years as a Range II, multiple offender with the manner of service of the sentence to be determined after a sentencing hearing. At the hearing, the trial court denied an alternative sentence, ordering Defendant to serve the sentence in incarceration. Defendant appeals. After a review, we determine there is a clerical error in the judgment form. The judgment form wrongly designates Defendant as a Range I, standard offender and the technical record indicates that Defendant, as a Range I offender, has already received the benefit of Determinate Release from the Department of Correction. We remand for entry of a corrected judgment form, designating Defendant as a Range II, multiple offender, requiring Defendant to complete his sentence as such an offender. Otherwise, we affirm the trial court’s denial of alternative sentencing.

This action involves the termination of a mother’s parental rights to her minor child. Following a bench trial, the trial court found that clear and convincing evidence existed to support the statutory grounds of abandonment by her (1) failure to visit; (2) failure to support; and (3) conduct that exhibited a wanton disregard for the child’s welfare. The trial court also found that termination was in the best interest of the child. We reverse the trial court on its finding that the mother abandoned the child by failing to remit support. We affirm the trial court on all other rulings.

A Montgomery County Grand Jury indicted the Defendant with second degree murder (count one), vehicular homicide (count two), aggravated assault (count three), failure to complete boating safety certification (count four), and operating a motorboat without a valid identification number (count five). Pursuant to a plea agreement, the Defendant entered a guilty plea to reckless homicide, a lesser included offense of second degree murder (count one). The plea agreement further provided that the Defendant plead guilty as a Range II, multiple offender pursuant to Hicks v. State, 945 S.W.2d 706, 709 (Tenn. 1997) (holding that a knowing and voluntary guilty plea waives any irregularity as to offender classification or release eligibility), with the trial court to determine the length and manner of service of his sentence. In exchange for the Defendant’s plea of guilty, the State agreed to dismiss the remaining counts in the indictment. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed a sentence of five-years’ imprisonment. Ten days later, the Defendant filed a motion to modify his sentence pursuant to Rule 35 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure. Following a second hearing, the trial court denied relief and imposed the same sentence. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred in sentencing the Defendant and in failing to grant his Rule 35 motion to modify the sentence. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Samuel Winkfield, appeals the Madison County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for a writ of error coram nobis from his second degree murder and tampering with evidence convictions, for which he received an effective sentence of twenty-five years. We affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court.

The petitioner, Ronnie Ingram, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received the effective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.