APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant, Jenny Frye, appeals the order of the trial court revoking her community corrections sentence and ordering her to serve an increased sentence of eight years in confinement. Upon review of the record, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the defendant violated the terms of her community corrections sentence. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed in part. However, because the trial court failed to conduct a sentencing hearing prior to increasing the defendant’s sentence, we remand the matter for a new sentencing hearing.

The petitioner, Troy Love, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received the effective assistance of counsel at trial. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

A Hamilton County jury found Defendant, Diontae Smartt, guilty of aggravated sexual battery, for which he received a sentence of eight years’ incarceration. On appeal, Defendant contends that the trial court erred by denying his motion to admit the video recording of his statement to police in its entirety, pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Evidence 106, after the State questioned Defendant about inconsistencies between the statement and Defendant’s trial testimony. Defendant further contends that the trial court erred by denying his request to instruct the jury on self-defense as the defense was fairly raised by the proof at trial. Following a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Appellant appeals from the dismissal of his complaint seeking damages for the improper forfeiture of his property seized incident to an arrest. The trial court dismissed the action on the basis of lack of subject matter jurisdiction. We affirm the trial court’s dismissal of Appellant’s claim for the return of his seized property, as the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate that claim. We reverse, however, the dismissal of Appellant’s claim for damages related to a bad faith seizure under Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-33-215.

This appeal involves a review of the denial of a motion pursuant to Rule 60.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. We affirm the ruling of the trial court.

This case presents a boundary line dispute between the owners of adjacent properties. Gloria Juanita Milton (plaintiff), owner of a roughly 2.44-acre lot in the Morton Acres subdivsion in Campbell County, brought this action against the owners of the adjacent lot to the north, Donald Powell and Donna Powell Fredricks Carson (defendants). The issue at trial was the location of the boundary line between the properties. Each side hired a surveyor. Plaintiff’s surveyor, William Easter, presented a survey of plaintiff’s property that conformed very closely to the calls and boundaries established by the original subdivision plat. Defendants’ surveyor, Dwight Crutchfield, presented a survey of the boundary line that gave defendants property in the amount of about 0.46 acre more than that described in the subdivison plat and Easter’s survey. The trial court credited the survey presented by plaintiff and established the boundary line as presented in the Easter survey. Defendants appeal, arguing that the trial court erred by disregarding wellestablished principles for determining disputed boundaries as prescribed in Thornburg v. Chase, 606 S.W.2d 672 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980) and Wood v. Starko, 197 S.W.3d 255 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006). We affirm.

An insured sued his health insurance provider, seeking damages for breach of contract and bad faith refusal to pay valid insurance claims after coverage was denied for medical expenses related to the removal of a kidney stone. The defendants moved for summary judgment based on a benefit exclusion rider to the insurance contract that excluded coverage for treatment, surgery, or expenses related to kidney stones. The trial court rejected the insured’s argument that the exclusion rider did not apply and granted summary judgment to the defendants. Because the defendants were entitled to a judgment of dismissal as a matter of law based on the undisputed facts, we affirm.

A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her child. Before trial, the mother moved to dismiss the petition to terminate her parental rights for failure to join the father of the child as a necessary party. The juvenile court denied the motion. And after a trial, the court found six statutory grounds for termination and that termination of the mother's parental rights was in the child's best interest. We discern no error in the trial court's denial of the motion to dismiss. But we conclude that the evidence was less than clear and convincing as to one of the statutory grounds relied on by the trial court for the termination of the mother's parental rights. Still, the record contains clear and convincing evidence to support the remaining five grounds for termination and that termination is in the child's best interest. So we affirm the termination of the mother's parental rights.

The Petitioner, Ugenio Dejesus Ruby-Ruiz, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2013 convictions for nine counts of rape of a child, two counts of rape, five counts of aggravated sexual battery, and three counts of sexual exploitation of a minor and his 121-year sentence at 100% service. The Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. We reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court and remand the case for the entry of an order granting the Petitioner a delayed appeal for the limited purpose of filing an application for permission to appeal to our supreme court. The Petitioner’s remaining allegations shall be held in abeyance in the post-conviction court until the resolution of the delayed appeal.

I respectfully dissent from the majority’s opinion granting the delayed appeal because I conclude that the Tennessee Supreme Court, in denying the Petitioner’s request to late-file his appeal pursuant to Rule 11 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure (“Rule 11 application”), has already reviewed the substantive underlying issues of the appeal in determining not to accept the late-filed appeal in the interest of justice.

Defendant, Trenell Lamar Copeland, appeals from his convictions of four counts of aggravated sexual battery of a child. Defendant was found guilty following a jury trial in 2010. On appeal, Defendant argues that (1) the evidence at trial was insufficient to support the convictions, (2) the trial court erred in its instructions to the jury, and (3) the trial court erred by allowing the victim’s prior consistent statements to be admitted into evidence. After review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the defendant’s convictions must be reversed and the case remanded for a new trial due to the prosecutor’s improper remarks during closing argument. I write separately to express my concern about the trial judge’s ex parte discussion with the jury during deliberations.

In this divorce, Wife appeals the trial court’s decision to deny her alimony notwithstanding a previously executed separation agreement that provided a non-modifiable award of alimony in futuro. Wife also appeals the trial court’s denial of a arrearage judgment for school and extracurricular expenses under the separation agreement. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

This appeal arose from the parties’ divorce proceedings. After the husband failed to appear at a motion hearing wherein the wife was seeking to compel discovery and requesting sanctions against the husband, the Trial Court granted a default judgment against the husband. Although requesting sanctions to include default judgment if the husband failed to comply with discovery, the wife had not specifically requested immediate entry of default judgment against him. The Trial Court thereafter scheduled a final trial for the divorce. The husband filed nothing with the Trial Court to attempt to remedy the default judgment against him prior to trial. The husband was provided notice of the trial but failed to appear. On the day of the trial, the Trial Court heard the evidence presented by the wife regarding the grounds for divorce, marital assets, marital debts, property division, and alimony. Based on the wife’s uncontested testimony and evidence presented at trial, the Trial Court granted a divorce, divided the marital estate, and awarded wife alimony in futuro and alimony in solido. Subsequently, the husband filed two motions pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02, both of which were denied by the Trial Court. The husband appealed. Upon a review of the record before us, we determine no reversible error exists in this matter. We, therefore, affirm the Trial Court’s judgment in all respects.  

The defendant, Terry D. Winters, was indicted for and convicted of aggravated kidnapping, aggravated assault, and domestic assault for which he received an effective twenty-year sentence. He now appeals the denial of his motion for new trial wherein he alleged he received ineffective assistance of counsel and challenged a statement made during the State’s closing argument. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the motion.

Following a jury trial, the defendant, Gregory Randall South, was convicted of two counts of selling morphine, a Schedule II controlled substance. On appeal, the defendant contends the prosecutor improperly commented on his right not to testify and used an improper hypothetical during closing argument. Having thoroughly reviewed the record, we conclude the prosecutor’s comments on the defendant’s right not to testify constitute reversible non-structural constitutional error. Accordingly, we reverse the judgments of the trial court and remand the matter for a new trial.

Kelvin Brown, Petitioner, filed a pro se Petition for Post-Conviction Relief (“the Second Petition”). The post-conviction court summarily denied the Second Petition, finding that Petitioner had previously filed a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief (“the First Petition”); that counsel had been appointed for Petitioner; and that Petitioner appeared at an evidentiary hearing with counsel and withdrew the First Petition after specifically being warned by the court that “any dismissal would be with prejudice.” Petitioner appealed, claiming the post-conviction court erred in summarily dismissing the Second Petition. Discerning no error, we affirm.

In this post-divorce action concerning modification of the father’s child support obligation, the trial court determined that a significant variance existed between the parties’ incomes at the time of the modification hearing and the amount of income the parties earned at the time of the divorce. The trial court modified the father’s child support obligation accordingly. The trial court declined, however, to modify the father’s child support obligation for any time period prior to the filing of the mother’s modification petition in 2015 despite language in the parties’ agreement providing that recalculation would take place in 2011. The trial court also ordered that the father would pay 65% of the children’s private school tuition and the mother would pay 35%. The trial court further awarded to the mother a portion of her attorney’s fees and expert witness fees incurred up to the time of the hearing. The mother has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the trial court’s judgment in all respects. We decline to award attorney’s fees to either party on appeal.

The State appeals from the trial court’s dismissal with prejudice of a two-count indictment against the Defendants, Rontavious S. Ferguson and Tramon T. Key, for attempted second-degree murder and attempted aggravated robbery. The State contends that it had discretion to nolle prosequi the charges and that dismissal without prejudice would not have placed the public interest at stake. After review, we affirm the dismissal of the indictment against the Defendants but remand to the Dyer County Circuit Court for entry of an amended order dismissing the case without prejudice.

Following a trial, a Madison County jury convicted Defendant, Tony F. Boyle, of driving under the influence (DUI). The trial court imposed a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days, which was suspended to community corrections supervision following the service of thirty days in jail. On appeal, Defendant contends that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his conviction. Following a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Whitcliffe McLeod, appeals his sentences for second degree murder and attempted second degree murder. The defendant argues the trial court abused its discretion in ordering the defendant to serve his sentences consecutively. Following our review, we affirm the judgments and sentence of the trial court.

Both the plaintiffs and the defendant have appealed from an order granting in part and denying in part the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. The trial court determined that there was no just reason for delay and directed the entry of a final judgment under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 54.02. Because the partial summary judgment is not appropriate for certification as a final judgment under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 54.02, we dismiss the appeal.

The Defendant was convicted upon his guilty plea to theft of property valued at more than $1,000 but less than $10,000, a Class D felony. See T.C.A. § 39-14-103(a) (2018) (theft), 39-14-105 (Supp. 2015) (amended 2016) (grading of theft). The trial court sentenced the Defendant to serve eight years as a Range II, multiple offender. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in sentencing. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I respectfully dissent from the conclusion reached by the majority affirming the trial court’s denial of the Defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Based on my review of the record, the Defendant’s guilty pleas were not knowingly, voluntarily, and understandingly entered as to their effect and consequences. Accordingly, I would have concluded that the trial court erred by denying his motion to withdraw the guilty plea.

Defendant, Ricky Jan Stevison, pled guilty to theft of property and was sentenced to two years on supervised probation with the trial court to determine the issue of restitution at a hearing. Defendant subsequently filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The trial court denied the motion after a hearing. Because we determine that the trial court did not abuse its discretion, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. However, because the judgment form does not include the amount of restitution or the terms of the repayment, we remand to the trial court for entry of an amended judgment form.