APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Petitioner, Wayford Demonbreun, Jr., appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s summary denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Rule 36.1 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that his convictions are illegal because the trial court failed to award pretrial jail credits, the date his sentences were imposed is in question, the trial judge’s name was not printed on the judgment forms, and the judgment forms were not stamped filed. We affirm the trial court’s denial of relief.

The Defendant, Frazier Lee Savage, was convicted by a Knox County Criminal Court jury of possession with intent to sell less than fifteen grams of heroin within 1,000 feet of a child care agency, a Class B felony; possession with intent to deliver less than fifteen grams of heroin within 1,000 feet of a child care agency, a Class B felony; possession with intent to sell alprazolam within 1,000 feet of a child care agency, a Class D felony; possession with intent to deliver alprazolam within 1,000 feet of a child care agency, a Class D felony, and possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. §§ 39-17-417(a)(2) (2018) (possession with intent to deliver), 39-17-417(a)(3) (possession with intent to sell), 39-17-425 (2018) (possession of drug paraphernalia), 39- 17-432 (2018) (providing enhanced penalties for drug offenses committed in Drug-Free School Zones). After a sentencing hearing, the trial court merged the two heroin counts and the two alprazolam counts and imposed an effective twelve-year sentence at 100% service. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the evidence obtained from a warrantless search of a motel room. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Arnold Asbury, Defendant, claims that the trial court erred by denying his “Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea Prior to Sentencing” and, as a result, that he was denied a right to trial by jury. Although we determine that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to withdraw the guilty plea, we determine that the trial court committed reversible error at the subsequent sentencing hearing because it neither properly accepted Defendant’s Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement pursuant to Rule 11(c)(4) nor properly rejected the plea agreement pursuant Rule 11(c)(5). We reverse the judgments of the trial court and remand for a hearing in which the court may, in its discretion, either reject or accept the Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement. If the trial court rejects the plea agreement and Defendant opts to withdraw his guilty pleas, Defendant will have the right to a trial by jury. If the trial court accepts the agreement, it must sentence Defendant pursuant to the terms of the plea agreement.

The plaintiffs appeal the trial court’s decision concerning the ownership of real property. We affirm.

A Knox County Criminal Court Jury convicted the Appellant, David William Gary, of rape, and the trial court sentenced him to ten years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction, that the trial court erred by allowing testimony regarding his expressed interest in a specific type of sexual activity, and that the trial court erred by refusing to allow him to present evidence that a police investigator improperly influenced the victim’s preliminary hearing testimony. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Plaintiff, James Bidwell, took his wife, Clarissa Bidwell, to Starr Regional Medical Center for treatment. She was transferred to Chattanooga-Hamilton County Hospital Authority dba Erlanger Health System, a governmental hospital authority, where she was treated, but later died. Plaintiff provided statutorily compliant pre-suit notice of his intent to file a health care liability action against each health care provider that was named as a defendant in the complaint. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121(a). Plaintiff did not provide pre-suit notice to Erlanger. Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121(a)(5) requires a recipient of pre-suit notice to give written notice to a claimant of any other person, entity, or health care provider who may be properly named a defendant within thirty days of receiving pre-suit notice. However, Dr. Jeffery Colburn and Dr. Timothy A. Strait failed to identify Erlanger as their employer, i.e. a known and necessary party to the suit. Plaintiff timely filed his complaint within the 120-day extension of the statute of limitations provided by Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121. Defendants answered plaintiff’s complaint, each raising the affirmative defense of comparative fault. Dr. Colburn and Dr. Strait then moved for summary judgment arguing that, pursuant to the Governmental Tort Liability Act, without Erlanger as a party defendant no judgment could be rendered against them. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-310(b). In response, plaintiff filed two motions to amend his complaint to add Erlanger as a defendant, in reliance upon the extension to the statute of limitations provided in Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-1-119(a). After a hearing, the trial court held that plaintiff’s failure to provide pre-suit notice to Erlanger prevents him from adding them to his complaint. It granted Dr. Colburn and Dr. Strait’s motions for summary judgment. Plaintiff appeals. We hold that Tenn. Code Ann. § 2926-121(a)(5) required Dr. Colburn and Dr. Strait to identify Erlanger as a known and necessary party within thirty days after receiving pre-suit notice; they failed to comply with § 29-26-121(a)(5). We hold that, pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann.
§ 20-1-119, their subsequent declaration of the necessity of the nonparty to the suit, after the complaint was filed, granted plaintiff an additional ninety days following the filing of the first answer to amend his complaint in order to add the nonparty as a defendant. See Tenn.Code Ann. § 20-1-119; see also Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-1-119(g) (stating that this section applies to suits involving governmental entities). In addition, we hold that, pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121(c), plaintiff’s addition of the nonparty is not barred for failure to provide pre-suit notice. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121(c). Therefore, we vacate the trial court’s award of summary judgment to defendants Dr. Colburn and Dr. Strait. We remand this matter for further proceedings, pursuant to applicable law, and consistent with this opinion.

We granted permission to appeal in this case to clarify application of the doctrine of judicial estoppel. The plaintiff filed this legal malpractice action against an attorney who represented her in her divorce. She asserts that the attorney’s actions so compromised her position in the divorce proceedings that she was forced to settle on unfavorable terms. After the attorney filed a motion for summary judgment, the trial court applied the doctrine of judicial estoppel. Citing the plaintiff’s sworn acknowledgment in her marital dissolution agreement that the divorce settlement was “fair and equitable,” the trial court held that the plaintiff was estopped from asserting in the legal malpractice action that the divorce settlement terms were unfavorable. On this basis, the trial court granted summary judgment to the defendant attorney. The Court of Appeals affirmed. We hold that the trial court should not have applied the doctrine of judicial estoppel to the statements at issue because they are not directly contradictory statements of fact. The plaintiff’s sworn acknowledgment in her marital dissolution agreement is instead a context-related legal conclusion, and the plaintiff offers a reasonable explanation for any apparent discrepancy between her sworn acknowledgment in the divorce and her assertions in this legal malpractice action. As a result, we hold that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on the basis of judicial estoppel. We reverse the grant of summary judgment and remand the case for further proceedings.

The Petitioner, Harold Francis Butler, III, appeals the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions of first degree felony murder, attempted first degree premeditated murder, attempted especially aggravated robbery, and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony and resulting sentence of life plus thirty-one years. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the State violated his constitutional rights by conducting an unduly suggestive identification procedure that rendered the identification unreliable and by eliciting false testimony from a key witness at trial. He also raises numerous allegations of ineffective assistance of trial counsel and contends that he is entitled to a new trial under the cumulative error doctrine. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This action was filed by two brothers, after the death of their father, contesting the validity of an amendment to their father’s trust agreement. The brothers alleged that their siblings coerced their infirmed father to amend his trust in such a manner that was favorable to the siblings’ pecuniary interests and that two sisters had a confidential relationship with their father. The trial court directed a verdict in favor of the defendants. The plaintiffs appealed. We affirm the decision.

This appeal involves a homeowner’s fraud claim against a foundation repair company. The trial court rejected the foundation repair company’s argument that the fraud claim was barred by the statute of limitations and the statute of repose. After a three-day bench trial, the trial court found that the foundation repair company had engaged in fraud. Specifically, the trial court found that the foundation repair company sold its systems to the homeowner representing that they would stabilize her house from further movement when in reality it did not have the knowledge or understanding to design an effective solution for the house and “simply did not really care” whether the systems would be effective in any way. The trial court further found that the company fraudulently misrepresented whether an engineer would be involved in the process and whether it would obtain a permit for the work. The home had been condemned by the time of trial, and the trial court awarded the homeowner $187,000 for the loss of the value of the structure. Based on the reckless and fraudulent conduct of the foundation repair company, the trial court also awarded $15,000 in punitive damages to the homeowner. The foundation repair company appeals. We affirm as modified.

The defendant, Victor Wise, appeals his Shelby County Circuit Court jury convictions of two counts of aggravated robbery, one count of attempted aggravated robbery, and two counts of aggravated assault, challenging the exclusion of certain evidence, the sufficiency of the convicting evidence, and the propriety of the 44-year effective sentence. We affirm the defendant’s convictions but conclude that the trial court erred by imposing consecutive sentences. Accordingly, the defendant’s total effective sentence is modified to 12 years.

The petitioner, Cordricus Arnold, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received the effective assistance of counsel at trial. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

This is an appeal in a proceeding to modify a residential parenting plan, established in January 2013. The initial petition to modify the plan was filed by the Father, accompanied by his proposed plan, in October 2016; Mother answered the petition in January 2017 and a hearing was set for two non-consecutive days in July 2018. During the hiatus in the hearing, the Mother filed a counter-petition and a proposed parenting time plan. The hearing resumed solely on Father’s plan and the court entered an order finding a material change of circumstance and reducing Father’s parenting time; Father appeals. Because the court has not yet resolved the claims between the parties, we dismiss the appeal for lack of a final judgment.     

Petitioner, Helen Ruth Kirby, appeals from the summary denial of her petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging her guilty-pleaded conviction for second degree murder. Because Petitioner failed to state a cognizable claim for habeas corpus relief, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Ronnie Wilson, appeals from the Jefferson County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner contends that he received ineffective assistance from his trial counsel because trial counsel (1) made no effort to exclude a prior aggravated robbery conviction that the State sought to use as impeachment evidence; (2) failed to explain the concept of criminal responsibility to the Petitioner; and (3) was intoxicated when he met with the Petitioner prior to trial. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This appeal involves a breach of a lease agreement. At trial, both defendants, operators of a natural foods business, admitted that the lease had been breached. However, because only one of the Defendants had signed the lease, the other argued that he was not a party to and was therefore not responsible for the obligations of the lease. The Defendant who had signed the lease claimed he did so on behalf of and at the direction of the other. Finding that both Defendants had combined their efforts, skills, knowledge, and money for the purpose of operating the business, the trial court concluded on several bases that the Defendants were jointly liable for the obligations of the lease. Only the non-signing Defendant appeals. Because we agree with the trial court that the Defendants had formed a joint venture and, thus, were jointly liable, we affirm. 

This appeal involves a boundary dispute. In resolving the dispute, the trial court made specific findings about the location of a
non-party’s border, indicating that it was coterminous with the disputed northern border of Mr. Simpkins, who is a party to this case. Finding this non-party to be a necessary party based on the record, we vacate the trial court’s order and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. 

Following a bench trial before the Davidson County Criminal Court, the Defendant-Appellant, Charles Eugene Darvin, Jr., was convicted as charged of especially aggravated robbery, see Tenn. Code Ann. §39-13-403, a Class A felony. The trial court later accepted the agreement of the parties to sentence the Defendant to a term of fifteen years’ imprisonment, to be served at 100%. The sole issue presented for our review is whether the evidence is sufficient to support the element of serious bodily injury as required to establish the offense. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Johnthony K. Walker, was convicted of six counts of criminally negligent homicide, eleven counts of reckless aggravated assault, seven counts of assault, one count of reckless endangerment, one count of reckless driving, and one count of the use of a portable electronic device by a school bus driver after a school bus he was driving crashed leaving six children dead and numerous other children injured. The trial court sentenced Defendant to an effective sentence of four years for the convictions and denied judicial diversion after a sentencing hearing. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court improperly denied judicial diversion and/or an alternative sentence. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, John Burley Alberts, appeals the Williamson County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for four counts of rape of a child, for which he is serving an effective 100-year sentence. He contends that the
post-conviction court erred in denying his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

In this case, the plaintiff-appellant, Nationwide Investments, LLC, brought suit against Pinnacle Bank for, among other things, an alleged violation of the state’s Financial Records Privacy Act. The case was dismissed at summary judgment, and sanctions were imposed against the plaintiff and its counsel. Although the plaintiff and its counsel now appeal, raising several issues for our review, for the reasons stated herein, we affirm.  

All claims on the plaintiff’s case in chief in this case have been non-suited. This is an appeal only from three orders for sanctions entered against plaintiff’s attorney. In the first order, the trial court awarded opposing counsel attorney’s fees and prohibited the attorney from making any threatening, insulting, or embarrassing communications regarding opposing counsel. In the second and third orders, the trial court found that the attorney had continued the prohibited conduct, suspending him from the practice of law in the Circuit Courts of Davidson County for a total of 240 days and awarding opposing counsel their attorney’s fees. The attorney appealed the three orders. We affirm.

Petitioner, Jason Wayne Staggs, pled guilty in the Tipton County Circuit Court as a persistent offender to (1) burglary of a building, (2) theft of property valued over $10,000 and less than $60,000, and (3) evading arrest. The trial court sentenced Petitioner pursuant to a plea agreement to an effective sentence of fifteen years’ incarceration to be served at forty-five percent. Petitioner timely filed pro se petitions for post-conviction relief, and the post-conviction court appointed counsel, who filed an amended petition. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied the post-conviction petition in a written order. On appeal, Petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and his guilty plea was unknowing. Following a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Following a jury trial, Defendant, Joseph Edward Wilson, was convicted of two counts of the sale of 0.5 grams or more of cocaine, one count of the sale of less than 0.5 grams of cocaine, and one count of delivery of 0.5 grams or more of cocaine. The trial court merged one of Defendant’s convictions for the sale of 0.5 grams or more and his conviction for the delivery of 0.5 grams or more because they were part of the same criminal episode. The trial court sentenced Defendant to serve an effective twelve-year sentence. The sole issue raised on appeal is whether the evidence was sufficient to support Defendant’s convictions. Having reviewed the entire record and the parties’ briefs on appeal, we affirm Defendant’s convictions and sentences, but we remand this case to the trial court for entry of a judgment for the merged offense pursuant to State v. Berry, 503 S.W.3d 360 (Tenn. 2015). Additionally, on remand the trial court is directed to enter corrected judgments for each of Defendant’s remaining convictions to clarify which of Defendant’s sentences run concurrently.

The Petitioner, Sean Patrick Goble, appeals from the Greene County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition pursuant to the Post-Conviction DNA Analysis Act of 2001 (the Act), Tennessee Code Annotated sections 40-30-301 to -313 (2018). The
post-conviction court denied relief on the basis that the results of the DNA analysis would not have exculpated the Petitioner of first degree murder. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the court erred in dismissing his petition. We affirm the judgment of the
post-conviction court.