APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Defendant, Darius Alexander Cox, was convicted after a jury trial of two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, two counts of aggravated robbery, and two counts of employing a firearm during a dangerous felony. After a sentencing hearing, Defendant received a total effective sentence of forty years. After the denial of his motion for new trial, Defendant appeals and argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions, that the trial court erroneously admitted evidence of other crimes under Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b), that the prosecutor made improper comments during closing argument, and that the trial court erred by imposing consecutive sentences. After a thorough review, we conclude that the trial court committed reversible error by admitting evidence of Defendant’s other crimes because the evidence was not relevant to a material issue other than Defendant’s character. Accordingly, we reverse the judgments of the trial court and remand for a new trial.

Wife/Appellee filed a complaint for divorce while the Husband/Appellant was incarcerated. After the matter was set for final hearing, Husband filed a motion with the trial court requesting that Husband be allowed to participate in the proceeding via telecommunication. The trial court failed to rule on Husband’s motion, and proceeded to hold the hearing and grant Wife’s petition with no participation from Husband. Because we conclude that the trial court erred in proceeding with the final hearing while Husband’s motion remained pending, the judgment of the trial court is hereby vacated in its entirety and the case is remanded for a new trial. 

In this case, the decedent’s ex-wife filed a claim against his estate to collect unpaid pension benefits awarded to her in their divorce. She asserted that the decedent failed to pay her a pro rata share of his cost-of-living allowances and “supplemental” benefit. The executrix for the decedent’s estate filed an exception to the claim, asserting that the divorce decree expressly provided that the ex-wife would “have no claim against the estate of [the decedent],” and did not award cost-of-living allowances or an interest in the “supplemental” benefit. The trial court found that the divorce decree did not bar the ex-wife’s action, that the ex-wife was entitled to a share of the decedent’s cost-of-living allowances and “supplemental” benefit, and awarded prejudgment interest. We affirm the trial court’s award of damages and interest but modify the judgment to reflect that the ex-wife is entitled to postjudgment rather than prejudgment interest.

This appeal concerns whether the public duty doctrine, which immunizes public employees and governmental entities from liability when their duty is owed to the general public rather than any particular individual, survived the 1973 enactment of the Governmental Tort Liability Act (“The GTLA”). While walking in Memphis, Janet C. Fleming (“Plaintiff”) was bitten by a pit bull. Plaintiff sued the City of Memphis (“Defendant”) in the Circuit Court for Shelby County (“the Trial Court”) alleging that Defendant knew of the dog’s violent tendencies from prior incidents and should have taken stronger preventative action. Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment asserting the public duty doctrine. The Trial Court granted the motion. Plaintiff appeals, arguing that the GTLA supersedes the public duty doctrine despite the fact that our Supreme Court has held otherwise in a never-overturned opinion. Constrained to adhere to our Supreme Court’s binding precedent, we hold that the public duty doctrine was not superseded by the GTLA. We hold further that while the GTLA does not provide immunity to Defendant, the public duty doctrine does because Defendant’s duty was to the public at large and Plaintiff has not established a special duty exception. We, therefore, affirm the judgment of the Trial Court.

The Petitioner, Almonda Duckworth, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and his guilty pleas were unknowing and involuntary. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the
post-conviction court denying the petition.

The Defendant, Joe T. Brooks, appeals as of right, from the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s revocation of his probationary sentence and order of nine months’ incarceration for his conviction of reckless endangerment. The Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering him to serve nine months of confinement before being returned to supervised probation. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Following a bench trial, Larry Joe Carroll (“Defendant”) was convicted of criminal trespass, criminal simulation valued at $1,000 or less, and criminal impersonation, for which he received an effective sentence of two years to serve in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence as it relates to his convictions for criminal simulation valued at $1,000 or less and criminal impersonation. Following a thorough review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Appellant, an inmate in the custody of the Tennessee Department of Correction, appeals the trial court’s dismissal of his petition for common law writ of certiorari. Appellant raises several issues regarding violations of the Tennessee Department of Correction’s uniform disciplinary procedures. The inmate was found guilty of refusal/attempt to alter a drug test. After exhausting his administrative appeals, he filed an application for a writ of certiorari in the trial court. The trial court granted the writ of certiorari, and on review of the record, dismissed Appellant’s petition. Finding no error, we affirm.

In this post-divorce dispute, the mother filed a criminal contempt petition alleging the father had violated the permanent parenting plan.  Two years later, the father filed a petition for criminal contempt and modification of the parenting plan.  The court consolidated the competing petitions for trial.  Sometime after the court began hearing proof, the mother filed a motion to change venue, arguing that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to modify the plan because she and the child had lived in Georgia for seven years.  The court denied the mother’s motion.  And after completion of the trial, the court found that a material change in circumstance had occurred sufficient to modify the residential parenting schedule and that modification of the schedule was in the child’s best interest.  The court also found the mother in criminal contempt for violations of the parenting plan.  Based on the circumstances surrounding the mother’s contempt, the court ordered the mother to pay the father’s attorney’s fees.  Upon review, we conclude that the trial court retained exclusive, continuing jurisdiction to modify the parenting plan.  Based on the state of the record, we also affirm the modification of the parenting plan and the criminal contempt conviction.  But we vacate the award of attorney’s fees and remand for reconsideration of the amount of fees awarded. 

In this child custody action, the trial court awarded custody of the minor child to the child’s father despite the fact that the child had resided with and/or been in the legal custody of the respondent maternal grandmother for a significant period of time. The maternal grandmother has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the trial court’s judgment in all respects.

Defendant/Appellant filed a motion for attorney fees in the Knox County Circuit Court after Plaintiffs/Appellees’ claims against the defendant were dismissed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(6). The trial court denied Defendant’s request, concluding that one of the plaintiffs’ claims was an issue of first impression and as such, the plaintiffs were exempt from having attorney’s fees assessed against them. Defendant appeals. Because we conclude that the trial court’s application of the attorney fees statute, Tennessee Code Annotated section 20-12-119, was in error, we vacate the order of the trial court and remand for further proceedings.

In this action for a deficiency judgment following the foreclosure sale of six tracts of real property, some of which were improved by resort cabins, the trial court granted the plaintiff bank’s motion for partial summary judgment against the defendant real estate developers and their limited liability company, for which the developers were guarantors, finding that the developers were liable for deficiency balances owed on promissory notes and guaranty agreements, as well as accrued interest, bank charges, late fees, and attorney’s fees. Following a bench trial concerning the amounts owed, the trial court awarded money judgments to the bank in the amounts, respectively, of $1,180,223.77 against the developers as individuals and $144,848.30 against the developers’ limited liability company. Finding, inter alia, that the developers had failed to properly plead the defense of inadequate foreclosure sales prices, the trial court sustained the bank’s objections to the developers’ requests to cross-examine the bank’s witnesses and introduce additional evidence regarding the adequacy of the foreclosure sales prices and foreclosure process. The trial court subsequently denied the developers’ motion to vacate the order granting the money judgments. The developers have appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

In this appeal arising from a divorce, the trial court adopted a permanent parenting plan for the parties’ two minor children that named the father the primary residential parent for one child and the mother the primary residential parent for the other. The court also awarded Mother alimony in futuro after finding her to be relatively economically disadvantaged and that rehabilitation was not feasible. On appeal, the father challenges both the permanent parenting plan and the alimony award. We affirm. 

This case involves the interpretation of a buy-sell provision in a partnership agreement. The trial court concluded that the buy-sell provision was properly triggered by the Appellee and ordered that $125,000.00 be paid to the Appellee, representing the value of Appellee’s interest in the partnership. The trial court also awarded the Appellee attorney’s fees and held that other claims which had been pursued by the parties were moot. Having reviewed the terms of the buy-sell provision, we conclude that the provision was never properly triggered and, therefore, reverse the judgment of the trial court to the extent that it purported to enforce the parties’ agreement. Because various other claims were dismissed as moot in light of the trial court’s specific enforcement of the buy-sell provision that dismissal is hereby vacated, and those additional claims are remanded for further consideration and proceedings in the trial court.

The Petitioner, Alejandro Vasquez, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that due process considerations should toll the running of the statute of limitations because he is a native Spanish speaker and cannot speak English. Following our review, we affirm the dismissal of the petition as time-barred.

The Defendant, Robert Antwan McElmurry, was convicted by a Dyer County Circuit Court jury of aggravated statutory rape, a Class D felony, and was sentenced to eight years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Following a bench trial, the Defendant-Appellant, David Levon Byers, Jr., was convicted of possession of a weapon by a convicted felon, possession of drug paraphernalia, and “improper lane change” in violation of Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-8-123, for which he received an effective sentence of four-years to be served on supervised probation. Prior to trial, the Defendant filed a motion to suppress challenging the constitutionality of the traffic stop, which was denied by the trial court. The sole issue presented in this appeal as of right is whether the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. Upon our review, we affirm.

Defendant, Ronnell Barclay, was convicted after a jury trial of one count of rape of a child, one count of aggravated sexual battery, and six counts of exploitation of a minor. After a sentencing hearing, Defendant was sentenced to a total effective sentence of
thirty-five years. After the denial of a motion for new trial, Defendant appeals and argues that he did not receive adequate notice of the factual basis for the charge of rape of a child, that the State withheld exculpatory statements made by the victim, and that the prosecutor made improper statements during rebuttal closing argument. After a review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Defendant, Kenneth Guthrie, entered a best interest plea to attempted rape in exchange for a three-year sentence with the manner of service of the sentence to be determined by the trial court at a sentencing hearing. After the hearing, the trial court sentenced Defendant to serve six months day-for-day with the balance of the sentence to be served on probation. Defendant appeals his sentence, arguing that the trial court improperly denied a sentence of full probation. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A mother and father appeal the termination of their parental rights to two children. The juvenile court found four statutory grounds for termination of mother’s parental rights and two statutory grounds for termination of father’s parental rights. The court also found that termination of both parents’ parental rights is in the children’s best interest. We conclude that the record contains clear and convincing evidence to support one ground for termination against Mother and two grounds for termination against Father. We further conclude that termination of parental rights is in the children’s best interest. So we affirm.

Plaintiffs/Appellants brought a negligence suit against the State of Tennessee after their six-year old son fell from the fifth floor balcony of the state owned and operated Paris Landing State Park Inn. The Plaintiffs alleged that the State was negligent in two respects: 1) in allowing their son to gain access to an unoccupied guest room and the attached balcony, and 2) in maintaining balcony railings that were shorter in height than was required by applicable building codes. Following a bench trial, the Tennessee Claims Commissioner concluded that the Plaintiffs failed to establish that the State’s negligence was the proximate cause of their son’s injuries. Because we have determined that the Commissioner’s conclusions of law are deficient and only address one of the Plaintiffs’ claims for negligence, we vacate the judgment and remand for further consideration.

Petitioner, Stevie Gibson, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, in which he challenged his Shelby County Criminal Court convictions for two counts of second degree murder and one count of aggravated robbery. On appeal, Petitioner argues that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel based on trial counsel’s failure to argue at trial that Petitioner could not form the requisite mens rea for the charges of first degree murder and aggravated robbery due to his voluntary intoxication at the time of the offense. Additionally, Petitioner asserts that he was denied a full and fair hearing due to the post-conviction judge’s refusal to recuse himself. After a thorough review of the facts and applicable law, we affirm.

The Appellant, Sharrad Sharp, was convicted in the Shelby County Criminal Court of one count of aggravated child abuse of a child eight years of age or less, a Class A felony; two counts of aggravated child neglect of a child eight years of age or less, a Class A felony; one count of aggravated sexual battery of a child less than thirteen years of age, a Class B felony; three counts of aggravated assault, a Class C felony; and two counts of child abuse of a child eight years of age or less, a Class D felony. After a sentencing hearing, he received an effective thirty-seven-year sentence. On appeal, the Appellant contends that six of the
twenty-five counts of the indictment are void because they failed to state an offense, that it was plain error for the State to play the victims’ forensic interviews in their entirety for the jury and introduce those interviews into evidence, that the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions, and that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering consecutive sentencing. The State acknowledges that six of the convictions should be vacated because the indictment failed to provide the Appellant with adequate notice. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the Appellant’s convictions of aggravated child abuse in count one, aggravated child neglect in counts five and six, and aggravated assault in counts two, seven, and eight must be reversed and vacated and the charges dismissed because the indictment failed to provide the Appellant with adequate notice of the offenses charged. The Appellant’s remaining convictions of aggravated sexual battery in count seventeen and child abuse in counts eighteen and nineteen and the resulting effective sixteen-year sentence are affirmed.

The Defendant, William Scott Hunley, was convicted of possession with intent to sell more than 0.5 grams of methamphetamine, possession with intent to deliver more than 0.5 grams of methamphetamine, possession of marijuana, and possession of drug paraphernalia. He received an effective sentence of twenty-five years. On appeal, the Defendant challenges only his conviction of possession with intent to sell methamphetamine, arguing that the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict. He also challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress. Upon reviewing the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.