APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

In this dependent and neglect proceeding, the maternal grandparents of four children appeal an order entered in the Shelby County Juvenile Court dismissing a petition in which they sought visitation with the children pursuant to the grandparent visitation statute at Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-6-306. For the reasons set forth hereinafter we affirm the juvenile court’s dismissal of the petition for lack of jurisdiction.

This appeal stems from a healthcare liability action filed nearly two decades ago. The defendant hospital filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that neither of the plaintiffs’ expert witnesses was competent to testify and, therefore, the plaintiffs could not establish their claim. After the trial court granted the motion for summary judgment, the plaintiffs filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment along with a new affidavit of one of the previous experts, which purported to establish the expert’s competency to testify. The trial court, however, denied the motion to alter or amend, and the plaintiffs specifically appealed the trial court’s order denying their motion. Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm.

The Defendant, Crystal L. Gregoire, pled guilty in the Lawrence County Circuit Court to tampering with evidence and was convicted following a jury trial of first degree premeditated murder and sentenced to an effective term of life imprisonment. On appeal, she challenges the sufficiency of the evidence of premeditation and argues that the trial court abused its discretion by excluding the testimony of a retired Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) agent of the facts surrounding the victim’s 1982 kidnapping convictions and the victim’s having put out an “open contract” on the agent and the agent’s family, by granting the State’s request for a special jury instruction pertaining to the victim’s having become “disarmed or helpless” during the killing, and by admitting prejudicial crime scene and autopsy photographs. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Following a bench trial, the Defendant, Steven Kelly, was convicted of possession with intent to sell or deliver 0.5 grams or more of cocaine. By agreement of the parties, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to a suspended nine-year sentence to be served consecutively to a federal sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence failed to prove that he had the intent to sell the cocaine. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

This is a termination of parental rights case. The trial court terminated father’s parental rights on the grounds of abandonment by willful failure to support and abandonment by willful failure to visit. With respect to the former ground, we reverse, finding insufficient evidence to support a finding that Father had the ability to pay child support. However, we affirm the latter ground, finding ample evidence that father had failed to exercise his visitation rights for over two years prior to the filing of the termination petition. We further find that termination of father’s parental rights is in the best interest of the child.

The pro se Petitioner, Christopher Jake Reynolds, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Following our review, we affirm the dismissal of the petition.

After husband’s health care liability complaint was dismissed without prejudice for lack of prosecution, husband and wife re-filed in reliance on the savings statute. The intended defendant, who had neither been served nor named in connection with the first complaint, was eventually named in an amended complaint after the second complaint had been filed. The trial court later dismissed the action against the intended defendant, holding, among other things, that the case was barred by the statute of limitations. We affirm.

Defendant, Francisco Gomez, was convicted of rape of a child and aggravated sexual battery by a Rutherford County jury. The trial court ordered Defendant to serve a total effective sentence of twenty-five years with release eligibility after service of 100% of the sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred in excluding his testimony that he was living in Kentucky during the time period when the offenses occurred because Defendant failed to give the State the notice required by Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 12 for alibi evidence. After a thorough review of the facts and applicable case law, we conclude that Defendant’s proffered testimony was not alibi evidence, and thus, the trial court erred in excluding it on the ground that Defendant failed to provide notice to the State. However, we also conclude that the error was harmless, and we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Kevin Fennell, appeals from the denial of post-conviction relief, alleging that his guilty pleas are constitutionally infirm due to trial counsel’s failure to inform him that his sentence was required to be served in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This appeal arises from injuries the plaintiff sustained from a fall while descending the exterior sidewalk steps of property owned and managed by the City of Dyersburg. The plaintiff contends she fell because, inter alia, the city was negligent in the design and maintenance of the stairway and in failing to correct the defect in the steps. Following a bench trial, the court found the proof failed to establish that there was a dangerous or defective condition that was the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s fall, and if there was a defective condition, the City of Dyersburg had no prior notice. The trial court also found that if there was a defective condition, the plaintiff was more than 50% at fault which bars any recovery. For these and other reasons, the trial court dismissed the complaint. This appeal followed. Having determined that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s findings of fact, and discerning no error with its conclusions of law, we affirm.

The Petitioner, Kenneth Brown, appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing (1) that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance in failing to present Agent James Davis and Beatrice Vaulx as witnesses at trial and in failing to request an instruction on proximate cause of death; and (2) that he is entitled to a second post-conviction hearing based on post-conviction counsel’s ineffectiveness. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant-Appellant, Septian Valentine, appeals from the revocation of supervised release by the Lake County Circuit Court, arguing that the trial court erred in revoking his probation and ordering him to serve the remainder of his sentence in confinement. After review, we affirm.

Defendant, Troy Lee Springfield, was found guilty of attempted voluntary manslaughter, aggravated assault, being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm, and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. He was sentenced to eight years for attempted voluntary manslaughter, ten years for aggravated assault, four years for being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm, and ten years for employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. The trial court ordered the sentences for aggravated assault and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony to be served consecutively to each other and concurrently with the remaining counts for an effective sentence of twenty years. On appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions, and the State did not prove his identity as the perpetrator of the offenses.

The Defendant-Appellant, Shawn Gibson Delosh, was convicted by a Dyer County jury of promoting the manufacture of methamphetamine, see Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-433(a)(1), for which he received a sentence of twelve years, to be served consecutively to his prior sentences and parole revocations. On appeal, the Defendant argues that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, and (2) the trial court improperly ordered his sentence to be served consecutively to “all prior sentences and/or parole revocations.” Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Madison County Jury convicted the Defendant-Appellant, Wayne Luster Boykin, Sr., of possession with intent to sell more than one-half ounce of marijuana (Count 1), possession with intent to deliver more than one-half ounce of marijuana, (Count 2), both Class E felonies, and possession with intent to use drug paraphernalia (Count 3), a Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. §§ 39-17-417, -425(a)(1). He received an effective sentence of four years in confinement. Prior to trial, Boykin filed a motion to suppress arguing that the search warrant and supporting affidavit were based on “stale” information. The trial judge, who was the issuing magistrate for the search warrant, transferred the motion to suppress to be heard by another judge. Following the denial of the motion to suppress, the case was transferred back to the original trial judge to conduct the trial. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant argues: (1) the trial court that heard the motion to suppress erred in denying his motion to suppress the search and his subsequent statement; (2) the trial court that conducted the trial and the motion for new trial erred in its review of the motion to suppress; and (3) that he received an excessive sentence. Upon our review, we remand Count 3 for entry of an amended judgment. In all other respects, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Tavares Dewayne Buchanan, aka Tavarea Dewayne Buchanan, was convicted by a Davidson County Criminal Court jury of aggravated kidnapping, a Class B felony; two counts of rape, Class B felonies; aggravated assault, a Class C felony; felon in possession of a firearm, a Class D felony; and unlawful photography, a Class A misdemeanor, and he was sentenced to an effective term of ten years in incarceration followed by ten years on probation. On appeal, he argues that: (1) the trial court erred in allowing the State to introduce evidence of his prior felony convictions in its case-in-chief; (2) the trial court erred in overruling his objection to the State’s vouching for the reliability of the victim in its closing argument; and (3) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Petitioner, Harold Joe Rittenhouse, appeals the trial court’s summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus and motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. Following our review of the parties’ briefs and applicable law, we dismiss the appeal.

The defendant, Carl David Roe, appeals the denial of his motion to withdraw his 2003 guilty plea to attempted aggravated sexual battery, arguing that the entry of an amended judgment in 2007 that added a requirement that the defendant be subject to community supervision for life invalidated the plea. Discerning no error, we affirm the denial of relief.

A Shelby County Criminal Court Jury convicted the Appellant, Siranthony Williams, of aggravated robbery, and the trial court imposed a sentence of ten years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence sustaining his conviction, specifically his identity as the perpetrator of the offense. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, Lazette Sanders, was indicted by the Hardeman County Grand Jury for one count of attempted first degree murder. Petitioner pleaded guilty to the amended charge of attempted second degree murder and received a sentence as a Range I offender of eight years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Petitioner filed a petition seeking postconviction relief, in which she alleged that she received the ineffective assistance of counsel and that her guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered. Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied her petition. Petitioner appeals and we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.