APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

I concur in the majority opinion, but write separately to again say that the term “prosecutorial misconduct” should not be used to describe errors by counsel for the State in making arguments to the jury. Instead, I believe it should be referred to as “improper prosecutorial argument” for non-constitutional errors.

The Petitioner, Gregory Woods, appeals from the denial of post-conviction relief, alleging that he was not competent to enter a guilty plea, that he was improperly sentenced as a Range II offender, and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Pursuant to a plea agreement, the Petitioner entered a guilty plea to aggravated sexual battery, for which he received an effective sentence of twenty years as a Range II offender.1 Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Defendant, Mack Transou, appeals the dismissal of his “Motion for Correction of Clerical Oversight Pursuant to Rule 36” of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure, in which Defendant alleged his March 1999 judgment of conviction for driving after being declared a habitual motor vehicle offender contained a clerical error because it failed to properly list his pretrial jail credits. Defendant contends on appeal that the trial court erred in denying his motion. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this appeal of a certified question of law, the defendant challenges the constitutionality of a statute that imposes a fee upon persons convicted of certain drug and alcohol offenses when forensic scientists employed by the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation (“TBI”) have conducted chemical tests to determine blood alcohol or drug content. The challenged statute earmarks the fees imposed to an intoxicant testing fund, and monies within this fund do not revert to the State’s general fund but “remain available for appropriation to the [TBI] as determined by the [G]eneral [A]ssembly.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10-413(f)(3)(B) (2017). The defendant argues that this statutory scheme provides TBI forensic scientists with a personal and institutional financial incentive to produce blood alcohol test results that secure convictions, which, in turn, increases fees and funding for the TBI. Relying on Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927); Ward v. Vill. of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972); and Connally v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 245 (1977), the defendant asserts that these financial incentives create an appearance of impropriety and deprive her of the federal and state constitutional right to a fair and impartial trial. We conclude that, under both the federal and state constitutions, the standards of neutrality announced in Tumey, Ward, and Connally apply only to persons exercising judicial or quasi-judical authority and do not apply to TBI forensic scientists, who do not exercise such authority. Furthermore, even if the Tumey standards applied to TBI forensic scientists, the defendant’s constitutional claim would fail because, as salaried employees, the TBI forensic scientists have no direct, personal, substantial pecuniary interest in fees imposed pursuant to the statute, and any institutional financial interest the TBI forensic scientists may have as a result of the statute is too remote to give rise to an appearance of impropriety. We also disagree with the Court of Criminal Appeals’ holding that the statute violates substantive due process by creating a situation analogous to an expert witness contingency fee arrangement. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is reversed, and the judgment of the trial court is reinstated.

The Petitioner, Kristie M. Smith, appeals from the denial of post-conviction relief, alleging the trial court erred in summarily dismissing her petition for post-conviction relief. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Appellant, Rudolph Miller Brooks, Jr., appeals from the Blount County Circuit Court’s order revoking his community corrections sentence and ordering him to serve his sentence in confinement. The Appellant’s counsel has filed a motion to withdraw pursuant to Rule 22 of the Rules of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals. We conclude that counsel’s motion is well-taken and, in accordance with Rule 22(F), affirm the trial court’s judgment pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals.

This case involves a second healthcare liability action brought by Crystal Herpst on behalf of the estate of her deceased father, James Ingram. The defendants are Dr. LeAnthony A. Hardy – Mr. Ingram’s treating physician – as well as Parkridge Medical Center, Inc., Chattanooga Diagnostic Associates, LLC, and Columbia Medical Group- Parkridge, Inc. (the Parkridge defendants). The trial court determined that plaintiff could not avail herself of Tennessee’s saving statute because her first complaint was not filed prior to the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations. The court therefore dismissed plaintiff’s second complaint as untimely filed. She appeals. We affirm.

I concur in the majority’s conclusion that it was unnecessary for the trial court to treat the motions of LeAnthony A. Hardy, M.D., Parkridge Medical Center, Inc. Chattanooga Diagnostic Associates, LLC, and Columbia Medical Group-Parkridge, Inc. to dismiss as motions for summary judgment. But I reach that conclusion without resort to the pleadings filed in another case. Examining the allegations of the complaint filed in this action only, Crystal Herpst filed outside the applicable statute of limitations. So on the basis of the pleadings filed in this case I would affirm the dismissal of the complaint.

Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her two children. Upon our review, we conclude that the order of termination fails to comply with Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113(k)’s requirement that the court make specific factual findings, which precludes our meaningful review. We vacate the order and remand for entry of an order that complies with subsection 113(k).

A Greene County jury convicted the Defendant, James Douglas Black, of first degree premeditated murder and first degree felony murder of Courtney Thompson and Terrance Stewart. The trial court imposed concurrent life sentences. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments, but we remand for entry of corrected judgments reflecting the merger of certain counts.

The Defendant, Jason Paul Baker, appeals his conviction for premeditated first degree murder and his sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. In imposing the sentence, the jury found one aggravating circumstance: the Defendant was previously convicted of one or more felonies with statutory elements involving the use of violence to the person. See T.C.A. § 39-13-204(i)(2). On appeal, the Defendant contends: (1) the evidence established that he was insane at the time of the offense; (2) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction; and (3) the trial court erred during the penalty phase in allowing the State to rely upon the Defendant’s prior aggravated assault conviction to establish the (i)(2) aggravating circumstance. The State concedes that the trial court erred during the penalty phase, and we agree. Accordingly, we reverse the Defendant’s sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole and remand the case to the trial court for entry of a judgment reflecting a sentence of life imprisonment. We otherwise affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Rashunus B. Pearsons, was indicted for two counts of aggravated assault and two counts of harassment. Defendant was uncooperative with his appointed attorneys, and the trial court allowed Defendant to represent himself at trial. After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of all counts. On appeal, Defendant argues that his right to a speedy trial was violated, that the trial court erred by granting the State’s motion in limine to exclude mention of the victim’s immigration status, that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for aggravated assault, and that the trial court deprived him of his right to counsel. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that proper procedure was not followed to secure a waiver of the right to counsel from Defendant and that Defendant did not forfeit his right to counsel. Therefore, we reverse the judgments of the trial court and remand this case for a new trial.

The defendant, John Ewing Clemmons, appeals from the entry of an order denying his “Petition/Motion for Modification and/or Reduction of Sentence Pursuant to Rule 35 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure.” In denying the defendant’s motion, the trial court determined it no longer had jurisdiction over the defendant’s sentence. Following our review of the record, we affirm the ruling of the trial court.

The Defendant-Appellant, Stephen Douglas Smith, was convicted by a Marshall County jury of one count of rape of a child, four counts of aggravated statutory rape, and forty counts of especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor, for which he received an effective sentence of forty-one years. T.C.A. §§ 39-13-522, -506; 39-17-1005. On appeal, the Defendant argues that: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; (2) the trial court improperly admitted a thumb drive and the photographs from it into evidence; and (3) the trial court erred in denying his motion to cross examine the victim regarding her sexual history. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Eric Orlando Carter, was indicted on one count each of first degree premeditated murder, first degree felony murder, and attempted first degree murder. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-12-101, -13-202. Following a jury trial, the Defendant was convicted of first degree premeditated murder and attempted first degree murder. The jury was unable to reach a verdict on the charge of first degree felony murder. A mistrial was declared on that charge, and it was subsequently dismissed by the State. The trial court then imposed a total effective sentence of life imprisonment. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends (1) that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions; and (2) that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Little Hurricane Properties, LLC (“Plaintiff”) filed its Complaint to Remove Cloud on Title and for Injunction against Ralph Cafaro and Margetta Langlois (“Defendants”) in the Chancery Court for Cumberland County (“the Trial Court”). The properties at issue are located in Cumberland and DeKalb Counties. The Trial Court ruled in favor of Plaintiff. Defendants appealed. We hold that, to the extent Plaintiff seeks to quiet title to land in DeKalb County, Cumberland County is not the proper venue. We vacate that element of the Trial Court’s judgment and remand for this case to be transferred to an appropriate court in DeKalb County to address Plaintiff’s action to quiet title to land in that county. Otherwise, we affirm the Trial Court.

The defendant, Benny S. Towns, appeals from the entry of an order denying his “Motion to Discharge Community Supervision.” On appeal, the defendant asserts the trial court erred in not conducting a hearing on the motion and requests the matter be remanded for the same. Following our review of the record, we conclude the defendant’s motion is premature and he is not entitled to relief.

Petitioner, Kevin D. Buford, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The post-conviction court found that although Petitioner’s appellate counsel was deficient for not timely filing his application for permission to appeal to the Tennessee Supreme Court, Petitioner was not prejudiced because the Tennessee Supreme Court would have ultimately denied the appeal. On appeal, the State concedes that Petitioner was entitled to a delayed appeal. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court and remand for further proceedings in compliance with Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 28.

This appeal stems from an ouster proceeding that was commenced against the former mayor of Jellico, Tennessee. When the mayor was defeated in his bid to seek reelection, the trial court dismissed the ouster complaint as moot. Notwithstanding this outcome, the defendant argued that the trial court should consider his “Counter- Complaint” that he filed in connection with the underlying proceeding. The trial court, however, ultimately dismissed the “Counter-Complaint.” For the reasons stated herein, we affirm.

The Petitioner, Larry Carpenter, appeals from the Hawkins County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2015 guilty pleas to attempted second degree murder and especially aggravated robbery, for which he is serving an effective twenty-year sentence. The Petitioner contends that (1) he received the ineffective assistance of counsel and (2) his guilty pleas were involuntary. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Decarlos M. Murphy, appeals as of right, from the Davidson County Criminal Court’s revocation of his probationary sentence and order of incarceration for the remainder of his twelve-year sentence. The Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering his sentence into execution instead of reinstating him to community corrections or probation with a mental health and substance abuse treatment. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal involves a corporation’s debt collection action. The corporation, a steel welding and fabricating company, was previously owned jointly by husband and wife. After nearly thirty years of marriage, husband filed for divorce, after which he was awarded sole ownership of the company. Following the divorce, the corporation brought a separate suit in a different court against the former wife for money she had taken from the company and which the divorce court had determined was a debt she owed to the company. The former wife argued the debt was for rent money the company owed to her. Following a bench trial, the trial court determined that the money was a debt that the former wife owed to the corporation. We affirm.

This is a termination of parental rights case. Mother/Appellant appeals the termination of her parental rights to the minor child on the grounds of abandonment by willful failure to support and willful failure to visit. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-1-113(g)(1), 36-1- 102(1)(A)(i). Mother also appeals the trial court’s determination that termination of her parental rights is in the child’s best interest. Discerning no error, we affirm and remand.

The Petitioner, Christopher A. Howard, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance. After review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The Hamilton County Grand Jury indicted Robert A. Franklin, the Defendant-Appellant, for driving under the influence of an intoxicant (DUI by impairment), driving while the alcohol concentration in his blood or breath was 0.08% or more (DUI per se), violating the financial responsibility law, and violating the vehicle registration law. Prior to trial, Franklin filed a motion to suppress evidence from his search, seizure, and arrest on the basis that the sobriety checkpoint where this evidence was obtained was unconstitutional. After the trial court denied this motion to suppress, Franklin filed a motion to reconsider, which was also denied. Franklin next filed a motion to dismiss the indictment, or in the alternative, to exclude the evidence from his blood test, arguing that Code section 55-10- 413 is unconstitutional because it creates a fee system that violates the right to due process and a fair trial. Although Franklin’s request to dismiss the indictment or exclude the evidence was denied, the trial court granted his request for a jury instruction regarding the fee in Code Section 55-10-413(f). Thereafter, during voir dire, Franklin asserted that the State engaged in purposeful discrimination in violation of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), when it used its peremptory challenges to exclude two African-American individuals from the jury pool. At the ensuing trial, the jury convicted Franklin of DUI per se and violating the vehicle registration law but acquitted him of DUI by impairment, and the State dismissed the charge for violating the financial responsibility law. On appeal, Franklin argues that the trial court erred in: (1) denying his motion to suppress because the checkpoint was unconstitutional; (2) overruling his Batson challenge; and (3) denying his motion to dismiss the indictment, or in the alternative, to exclude the evidence based on the unconstitutionality of Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-10-413(f) (2017). Because the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress given the unconstitutionality of the checkpoint, we reverse the judgments of the trial court, vacate Franklin’s convictions, and dismiss the charges.