APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Defendant, Mark London, was convicted by an Obion County jury of aggravated assault and simple assault. At sentencing, the trial court merged the convictions, sentencing Defendant to one count of aggravated assault for three years as a Range I, standard offender. Defendant appeals his conviction, alleging that the evidence was insufficient. Because we determine that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Defendant, Lloyd Rush Pratt, Jr., appeals from his convictions for driving as an habitual motor vehicle offender, driving under the influence, and failure to exercise due care, for which he received an effective sentence of one year with 120 days to serve followed by supervised probation. Defendant argues on appeal that the trial court erred in denying a mistrial, that the State committed a Brady violation, and that the trial court allowed statements of a witness to be admitted despite her unavailability at trial. For the following reasons, we determine that the trial court erred in denying a mistrial and improperly admitting hearsay evidence. The judgments of the trial court are reversed and remanded.

Defendant, Robert L. Smith, was convicted of two counts of reckless aggravated assault in case number 18093 and of failure to appear in case number 18094 and received a total effective sentence of thirteen years with release eligibility after service of thirty-five percent of the sentence. On appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient for a rational juror to have found him guilty of two counts of reckless aggravated assault and that his sentence is excessive. After a thorough review of the facts and applicable case law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

Adam R. P. (“Father”) appeals the order of the Juvenile Court for Knox County (“the Juvenile Court”) terminating his parental rights to the minor child Ava H. (“the Child”) after finding and holding that clear and convincing evidence had been proven that grounds existed to terminate Father’s parental rights for abandonment by wanton disregard pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-1-113(g)(1) and 36-1-102(1)(A)(iv) and that it was in the Child’s best interest for Father’s parental rights to be terminated. We find and hold that grounds were proven by clear and convincing evidence to terminate Father’s parental rights and that it was proven by clear and convincing evidence that it was in the Child’s best interest for Father’s parental rights to be terminated. We, therefore, affirm.

This negligence action primarily concerns a failed attempt at service of process in an underlying healthcare liability action filed in 2008. After the dismissal of a defendant doctor in the underlying suit, the plaintiffs filed the present case asserting that the defendants prevented the doctor from being served with process in the healthcare liability action. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The trial court, among other rulings, granted the motion for summary judgment, and the plaintiffs appealed the trial court’s various rulings. In an opinion filed on April 28, 2017, we affirmed the denial of the plaintiffs’ motions for default judgment, to dismiss their own complaint as moot, and for additional time to conduct discovery; however, we vacated the order granting the defendants’ motion for summary judgment and remanded the case for entry of an order that complied with Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 56.04. On remand, the trial court again granted summary judgment explaining that its decision was based on its conclusion that no duty of care was owed by the defendants to the plaintiffs. We affirm.

Kristin McKenzie and her husband, Joshua McKenzie, filed this health care liability action individually, and on behalf of their infant child, Jacob, who sustained injuries during his birth. As a result of these injuries, Jacob has limited use of his left arm. The plaintiffs allege that defendant Dr. Matthew A. Roberts was negligent in the delivery of Jacob. They assert that he applied a vacuum extractor during the delivery without first obtaining mother’s informed consent. Following a two-week trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Dr. Roberts and his employer. Plaintiffs argue that the trial court committed several errors that entitle them to a new trial. They claim that the court erred in allowing the introduction of evidence that violates the collateral source rule. Specifically, they argue that the defendants were allowed to extensively cross-examine plaintiffs’ witnesses regarding possible health insurance benefits under the Affordable Care Act and other benefits under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act. The plaintiffs argue that the defendants pursued this line of interrogation in an attempt to show that some of Jacob’s needs would be covered by these collateral sources. The plaintiffs state that the trial court also erred in restricting the scope of the plaintiffs’ argument. Plaintiffs assert that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on the sudden emergency doctrine. Finally, they argue that the trial court erred in its jury instruction regarding the concepts of “foresight” and “hindsight.” Plaintiffs appeal, arguing reversible errors on the part of the trial court. We vacate the trial court’s judgment on the jury verdict. We affirm some of the actions of the trial court, actions that are challenged by plaintiffs. We vacate the trial court’s order awarding the defendants $81,343.47 in discretionary costs. This case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.

The Defendant, Lavelle Moore, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of two counts of theft of merchandise over $1000, a Class D felony, under alternate theories. The trial court merged the convictions and sentenced the Defendant as a career offender to twelve years at 60% in the Department of Correction, to be served consecutively to his sentence in another case. The sole issue the Defendant raises on appeal is whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain his conviction. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Jermel Brown, appeals his Shelby County Criminal Court convictions for aggravated robbery, criminal attempt to commit aggravated robbery, and aggravated assault, for which he received a total effective sentence of twenty-six years’ incarceration. Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions, arguing that the State failed to adequately prove his identity as a perpetrator of the offenses. Following a thorough review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Shelby County Criminal Court Jury convicted the Appellant, Devin Buckingham, of first degree premeditated murder, and the trial court sentenced him to life. On appeal, the Appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction; that the trial court erred by ruling that defense counsel’s notes, taken during counsel’s interview of a defense witness, qualified as Jencks material; and that the trial court erred by prohibiting defense counsel from questioning a defense witness about the victim’s prior bad acts. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we find no reversible error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Tony Thomas, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief, which petition challenged his 2010 conviction of aggravated sexual battery. In this appeal, the petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred by summarily dismissing his petition on grounds that he had filed more than one petition for post-conviction relief and that the grounds in his petition had been previously determined. The post-conviction court correctly determined that the petitioner’s claim that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel at trial was previously determined; that portion of the court’s order so holding is affirmed. Because the postconviction court erred by concluding that (1) the petitioner had filed more than one petition for
post-conviction relief and (2) the remainder of the petitioner’s claims for post-conviction relief had been previously determined, that portion of the court’s order is reversed. The case is remanded for an evidentiary hearing on those claims not previously determined.

This appeal arises from post-divorce efforts to modify a permanent parenting plan. In her petition to modify, Mother set forth distinct material changes in circumstances she claimed warranted either a change in custody or a change in the residential parenting schedule. Specifically, the petition alleged, among other things, that Father interfered with Mother’s visitation and her ability to be more involved in the children’s lives. The court found Mother did not prove any of the factual allegations in her petition by a preponderance of the evidence and thus found no material change in circumstances. From this ruling, Mother appealed. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Both parties appeal from the trial court’s order finding two grounds to terminate Mother’s parental rights, but ultimately concluding that termination was not in the child’s best interests. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

The pro se Defendant, Dewayne Cross, appeals the Blount County Circuit Court’s summary denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Rule 36.1 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure. We affirm the judgment of the trial court pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

The Petitioner, Kendall Southall, appeals from the Williamson County Circuit Court’s denial of his motion to terminate costs from his drug-related convictions between 1992 and 2002. The Petitioner contends that the trial court erred by denying relief because multiple pending civil actions existed to collect unpaid costs relative to the convictions and that the ten-year statute of limitations period prohibits the State from attempting to collect the costs. We dismiss the appeal because this court lacks jurisdiction to consider it.

A mother’s parental rights to her two daughters were terminated on the grounds of abandonment by failure to support; substantial noncompliance with permanency plans; failure to manifest an ability and willingness personally to assume legal and physical custody or financial responsibility for the children; and persistence of conditions. The court also found that termination was in the children’s best interest. The mother appeals. Upon our review, we hold that the evidence in the record does not support a finding that Mother willfully failed to abandon the children by her failure to pay support; in all other respects, we affirm the termination.

The Petitioner, Daramis Sharkey, appeals as of right from the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, wherein he challenged the validity of his guilty pleas to three counts of aggravated rape and four counts of aggravated burglary. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he did not enter into his original guilty plea knowingly and voluntarily because his attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel by inappropriately pressuring the Petitioner to enter into a plea deal rather than proceed with the jury trial. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner, Nicholas Watkins, appeals from the Madison County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner contends that his guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered because of his trial counsel’s ineffective assistance. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

On May 25, 2017, the Defendant, Kenneth Mark Jones, was convicted by a jury for the sale of less than 0.5 grams of cocaine, a Class C felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-417(a)(3). The trial court subsequently sentenced the Defendant to three years confinement as a Range I, standard offender. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction because he was merely guilty of facilitation. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Willis Holloway, was convicted of two counts of aggravated robbery, two counts of aggravated kidnapping, and one count of aggravated burglary, and the trial court imposed an effective forty-four year sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, this court affirmed the Petitioner’s conviction and sentence. See State v. Charles Jackson and Willis Holloway, No. W2010-01133-CCA-R3-CD, 2012 WL 543047, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Feb. 17, 2012), perm. app. denied (Tenn. June 22, 2012). Subsequently, the Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, and the post-conviction court denied relief. Willis Holloway v. State, No. W2014-02444-CCA-R3-PC, 2015 WL 6122155, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Oct. 16, 2015), perm. app. denied (Tenn. March 23, 2016). The Petitioner then filed a “Petition for Extraordinary Relief,” the subject of this appeal, asserting: (1) his sentences were void for duplicity; (2) his indictments were void because the charges were vague; (3) two of the indictments were defective; (4) the trial court constructively amended the indictments; and (5) trial and post-conviction counsel were ineffective. The postconviction court, treating the petition as one for post-conviction relief, found that the Petitioner’s claims had either been previously determined or waived because the Petitioner failed to raise them in his earlier appeals and denied relief. After review, we affirm.

The petitioner, Timothy A. Baxter, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Because the notice of appeal was untimely and because the interests of justice do not warrant waiver of the timely filing in this case, the appeal is dismissed.

A Campbell County Criminal Court Jury convicted the Appellant, Christopher Lee Smith, of driving under the influence (DUI), 5th offense; DUI, per se; driving on a revoked license; and violating the financial responsibility law. The trial court merged the DUI convictions and sentenced the Appellant as a Range II, multiple offender to a total effective sentence of three years, to be suspended after service of 150 days in confinement. On appeal, the Appellant contends that (1) he should have been tried on the original indictment, not the amended indictment; (2) the trial court should have granted a mistrial after the State informed the jury that the Appellant acted “feloniously,” thereby informing the jury that the Appellant had prior DUI convictions; and (3) the proof was insufficient to sustain his DUI convictions, arguing that the State failed to prove that he acted “feloniously” as alleged in the indictment. Upon review, we note that the judgment of conviction in count one incorrectly reflects that the charged offense was DUI, 3rd offense; accordingly, the case is remanded to the trial court for entry of a corrected judgment reflecting that the charged offense in count one was DUI, 5th offense. The trial court’s judgments are affirmed in all other respects.

The Defendant, Nicholas Zamarron, pleaded guilty to conspiracy to deliver 0.5 gram or more of cocaine and to three counts of possession with the intent to deliver 0.5 gram or more of cocaine. See T.C.A. § 39-17-417 (2014). He received a total effective sentence of ten years’ incarceration. On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred by denying alternative sentencing. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Davidson County Criminal Court Jury found the Appellant guilty of aggravated robbery. The trial court sentenced the Appellant as a Range II, multiple offender to eighteen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Appellant contends that (1) the trial court erred by allowing the State to introduce proof from a portion of a surveillance video that was not preserved for trial; (2) the trial court erred by allowing a State’s witness to testify regarding hearsay evidence; (3) the trial court erred by allowing a photograph lineup that had not been introduced as evidence to be taken into the jury deliberations room; (4) the evidence is not sufficient to sustain his conviction of aggravated robbery; and (5) the length of his sentence is excessive. On appeal, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal arises from a divorce. Sandra Jo Robbins (“Wife”) sued her husband Robert Scholze Robbins (“Husband”) for divorce in the Circuit Court for Hamilton County (“the Trial Court”) after approximately 20 years of marriage. Following trial, the Trial Court divided the marital estate, entered a permanent parenting plan regarding the parties’ minor children Ava and Theodore (“the Children”), and awarded Wife alimony in futuro. Husband appeals to this Court, raising a host of issues. We hold, inter alia, that the Trial Court erred in excluding Husband, pro se, and Wife’s attorney from in-chambers questioning of the Children. However, we hold further that, considering the whole record, this error by the Trial Court was not reversible error. We, therefore, affirm the judgment of the Trial Court.

In this action, the petitioner sought a declaratory judgment establishing that the marriage between her deceased father and stepmother was void ab initio. The petitioner claimed that her father was not legally divorced from her mother when the marriage occurred. The trial court denied the petition, finding that the petitioner failed to rebut the validity of the second marriage. The petitioner appeals. We affirm.