APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This is a premises liability case. Appellants sued Appellee, building owner, for negligence alleging that his injuries from a fall were due to an unsafe ladder on which he was standing to access Appellee’s HVAC units. Appellee denied all allegations and asserted comparative fault by one of the Appellants, Christopher Creech. After various pre-trial motions, the case proceeded to trial. At the close of trial, the trial court denied both motions for directed verdict. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Appellee. Appellants appeal. Discerning no error, we affirm and remand.

This appeal arises out of a petition to construe a will. The petitioner has appealed from an order requiring him to obtain an attorney within thirty days or else the matter would be dismissed. Because the order does not dismiss the petition or otherwise dispose of all the claims between the parties, we dismiss the appeal for lack of a final judgment.

This appeal arises from a personal injury lawsuit. Thomas Sutherland (“Plaintiff”) sued MP & T Hotels, LLC (“the Hotel”) in the Circuit Court for Wilson County (“the Trial Court”) for personal injuries after encountering noxious fumes in his hotel room. The Hotel raised the affirmative defense of comparative fault against Charles Stewart d/b/a Stewart and Son Termite and Pest Control (“Stewart”), who days before Plaintiff’s stay had sprayed insecticides in several of the Hotel’s rooms in keeping with a contract with the Hotel. Plaintiff thereafter sued Stewart as well. Plaintiff died during this case, and his son (“Substitute Plaintiff”) was substituted.1 For having to defend himself in this action, Stewart contends he is entitled to attorney’s fees and expenses from the Hotel under a theory of implied indemnity. The Trial Court denied the parties’ competing motions for summary judgment. Stewart appeals. Because the order appealed from is not a final judgment, this Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction, and this appeal must be dismissed. We, therefore, dismiss this appeal.

Plaintiff in this action, which recovered a judgment against the Tennessee Defendants in a New York court, sought to enroll and enforce the judgment in accordance with the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, Tennessee Code Annotated sections 26-6-101 to -108, in Davidson County Circuit Court. Defendants moved to dismiss the proceeding and to deny the New York judgment full faith and credit on the ground, inter alia, that it was void under Tennessee law. The court denied the motion, held that the judgment was entitled to full faith and credit, and enrolled the judgment. Defendants appeal; we reverse and remand the case for further proceedings.

This case involves an interlocutory appeal to the Davidson County Chancery Court (“trial court”) of an administrative decision denying a motion to compel discovery. The petitioner, Xcaliber International Ltd., LLC (“Xcaliber”), is a tobacco manufacturer. In December 2016, Xcaliber filed a petition for an administrative contested case hearing concerning a decision pending by the Tennessee Department of Revenue (“the Department”) to remove Xcaliber’s two cigarette brand families distributed in Tennessee from the Tennessee Directory of Approved Tobacco Product Manufacturers (“the Directory”). Within this administrative proceeding, Xcaliber filed a motion to compel discovery in May 2017, expressing its dissatisfaction with the Department’s responses to two sets of interrogatories, requests for admissions, and requests for production of documents. Based on the pleadings, the administrative law judge denied Xcaliber’s motion to compel. On June 20, 2017, Xcaliber filed a petition in the trial court, seeking interlocutory review of the administrative order pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 4-5-322(a)(1) (Supp. 2017). The Department subsequently filed a motion to dismiss the petition for judicial review, purportedly asserting both a facial challenge and a factual challenge to the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction over the interlocutory administrative order. Following a hearing, the trial court entered an order on August 24, 2017, granting the Department’s motion based on what the court treated as a factual challenge to subject matter jurisdiction and dismissing Xcaliber’s petition for judicial review with prejudice. Xcaliber has appealed. Having determined that the trial court has subject matter jurisdiction, we reverse and remand for review on the merits of the administrative order denying Xcaliber’s motion to compel discovery.

Defendant, John Sears, was convicted at trial of theft of property over the value of $60,000 for his theft of ownership interest in three real properties owned by family members. On appeal, Defendant argues that: (1) the evidence was insufficient for a rational juror to have found him guilty of theft of property over the value of $60,000 beyond a reasonable doubt; (2) the trial court erred in admitting lay witness testimony regarding the value of the stolen real property; and (3) cumulative error warrants the grant of a new trial. After a thorough review of the facts and applicable case law, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The Appellant, Anita H. Lane, pled guilty to theft of property valued $60,000 or more but less than $250,000, a Class B felony, with the trial court to determine the length and manner of service of the sentence. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced her as a Range I, standard offender to eleven years in confinement and ordered that she pay restitution to the victim in the amount of $255,033.05. On appeal, the Appellant contends that the trial court erred by ordering that she pay $255,033.05 in restitution when she had no ability to pay that amount and that the trial court erred by finding that she had made no effort to pay restitution to the victim when she paid the victim’s insurance carrier $100,000. The State concedes that the trial court erred by ordering restitution without making findings on the Appellant’s ability to pay but argues that the trial court properly rejected her $100,000 payment to the insurance company as a basis for mitigation. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we agree that the trial court failed to make findings regarding the Appellant’s ability to pay restitution. Therefore, we reverse the trial court’s ordering that the Appellant pay $255,033.05 and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed in all other respects.

Because the order appealed is not a final judgment, we dismiss this appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

The Petitioner, Christopher Lewis, appeals from the Putnam County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner contends that he received ineffective assistance from his trial counsel because trial counsel (1) failed to call several witnesses at trial; and (2) failed to introduce evidence “of the weather during the weekend” of the victim’s death and “additional evidence . . . regarding . . . a large hole” in the backyard of the Petitioner and victim’s home. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post conviction court.

The defendant, Troy Anthony Lozano, appeals his Montgomery County Circuit Court jury convictions of simple possession of marijuana, possession of drug paraphernalia, operating a motor vehicle without two operable tail lights, and violation of the registration law. In this appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and the denial of his motion to suppress. Discerning no error, we affirm.

A Dyer County jury convicted the Defendant, Raymond B. Thomas, of two counts of sale of dihydrocodeinone, a Schedule III controlled substance commonly referred to as Hydrocodone, within 1,000 feet of a school zone and sale of a controlled substance obtained through TennCare. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to concurrent terms of six years for each of his sale of dihydrocodeinone convictions and two years for the sale of a controlled substance obtained through TennCare conviction. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions for sale of dihydrocodeinone within 1,000 feet of a public elementary school. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Robert Burnette, of attempted first degree premeditated murder, employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and being a felon in possession of a weapon. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to life without the possibility of parole. On appeal, the Defendant claims that the trial court erred when it allowed an undisclosed and incompetent witness to testify, and that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction for attempted first degree premeditated murder. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

The Appellant, AAA Bonding Company, executed as surety an appearance bond for a defendant charged with theft, following which a general sessions court judge issued a conditional order of forfeiture. The Appellant appealed to the circuit court, which remanded the case to the lower court for entry of a final judgment. The Appellant filed a notice of appeal with this court. After review, we dismiss for lack of appellate jurisdiction.

After ten years of marriage, Karen Gaye Thompson Bounds (“Wife”) sued Kenneth Newton Bounds (“Husband”) for divorce. After a trial, the Circuit Court for Bradley County (“the Trial Court”), inter alia, awarded the parties a divorce, divided the marital property and debts, held that the marital residence was Husband’s separate property, awarded Wife alimony in solido, and awarded Wife attorney’s fees. Husband appeals raising issues regarding the award of alimony and the award of attorney’s fees. We find and hold that the Trial Court did not abuse its discretion with regard to the award of alimony or the award of attorney’s fees. We, therefore, affirm.

The unsuccessful bidder on a contract for a street resurfacing project brought suit against the City of Oak Ridge, alleging that the city had not followed the competitive bidding process mandated by its municipal code. Plaintiff’s complaint sought declaratory relief, equitable relief and damages, as well as review under a writ of certiorari. The trial court determined that the lawsuit presented a proper case for review under the common law writ of certiorari and dismissed the pleaded original causes of action, finding their joinder to be inappropriate. The certiorari action was later dismissed after the trial court determined that it was not supported by a proper oath or affirmation. On appeal, plaintiff challenges the trial court’s conclusion that this case was proper for certiorari review. We affirm.

The Appellant, Durwin L. Rucker, pled guilty in the Cheatham County Circuit Court to violating an order declaring him to be a motor vehicle habitual offender and driving under the influence (DUI) and received an effective four-year sentence to be served as sixty days in jail and the remainder on supervised probation. Subsequently, the trial court revoked his probation. On appeal, the Appellant contends that the trial court erred by ordering that he serve his effective four-year sentence in confinement. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, William Cole Nicholson, appeals his Montgomery County Circuit Court jury conviction of aggravated sexual battery. He challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the element of unlawful sexual contact and the weight of the evidence supporting the guilty verdict. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Husband, a member of the United States Army, and Wife divorced. The trial court awarded Wife a portion of Husband’s military retirement pay, including his VA disability pay. Husband took issue with the trial court’s method of calculating Wife’s share of his retirement pay, as well as its determinations as to the residential parenting schedule and child support obligations. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and vacate in part. 

A Maury County Circuit Court Jury convicted the Appellant, Aspyn Riner, of aggravated perjury, a Class D felony, and the trial court sentenced her as a Range I, standard offender to two years, six months to be served as six months in confinement and the remainder on supervised probation. On appeal, the Appellant claims that the trial court erred by denying her requests for judicial diversion and full probation and by ordering that she serve four calendar months in confinement before being eligible to earn good time credits. The State acknowledges that the trial court could not preclude the Appellant from earning good time credits but argues that the court properly sentenced her in all other respects. We agree with the State. Accordingly, the trial court’s denials of judicial diversion and full probation are affirmed, but the court’s ordering four months of confinement before becoming eligible for good time credits is reversed. The case is remanded to the trial court for correction of the judgment to so reflect.

An adoptive father appeals the dismissal of his petition to have his Georgia-issued order of adoption enforced and his children placed in his custody, rather than in the care of their biological mother with whom they currently reside. The Hamilton County Court, pursuant to the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Enforcement Act, communicated with the Superior Court for Fulton County, Georgia, where a custody petition filed by the biological mother was pending. The Georgia court, given its history with the parties, found that it was a more convenient forum, and the Hamilton County court dismissed Father’s petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Upon our review, we affirm.

Elijah O. (“Father”) appeals the October 6, 2017 order of the Circuit Court for Sevier County (“the Trial Court”) terminating his parental rights to his minor children, Sophie O., Micah O., and Samuel O. (collectively “the Children”). We find and hold that clear and convincing evidence was proven of grounds to terminate Father’s parental rights to the Children for abandonment by wanton disregard pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-1- 113(g)(1) and 36-1-102(1)(A)(iv); for substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(2); for persistent conditions pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(3); and for failure to manifest an ability to parent pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(14). We further find and hold that clear and convincing evidence was proven that it was in the Children’s best interests for Father’s parental rights to be terminated. We, therefore, affirm the termination of Father’s parental rights to the Children.

The Defendant, Ryan Patrick Broadrick, pled guilty to statutory rape, a Class E felony, in exchange for a three-year sentence on probation. Following a hearing, the trial court ordered that the Defendant was required to register as a sex offender. The Defendant appeals, arguing (1) that this court should review the trial court’s decision using a de novo standard of review, rather than an abuse of discretion with a presumption of reasonableness standard; (2) that the trial court was not authorized by Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-506(d)(2)(B) to consider anything other than the facts and circumstances of the statutory rape offense to which the Defendant pled guilty; (3) that due process principles prohibited the trial court from considering the nolled sexual exploitation of a minor count of the indictment that pertained to photographs found on the Defendant’s phone; (4) that due process of law afforded him the right to perform independent forensic testing of the photographs found on his phone; (5) that the trial court failed to articulate for the record how it took into account “the facts and circumstances of the offense” as required by the statute; and (6) that the photographs relied upon by the trial court did not depict minors engaged in sexual activity. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. However, we remand the case for entry of judgment forms for each count of the indictment.

An altercation between the residents of a home and alleged Comcast employees occurred when the alleged employees attempted to recover an unreturned modem from the residents after their service had been cancelled. The residents brought suit alleging several claims against multiple Comcast entities. Several of the entities were previously dismissed from the case. The trial court granted summary judgment to the remaining Comcast entity-defendants, having concluded that they had established that the alleged tortfeasors were independent contractors of a separate third party entity, and, as a result, the Comcast entities could not be liable. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm the judgment of the trial court and remand this case for such further proceedings as may be necessary and are consistent with this Opinion.

Defendant, Tammy Tuttle, appeals her convictions of possession of not less than 14.175 grams (0.5 ounces) but not more than ten pounds of marijuana with the intent to sell and possession of 0.5 grams or more of cocaine with the intent to sell as well as the forfeiture of $1,098,050 in United States currency. The trial court sentenced Defendant to an effective eight year sentence to serve. On appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain her convictions and that the trial court erred in ruling that the $1,098,050 was forfeited to the State. After a thorough review of the record, we hold that the evidence is sufficient for Defendant’s convictions and that we do not have jurisdiction to hear the forfeiture issue because the notice of appeal was untimely. Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of the trial court but remand for entry of corrected judgments in Counts Three and Four.