APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The majority holds that Erlanger was immune from suit pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-20-101, et seq., the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act (“GTLA”); that Ms. Wimmer failed to prove that said immunity was removed; and, in the alternative, that she failed to prove causation. I think the hospital is liable for this injury and the plaintiff should prevail.

The Defendant, William D. Lennox, Jr., appeals from the Sevier County Circuit Court’s order denying his motion to correct illegal sentences. See Tenn. R. Crim. P. 36.1. The Defendant’s counsel has filed a motion to withdraw pursuant to Rule 22 of the Rules of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals. We conclude that counsel’s motion is welltaken and, in accordance with Rule 22(F), affirm the trial court’s judgments pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals.

Following the end of the three-year term of a commercial real estate lease, the tenant continued to occupy the leased premises and pay rent to the landlord. The landlord accepted the rent payments for six months and then notified the tenant that the amount of the required rent had increased. The tenant paid the increased rent but notified the landlord that it was ending its tenancy in thirty days. Contending that the tenant had in effect exercised its option to renew the lease for an additional three years, the landlord demanded that the tenant pay rent for the remainder of the renewal term. The tenant refused, and the landlord brought this action for breach of the lease agreement. Both parties filed motions for summary judgment. Because the trial court found that the lease had not been renewed and the tenant properly terminated the resulting periodic tenancy upon thirty days’ notice, the court denied the landlord’s motion and awarded summary judgment to the tenant. We agree that the lease was not renewed, but because we conclude that the resulting periodic tenancy was year-to-year, the tenant was required to give at least six months’ notice prior to the end of the periodic tenancy. Thus, we affirm in part and reverse in part.

The trial court terminated Father’s parental rights on the ground of abandonment by demonstrating a wanton disregard for his child’s welfare. DCS failed to offer evidence that Father knew of the child’s existence when Father was engaging in the behavior that demonstrated wanton disregard. Accordingly, we reverse the termination of Father’s parental rights.

The Petitioner, William Greene, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner pled guilty to aggravated assault, being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm, and intentionally evading arrest in a motor vehicle. Pursuant to the plea agreement, he received an effective three-year sentence. The Petitioner sought post-conviction relief, asserting that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty plea was not voluntarily and intelligently entered because trial counsel failed to inform him of a special condition waiving his ability to petition to suspend the remainder of his sentence. Following a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. After review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of relief.

A Madison County jury convicted the Defendant, Corbyn Davis, of first degree premeditated murder and being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to life in prison for the murder conviction and to four years for the firearm conviction. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support each conviction. Upon reviewing the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A father filed a petition to modify his child support obligation based on a reduction in income. Following a trial, the court determined that there was a significant variance between the Tennessee Child Support Guidelines and the amount of support ordered, and the court reduced the father’s child support obligation. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This appeal arises from a judgment of divorce and an award of damages in tort.  The trial court awarded the wife an absolute divorce and full custody of their minor child.  After determining that the husband was willfully and voluntarily underemployed, the court set child support based on his earning capacity rather than his actual gross income.  Then, the court classified, valued, and divided the marital property and awarded the wife both alimony in futuro and alimony in solido.  The court also granted the wife a judgment for compensatory damages on her tort claim.  On appeal, the husband challenges the court’s determination that he is willfully and voluntarily underemployed, the valuation of the marital residence, the alimony awards, and the award of damages in tort.  After careful review, we vacate the court’s award of damages to the wife for her child’s pain and suffering.  In all other respects, we affirm.

This appeal arises from an alleged breach of contract. Lew Winters (“Winters”) sued Southern Heritage Bank (“the Bank”) in the Circuit Court for Bradley County (“the Trial Court”) for, among other things, breach of contract. Specifically, Winters asserted that the Bank wrongly backed out of a tripartite agreement involving the Internal Revenue Service (“the IRS”) which would have allowed Winters to obtain financing for new tractors and therefore be able to continue operating his trucking company. The Bank filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that no such agreement was reached. Instead, according to the Bank, the parties only engaged in discussions about a possible resolution. The Trial Court granted the Bank’s motion for summary judgment. Winters appealed to this Court. We hold, inter alia, that the purported oral agreement violates the Statute of Frauds. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court.

The petitioner, Randy Poole, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received effective assistance of counsel at trial and in filing his motion for new trial. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

This is a termination of parental rights case. The trial court terminated Appellant’s parental rights to the minor child on the grounds of: (1) abandonment by willful failure to support or visit; (2) abandonment by an incarcerated parent by wanton disregard; and (3) on grounds codified at Tennessee Code Annotated Section 36-1-113(g)(9)(A) et seq. Because Appellees did not meet their burden to show that Father willfully failed to support or visit the child, and because Appellees did not meet their burden to show that Father had the financial means to pay for his reasonable share of prenatal and postnatal support, we reverse the trial court’s findings as to these grounds. We affirm as to the other grounds found by the trial court. We also affirm the trial court’s finding that termination of Appellant’s parental rights is in the best interest of the minor child.

In May 2015, the Montgomery County Grand Jury indicted the Defendant, Christopher D. Linsey, for possession of 0.5 grams or more of cocaine with the intent to sell or deliver, simple possession of marijuana, possession of drug paraphernalia, and resisting arrest. Following a jury trial, the Defendant was convicted as charged, and the trial court sentenced the Defendant, as a Range III persistent offender, to a total effective sentence of twenty-three years. On appeal, he contends that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his conviction for possession of 0.5 grams or more of cocaine with the intent to sell or deliver, and he challenges his sentence as excessive. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Aaron Westbrook, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received effective assistance of counsel relating to the entry of his guilty plea. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The Defendant, Thomas J. Privett, entered a guilty plea to vehicular homicide by intoxication, with an agreed sentence length of ten years and the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. The trial court held a sentencing hearing and determined that the Defendant would serve his sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying alternative sentencing and in fully revoking his probation on a prior conviction. After a review of the record, we determine that there was no abuse of discretion, and we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is a termination of parental rights case. The Department of Children’s Services filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of C.K.H. (mother) with respect to her child, K.Y.H. The trial court found that clear and convincing evidence supported termination of mother’s rights based upon the persistence of conditions that led to the removal of the child. The trial court also found clear and convincing evidence that terminating mother’s rights was in the best interest of the child. Mother appeals. We affirm.

Two individuals purchased commercial property for the purpose of housing a business offering “flex loans” to consumers; the property owners were denied a building permit because the Zoning Administrator concluded that “flex loans” constituted cash advances, and consequently, the property owners’ intended use violated the requirement in the Metropolitan Nashville and Davidson County Code of Ordinances that cash advance, check cashing, or title loan businesses be at least 1,320 feet apart. The property owners appealed to the Board of Zoning Appeals, which affirmed the decision of the administrator. The property owners then petitioned for certiorari review in Davidson County Chancery Court; the court granted the writ and, after a hearing, affirmed the Board’s decision. Finding that the decision of the Board is supported by substantial and material evidence and is not arbitrary or capricious, we concur with the decision of the trial court and affirm the Board’s decision.      

This is a controversy between the City of Tullahoma and Coffee County about the proper distribution of a portion of liquor by the drink revenues collected in Tullahoma. The trial court ruled that the distribution provisions of Tenn. Code Ann. § 57-4-306(2)(A) were not effective in Coffee County and that the statute was ambiguous. The trial court resorted to the legislative history to determine that Tullahoma should keep the funds addressed in Tenn. Code Ann. § 57-4-306(2)(A). We do not find the statutory language ambiguous and reverse the decision of the trial court.

This is an interlocutory appeal as of right, pursuant to Rule 10B of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Tennessee, from the denial of a motion to recuse the Trial Court Judge filed by Stephanie Diane Metzger (“Mother”) during the final hearing in the parties’ divorce proceedings below. Having reviewed the Petition for Recusal Appeal filed by Mother, and discerning no reversible error in Trial Court’s denial of the motion, we affirm

This case involves various issues related to an ordinance the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County enacted to address short-term rental properties. Among other things, the enacted ordinance provided that no more than 3% of
non-owner-occupied single-family or two-family residential units would be granted short-term rental permits in each census tract. The plaintiffs, who previously listed their home on Airbnb.com, filed suit against the Metropolitan Government challenging the enforceability of the ordinance on several fronts. In addition to asserting that the enacted ordinance was unconstitutionally vague, the plaintiffs contended that the 3% cap on certain short-term rentals was an unlawful monopoly. After competing motions for summary judgment were filed, the trial court held that the definition of a “short-term rental property” was unconstitutionally vague as-applied to the plaintiffs, but it also held that the 3% cap did not constitute a monopoly. Given the plaintiffs’ success on their constitutional “vagueness” claim, the trial court found them to be prevailing parties under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and awarded them certain attorney’s fees. On appeal, both sides raise issues asserting error. Because several definitions contained within the governmental ordinance have been amended since the filing of this appeal, we conclude that the plaintiffs’ constitutional “vagueness” claim is now moot. Concerning the propriety of the 3% cap on non-owner-occupied short-term rentals, we have determined that the cap is constitutionally permissible even assuming that it constitutes a monopoly. For reasons discussed herein, we vacate the award of attorney’s fees and remand the issue for reconsideration.   

This is a termination of parental rights case. The trial court terminated Appellant Mother’s parental rights on the grounds of: (1) abandonment by willful failure to support; and (2) failure to substantially comply with the reasonable requirements of the permanency plan. Because Appellees did not meet their burden to show that Mother willfully failed to provide support for the children, we reverse the trial court’s order as to the ground of abandonment by willful failure to support. The trial court’s order is otherwise affirmed.

This is an action against an attorney who previously served as a Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 40A court appointed guardian ad litem for the benefit of the plaintiff and his two younger siblings in their parents’ divorce. Plaintiff alleges that he had an attorney-client relationship with the guardian ad litem, and the guardian ad litem violated the attorney-client relationship by disclosing confidential information to the divorce court after he was 18 years old. The guardian ad litem denies any liability or actionable conduct, insisting that all of her actions were pursuant to Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 40A and the Order Appointing Guardian Ad Litem in the divorce action. The trial court dismissed the complaint pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6) upon a finding that the complaint failed to state a claim because the guardian ad litem’s duties in the divorce action did not terminate when the oldest child turned 18 due to the fact that the custody proceeding concerning his two younger siblings was still ongoing, and the order of appointment authorized the guardian ad litem to disclose to the court confidential information that may affect the best interests of the children. Finding no error, we affirm.

Petitioner, Gregory Griggs, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. On June 18, 2015, Petitioner pleaded guilty to multiple offenses: attempted first degree murder; employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony; attempted aggravated robbery; possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony; and evading arrest. Petitioner received an effective sentence of 24 years’ incarceration. Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied post-conviction relief, finding that Petitioner failed to establish that his trial counsel’s performance was deficient or that he was prejudiced by any alleged deficiency. After a review of the record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Petitioner, Jeffrey Henry, was indicted in case number 13-06323 by a Shelby County Grand Jury for rape of a child and aggravated sexual battery. Petitioner was also indicted in case number 13-06324 for two counts of rape of a child and two counts of aggravated sexual battery. Petitioner entered best interest guilty pleas in both cases to each count of aggravated sexual battery in exchange for dismissal of the remaining charges. Petitioner agreed to serve an out-of-range sentence of 20 years at 100%. Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that his pleas were unknowingly and involuntarily entered. Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. After review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This is a personal injury case involving a motor vehicle accident. The alleged tortfeasor died subsequent to the injury-causing accident. The plaintiffs were unaware of the decedent’s death and commenced this suit naming him as a defendant. Some months later, after learning of the decedent’s death, the plaintiffs sought the appointment of an administrator ad litem in the Probate Court and amended their complaint naming the administrator ad litem as a party as required by the survival statute. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss arguing that the plaintiffs’ complaint was not properly filed until after the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations. The trial court agreed and granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss. The plaintiffs timely appealed. Having concluded that the plaintiffs did not properly commence their lawsuit within the time afforded by the applicable statute of limitations, we affirm.

Plaintiffs, an elderly man and his wife, sued their bank and affiliated entities and others, alleging various theories of liability. The elderly man, upon making two separate withdrawals of a large amount of cash from the bank, was robbed on two separate occasions following the withdrawals. Plaintiffs alleged that the robberies occurred because a bank employee informed her husband of the elderly couple’s address and of the large cash withdrawals. The bank filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, and the trial court granted the motion. We affirm the dismissal of several claims because the Appellants’ brief does not comply with the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. We affirm the dismissal of the remaining claims because Appellants have not stated a claim for which relief may be granted.