APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Petitioner, Michael V. Morris, appeals the Trousdale County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus in which the Petitioner challenged his classification as a career offender. We conclude that the Petitioner has failed to establish that he is entitled to habeas corpus relief, and we affirm the denial of his petition in accordance with Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

This is a termination of parental rights case. The Department of Children’s Services filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of M.L.D.N. (mother) with respect to her firstborn child, M.E.N.J. While that petition was pending, mother had a second child. The guardian ad litem for the two children later filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of mother with respect to her second-born child, M.A.L.D.1 The trial court found clear and convincing evidence supporting the termination of mother’s rights with respect to both children based on three grounds. The court found (1) substantial noncompliance with a permanency plan; (2) persistence of conditions that led to removal of the children; and (3) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to personally assume custody or financial responsibility of the children. The trial court also found clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the best interest of the children. Mother appeals. We affirm.

We granted permission to appeal in this case to clarify when two Tennessee statutes would apply to preclude a parent who owes child support arrearages from recovering proceeds from a wrongful death lawsuit. In this case, the plaintiff and the decedent were married and had one child; the plaintiff abandoned the decedent and their son soon after the child was born. The plaintiff and the decedent never divorced. The decedent spouse died unexpectedly, and soon afterward the plaintiff surviving spouse filed this wrongful death action. At the time, the plaintiff surviving spouse owed child support arrearages for four other children unrelated to the decedent. The trial court dismissed the plaintiff surviving spouse from the wrongful death lawsuit based on a provision in Tennessee’s wrongful death statutes, Tennessee Code Annotated section 20-5-107(b) (2009 & Supp. 2017), and a similar provision in Tennessee’s intestate succession statutes, Tennessee Code Annotated section 31-2-105(b) (2015 & Supp. 2017). It held that these two statutes disqualified the plaintiff from filing the wrongful death action or recovering the proceeds from it because he never provided financial support for his child with the decedent spouse and because he had child support arrearages for his four children unrelated to the decedent spouse. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part. It held that the two statutes did not bar the plaintiff from commencing the lawsuit for the wrongful death of his spouse, but it also held that they precluded him from recovering proceeds from the wrongful death lawsuit until his outstanding child support arrearages were satisfied. Consequently, the Court of Appeals ordered that the plaintiff’s recovery from the wrongful death action be paid toward satisfaction of his child support arrearages for his four children who were unrelated to the decedent spouse. On appeal, we hold that the prohibitions in Tennessee Code Annotated sections 20-5-107(b) and 31-2-105(b) apply only when (1) the “parent” who seeks to recover in the wrongful death lawsuit is a parent of the decedent child, and (2) that parent’s child support arrearage is owed for the support of that decedent child. Therefore, neither statute is applicable under the facts of this case. Accordingly, the decisions of the lower courts are reversed and vacated insofar as they applied those two statutes to this case. We affirm the Court of Appeals’ holding that newly enacted wrongful death statutes regarding a surviving spouse’s waiver based on abandonment of a decedent spouse may not be applied retroactively.

Father appeals from the termination of his parental rights to his four children. Father, who did not attend the final hearing, stipulated through counsel that a statutory ground existed for termination of his parental rights and that termination was in the children’s best interest. The juvenile court terminated Father’s parental rights based on his stipulation and the proof offered by DCS. Despite the stipulation, we conclude that there was clear and convincing evidence of a statutory ground for termination but not for the finding that termination was in the children’s best interest. Thus, we reverse the termination of Father’s parental rights and remand for entry of a judgment dismissing the petition.

The Defendant, Daniel S. Sharp, appeals from the Blount County Circuit Court’s order revoking his community corrections sentence for his convictions for three counts of aggravated assault and one count of robbery. The Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking his community corrections sentence and by ordering him to serve the remainder of his effective ten-year sentence in confinement. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

Mother appeals from the termination of her parental rights to her four children. Mother, who did not attend the final hearing, stipulated through counsel that a statutory ground existed for termination of her parental rights and that termination was in the children’s best interest. The juvenile court terminated Mother’s parental rights based on her stipulation and the proof offered by DCS. Despite the stipulation, we conclude that there was clear and convincing evidence of a statutory ground for termination but not for the finding that termination was in the children’s best interest. Thus, we reverse the termination of Mother’s parental rights and remand for entry of a judgment dismissing the petition.

Defendant, Trevor H. Taylor, pled guilty to three separate sales of cocaine. Corresponding guilty pleas to delivery of cocaine were merged with the sale of cocaine convictions. The negotiated plea agreement set a sentence of three years for each conviction, to be served concurrently with each other for an effective sentence of three years. The manner of service of the sentence was left to the determination of the trial court at a separate sentencing hearing. The trial court ordered the entire sentence to be served by incarceration. Defendant appeals, arguing that the trial court erred by denying “probation or other appropriate alternative sentencing.” After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Defendant, Shelton Stone Goss, was convicted by a Tipton County Jury of attempted  second degree murder, aggravated burglary, five counts of burglary of a vehicle, two counts of theft under $500, one count of theft over $500, one count of theft over $1,000, employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony to wit: attempted second degree murder of Joshua Halleron, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony: to wit: aggravated burglary of the Halleron residence. He received an effective fourteen-year sentence to be served in confinement. On appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Eric Dewayne Wallace, Petitioner, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus claiming that he was being illegally detained because his fifteen-year sentence for attempted first degree murder, which was ordered to be served consecutively to his life sentence for felony murder, has expired. The habeas corpus court summarily dismissed the petition. We affirm.

Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights. Because the trial court failed to provide a rationale for its decision and the final order entered by the trial court is nearly a verbatim recitation of the termination petition, we vacate the order of the trial court and remand for the entry of an order that reflects that it is the product of the trial court’s individualized decision-making and independent judgment. 

This is a termination of parental rights case involving an almost nine-year-old child, who was removed from his parents’ custody after allegations of sexual abuse, physical abuse, and a violation of the prior visitation order. On June 26, 2015, the Stewart County Juvenile Court (“trial court”) granted temporary legal custody of the child to the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”). The child was immediately placed in foster care, where he has remained since that date. Following an adjudicatory hearing, the trial court entered an order, finding the child dependent and neglected as to both parents. The father filed a notice of appeal from the adjudicatory hearing order, which appeal was still pending during trial in this matter. On September 1, 2015, DCS filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of the father. Following a bench trial, the trial court terminated the father’s parental rights to the child upon the grounds that (1) prior to incarceration, the father had abandoned the child by exhibiting a wanton disregard for the child’s welfare, (2) the conditions that led to the child’s removal from the parents’ custody persisted, and (3) he had committed severe abuse against a half-sibling of the child. The court also found clear and convincing evidence that termination of the father’s parental rights was in the best interest of the child. The trial court declined to terminate the mother’s parental rights after finding that said termination was not in the best interest of the child. The father has appealed. Having determined that there was not a final adjudicatory hearing order for purposes of res judicata due to a pending appeal, we reverse the trial court’s ruling regarding the statutory ground of persistence of conditions. We conclude that the trial court erred by including in its decision portions of evidence from the adjudicatory hearing order, which was pending on appeal, but we determine this error to be harmless. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects, including the termination of Father’s parental rights to the child. 

The defendant, Torry Holland, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition, filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1, to correct what he believes to be an illegal sentence imposed for his convictions of drug and firearms possession. Discerning no error, we affirm the trial court’s order of summary dismissal. Although we affirm the order dismissing the defendant’s motion, we do notice a clerical error in the judgment form for count 3 in case number 12-00532 that requires entry of a corrected judgment in that count.

The petitioner, Shaun Taliaferro, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief from his 2013 Haywood County Criminal Court jury convictions of second degree murder and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, for which he received an effective sentence of 44 years. In this appeal, the petitioner contends that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This is an accelerated interlocutory appeal as of right, pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B, from the trial court’s denial of a motion for recusal. Having reviewed the petition for recusal appeal, pursuant to the de novo standard as required under Rule 10B, § 2.01, we affirm the trial court’s decision to deny the motion for recusal.

Aaron Jermaine Clark (“the Defendant”) appeals the trial court’s revocation of his probation and imposition of his sentences, claiming that he should have been granted an alternative sentence so that he could continue his course of drug rehabilitation. After a review of the record and applicable law, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The Petitioner, Marlon Duane Kiser, appeals the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief challenging his 2003 first degree murder conviction and resulting death sentence. On appeal, the Petitioner alleges that the postconviction court should have granted post-conviction relief based upon allegations of the ineffective assistance of counsel during the guilt-innocence phase of the trial, the original trial judge’s failure to recuse himself for an inappropriate relationship with a victimwitness coordinator, the perjured testimony of a witness, and newly-discovered evidence raising doubt as to his guilt. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the postconviction court.

In this action, the Tennessee Department of Revenue (“the Department”) sought to collect unpaid franchise and excise taxes owed by a dissolved corporation from its former shareholder. The trial court entered a judgment in favor of the shareholder, determining that the Department could not collect on the assessments originally issued in 2008 and 2009 due to the six-year statute of limitations contained in Tennessee Code Annotated § 67-1-1429. The trial court also determined that the shareholder was not a “person” or “taxpayer” subject to franchise and excise taxes because those taxes are assessed solely against entities such as corporations. Finally, the trial court determined that the shareholder had no personal liability for the taxes owed by the dissolved corporation absent proof of a fraudulent conveyance. The Department timely appealed. Determining that the trial court erred in its construction and application of the applicable tax statutes, we reverse the judgment in favor of the shareholder.

The parents in this action challenge inter alia, the juvenile court’s decisions regarding calculation of the parents’ income for child support purposes and the modification of the final co-parenting order. Because the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s findings, we affirm.

This appeal arises from a combined judgment of divorce and an award of damages in tort. After awarding the husband a divorce, the court classified, valued, and divided the marital property. The court also granted the husband a judgment for compensatory and punitive damages arising from an intentional tort committed by the wife. The wife raises numerous issues on appeal, including the classification of marital property, the equitable division of the marital estate, and the amount of the damages award. Because the court’s order lacks sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law to explain its division of the marital estate or the amount of punitive damages awarded, we vacate those portions of the court’s judgment and remand for entry of an order in compliance with Rule 52.01 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. In all other respects, we affirm.

The Defendant, Kyle J. Dodd, was convicted by a jury of driving under the influence (DUI), second offense, a Class A misdemeanor. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 55-10-401, - 402(a)(2). The trial court imposed a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days with fifty days to be served in confinement and the remainder to be served on supervised probation. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his statements to the investigating officer and “all evidence derived from” his statements because the officer did not properly inform him of his rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). However, our review of the record reveals that the Defendant failed to raise this issue in a timely motion for new trial; thereby, waiving full appellate review. Additionally, we conclude that plain error review of the issue is not warranted. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is a custody case involving the minor children of unmarried parties. C.W.H. (hereinafter “Father”) and L.A.S. (hereinafter “Mother”) agreed to a modification of an existing parenting plan in 2013. Subsequently, Father learned information to which he was not privy during the settlement conference, namely, that Mother had relocated from her state of residence (Ohio) to Nevada with the parties’ minor children, where she was employed as a prostitute. Father filed a motion for an emergency temporary custody order and a temporary restraining order. Father prevailed in a hearing before the juvenile court magistrate and was designated as the primary residential parent. Mother requested a hearing before the juvenile court. Following a hearing, the juvenile court found a material change in circumstances and upheld the magistrate’s determination. Mother appealed to the Court of Appeals, which vacated and remanded the case for the juvenile court to conduct a best interest analysis. On remand, the juvenile court affirmed its earlier findings regarding a material change in circumstances and, in addition, concluded that changing the primary residential parent from Mother to Father was in the best interest of the children. Mother again appealed to the Court of Appeals, which concluded “that the evidence preponderate[d], in part but significantly, against the juvenile court’s factual findings,” reversed the juvenile court, and mandated that its order be carried out within twenty days. We granted Father’s application for permission to appeal pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 11 to decide, as set forth in Father’s application, whether “the Court of Appeals err[ed] in reversing the [juvenile court] and awarding Mother custody of the minor children” and whether “the Court of Appeals err[ed] in ordering the change in custody prior to an opportunity for the Father to appeal to this Court?” We answer both questions in the affirmative, reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals, and remand this matter to the juvenile court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

This appeal arises from a dispute over the grant of a zoning variance. Earl Scott Moore and Joetta Moore (“the Moores,” collectively) applied for a variance in order to build a carport at their home. The Moores’ neighbors, Michael Cobble and Lora Cobble (“the Cobbles,” collectively) opposed the requested variance. The Greene County Board of Zoning Appeals (“the BZA”) rejected the Moores’ application. The Moores submitted a second application, this time reducing their request by seven feet so as not to protrude into a public right-of-way. The BZA granted the Moores’ application for a variance. The Cobbles filed a petition for common law writ of certiorari in the Chancery Court for Greene County (“the Trial Court”). The Trial Court concluded that material evidence supported the BZA’s decision to grant the variance and dismissed the Cobbles’ petition. The Cobbles appealed to this Court. We affirm the Trial Court in its declining to hold that res judicata barred the Moores’ second application for a variance. We hold further that, because the Moore property is not distinguishable in any meaningful way, the BZA’s decision to grant a variance was not supported by material evidence. We affirm, in part, and reverse, in part, the judgment of the Trial Court.

An advanced practice nurse worked at three different testosterone clinics in the Memphis area and was charged with violating portions of the Nursing Practice Act and the rules and regulations governing nurses. The Tennessee Board of Nursing (the “Board”) held a hearing and determined that the evidence supported many of the alleged offenses. The Board revoked the nurse’s certificate to practice as an advanced practice nurse, revoked the nurse’s license to practice as a registered nurse in Tennessee and the multistate privilege to practice in any other party state, and assessed civil penalties against her that totaled $7,200. The nurse sought judicial review of the Board’s decision, and the trial court affirmed the Board’s decision. The nurse then appealed the Board’s decision to this court. Concluding that substantial and material facts support the Board’s findings, we affirm the Board’s decision.

Plaintiff sued a physician, alleging that the physician’s handshake caused her injuries and that the physician failed to properly document her medical records. The trial court dismissed plaintiff’s claims for failure to comply with the pre-suit notice and certificate of good faith requirements of the Health Care Liability Act. We conclude that the claim of failure to properly document plaintiff’s medical records relates to the provision of, or failure to provide, health care services. Therefore, we affirm the dismissal of that claim for failure to comply with the Health Care Liability Act’s procedural requirements. But we conclude the trial court erred in dismissing plaintiff’s claim for injuries allegedly caused by the physician’s handshake. Thus, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.

This is a child custody case. Mother appeals the trial court’s determination that Father should be designated as the child’s primary residential parent. Father requests attorney’s fees for defending this appeal. Discerning no error, we affirm the decision of the trial court. This Court deems the appeal frivolous and remands this matter to the juvenile court to determine attorney’s fees and costs to be awarded to Father.