APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Dannie Weaver, the Petitioner, entered a best interest plea to driving under the influence, possession of a Schedule VI controlled substance with prior convictions, possession of a Schedule II drug, possession of drug paraphernalia, and a violation of the seat belt law. The Petitioner received a total effective sentence of four years with thirty-five percent release eligibility, which was suspended to probation following the service of thirty-five days in jail. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief and alleged that trial counsel’s performance was deficient and that, absent the deficient performance, the Petitioner would have proceeded to trial. The Petitioner also alleged that his best interest plea was involuntary and unknowing. The post-conviction court denied relief and the Petitioner appealed. After a thorough review of the facts and applicable case law, we affirm.

The Defendant, Trevial Moss, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of aggravated robbery and sentenced to twelve years’ confinement. In this direct appeal, the Defendant argues that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction; (2) the verdict is contrary to the law and weight of the evidence; (3) the State withheld discovery material in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963); and (4) the trial court erred in imposing the maximum sentence. Upon our review, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Following a bench trial, the Defendant, Curtis Johnson, Jr., was convicted of three counts of aggravated robbery, one count of aggravated burglary, and one count of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony and was sentenced to twenty-four years’ imprisonment. The sole issue presented for our review is whether the trial court abused its discretion by imposing partially consecutive sentences. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Purchasers of an unimproved parcel of real property filed suit against their grantor’s seller, claiming that the seller violated the warranty of title that it issued to the purchasers’ grantor. This action was filed several years after a related class action lawsuit was concluded in which the trial court ruled that the class plaintiffs’ units were properly classified as condominiums rather than fee simple estates. The trial court in the instant action dismissed the complaint on grounds of res judicata and estoppel by deed, among other grounds. The purchasers appeal, and we affirm the trial court’s judgment.  

The Petitioner, Keenan Scott McNeal, appeals from the Blount County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction for the sale of one-half gram or more of a substance containing cocaine within 1000 feet of a child care facility, for which he is serving an eight-year sentence. On appeal, he contends that he received the ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Joseph D. Sexton, entered an open guilty plea to one count of attempted aggravated sexual battery. The trial court held a sentencing hearing and sentenced the Defendant to five years of incarceration. The Defendant appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in calculating the length of the sentence based on the enhancing and mitigating factors presented and that the trial court erred in denying alternative sentencing. After a thorough review of the record, we determine that there was no abuse of discretion, and we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Michael Mayuric (“Employee”) was employed by Huff & Puff Trucking, Inc. (“Employer”) as an over-the-road truck driver. While driving through Minnesota, his truck slid off the road. He developed post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”) after the accident. He brought this action, alleging that he was permanently and totally disabled as a result of the accident. Employer denied that Employee was totally disabled. The trial court found that Employee had sustained 80% permanent partial disability from the incident. Employer has appealed. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the judgment.

The Petitioner, Bryiant C. Overton, appeals from the Rutherford County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for aggravated kidnapping, aggravated robbery, attempted first degree murder, and conspiracy to commit kidnapping, for which he is serving an effective forty-eight-year sentence. On appeal, he contends that the post-conviction court erred in denying relief on his ineffective assistance of counsel claims relative to trial counsel’s performance, that he received the ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel, and that he was subject to inappropriate questions at the post-conviction hearing about the facts of the conviction offenses. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner, Dennis Rasheed Gaye, appeals from the Knox County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2014 guilty plea to possession with intent to sell 0.5 gram or more of cocaine within 1000 feet of a drug-free childcare zone, for which he is serving an eight-year sentence. The Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred by failing to dismiss the indictment because the judgment did not reflect the proper conviction. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Joshua Michael Stewart, was found guilty by a Knox County Criminal Court jury of rape of a child, a Class A felony, and two counts of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-15-522 (2014) (rape of a child), 39-13-504 (2014) (aggravated sexual battery). The trial court sentenced the Defendant to twenty-five years for rape of a child, twelve years for aggravated sexual battery, and eight years for aggravated sexual battery. The court ordered partial consecutive service, for an effective sentence of thirtythree years at 100% service. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions and (2) the court erred by denying his request to exclude references to his tattoos and relationship with his father from the recording of his police interview. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal concerns termination of a father’s parental rights. The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition in the Juvenile Court for Shelby County (“the Juvenile Court”) seeking to terminate the parental rights of Kenneth F. (“Father”) to his minor child Ken’bria B. (“the Child”). After a trial, the Juvenile Court entered an order terminating Father’s parental rights to the Child. Father timely appealed to this Court. On appeal, Father argues, among other things, that he has an upcoming opportunity for parole and, therefore, the ground of incarceration for ten years or longer when the child is less than eight years of age should not apply. We affirm the judgment of the Juvenile Court.

The Petitioner, Joseph Miles, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus, in which he challenged his second degree murder conviction and resulting forty-year sentence. We conclude that the Petitioner has failed to establish that he is entitled to habeas corpus relief, and we affirm the denial of his petition in accordance with Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

Defendant, Calvin Reeves, appeals the trial court’s entry of amended judgment forms, without notice to him, which removed pretrial jail credit from two of his three consecutive sentences. He claims those credits were part of his negotiated plea agreement. Based upon our review of the record, the triplicate award of pretrial jail credit was a clerical error such that the trial court had the authority to amend the judgments under Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36. However, the amended judgment form for Count One still contains a clerical error when compared with the actual pretrial jail credit awarded during the plea submission hearing. Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s judgments in part, reverse in part, and remand for the entry of a corrected judgment form on Count One.

The Defendant, Jerica Elizabeth Taylor, was convicted by a Davidson County Criminal Court jury of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony. See T.C.A. § 39-13-402 (2014). The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I, standard offender to eleven years’ confinement at 85% service. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support her conviction, (2) the trial court improperly limited her cross-examination of the victim, (3) the photograph lineup was improperly admitted as evidence, and (4) the trial court erred during sentencing. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This interlocutory appeal arises out of an action in which two companies brought suit against their former attorney for legal malpractice. The attorney moved for summary judgment as to one client’s claim, contending that the claim was barred by the statute of limitations; the client responded that it learned of its cause of action within one year of the assertion of the claim. The attorney then sought through discovery to have the former client produce communications from the client’s new counsel; the client declined to produce the communications, taking the position that they were protected by the attorney-client privilege. The attorney moved the trial court to compel the client to produce the communications, and the court granted the motion, holding that the client impliedly waived attorney-client privilege in asserting that the client discovered the cause of action within the year preceding the assertion of the claim. Discerning no error, we affirm the trial court’s holding.

This is a will contest. The trial court denied Appellant’s motion to set aside its order admitting Decedent’s will to probate and, subsequently, struck Appellant’s motion to amend his counter-petition because such amendment would be futile. The trial court additionally found that Decedent possessed testamentary capacity to execute a holographic will, and that although there was a confidential relationship between Decedent and Beneficiary, Beneficiary provided clear and convincing evidence to rebut the presumption of undue influence. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This case involves the appeal of an action for possession of property initially filed in general sessions court. On appeal to the circuit court, the trial court dismissed the appellant’s counterclaims for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The circuit court thereafter determined that the appeal from general sessions court was not timely. We reverse the circuit court’s dismissal of the general sessions appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction but affirm the dismissal of the appellant’s counterclaims.

This is an interlocutory appeal as of right from certification of a class. Plaintiff, a physician-owned independent practice association, and Defendant, an organization that owns several hospitals and medical clinics, formed a physician-hospital organization to further their mutual interests, such as joint negotiations with entities such as insurance companies. Plaintiff filed this class action lawsuit alleging, among other things, that Defendant breached the contractual non-solicitation and non-competition agreement between the parties, which caused harm to Plaintiff and its members. Plaintiff moved to certify a class consisting of itself and its members, and Defendant objected. The trial court certified the class with respect to all claims pursuant to each of the three categories of class actions specified in Rule 23.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. We reverse the trial court’s certification of the class pursuant to Rule 23.02 subsection (1) of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. We affirm the judgment of the trial court and certification of the class pursuant to subsections (2) and (3) of Rule 23.02 and remand for further proceedings.

Jamie Jordan (“Employee”) is employed by the City of Murfreesboro (“Employer”) as a trash collector. He allegedly sustained a low back injury on May 22, 2012, when lifting a wet sofa into a refuse truck. Employer denied his claim for workers’ compensation benefits claiming, both, he failed to provide timely notice of his injury and his symptoms were caused by a preexisting condition. The trial court held Employee sustained a compensable injury and awarded 6% permanent partial disability benefits. Employer appeals. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm.

This appeal arises from a divorce action following a four-year marriage. The issues pertain to the trial court’s classification of the wife’s business as her separate property, the valuation and division of the marital property, and its rulings on the husband’s numerous pretrial motions for civil contempt, pendente lite support, and recusal of the trial judge. The trial court denied all of the husband’s motions and ordered the husband to pay the attorney’s fees that the wife incurred in defending certain repetitious motions. After a two-day trial, the court declared the parties divorced, classified their property as separate or marital, and valued and divided the marital property. One of the marital assets was a patent application that had been denied, which the court valued at $0.00 and awarded to the wife. The husband raises eleven issues on appeal. We reverse the award to the wife of the attorney’s fees she incurred in defending the husband’s numerous pretrial motions. We affirm the trial court in all other respects.
 

Worker commenced this action in the general sessions court seeking compensation for miscellaneous work performed at defendant’s residence. When the plaintiff prevailed in the general sessions court, the defendant filed a timely notice of appeal to the circuit court. After the circuit court set the case for trial on April 20, 2017, the parties entered an agreed order to continue the trial to allow the parties to mediate the claim. The agreed order also reset the trial for June 8, 2017. The parties agreed to a mediator and date and time for the mediation but neither the defendant nor her attorney attended. When the case came on for trial, neither the defendant nor her attorney appeared, and the trial proceeded. After the plaintiff presented his evidence, the court awarded the plaintiff a judgment for $24,952.91. The defendant appeals without identifying a specific issue. It appears that the defendant is contending that the trial court erred by proceeding with the trial in her absence. She also appears to be contending that she had been in a romantic relationship with plaintiff and that all of the work he did around her house was gratuitous. We find no abuse of discretion with the trial court’s decision to proceed with the trial. Because there is neither a transcript of the evidence nor a statement of the evidence, we must assume that the record, had it been preserved, would have contained sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s factual findings at trial. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is one of four separate actions currently before this Court with the common issue of whether the version of Tennessee Code Annotated § 57-4-306(a)(2)(A) in effect prior to the July 2014 amendment of that statute required a municipality governed by its own liquor-by-the-drink referendum and operating its own school system to share one-half of its liquor-by-the-drink tax revenue with the county in which the municipality was located when the county had not enacted a liquor-by-the-drink referendum. The county commenced the instant action by filing a complaint requesting declaratory judgment of its asserted right to a portion of liquor-by-the-drink tax revenue collected within the municipality. The city filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, or in the alternative, for summary judgment. Following a hearing, the trial court denied the municipality’s motion for summary judgment and granted declaratory judgment to the county, declaring that the municipality was required to share with the county its liquor-by-the-drink tax monies distributed to it by the Tennessee Commissioner of Revenue (“the Commissioner”) in the manner that county property tax was expended and distributed. The trial court reserved issues of prejudgment interest and the amount of unremitted tax revenue for an evidentiary hearing. The municipality subsequently filed an unopposed motion for interlocutory appeal, which was granted, respectively, by the trial court and this Court. Determining that the municipality was not required under the applicable version of the statute to share its liquor-by-the-drink tax revenue with the county, we reverse the trial court’s grant of declaratory judgment and grant summary judgment in favor of the municipality, dismissing the county’s complaint.

This is one of four separate actions currently before this Court with the common issue of whether the version of Tennessee Code Annotated § 57-4-306(a)(2)(A) in effect prior to the July 2014 amendment of that statute required a municipality governed by its own liquor-by-the-drink referendum and operating its own school system to share one-half of its liquor-by-the-drink tax revenue with the county in which the municipality was located when the county had not enacted a liquor-by-the-drink referendum. The county commenced the instant action by filing a complaint requesting declaratory judgment of its asserted right to a portion of liquor-by-the-drink tax revenue collected within the municipality. Upon subsequent competing motions for summary judgment, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the municipality, finding that the municipality was entitled to keep all liquor-by-the-drink tax monies distributed to it by the Tennessee Commissioner of Revenue (“the Commissioner”). Upon the county’s motion to alter or amend, the trial court reserved judgment on the issue of whether the municipality was entitled to the local political subdivision’s portion of the liquor-by-the-drink tax revenue for sales that took place at private clubs within the municipal limits of the municipality prior to the municipality’s 2002 passage of its referendum authorizing liquor-by-the-drink sales. Following consideration of a motion for summary judgment on this remaining issue filed by the municipality and a response filed by the county, the trial court again granted summary judgment in favor of the municipality, dismissing the county’s complaint in its entirety. The county has appealed. Determining that the municipality was not required under the applicable version of the statute to share its liquor-by-the-drink tax revenues with the county, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

This is one of four separate actions currently before this Court with the common issue of whether the version of Tennessee Code Annotated § 57-4-306(a)(2)(A) in effect prior to the July 2014 amendment of that statute required a municipality governed by its own liquor-by-the-drink referendum and operating its own school system to share one-half of its liquor-by-the-drink tax revenue with the county in which the municipality was located when the county had not enacted a liquor-by-the-drink referendum. The county initially filed separate complaints against the two municipalities involved in this appeal, requesting declaratory judgment as to the county’s asserted right to a portion of liquorby- the-drink tax revenue collected within each municipality. The municipalities each respectively filed answers denying the county’s claims, as well as counterclaims asserting that the county owed them a portion of liquor-by-the-drink tax revenue collected from private clubs located within the county but outside the incorporated limits of the municipalities. By agreement, the trial court subsequently consolidated the actions. Upon competing motions for summary judgment, the trial court granted partial summary judgment in favor of the municipalities and dismissed the county’s claims, finding that the municipalities were entitled, respectively, to keep all liquor-by-the-drink tax monies distributed to them by the Tennessee Commissioner of Revenue (“the Commissioner”). The county filed a motion to alter or amend this judgment, and the municipalities filed a motion for summary judgment on their counterclaims. In a subsequent order, the trial court denied the county’s motion to alter or amend and granted summary judgment in favor of the municipalities on their counterclaims, awarding money judgments against the county in favor of each municipality. The county has appealed solely the judgment dismissing its claims against the municipalities. Determining that the municipalities were not required under the applicable version of the statute to share their liquor-by-the-drink tax revenues with the county, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

This is one of four separate actions currently before this Court with the common issue of whether the version of Tennessee Code Annotated § 57-4-306(a)(2)(A) in effect prior to the July 2014 amendment of that statute required a municipality governed by its own liquor-by-the-drink referendum and operating its own school system to share one-half of its liquor-by-the-drink tax revenue with the county in which the municipality was located when the county had not enacted a liquor-by-the-drink referendum. The county commenced the instant action by filing a complaint requesting declaratory judgment of its asserted right to a portion of liquor-by-the-drink tax revenue collected within the two municipalities involved in this appeal. Following the trial court’s denial of a motion to dismiss filed by the municipalities, the municipalities filed a motion for summary judgment. The county subsequently amended its complaint to, in the alternative, request reimbursement of the portion of liquor-by-the-drink tax revenue it had previously distributed to the municipalities’ respective school systems from liquor-by-the-drink gross receipts collected at private clubs located within the county but outside the incorporated limits of the municipalities. The county then filed a motion for partial summary judgment on the original issue of the cities’ purported liability to share a portion of their liquor-by-the-drink tax revenue with the county. Following a hearing, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the municipalities, finding that the municipalities were entitled, respectively, to keep all liquor-by-the-drink tax monies distributed to them by the Tennessee Commissioner of Revenue (“the Commissioner”). The county filed a motion to alter or amend, which the trial court granted insofar as it found that the county’s claims for alternative relief had not been properly before the court when the judgment was entered. Upon subsequent competing motions for summary judgment, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the municipalities on the alternative claims as well. The county has appealed. Determining that the municipalities were not required under the applicable version of the statute to share their liquor-by-the-drink tax revenues with the county but that the county was required to share tax revenue from liquor-by-the-drink sales within unincorporated areas of the county with all school systems in the county, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.