APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

After a jury trial, the defendants, Leon Denton and Devan Denton, were convicted of three counts of aggravated rape, one count of facilitation of aggravated rape, one count of facilitation of especially aggravated robbery, and two counts of facilitation of aggravated robbery. On appeal, the defendants assert the evidence was insufficient to support their convictions, arguing the State failed to overcome the defense of duress. The defendants also claim their right to a speedy trial was violated. Independently, Leon Denton argues his convictions violate double jeopardy. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Errol Johnson, was convicted of two counts of aggravated child neglect, a Class A felony, and two counts of criminally negligent homicide, a Class E felony. The trial court merged the two aggravated child neglect convictions and sentenced the defendant as a violent offender to twenty-two years in the Department of Correction. The trial court also merged the defendant’s convictions for criminally negligent homicide and sentenced him to two years. The defendant’s sentences were ordered to be served concurrently for an effective sentence of twenty-two years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions for aggravated child neglect and that the trial court imposed an excessive sentence. We conclude that the evidence is sufficient to sustain the jury’s verdict and affirm the judgments of the trial court. However, because aggravated child neglect is not an enumerated offense included in Tennessee Code Annotated § 40-35-501(i)(2), the trial court erred in its applying the statute and sentencing the defendant as a violent offender at 100% release eligibility. Therefore, we remand the matter for a new sentencing hearing.

The petitioner, Tony Britton, appeals pro se from the summary dismissal of his 2015 petition for post-conviction relief, which challenged his 2011 guilty-pleaded conviction of second degree murder. Because the petition was filed well beyond the applicable statute of limitations and because the petitioner failed to prove a statutory exception to the timely filing or a due process tolling of the statute of limitations, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Holly Rader (“Plaintiff”) appeals the August 4, 2016 order of the Circuit Court for Knox County (“the Trial Court”) granting summary judgment to Ruby Tuesday, Inc. (“Ruby Tuesday”) in this slip and fall action after finding that Ruby Tuesday did not have superior, actual, or constructive knowledge of the condition that caused Plaintiff’s slip and fall. We find and hold that Ruby Tuesday did have superior, actual, or constructive knowledge of the condition that caused the slip and fall and owed a duty to Plaintiff. We, therefore, vacate the grant of summary judgment and remand this case for further proceedings.

William Harold Smith, alias (“the Defendant”), was convicted of failure to appear after a jury trial. The trial court sentenced him to serve three years with a thirty-five percent release eligibility in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence introduced at trial was insufficient to support his conviction. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we reverse the Defendant’s conviction and dismiss the charge.

In this divorce case, Edward Keith Morelock (Husband) appeals the trial court’s decisions regarding (1) co-parenting time with the parties’ child; (2) division of marital property, (3) valuation of one of the marital assets, and (4) refusal of the court to award him spousal support. Husband argues that the trial court should have designated him primary residential parent and granted him more residential time with the child. He also asserts that the trial court overvalued the business owned by the parties, and that the court should have equally divided the assets and liabilities of that business rather than awarding and assigning all of them to him. Finally, he argues that the trial court should have ordered Ruth Ellen Mick Morelock (Wife) to pay him alimony. Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The Defendant, Jabriel Linzy, alias, appeals as of right from his convictions for first degree murder, attempted first degree murder, and employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. The Defendant argues (1) that there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions, and (2) that evidence from social media posts was improperly admitted. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A prison inmate filed a health care liability action against two physicians and a medical center without providing the defendants with pre-suit notice, as required by Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121(a), and without attaching a certificate of good faith to the complaint, as required by Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-122. The defendants filed motions to dismiss, which the trial court granted. The inmate appealed, and we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

This is a legal malpractice action in which the trial court granted partial summary judgment to the defendants, a law firm and its owners, on the plaintiff’s claim for lost profits and, in due course, granted summary judgment to the defendants on the remaining claims. The underlying suit arose from a failed real estate transaction in which a judgment for $200,000 for failure to perform a contract to purchase land for development was entered against the plaintiff in this action. The plaintiff appeals, contending that the court erred in various respects in granting the motions for summary judgment. Upon a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court in all respects.

This is an appeal of the termination of a tenured teacher’s employment pursuant to the Tenure Act, Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 49-5-501
and -515. The Cheatham County Director of Schools initiated these proceedings by filing a notice of charges recommending the termination of the tenured teacher on the grounds of insubordination and inefficiency. Following an administrative hearing, the hearing officer recommended dismissal. When the Cheatham County Board of Education voted to sustain the hearing officer’s decision and to dismiss the tenured teacher, the teacher sought review of the decision in the chancery court. The chancery court affirmed her dismissal, and this appeal followed. We have determined that the evidence preponderates against the chancery court’s factual findings and its conclusion that the teacher was insubordinate and inefficient as those terms are defined in the Tenure Act. We have also determined that the record fails to establish any basis for the dismissal of a tenured teacher. Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the chancery court and remand with instructions for the chancery court to determine the relief to which the tenured teacher is entitled for being dismissed without justification. This includes whether the teacher is entitled to back pay pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-5-511(a)(3) and, if so, in what amount. 

The Petitioner, Larry A. Pullum, appeals from the Wayne County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The habeas corpus court dismissed the petition because it failed to state a cognizable claim. We affirm its judgment.

This is an appeal from a divorce case dissolving a long-term marriage with two minor children. Following a four and one-half day trial, the court awarded Wife a divorce, designated Husband as the primary residential parent of the parties’ children, distributed the marital property, awarded Wife rehabilitative alimony, and denied Wife’s request for attorney’s fees. Wife appeals the designation of Husband as primary residential parent, the value and division of certain items within the marital estate, the court’s decision to award her rehabilitative alimony rather than alimony in futuro, and the denial of her request for attorney’s fees. We vacate the trial court’s order regarding retroactive child support and remand the issue for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We affirm the remainder of the judgment of the trial court. We deny Wife’s request for attorney’s fees incurred on appeal.

This action arises out of an alleged violation of the plaintiff’s civil rights by the City of Clarksville (“the City”) and a group of police officers employed by the City (“the Officers”) (collectively, “Defendants”). The plaintiff was arrested on June 1, 2015, for driving on a revoked or suspended license, see Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-50-504 (2012), and making a 911 telephone call in a nonemergency situation, see Tenn. Code Ann. § 7-86-316 (2015). The plaintiff filed a complaint on August 11, 2016, alleging that as a result of his arrest, the Officers caused him to suffer damages from false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, malicious harassment, outrageous conduct, intentional infliction of emotional distress, conversion, and inverse condemnation. The plaintiff also alleged violations of his civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss on October 5, 2016, asserting, inter alia, that the plaintiff’s claims were statutorily barred due to the immunity granted to Defendants by the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act (“GTLA”). See Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-205 (2012). The trial court entered a final order regarding Defendants’ motion to dismiss on November 17, 2016, granting the motion and dismissing all claims. The plaintiff has appealed. Discerning no error, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s claims.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Petitioner, Sebastian Pegues, of two counts of first degree felony murder, one count of aggravated child abuse, and one count of aggravated child neglect, and the trial court sentenced him to life plus twenty years of incarceration. This court affirmed the Petitioner’s convictions and sentence on appeal. State v. Sebastian Pegues, No. W2014-00854-CCA-R3-CD, 2015 WL 3404736, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, May 27, 2015), no Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application filed. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel ineffectively cross-examined the medical examiner. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. We affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

This is an appeal from an order terminating the parental rights of the appellant to his minor children. The only Notice of Appeal filed by the appellant within the time provided in Rule 4(a) of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure for the filing of a notice of appeal, did not comply with Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-124(d), which states: “Any notice of appeal filed in a termination of parental rights action shall be signed by the appellant.” Because this Notice of Appeal was insufficient to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court, this appeal is dismissed.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Calvin Banks, of first degree premeditated murder and the trial court imposed a sentence of life. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the evidence supporting his conviction is insufficient because the State failed to establish premeditation. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The Defendant, Donald Ragland, appeals the trial court’s summary dismissal of his motion to correct a clerical error pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36. The Defendant has failed to present an appropriate argument under Rule 36; therefore, we affirm the summary dismissal pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

A Stewart County jury convicted the Defendant, Mark L. Watson, of vandalism of property valued at $1,000 or more but less than $10,000. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to two years on probation. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Michael Dean Sexton, was convicted of one count of theft over $10,000 and one count of vandalism over $10,000. He received concurrent sentences of nine years for each count to be served on supervised probation. On appeal, Defendant raises the following issues: (1) Whether the trial court properly discharged a juror (Defendant’s Issues I and II); (2) Whether the State was required to make an election of offenses and whether the trial court properly declined to issue a jury instruction (Defendant’s Issues III and IV); and (3) Whether the trial court erred by permitting the name of the co-defendant to be redacted from the indictment and whether the trial court refused to allow Defendant to introduce a copy of the unredacted indictment into evidence. (Defendant’s Issues V and VI). After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Carl Bond, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of one count of aggravated robbery. Over a year after this Court affirmed his conviction, the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief. The trial court subsequently denied the petition on its merits. Following our review of the record and pertinent authorities, we conclude the petition was untimely, and this Court is without jurisdiction to consider this appeal. Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal.

The Defendant, Kristie Louise McLerran, entered a plea of nolo contendere to attempted aggravated child neglect, a Class B felony, as a Range I, standard offender and to serve an eight-year term with manner of service to be determined by the trial court. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed a term of incarceration, finding that confinement was necessary to avoid depreciating the seriousness of the offense. The Defendant appeals the trial court’s denial of alternative sentencing. We conclude that the trial court did not err in sentencing the Defendant to a term of imprisonment. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal concerns a claim of retaliatory discharge. After a trial before a jury, judgment was entered against the defendant employer. The plaintiff was awarded $225,000 in compensatory damages and $200,000 in punitive damages. The employer appeals. We affirm.

We accepted certification of questions of law from the United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee, which require us to determine: (1) whether, for split confinement sentences, Tennessee law authorizes a sentencing court to fix a percentage of the sentence that a defendant must serve in actual confinement before becoming eligible to participate in a work program in the local jail or workhouse; and (2) whether Tennessee law imposes a duty on a sheriff to challenge an inmate’s improper or potentially improper sentence. We conclude (1) that for split confinement sentences Tennessee trial judges are authorized to fix a percentage the defendant must serve in actual confinement before becoming eligible to earn work credits; and (2) that sheriffs in Tennessee have no duty to challenge an inmate’s sentence as improper or potentially improper.

This is a will contest. The affidavit attached to the purported will was signed, in the presence of the testator, by two witnesses. At the hearing on the will contest, both witnesses and the notary public testified as to the validity of signatures on the purported will. The trial court held that the will and accompanying affidavit were not in strict compliance with the statute and denied admission of the will to probate. On appeal, the proponent of the purported will argues that the will satisfied the recent statutory requirements of Tennessee Code Annotated Section 32-1-104(b) such that the signatures of both witnesses were integrated into the will. Concluding that the witnesses’ signatures were integrated into the will pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated Section 32-1-104(b), and that the other statutory requirements were met, we reverse the trial court’s ruling.