APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Defendant, Jimmy Newell, appeals from the trial court’s denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas in multiple cases. Petitioner entered guilty pleas in several cases at a single hearing as part of a “global plea deal” and received a total effective sentence of four years’ incarceration. Defendant filed a pro se motion to withdraw his pleas. Counsel was appointed to represent him. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied Defendant’s motion. Defendant appeals the trial court’s ruling, asserting that his pleas were entered unknowingly and involuntarily and that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance. Having reviewed the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal concerns the dismissal of a health care liability action for noncompliance with the Health Care Liability Act, specifically Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-26-121 (Supp. 2016). Before filing this action, the plaintiff gave timely written pre-suit notice of her health care liability claim, including the required medical authorizations, to all potential defendants. But when she filed her complaint, the plaintiff failed to provide copies of the medical authorizations as required by statute. Both defendants filed motions to dismiss based on the missing documents. The trial court determined that the plaintiff had substantially complied with the statute and that the defendants were not prejudiced by the omission. Even so, the court dismissed the complaint with prejudice after concluding that strict compliance with the statute was required when the defendant was a governmental entity. Upon review, we conclude that substantial compliance with the documentation requirement in Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-26-121(b) is sufficient even when the defendant is a governmental entity. Thus, we reverse the dismissal of the complaint.

William Lewis (“Employee”) worked for the Tennessee Department of Transportation (“TDOT”) as a Highway Maintenance Worker I from 2002 until June 2010. During the course of his employment, he sustained compensable injuries to his right shoulder, left shoulder, and right eye. The claims arising from these injuries resulted in settlements or awards, all of which provided that Employee retained a right to reconsideration pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241(d). On May 24, 2010, Employee collapsed while flagging traffic. He stated that his knees gave out at that time. Employee subsequently filed a claim for bilateral knee injuries, and petitions for reconsideration of the three previous settlements. After hearings on June 14, 2014, and December 7, 2015, the Commission issued a written decision. The Commission awarded ninety percent (90%) permanent partial disability to both legs for the May 24, 2010 injury, but declined to award additional benefits for the reconsideration claims. TDOT has appealed from the Commission’s decision pertaining to Employee’s knee injuries, and Employee has appealed from the decision to deny additional benefits on the reconsideration claims. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the judgment on the award of disability to the legs, but reverse on the reconsideration claims and remand to the Commission to recalculate Employee’s disability regarding his shoulders.

Mother appeals judgment holding her in criminal contempt of court, contending that the court lacked jurisdiction to enforce the order as to which she was found in contempt, that she was not given the notice required by Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure 42(b), and that she was improperly served with the contempt petition. Upon a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment.

The Defendant, Lawrence A. Gray, entered a guilty plea to three counts of aggravated robbery and two counts of attempted aggravated robbery with the trial court to determine sentencing. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed an effective sentence of twelve years. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the trial court improperly imposed a twelve-year sentence. We affirm the trial court’s judgments.

Petitioner, Donnell V. Booker, appeals the denial of his second petition for habeas corpus relief in which he argues that his guilty plea to an “out of range” sentence was illegal. Because Petitioner’s claim has been previously determined and he fails to state a cognizable claim, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, Christopher M. Heath, was convicted of driving under the influence (“DUI”), fifth offense, and second offense driving on a cancelled, suspended, or revoked driver’s license. He received an effective sentence of fifteen months. There was no direct appeal. Petitioner sought post-conviction relief. After a hearing at which Petitioner did not appear and did not present any proof, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition. Petitioner appeals from the denial of post-conviction relief. After a review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Chayce Collier, a minor, by and through his natural parent and next friend, Kendall Collier (“Plaintiff”) sued Periclis Roussis, M.D. and Fort Sanders Perinatal Center and Fort Sanders Regional Medical Center (“the Hospital”) for injuries allegedly suffered by Plaintiff when his mother had an allergic reaction during labor. After trial before a jury, the Circuit Court for Knox County (“the Trial Court”) entered judgment on the jury’s verdict that Dr. Roussis was not negligent and that the nurses employed by the Hospital were not negligent and dismissed the suit. Plaintiff appeals to this Court raising several issues including whether the Trial Court erred in allowing the admission of previously undisclosed testimony from the nurses and a defense expert witness, among other things. We find and hold that the Trial Court erred in allowing the previously undisclosed testimony of the nurses and the defense expert witness. We, therefore, vacate the Trial Court’s judgment and remand this case for a new trial.

The Defendant, Bart Leo Tucker, was convicted by a Williamson County jury of one count of issuing a worthless check. See T.C.A. § 39-14-121. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and contends that the trial court erred by denying his motion for judgment of acquittal. Following our review, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.

Because I believe the appellate record is incomplete for our review, I respectfully dissent. While I am certainly a proponent of records containing only what is essential for a meaningful review on appeal, when an appellant raises the issue of sufficiency of the evidence, as is the case here, all of the evidence presented at trial is needed. Here, Defendant has picked and chosen parts of only one of the State’s witnesses for inclusion in the record, leaving us to speculate whether other evidence or witness testimony may have fulfilled the State’s burden. Thus, the record does not convey a fair, accurate, and complete account of what transpired with respect to the issue of sufficiency of evidence. The record is not in keeping with Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(b). I would grant Defendant’s “(Conditional) Motion To Supplement The Record” and then proceed with an unabridged record.

A dispute among members of a church arose over control of the church. One group of church members incorporated, and then individual members of the church filed suit against the corporation and a second entity that operated a school on church property. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the trial court determined that the organizational structure of the church was “connectional” or “hierarchical” in nature and that all property of the church was under the control of the church’s board of deacons. Because we conclude that there are genuine issues of material fact that preclude entry of summary judgment, we affirm in part and reverse in part.

The Petitioner, Kenneth Kirkwood, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in denying him a full hearing and concluding that he waived all his ineffective assistance of counsel claims by raising an allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel in his motion for new trial and on direct appeal. Following our review, we affirm the dismissal of the petition on the basis that the Petitioner has already been afforded an opportunity to litigate his ineffective assistance of counsel claim.

After three trials, the Petitioner was convicted of attempted aggravated robbery and felony first degree murder, and the trial court sentenced him to life in prison. The Petitioner appealed his convictions, filed a petition for post-conviction relief, and filed multiple petitions for writs of habeas corpus relief. No relief was granted. In 2015, the Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of error coram nobis, alleging an anonymous informant’s statement was newly discovered evidence. The Petitioner conceded that his petition was untimely but asked the coram nobis court to toll the statute of limitations because, he asserted, the State withheld the statement. The coram nobis court declined to toll the statute of limitations, and it dismissed the petition as time-barred. We affirm the coram nobis court’s judgment.

Jason Baker (“Employee”) was first employed by Total Air Group, LLC (“Employer”) on June 17, 2010. On February 11, 2011, Employee sustained an injury to his back while working for Employer in Memphis, Tennessee. Employee’s treating physician determined that Employee had achieved maximum medical improvement on June 13, 2011. Employer’s workers’ compensation insurer made its final voluntary payment of Employee’s medical expenses on December 31, 2012. Employee returned to work but was terminated by Employer on July 29, 2014. Employee alleged that he requested and received from Employer’s workers’ compensation insurer authorization for additional medical treatment in February 2015. Employee requested a benefit review conference, which was held on April 30, 2015. Employee filed this workers’ compensation case on May 1, 2015. Employer answered, asserting as an affirmative defense that Employee’s claim was barred by the one-year statute of limitations. Tenn. Code Ann.
§ 50-6-203(b)(2). The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, which the trial court denied. Following a trial, the trial court held that Employee’s claim was not barred by the statute of limitations. Based upon the agreement of the parties, the trial court thereafter entered a final judgment awarding Employee benefits. Employer has appealed the trial court’s determination with respect to the statute of limitations. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the judgment, albeit on different grounds.

Steven Bell (“Employee”) worked for Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company (“Employer”) for thirty-seven years. He retired when Employer’s plant closed in 2011. Shortly thereafter, he filed a request for benefit review conference, contending that he had sustained hearing loss as a result of noise exposure in the course of his work for Employer. He filed this civil action on May 4, 2012. Hearing screens taken by Employer from 1974 through 2010 showed that Employee had moderate to severe hearing loss when he was hired. Employer, therefore, denied the claim. The trial court awarded permanent partial disability benefits of 40% to the hearing of both ears. Employer has appealed. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Lori Reel (“Employee”) was employed by Jenny Craig Operations, Inc. (“Employer”) as a Jenny Craig consultant. On January 8, 2010, Employee fell while at work and struck her right knee on the floor. Suit was filed. Employee alleged that she sustained a work-related injury to her right knee that aggravated pre-existing arthritis in that knee and ultimately necessitated a total knee replacement. While conceding that Employee sustained a temporary injury to her knee from the fall, Employer denied liability for the total knee replacement and for any permanent impairment. The trial court found that Employee’s work-related fall caused an acceleration, advancement, or progression of her osteoarthritis, such that she required a total knee replacement, that Employee’s January 8, 2010 injury was compensable, and that Employee retained a permanent partial disability of 46.5% to her right lower extremity. Employer has appealed. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Phillip M. Mullins, appeals the Wayne County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus from his 2001 convictions and his effective sentence of life without the possibility of parole plus twenty-five years. He contends that his convictions violate double jeopardy principles on several grounds. We affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

The Petitioner, Charles Phillip Maxwell, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for a writ of error coram nobis from his driving with a suspended license conviction and his thirty-day sentence, which was suspended to probation after twenty-four hours in confinement. The Petitioner contends that the court erred by denying relief and improperly ordered him to pay court costs associated with his petition. We affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court.

The Board of Professional Responsibility (“Board”) initiated disciplinary proceedings against attorney Paul Julius Walwyn based on a client’s complaint of professional misconduct. A hearing panel (“Panel”) determined that Mr. Walwyn had violated the Rules of Professional Conduct (“RPC”) and ultimately entered “Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Amended Judgment of the Hearing Panel” (“Amended Judgment”) imposing a public censure with a practice monitor for one year and six additional hours of continuing legal education (“CLE”) on subjects related to the management of a law practice and/or client communication. Mr. Walwyn did not appeal the Amended Judgment to the trial court. The Board petitioned this Court for an order enforcing the Panel’s Amended Judgment. Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 15.4(b) and (c), we determined that the punishment imposed by the Panel appeared inadequate and proposed that it be increased. Mr. Walwyn subsequently requested oral argument, which we granted. We now consider whether the punishment imposed by the Panel is appropriate under the circumstances of this case and is in uniformity with prior disciplinary decisions in this state. Following a thorough review of the record and the law, we conclude that it is not. Therefore, we modify the Panel’s Amended Judgment to impose a one-year suspension from the practice of law, with six months to be served on active suspension and six months to be served on probation with a practice monitor. The duties and obligations in relation to the practice monitor shall be enforced in accordance with the Panel’s Amended Judgment. We also impose six additional hours of CLE on subjects related to the management of a law practice and/or client communication.

This appeal arises from the termination of Mother’s and Father’s parental rights with respect to their two minor children. The children were removed from the parents’ custody by the Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) in July 2013 after investigators responded to a call where the children’s sibling was found deceased at home. DCS filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Mother and Father on the grounds of severe abuse and best interests. The trial court found clear and convincing evidence of grounds supporting termination and that termination of their parental rights was in the best interests of the children. Mother and Father separately appealed. After review, we affirm the trial court.

Joseph Kolby Willis (“Employee”) alleges that he sustained a compensable injury to his left knee while working for All Staff (“Employer”). After his petition for interlocutory relief was denied, discovery was taken, and a compensation hearing was held. The court of workers’ compensation claims (“trial court”) bifurcated the issues of compensability and relief. After the hearing, the trial court issued a compensation order finding the injury was compensable. Employer appealed to the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board (“Board”) pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-217 (2014). The Board reversed the trial court’s order, finding that Employee had failed to establish causation, and remanded the case to the trial court for entry of an order dismissing the claim. After the order was entered, Employee appealed to the Supreme Court. Employee’s appeal has been referred to this Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the judgment of dismissal.

Defendant, Javonta Marquis Perkins, was indicted by the Davidson County Grand Jury for aggravated robbery, carjacking, and possession of a weapon during the commission of a dangerous felony. Defendant was convicted as charged by a jury and sentenced by the trial court to ten years each for his aggravated robbery and carjacking convictions and six years for the possession of a weapon conviction. By operation of law, the trial court ordered Defendant’s six-year sentence consecutive to his concurrent ten-year sentences, for an effective sentence of 16 years. In this appeal as of right, Defendant contends that: 1) the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress the victim’s pretrial identification; 2) the trial court erred by instructing the jury on criminal responsibility; 3) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; and 4) his sentences are excessive. Having reviewed the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we find no error and affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Petitioner, David Dwight Hester, pleaded guilty to initiation of methamphetamine manufacture, and two counts of aggravated child neglect. He received an agreed effective sentence of twenty-five years at thirty percent as a Range I offender. Petitioner subsequently filed a post-conviction petition that was denied by the post-conviction court. On appeal, Petitioner argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the indictments charging him with aggravated child abuse or neglect because each indictment charged him with “two distinct offenses.” He also argues that trial counsel told him that he was required to receive the same sentence as his co-defendant and that Petitioner risked serving his sentence at one-hundred percent eligibility if the case went to trial. After thoroughly reviewing the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

Defendant, Latoya Britton, appeals the trial court’s revocation of her community corrections sentence and the imposition of additional consecutive sentencing and confinement upon resentencing. Following our review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.