APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Defendant, Michael Harris, appeals from an order of the trial court denying his petition to suspend the remainder of his sentence. Following our review of the record, we conclude that the trial court did not err by denying the petition. We affirm the order of the trial court in accordance with Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee.

Defendant, Montreal Lyons, appeals from the trial court’s dismissal of his motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. Defendant contends that his sentence is illegal because the trial court imposed the sentence for offenses that occurred in 2002 under the 2005 amendments to the sentencing act without an ex post facto waiver signed by Defendant. The State responds that the trial court properly dismissed Defendant’s motion because he failed to state a colorable claim for relief. We agree with the State. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Mario Bowles, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of two counts of aggravated rape and one count of aggravated kidnapping. The trial court sentenced Defendant to twenty-three years at one-hundred percent for each count of aggravated rape, which the trial court merged, and twenty-three years at one-hundred percent for aggravated kidnapping. The sentences were ordered to be served concurrently with one another and consecutively with an unrelated case. On appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for aggravated rape and that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of attempted aggravated rape. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Marcus Deangelo Lee, pleaded guilty in 1997 to escape from felony incarceration, and the trial court sentenced him to one year and ordered that his sentence run consecutively to a three-year sentence the Defendant received for drug-related and firearm convictions in 1995. Since that time, the Defendant has been arrested and convicted on other charges unrelated to this case. Almost seventeen years later, the Defendant filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 with regard to jail credits for his 1997 felony escape conviction. The trial court summarily dismissed the motion, and the Defendant appeals. On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred when it summarily dismissed his motion because the trial court improperly amended his judgment to reflect 103 days of jail credit, which he argues resulted in his sentences running concurrently rather than consecutively as mandated by statute. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Defendant, Marquis Devann Churchwell, pled guilty to one count of robbery and two counts of assault with the sentence to be determined by the trial court. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed a total effective sentence of eight years, eleven months and twenty-nine days. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by imposing a sentence of confinement. Upon our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. However, we remand the case for entry of judgment forms for each count of the indictment in case number 2015-D-2352.

Defendant, Atlanta Pearl Hardy, was convicted of second degree murder in 2004 and now appeals the trial court's denial of her motion to correct an illegal sentence under Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. Upon review of the record, this Court affirms the trial court's denial of relief under Rule 36.1.

This is an appeal from the grant of summary judgment in a Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act (“GTLA”) premises liability case. Appellant was exiting Jackson-Madison County General Hospital/Appellee when she was hit by an automatic door, fell, and sustained a broken femur. Appellee moved for summary judgment on the ground that it was immune from suit under the GTLA. Appellant argued that Appellee failed to make a reasonable inspection of the automatic door, so as to discover the alleged dangerous or defective condition. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Appellee, finding that the condition was not dangerous or defective, the condition was latent, and Appellee had no actual or constructive notice of the condition. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Petitioner, Charzelle Lamontez Swafford, was convicted of first degree murder, four counts of attempted first degree murder, and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous offense. His convictions and effective sentence of life plus fifty-six years were affirmed on direct appeal. See State v. Charzelle Lamontez Swafford, No. M2014-00421-CCA-R3-CD, 2015 WL 1543251, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 2, 2015), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Aug. 12, 2015). Petitioner subsequently sought post-conviction relief on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court denied relief after a hearing. On appeal, we determine that Petitioner failed to show that he was prejudiced by counsel’s actions. Accordingly, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

The Petitioner, Jerry Phillips, appeals the denial of his request for post-conviction relief from his four convictions for aggravated sexual battery. The Petitioner contends that trial counsel’s failure to object to the trial court’s jury selection procedures in this case, which deviated from Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 24, as recognized in State v. Frausto, 463 S.W.3d 469 (Tenn. 2015), amounted to ineffective assistance and that appellate counsel was likewise ineffective for failing to argue for plain error review of this issue on appeal. He further submits that the jury selection process violated his rights to due process of law, to a fair and impartial jury, and to intelligently exercise his peremptory challenges. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable authorities, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, Lucas Potter, pled guilty to attempted aggravated robbery, attempted robbery, and theft of property under $500. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-401, -402, 39-14- 103. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court denied the defendant’s request for judicial diversion and imposed an effective five-year sentence of split confinement with community corrections after 270 days of service. On appeal, the defendant argues the trial court failed to properly consider his request for judicial diversion and erred in allowing the State to present rebuttal proof at the sentencing hearing. Following our review of the briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Cleveland Frazier, appeals the Knox County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2015 guilty pleas to possession of less than 0.5 gram of cocaine in a school zone and possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony and his effective eleven-year sentence. The Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgment of the postconviction court.

The Defendant, Jonathan C. Buckner, was convicted by a Houston County Circuit Court jury of theft of property valued at $1,000 or more but less than $10,000, a Class D felony.  See T.C.A. § 39-14-103 (2014).  The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range III, persistent offender to twelve years’ confinement and ordered that his sentence be served consecutively to a sentence in an unrelated case.  On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred (1) by failing to provide witnesses and prospective jurors proper instructions before jury selection, (2) by admitting inadmissible hearsay evidence, (3) by denying his two motions for a mistrial, (4) by overruling defense objections during the prosecutor’s opening statement and closing argument, and (5) during sentencing.  We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is a termination of parental rights case. The trial court terminated Appellant’s parental rights to the minor child by order of July 15, 2016. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. However, Appellant failed to comply with Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-124(d) (Supp. 2016) in that she failed to sign the notice of appeal. Because this Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, we dismiss the appeal.

The majority opinion dismisses this appeal due to the failure of the appellant, Makayla B., the child’s mother, to sign the notice of appeal as required by Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-124(d). The majority has concluded, “[i]n the absence of full compliance with the statutory requirements, this Court does not have subject-matter jurisdiction over the appeal.” I recognize that the majority opinion is based on a prior Court of Appeals decision, but I respectfully disagree with the decision and the notion that Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-124(d) is jurisdictional or that the statute compels this court to dismiss appeals in parental termination cases when the parent fails to sign the notice of appeal without affording the parent the opportunity to cure the defect.

This is an appeal from an order terminating the parental rights of the appellant to his minor children. The only notice of appeal filed by the appellant within the time provided in Rule 4(a) of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure for the filing of a notice of appeal did not comply with Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-124(d), which states: “Any notice of appeal filed in a termination of parental rights action shall be signed by the appellant.” Because this notice of appeal was insufficient to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court, this appeal is dismissed.

This dispute stems from an agreement for the purchase and installation of a used automobile motor. The parties to the agreement both claim the other breached the agreement. Following a trial, the circuit court determined that the purchaser breached the agreement. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Defendant, Ronald E. McCarter (“Defendant”), seeks to appeal from a ruling of the Trial Court which does not constitute a final judgment. Specifically, the ruling to which the Notice of Appeal is directed in this case did not resolve the amount of attorney’s fees awarded to the Plaintiff, Deborah J. Meadows (“Plaintiff”), nor did it fully resolve Plaintiff’s claims against Tiffany Sharp. As such, it is clear that there is not a final judgment from which an appeal as of right would lie. We therefore lack jurisdiction to consider this appeal

This is an appeal from an order terminating the parental rights of the appellant to her minor child, Kendall H. The only Notice of Appeal filed by the appellant was signed only by her attorney. The appellees have filed a motion to dismiss this appeal arguing that the Notice of Appeal was insufficient to invoke this Court’s jurisdiction because it did not comply with Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-124(d), which states: “Any notice of appeal filed in a termination of parental rights action shall be signed by the appellant.” The absence of appellant’s signature on the notice of appeal deprives us of jurisdiction in this case. Accordingly, this case is dismissed.

The trial court dismissed plaintiff’s claim for failure to prosecute and for failing to respond to affirmative defenses. The trial court also denied plaintiff’s motion to alter or amend the judgment. Because disposition of litigation on the merits is favored over procedural dismissals, we reverse. 

This case involves residential property that was purchased after a foreclosure. The purchaser filed this detainer action against the original homeowners, who refused to vacate the property. The general sessions court ruled in favor of the purchaser, and after a de novo trial in circuit court, the circuit court ruled in favor of the purchaser as well. We do the same. The decision of the circuit court is hereby affirmed and remanded for further proceedings.

The trial court found clear and convincing evidence to terminate Mother’s parental rights to her two children on the grounds of abandonment by failure to establish a suitable home, substantial noncompliance with permanency plans, and persistence of conditions. The trial court also found clear and convincing evidence that termination was in the children’s best interest. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This appeal concerns termination of parental rights. The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition in the Juvenile Court for Warren County (“the Juvenile Court”) seeking to terminate the parental rights of Dara C. (“Mother”) to her minor children Jayden R., Kara C., and Jaxson C. (collectively, “the Children”). DCS also sought to terminate the parental rights of Jonathan C. (“Father”) to Kara C. and Jaxson C. After a trial, the Juvenile Court entered an order terminating Mother’s parental rights to the Children and Father’s parental rights to Kara and Jaxson. Mother and Father appealed. DCS argues that Mother’s and Father’s failure to sign their notices of appeal renders this appeal jurisdictionally deficient. We agree that Mother’s and Father’s failure to sign their notices of appeal as required by Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-124(d) renders this appeal jurisdictionally deficient, and it is dismissed on that basis. Even if the appeal were not jurisdictionally deficient, we would, given this record, affirm the Juvenile Court’s judgment terminating Mother’s and Father’s parental rights. We dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

The majority opinion dismisses this case due to the failure of Mother and Father to sign the notice of appeal pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-124(d).  I recognize that the majority opinion is based on a prior Court of Appeals decision, but I respectfully disagree with the majority’s conclusion.

The petitioner, Marvin Hurst, Jr., appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition. The petitioner argues he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that, by his actions, counsel overbore the petitioner’s will resulting in the petitioner pleading guilty rather than going to trial. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.