APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

In this termination of parental rights case, the Department of Children’s Services filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of T.W.B. (mother) with respect to her child, P.T.F. The trial court found clear and convincing evidence of two grounds supporting termination. By the same quantum of proof, the trial court held that termination of mother’s parental rights is in the best interest of the child. Mother appeals. We affirm.

In 2015, the Defendant, Kelly Renea Dubois, pleaded guilty to one count of theft of property, with the value of the property to be determined by the trial court, and to three counts of forgery, with the trial court to determine the length and manner of her sentence. At sentencing, the trial court ordered the Defendant to serve an effective sentence of nine years and six months in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court improperly sentenced her for a Class C felony theft because there was insufficient evidence to support the value determined, and that the trial court erred when it denied her request for an alternative sentence. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

The Appellant, Nickelle Jackson, appeals from the trial court’s denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Rule 36.1 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure. The State has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court’s judgment pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Pro se petitioner, Robert Page, appeals the summary dismissal of his Rule 36.1 motion to correct an illegal sentence by the Criminal Court of Shelby County. In this appeal, the petitioner claims his original sentence is illegal because the trial court “increased his sentence beyond the presumptive sentence” in violation of Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), and its progeny. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The pro se Appellant, Anthony Leon Moore, appeals the Madison County Circuit Court’s dismissal of his motion to correct illegal sentence. The State has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the lower court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Because the Appellant has failed to establish that his sentences are illegal, we conclude that the State’s motion is well-taken. Accordingly, we affirm the summary dismissal of the motion.

The defendant, Brandon D. Washington, appeals as of right from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 motion to correct an illegal sentence. The basis for the defendant’s appeal is the trial court’s alleged failure to accurately apply pretrial jail credits and other credits. Following our review, we conclude that the defendant failed to state a colorable claim and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, Mack Transou, appeals the summary dismissal of his fifth pro se petition for habeas corpus relief. In 1999, Petitioner pleaded guilty to driving after being declared a habitual motor vehicle offender and was subsequently incarcerated. Based on a blood sample taken from Petitioner as part of the intake process, Petitioner was later convicted, in two separate cases, of two counts of rape, one count of sexual battery, and one count of aggravated burglary. In this appeal, Petitioner argues that the habeas corpus court erred in summarily dismissing his petition. Following a review of the record, we conclude that Petitioner is collaterally estopped from challenging the validity of his blood draw. None of Petitioner’s other claims state a cognizable claim for habeas corpus relief. Accordingly, we affirm the court’s denial of relief.

Defendant, Adarius Dewayne Garth, was indicted by the Hamilton County Grand Jury for two counts of attempted first degree murder, domestic aggravated assault, aggravated assault, reckless endangerment, and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. Defendant entered an “open” guilty plea to the lesser-included offense of reckless aggravated assault, and the remaining charges were dismissed on motion by the State. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Defendant to four years’ incarceration as a Range I offender. Defendant appeals the length and manner of service of his sentence. Following a careful review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Taboris Jones, was convicted of possession with intent to sell more than 0.5 grams of cocaine within 1,000 feet of a school, and the trial court applied the Drug Free School Zone Act (the Act) to enhance Defendant’s sentence. Defendant also pleaded guilty to simple possession of marijuana and improper display of registered license plate. The trial court imposed concurrent sentences of fifteen years for the cocaine charge, and ten days for simple possession of marijuana. The trial court also imposed a $250.00 fine for the marijuana charge and a $5.00 fee for improper display of a license plate. On appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for possession of more than 0.5 grams of cocaine with intent to sell within 1,000 feet of a school and that the Drug Free School Zone Act should not apply to his cocaine conviction. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Two owners of separate lots in a planned residential subdivision of twenty lots brought this action against the Johnson County Regional Planning Commission and several state entities after the subdivision’s developer went into bankruptcy and development of the subdivision was halted. When the developer had earlier posted a performance bond securing the completion of the subdivision’s infrastructure, the planning commission had approved the subdivision plat, although infrastructure, including roads and utilities, had not been completed. After developer’s bankruptcy, the State of Tennessee bought the land comprising all of the subdivision lots, except the two owned by the plaintiffs. All of the remaining land in the intended subdivision, except for several other lots purchased by individuals before the bankruptcy, is now part of the Doe Mountain Recreation Area — an entity subsequently created by the State. Plaintiffs brought this action for breach of contract between developer and the planning commission. Plaintiffs also asked the trial court to issue a writ of mandamus compelling the county to complete the proposed subdivision infrastructure. The trial court granted the defendants summary judgment. The plaintiffs appeal. We affirm.

This appeal arises from a divorce. Rhonda Sue Griffis Grubb (“Wife”) filed for divorce against husband James Wesley Grubb (“Husband”) in the Chancery Court for Roane County (“the Trial Court”). Trial in this matter was bifurcated. The validity of the parties’ antenuptial agreement (“the Agreement”) was tried first. The Trial Court found that the provision in the Agreement purporting to cap Wife’s alimony was unenforceable but otherwise upheld the Agreement. Later, trial was conducted on the remaining issues in the case. Citing her adultery and a clause in the Agreement, the Trial Court declined to grant Wife alimony. However, the Trial Court awarded Wife a substantial portion of the marital estate. The Trial Court also ruled upon child support, parenting time, and education for the parties’ two daughters. Husband appealed to this Court raising numerous issues. Wife raised additional issues of her own. We find and hold that Husband failed to carry his burden as to the validity of the Agreement. As to the second stage of this bifurcated matter, we find that the Trial Court’s final judgment is devoid of factual findings to such a degree that we cannot effectively review the remaining issues in this case. We reverse as to the validity of the Agreement. We vacate and remand for further proceedings as necessary and for entry of a new final judgment containing detailed factual findings and conclusions of law as to the remaining issues.

The defendant, Jamie Jones, appeals his Shelby County Criminal Court jury convictions of felony murder and aggravated child abuse, claiming that the trial court erred by denying his motion to recuse, by permitting the State to amend the indictment, by admitting certain evidence at trial, and that the cumulative effects of these errors prevented him from receiving a fair trial. Discerning no error, we affirm.

On March 13, 1998, the petitioner, Gary Carr, entered a guilty plea to first-degree murder and received a sentence of life without parole. He did not file any post-judgment appeals. Eighteen years later, the petitioner, acting pro se, filed a motion entitled “Motion for Nunc Pro Tunc Order,” alleging, inter alia, that his conviction should be set aside and a new trial ordered because (1) the court clerk failed to enter or stamp-file his judgment of conviction in accordance with Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(e); and (2) he entered an unknowing and involuntary guilty plea based on threats that he would receive the death penalty. The Shelby County Criminal Court summarily dismissed his motion, and the petitioner now appeals. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Williamson County jury convicted the Defendant, Errol Shields, of theft of property valued at more than $500 but less than $1,000, and the trial court sentenced him to two years, suspended to probation. The Defendant filed a motion for judgment of acquittal and/or a new trial and then filed a supplement to that motion. The trial court denied the motion, and the Defendant appeals. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it denied his motion because the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction and that the trial court improperly allowed the State to introduce evidence that the Defendant returned an item to the store that he had legally purchased. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

This is an appeal arising out of a petition to change the primary residential parent and a petition for civil and criminal contempt. The notice of appeal for the criminal contempt finding was not timely filed, and the appeal is therefore dismissed as to the criminal contempt. With respect to the remaining issues, we remand this matter to the trial court for the limited purpose of conducting an evidentiary hearing regarding the timeliness of this appeal.

The Appellant, George Washington Matthews, appeals the trial court’s summary dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion asking this Court to affirm pursuant to Court of Criminal Appeals Rule 20. Said motion is hereby granted.

The Defendant, Ronnie Brewer, was convicted by a Grundy County Circuit Court jury of reckless aggravated assault, a Class D felony. See T.C.A. § 39-13-102 (2003) (amended 2005, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2013). The trial court sentenced the Defendant to three years, which was suspended to probation after six months’ confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction, (2) the trial court erred during jury instructions, and (3) the trial court erred during sentencing. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Davidson County jury convicted the Petitioner, Sanders Lee Madewell, of especially aggravated robbery and criminal impersonation, and the trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of seventeen years in prison. On appeal, this Court affirmed the convictions and sentence. See State v. Sanders Lee Madewell, No. M2012-02150-CCAR3- CD, 2012 WL 3129186, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, July 31, 2012), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Nov. 26, 2012). The Petitioner filed a post-conviction petition alleging that he had received the ineffective assistance of counsel, that the State had withheld evidence favorable to him, that he was “actually innocent”, and that the trial court failed in its role as the thirteenth juror. Following a bifurcated hearing, the postconviction court denied relief. On appeal, the Petitioner maintains the aforementioned issues. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

This case is again before this Court after being remanded to the Circuit Court for Hamilton County (“the Trial Court”) for a determination of whether it was in the best interest of the parties’ minor child (“the Child”) to relocate to New Jersey with Jessica Marcel Broadnax (“Mother”). Mother appeals the Trial Court’s May 5, 2016 order upon remand, which found, inter alia, that it was in the best interest of the Child to remain with Quentin Elliott Lawrence (“Father”) and not to move with Mother to New Jersey. We find and hold that the evidence in the record on appeal does not preponderate against the Trial Court’s findings. Finding no error on the part of the Trial Court, we affirm.

Petitioner, Tony Arthur Swann, appeals from the denial of his Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36 motion to correct a clerical error due to the alleged denial of pretrial jail credits and his Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 motion alleging that his sentence is illegal because of a probation revocation order. Following our review, we affirm the trial court’s decision.

Petitioner, Douglas Martinez, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. Because the record is inadequate for our review, we affirm the judgment of the postconviction court. However, an error in the judgment form necessitates a remand for correction of the judgment to reflect the proper conviction.

All members of the panel agree that the Defendant must receive a new trial, although we disagree, in part, about the reasons why a new trial is required. Specifically, Judge Easter and I disagree with Judge Thomas’s analysis regarding whether a jury separation occurred when the jurors were allowed to speak with family members by telephone while in the presence of court officers, and we conclude that no separation occurred. Likewise, Judge Easter and I depart from Judge Thomas’s analysis of the trial court’s admission of evidence related to the Defendant’s knowledge of DNA matters due to his presence at a prior judicial proceeding at which expert DNA proof was received. Although Judge Easter and I agree with Judge Thomas that the evidence was inadmissible, we disagree with his analysis pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b) and believe, instead, that the proper framework for determining the admissibility of the evidence is provided by Rules 401, 402, and 403.

The Defendant, Alvina Tinisha Brown, was convicted by a McMinn County Criminal Court jury of tampering with evidence, a Class C felony, misdemeanor possession of marijuana, misdemeanor possession of alprazolam, and possession of drug paraphernalia, Class A misdemeanors. See T.C.A. §§ 39-16-503 (2014) (evidence tampering), 39-17- 418 (2010) (amended 2014, 2016) (misdemeanor possession), 39-17-425 (2014) (possession of drug paraphernalia). The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range III, persistent offender to an effective fifteen years. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the trial court erred by denying her motion to suppress, (2) the evidence is insufficient to support her tampering with evidence conviction, and (3) the tampering with evidence sentence is excessive. Because the evidence is insufficient to support the Defendant’s conviction for tampering with evidence, we reverse the judgment of the trial court, vacate the conviction, and dismiss the charge. We affirm the remaining judgments of the trial court.

The Tennessee Department of Safety and Homeland Security forfeited a finance company’s interest in a vehicle after determining that the finance company failed to timely file a claim to contest the forfeiture after receiving notice. The finance company thereafter filed a petition for judicial review. The trial court reversed the forfeiture on the basis that the Tennessee Department of Safety and Homeland Security failed to prove that it sent proper notice to the finance company. We vacate the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings before the administrative agency.