APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Petitioner, Teddy Robbins, Jr., was convicted after a jury trial of domestic assault, aggravated assault, especially aggravated kidnapping, and aggravated rape for crimes committed against his wife, and he was sentenced to an aggregate sentence of fifty years’ imprisonment. The Petitioner filed a timely post-conviction petition, asserting that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel when his trial counsel failed to adequately prepare for trial and failed to present certain defense witnesses. After a hearing, the trial court found that counsel prepared adequately for trial, that a defense witness presented at the post-conviction hearing was not credible, and that the Petitioner failed to demonstrate any prejudice. The Petitioner appeals, contending that trial counsel’s testimony at the hearing demonstrated inadequate preparation and that as a result, his strategic decision not to call a witness was not entitled to deference. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The petitioner, Carlos Smith, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief from his 2012 Shelby County Criminal Court jury convictions of attempted second degree murder, aggravated assault, aggravated robbery, especially aggravated burglary, employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and being a felon in possession of a handgun, claiming that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial. Because the post-conviction court failed to make any findings with regard to the petitioner’s claim that trial counsel did not properly inform him of his potential sentencing exposure, we remand for the limited purpose of making the requisite findings on this issue. In all other respects, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Ebony Houston, appeals the Wilson County Criminal Court’s finding of criminal contempt for failure to appear at a show cause hearing. The Defendant argues, and the State concedes, that the trial court violated her due process rights when it found her in contempt without providing notice or an opportunity to prepare for the hearing. Following our review, we reverse the Defendant’s conviction.

The Defendant, Anthony Blackwell, was convicted by a Giles County jury of the aggravated rape of a child, a Class A felony, and sentenced as a Range III, Persistent Offender to fifty-years’ imprisonment at one-hundred percent service. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, that the trial court erred by allowing certain medical testimony and records pertaining to “child sexual abuse,” and that his sentence was unlawful. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The appellant, Tony P., filed a “Complaint and Petition to Terminate Parental Rights and/or for Adoption” in the Circuit Court for McMinn County (“trial court”) on September 18, 2015. This petition sought to terminate the parental rights of the “unknown father” of a child for whom Tony P. had signed a voluntary acknowledgment of paternity (“VAP”). Jon F. filed a motion to intervene, asserting that he was the biological father of the child. The trial court allowed Jon F. to intervene in the action pursuant to an agreed order. The child’s mother later filed a motion seeking to dismiss Tony P.’s petition for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted and lack of subject matter jurisdiction. By oral motion, Jon F. joined with the mother in seeking dismissal. The trial court entered a Memorandum and Order on August 15, 2016, finding that (1) Jon F. was the biological and legal father of the child, (2) Tony P.’s VAP had been rebutted, and (3) any and all parental rights of Tony P. as legal father were “terminated by operation of law under Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-102(28)(C).” The trial court entered a subsequent order dismissing the petition filed by Tony P. Tony P. timely appealed. Having determined that the trial court properly found that Jon F. challenged and rebutted the VAP executed by Tony P., we conclude that Tony P. no longer enjoyed any parental rights with regard to the child. Although we determine that the trial court erred by applying Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-102(28)(C) retrospectively to this action filed before the statutory subsection’s enactment, we determine this error to be harmless inasmuch as Tony P.’s parental rights were a nullity. We therefore modify the judgment to reflect that Tony P. had no parental rights to be terminated following the court’s rescission of the VAP. We affirm the trial court’s dismissal of Tony P.’s petition seeking termination of Jon F.’s parental rights. We decline to award fees and costs to the mother and Jon F.

The State of Tennessee filed a petition in 2013 on behalf of the mother of a child who was born in 1996 to legitimate the child and to require the father to provide health insurance for the child; the requested relief was granted.  In 2014, the mother filed a petition to set child support and, following a hearing before a juvenile court magistrate, the father was ordered to pay child support; the magistrate determined that child support should not be made retroactive to the birth of the child but, rather, to the date that the petition to have the child legitimated was filed.  Mother appealed the decision to the juvenile judge; after a de novo hearing, the juvenile judge adopted the findings of the magistrate and ordered Father to pay support of $549.00 per month from the date the petition to legitimate was filed.  Mother appeals the ruling, contending that the obligation to pay support should be retroactive to the date of the child’s birth.  Concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion, we affirm the judgment.  

The Petitioner, Kenneth Jackson, appeals as of right from the Knox County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner contends that his guilty pleas were not voluntary because trial counsel stated that she was not prepared for trial the day before the trial was scheduled to begin. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The pro se Petitioner, Marcus Johnson, appeals as of right from the Knox County Criminal Court’s order summarily denying his petition for post-conviction relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court’s denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we conclude that the State’s motion is well-taken and affirm the judgment of the Knox County Criminal Court.

The pro se Petitioner, Phillip W. Kelley, appeals as of right from the Morgan County Criminal Court’s order summarily dismissing his petition for writ of habeas corpus alleging that his 1982 convictions for three counts of first degree murder and one count of assault with intent to commit murder are void because the trial court’s minutes failed to reflect the indictments. The State has filed a motion to affirm the trial court’s judgment pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we conclude that the State’s motion is well-taken and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The pro se petitioner, Marquise Harris, appeals as of right from the Johnson County Criminal Court’s order summarily dismissing his fourth petition for writ of habeas corpus alleging that his 2006 guilty-pleaded convictions for two counts of attempted first degree murder, two counts of aggravated assault, and one count of felonious possession of a weapon are void because the general sessions and trial courts did not have jurisdiction over him due to his alleged mental incompetency. The State has filed a motion to affirm the trial court’s judgment pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we conclude that the State’s motion is welltaken and affirm the order of the trial court.

The pro se Appellant, Willie Johnson, appeals as of right from the Knox County Criminal Court’s order denying his motion to correct illegal sentence. Tenn. R. Crim. P. 36.1. The State has filed a motion to affirm the trial court’s judgment pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we conclude that the State’s motion is well-taken and affirm the order of the trial court.

The pro se appellant, Stephan Lajuan Beasley, Sr., appeals as of right from the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s order denying his motion for correction of illegal sentence. Tenn. R. Crim. P. 36.1. The State has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court’s denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we conclude that the State’s motion is well-taken and affirm the judgment of the Hamilton County Criminal Court.

Delinquent taxpayer appeals the denial of his Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02(3) motion to set aside a 2009 final decree confirming a tax sale of his property as void on due process grounds. Having determined that the doctrine of collateral estoppel precluded the delinquent taxpayer from relitigating the issue of notice, we affirm.

Petitioner, William B. Gatlin, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. Petitioner alleges that the jury at his original trial was subjected to an improper outside influence, thereby violating his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury. Petitioner also contends that the post-conviction judge was disqualified and should have recused himself because he had also presided as the trial judge in Petitioner’s original trial. Upon our review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This post-divorce appeal concerns the father’s petition to modify the residential schedule in an agreed parenting plan. Following a hearing, the trial court found that a material change in circumstances necessitated a change in the schedule. The court modified the plan by awarding the father additional co-parenting time. The court also entered a new child support order and directed the mother to remit payment for retroactive child support and the father’s attorney fees. The mother appeals. We affirm.

In this wrongful death action, the decedent’s mother filed suit alleging that the county emergency communications district and the city police department refused to send help when the plaintiff called to report that her daughter was making suicidal threats and that, as a result, her daughter committed suicide later the same night. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on the ground that the decedent’s suicide constituted an intervening, superseding cause. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, we conclude that the decedent’s suicide was foreseeable and that the special duty exception to the public duty doctrine applies. We, therefore, reverse the trial court’s grant of summary judgment and remand for further proceedings.

A bank filed a complaint to reform a Deed of Trust to correct a scrivener’s error in the legal description of a parcel of property in order to foreclose on the property. While the litigation was pending, the mortgagors conveyed title to the property to a third party, who claimed to be a bona fide purchaser for value without notice. The trial court concluded that the third party did not qualify as a bona fide purchaser because he was aware of the bank’s litigation when he obtained title to the property. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The Petitioner, Christopher Mimms, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus by the Trousdale County Criminal Court. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that his drug-related convictions are void because the trial court amended the indictment without his consent. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

Pro se Defendant, Daniel Inmon, was indicted by the Rutherford County grand jury with four counts of educational neglect, Tennessee Code Annotated sections 49-6-3001 to -3006, a class C misdemeanor, for failing to cause his four children to attend school for a period of seventeen days. He was subsequently convicted as charged and sentenced to thirty days supervised probation for each count, to be served consecutively. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions. Upon our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Following a jury trial in Hickman County Circuit Court, Defendant, Robert G. Thornton, Jr., was convicted of two counts of rape. The trial court merged the convictions and sentenced Defendant to twelve years in the Department of Correction to be served at 100%. On appeal, Defendant argues: (1) that the trial court improperly refused to strike a juror for cause; (2) that the trial court erred by denying his motion for a mistrial; (3) that the evidence was not sufficient to support his rape convictions; and (4) that his sentence is excessive. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Appellees entered into a contract for the purchase of an undeveloped lot in a planned unit development. Appellants, an attorney and his law firm, prepared closing documents, including a warranty deed and settlement statement. The warranty deed included language that the property was unencumbered, and the settlement statement provided for payoff of the first mortgage and for the purchase of title insurance. Appellees later discovered that Appellants had failed to procure release of the first lien and had also failed to procure title insurance. The property was foreclosed, and Appellees filed suit against Appellants for negligent misrepresentation and violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. The trial court found Appellees liable on these claims. We concluded that the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act does not apply to Appellants, who were engaged in the practice of law in the preparation of the closing documents. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s award of attorney fees and costs pursuant to the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. The trial court’s order is otherwise affirmed.

We granted this interlocutory appeal to determine whether Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-11-272(c)(1) of the Healthcare Quality Improvement Act (“HCQIA”), as applied to the facts of this case, violates the separation of powers provisions in the Tennessee Constitution. Plaintiff, a physician whose medical staff privileges were terminated by Summit Medical Center, sued the hospital, alleging, inter alia, that it acted in bad faith and with malice during the peer review process. Following a lengthy discovery process, the hospital filed a motion for summary judgment asserting, inter alia, that Plaintiff’s anticipated evidence was confidential, privileged, and inadmissible under the HCQIA because it was derived from the activity of a Quality Improvement Committee (“QIC”). At the same time, the hospital filed a motion in limine to exclude all records of quality improvement activity pursuant to the evidentiary privilege under Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-11-272(c)(1). After ascertaining that Plaintiff intended to rely on QIC evidence, the trial court ruled that the peer review privilege could not be waived, and that Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-11-272(c)(1) violated the separation of powers provisions because it deprived the court of its inherent authority to make evidentiary decisions affecting “the heart of this case.” This Tenn. R. App. P. Rule 9 interlocutory appeal followed. We agree with the trial court’s ruling that the privilege cannot be waived. However, we disagree with the trial court’s ruling that Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-11-272(c)(1), as applied to the facts of this case, violates the separation of powers provisions in the Tennessee Constitution. This is because the General Assembly created the evidentiary privilege to effectuate one of its powers, the enactment of legislation that promotes the safety and welfare of our citizens. To that end, the primary concern of the challenged legislation is not to create court rules, but to promote candor within a hospital’s quality improvement process to ensure effective evaluation measures. Furthermore, Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-11-272(c)(2) provides an “original source” exception to the privilege whereby documents not produced specifically for use by a QIC, and are otherwise available from original sources, are both discoverable and admissible into evidence even if the information was presented during a QIC proceeding. Thus, the privilege is reasonable and workable within the framework of - 2 - evidentiary rules already recognized by the judiciary. For these reasons, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

The Appellant, Michael Eugene Jones, pled guilty in the Marshall County Circuit Court to selling one-half gram or more of a Schedule II controlled substance, a Class B felony. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the trial court was to determine the length and manner of service of the sentence. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered that the Appellant serve ten years in confinement. On appeal, the Appellant contends that the length of his sentence is excessive and that the trial court erred by not sentencing him to community corrections. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this divorce action, the trial court awarded alimony in futuro and attorney’s fees to Wife; Husband appeals both awards. Concluding that the court did not make adequate findings as to whether rehabilitative or transitional alimony was feasible, we vacate the award of alimony in futuro and remand for further consideration of the nature and duration of the alimony award; we affirm the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees to Wife; and we decline to award attorney’s fees to either party for the appeal.

This appeal arises from the termination of a father’s parental rights. The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition against Anthony G. (“Father”) in the Juvenile Court for Knox County (“the Juvenile Court”) seeking to terminate Father’s parental rights to his son, Jase P. (“the Child”). Father had been incarcerated and unable to parent the Child since the Child’s birth. After a trial, the Juvenile Court terminated Father’s parental rights on the grounds of wanton disregard and various grounds coming under the putative father statute at Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1- 113(g)(9)(A). Father appeals. We affirm all grounds for termination found against Father. We further affirm that termination of Father’s parental rights is in the Child’s best interest. We, therefore, affirm the judgment of the Juvenile Court in its entirety.