APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Arzell A. Harmon (“the Defendant”) pleaded guilty to attempted second degree murder and was sentenced pursuant to a plea agreement to ten years at thirty percent release eligibility with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered the Defendant to serve his ten-year sentence in confinement. The Defendant then filed a motion for reduction of sentence pursuant to Rule 35 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure, which the trial court summarily denied. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his Rule 35 motion. Alternatively, the Defendant contends that the trial court should have converted his Rule 35 motion into a petition for post-conviction relief. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the Knox County Criminal Court.

The pro se Petitioner, Jimmy Newell, appeals as of right from the Bradley County Criminal Court’s order summarily dismissing his petition for writ of error coram nobis alleging that the State violated the terms of his plea agreement by filing a letter of opposition to parole with the Board of Parole. The State has filed a motion to affirm the trial court’s judgment pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we conclude that the State’s motion is welltaken and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A circuit court adjudicated a child dependent and neglected because her mother’s mental incapacity rendered the Mother unfit to properly care for the child. Upon review, we conclude that the circuit court’s decision is supported by clear and convincing evidence, and thus, we affirm.

In 1998, a Davidson County jury convicted the Petitioner, Jerry D. Carney, of first degree premeditated murder. On direct appeal, this Court affirmed the Petitioner's convictions. See State v. Jerry D. Carney, No. M1999-01139-CCA-R3-CD, 2000 WL 1335770, at *1(Tenn. Crim. Appl, at Nashville, Sept. 15, 2000), perm app. denied (Tenn. April 24, 2001). On December 19, 2014, the Petitioner filed his fourth petition for a writ of error coram nobis and in it alleged newly discovered evidence. The trial court issued an order on April 22, 2014, dismissing the petition as time-barred and meritless. We affirm the trial court's judgment.

An individual previously convicted of a felony drug offense petitioned for restoration of his citizenship rights. The trial court restored all his citizenship rights except the right to bear arms. In doing so, the court concluded that Tennessee Code Annotated § 39-17- 1307(b), which makes it an offense for certain persons to possess a firearm, prohibited the court from restoring the right to bear arms. We affirm.

The landlord of a shopping mall commenced this action against a commercial tenant for breach of a lease. The tenant claimed it had an enforceable oral agreement to terminate the lease with the former landlord. The landlord contended that the original lease contained a “no oral modification” clause; thus, the oral agreement to terminate the lease was unenforceable. After the landlord presented its proof at trial, the court dismissed the case pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 41.02(2), ruling that the oral termination agreement between the tenant and the former landlord was enforceable despite the “no oral modification” clause in the lease. This appeal followed. When a defendant files a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 41.02(2) motion for involuntary dismissal at the conclusion of the plaintiff’s proof at trial, the only evidence the trial court may consider in determining whether the proof was sufficient to demonstrate a right to the relief is “the plaintiff’s proof” at trial. Tenn. R. Civ. P. 41.02(2). We have determined that the trial court erroneously considered facts and documents not found in the plaintiff’s proof. Excluding the extraneous facts and documents, the evidence presented at trial preponderates against the trial court’s factual findings and its conclusion that the landlord’s predecessor in interest and the tenant entered into a binding lease termination agreement. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

This is a termination of parental rights case involving the child, Mariah H. (“the Child”), who was one year of age at the time of trial. On June 26, 2015, the Johnson City Juvenile Court (“trial court”) granted temporary legal custody of the Child to the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”). The Child was immediately placed in foster care, where she has remained since that date. Following separate hearings, the trial court entered two orders adjudicating the Child dependent and neglected in the care of the parents: one on November 25, 2015, as to the mother, Teresa H. (“Mother”), and the second on January 13, 2016, as to the father, Stafford B. (“Father”). On February 2, 2016, DCS filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Mother and Father.1 Following a bench trial, the trial court terminated Father’s parental rights to the Child after determining by clear and convincing evidence that Father willfully failed to visit the Child during the four months prior to the filing of the termination petition. Furthermore, the trial court dismissed the grounds alleged against Father of failure to establish paternity and persistence of the conditions leading to removal. Also finding clear and convincing evidence that termination of Father’s parental rights was in the best interest of the Child, the trial court terminated Father’s parental rights to the Child. Father has appealed. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The pro se Petitioner, Jeffrey Yates, appeals as of right from the Johnson County Criminal Court’s order denying his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court’s denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we conclude that the State’s motion is well-taken and affirm the judgment of the Johnson County Criminal Court.

The Appellant, Brian Garwood, pled guilty in the Grundy County Circuit Court to three counts of forgery and received a total effective sentence of six years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Appellant challenges the trial court’s denial of alternative sentencing, specifically drug court. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Defendant, Demarco Cortez Taylor, was convicted by a jury of aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. He received an effective sentence of ten years for the convictions. On appeal, Defendant challenges: (1) the trial court’s denial of the motion to suppress; (2) the State’s use of improper leading questions; (3) the exclusion of the victim’s recorded interview; (4) the omission of a jury instruction on intoxication; (5) the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the convictions for aggravated robbery and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony; (6) the denial of a new trial on the basis of jury bias; (7) an excessive sentence; and (8) cumulative error. After a review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Gary Hawkins, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief by the Shelby County Criminal Court. On appeal, he argues that trial counsel was ineffective for (1) failing to object to testimony regarding an alleged prior bad act by the Petitioner and (2) failing to object to improper statements made during the State’s closing argument. Additionally, he asserts that the cumulative errors made by trial counsel entitle him to relief. After review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to two of her children. Shortly after the filing of the petition to terminate parental rights, the juvenile court appointed counsel for the mother, who lacked the funds to afford one. However, on the day of trial, appointed counsel orally moved for leave to withdraw. The court granted the motion, and the trial proceeded with the mother representing herself. Ultimately, the court found clear and convincing evidence of five grounds for termination and that termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the children’s best interest. The mother argues on appeal, among other things, that the trial court erred in permitting her appointed counsel to withdraw. Because we agree, we vacate the judgment to the extent it terminated the mother’s parental rights and remand for further proceedings.  

In this class action, stockholders sued to prevent a proposed merger alleging that the company’s board of directors had breached their fiduciary duty. After expedited discovery, the stockholders agreed to settle in consideration for disclosure of additional information that could affect approval of the merger. The court preliminarily approved the proposed settlement and ordered the company to notify all potential class members of the proposal. Only one class member objected to the proposed settlement. After a fairness hearing, the chancery court approved the settlement and denied the objector’s request for access to discovery materials obtained during the litigation. The objector appeals, arguing that the chancery court erred in denying it access to discovery and in approving the proposed settlement. Upon review, we conclude that the chancery court did not abuse its discretion. Accordingly, we affirm.

The pro se Petitioner, David Hearing, appeals as of right from the Greene County Criminal Court’s order summarily dismissing his petition for writ of error coram nobis challenging his guilty-pleaded convictions for first degree murder. The State has filed a motion to affirm the trial court’s order pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we conclude that the State’s motion is well-taken and affirm the order of the trial court.

The plaintiff initiated this action, claiming, inter alia, a breach of contract. The plaintiff alleged that he was bringing the action as the assignee of a limited liability company, which was an original party to the contract at issue. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant estate, also an original party to the contract at issue, determining that the plaintiff lacked standing to file the action. The plaintiff timely appealed. Determining that the plaintiff possessed standing, we reverse the trial court’s grant of summary judgment. We affirm the trial court’s decision to allow the estate to amend its responses to the requests for admission propounded by the plaintiff.

The defendant, Darin Woods, was indicted for attempted first degree murder (Count 1), aggravated robbery (Count 2), attempted aggravated robbery (Count 3), and employing a firearm during a dangerous felony (Count 4). A jury convicted the defendant of the crimes as charged in Counts 2-4, but found him guilty of the lesser-included offense of attempted second degree murder in Count 1. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his attempted second degree murder conviction, arguing the State failed to prove he acted “knowingly” in shooting his victims. The defendant also challenges the trial court’s imposition of consecutive sentencing. The State contends sufficient evidence exists to show the defendant “knowingly” shot his victims, and argues consecutive sentencing was warranted in this case. After our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Shelby County jury convicted the defendant, Lavelle Moore, of six counts of theft of property over $500 but less than $1000. The trial court merged the convictions into two counts and imposed an effective sentence of twelve years. On appeal, the defendant contends the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions; the trial court abused its discretion by ruling the defendant could be impeached with his prior theft conviction; the theft convictions violate double jeopardy; the trial court erred by ordering the defendant, during deliberations, to stand before the jury and display his eyes; the trial court abused its discretion by telling the jury to keep working after it reached an impasse; and the trial court abused its discretion when imposing consecutive sentences. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude the evidence was sufficient; the trial court properly allowed the defendant to be impeached with his prior theft conviction; and the convictions did not violate principles of double jeopardy. However, we also conclude the trial court erred when allowing the jury to view the defendant’s eyes in close proximity for the first time after the case had been submitted to the jury. This error was not harmless. Accordingly, we reverse the judgments of the trial court and remand for a new trial. Because we have remanded this matter for a new trial, the defendant’s final issues concerning the trial court directing the jury to continue deliberations and sentencing are pretermitted.

This appeal involves post-judgment proceedings following a final judgment in favor of the city that the appellants pay $45,175 for unpaid maintenance fees on their commercial real property. The appellants appeal the trial court’s action overruling a motion to pay the judgment by installments under the so-called “slow-pay” statute, Tennessee Code Annotated section 26-2-216. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

Defendant, Fred Beal, was convicted by a jury of first degree premeditated murder, felony murder, attempted first degree murder, two counts of attempted especially aggravated robbery, and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. He appeals, arguing that the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions. As part of our review of the record, we note that there is no judgment form for Count 1 in the record. On remand, the trial court should enter a judgment form for Count 1, first degree felony murder. In all other respects, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

A Shelby County Grand Jury returned a two-count indictment charging the Defendant, Deangelo Norton, with rape of a child and aggravated sexual battery. Pursuant to Rule 412 of the Tennessee Rules of Evidence, prior to trial the Defendant filed a notice of his intent to introduce evidence at trial of the child victim’s knowledge of sexual matters. The trial court held a pretrial evidentiary hearing on the subject and denied the request, finding the proposed testimony to be irrelevant. A jury trial followed, and the Defendant was convicted of both counts. The trial court merged the convictions and sentenced the Defendant to twenty-five years at 100%. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his request to introduce evidence and that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his convictions. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Robert Webb, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief as untimely upon its conclusion that the Petitioner’s mental incompetence did not toll the statute of limitations. After review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

This is an appeal by Stoney’s Bail Bonding, Inc., (“Stoney’s”) of an order of the Maury County Circuit Court, sitting en banc, which denied Stoney’s Renewed Motion for Relief from Bond. Stoney’s argues the single issue that the trial court erred in its application of Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-11-201(c) because the State failed to commence extradition proceedings, as previously ordered by the en banc panel. Following our review of the record, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the motion.

This is a probate case. Vickie Miller (Widow), personal representative of the estate of her late husband, James E. Miller (Decedent), petitioned the trial court for letters of administration. Decedent died intestate on July 17, 2010. At issue is the ownership of Jim Miller Excavating Company, Inc. (the corporation), the company operated by the Decedent. Widow argues that she is the owner of all of the 1,000 shares of stock that the corporation issued to “Jim Miller and Vicky [sic] Miller JTROS” shortly after the company’s incorporation on April 3, 1990. She filed a copy of the stock certificate, dated April 30, 1990. Mechelle Miller and Jamie L. Shannon, Decedent’s daughters and heirs of the estate, argue that the stock certificate was invalid and that the corporation’s assets should be part of Decedent’s estate. The daughters filed a copy of the corporation’s bylaws, in which the following language is found: “the Board of Directors shall consist of one individual, to-wit, its sole shareholder, James E. Miller.” The trial court granted Widow’s motion for summary judgment. Only Mechelle Miller appealed. We hold that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the corporation’s directors and incorporators intended that the company would be owned by Decedent and Widow as joint tenants with the right of survivorship. We vacate the trial court’s summary judgment and remand for further proceedings.

Wilson J. B. Jones, the Defendant, filed a Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 motion for relief from an allegedly illegal sentence. The trial court found that the motion failed to state a colorable claim because the Defendant’s sentence had expired and dismissed the motion. The Defendant “concedes that his sentences have expired” and acknowledges that our supreme court in State v. Brown, 479 S.W. 3d 200 (Tenn. 2015), “held that Rule 36.1 does not authorize the correction of expired illegal sentences.” The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

A Shelby County jury convicted Antonio Sykes (“the Petitioner”) of first degree premeditated murder, especially aggravated robbery, and two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping. He received an effective sentence of life without parole plus seventy-five years. The Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of error coram nobis, arguing that the State had withheld exculpatory evidence that one of the State’s witnesses received a plea deal in exchange for favorable testimony, in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and that the exculpatory evidence constituted “newly discovered evidence” within the meaning of the coram nobis statute. The State filed a response and motion to dismiss, arguing that the Petitioner “fail[ed] to allege any new evidence relating to the matters litigated at trial[]” and that the petition was barred by the statute of limitations. The coram nobis court summarily dismissed the petition and found that the Petitioner failed to present actual evidence of a plea deal between the witness and the State. On appeal, the Petitioner concedes that his petition was untimely filed but argues that this court should toll the statute of limitations and address the merits of his petition. After a thorough review of the record and applicable case law, we affirm.