APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant-Appellant, William Sappington, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of theft of property with the value of more than $10,000 but less than $60,000, a Class C felony. T.C.A. § 39-14-103, 105(a)(4). The sole issue presented for our review in this appeal as of right is whether the evidence is sufficient to support his conviction. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Charis Lynn Jetton, pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter and possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-211, 39-17-1324(a). For her respective crimes, the trial court imposed consecutive sentences of seven years and three years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant argues the trial court erroneously denied her request for alternative sentencing as to the voluntary manslaughter conviction. Following our review of the briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we affirm the defendant’s seven-year sentence to be served in confinement.

A Shelby County jury found the defendant, Roy Robinson, guilty of aggravated assault and second degree murder. The trial court imposed an effective twenty-year sentence to be served at one hundred percent, and the defendant appealed. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his second degree murder conviction, arguing he shot his victim in self-defense. The State asserts sufficient evidence exists to support the second degree murder conviction. After our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Charles Steven Blocker (“Employee”) sustained a compensable injury to his cervical spine in November 2010.  Surgery was required to treat the injury.  He was able to return to work for Powell Valley Electric Cooperative (“Employer”) after that injury.  His claim for workers’ compensation benefits was settled.  Employee suffered a second, gradual injury to his cervical spine in January 2013.  He was unable to return to work after that injury.  He brought suit in the Chancery Court for Claiborne County against Employer and the Tennessee Department of Labor and Workforce Development, Second Injury Fund (“the Fund”).  The parties stipulated that Employee was permanently and totally disabled.  The only issue presented to the court was apportionment of the permanent total disability benefits between Employer and the Fund.  The trial court found that the second injury had caused a 9% permanent partial disability without reference to the prior injury.  Benefits were apportioned 9% to Employer and 91% to the Fund.  The Fund has appealed, contending that the trial court incorrectly apportioned the award.  The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51.  We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

I concur in the majority’s determination that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s judgment (1) finding a material change in circumstances; (2) holding that “the best interest of the children [is] that [Mr. Bell] be the Primary Residential Parent;” and (3) awarding father 215 days of residential parenting time with the balance of days awarded to mother.

The Appellant, Mack Jeffery Thompson, filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1.  The trial court denied the motion, and the Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal.  Based upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the motion but remand the case for correction of a clerical error on the judgment of conviction.

Petitioner, Young Bok Song, filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis concerning his multiple convictions for rape of a child and aggravated sexual battery and his sixty-five-year sentence. The petition was dismissed without an evidentiary hearing, and Petitioner appeals. We affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court.

The Defendant, Donald Gwin, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of aggravated rape, a Class A felony; aggravated robbery, a Class B felony; aggravated burglary, a Class C felony; and aggravated assault, a Class C felony. He was sentenced to an effective term of thirty-five years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant argues that: (1) the trial court erred in ruling that his prior sexual battery conviction, similar to that for which he was on trial, could be introduced if he opened the door to its admissibility; (2) the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion for a mistrial after the jury heard that he wore an ankle bracelet for monitoring as part of the sex offender registry; (3) the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion for a mistrial after a local newspaper printed an article about his case; and (4) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction for aggravated robbery. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The principal issues in this divorce action arise from the parties’ antenuptial agreement. The trial court declared the parties divorced, classified the bulk of the assets as Husband’s separate property, divided the modest amount of assets that were classified as marital property, and awarded Wife alimony in futuro of $8,000 per month and alimony in solido of $500,000. Both parties appeal. Wife contends the court erred in classifying the bulk of the assets as Husband’s separate property and that the alimony awarded to her is insufficient. She also requests an award of attorney fees incurred on appeal. Husband contends that all of the income he earned during the marriage is his separate property, that all assets he acquired with that income is his separate property, and that the antenuptial agreement prohibited the trial court from considering the value of his separate property in awarding alimony to Wife. We affirm the trial court in all respects. We also find that Wife is entitled to recover reasonable and necessary attorney fees incurred on appeal.

The Petitioner, Jeffery Lee Miller, appeals the Montgomery County Circuit Court’s dismissal of his petition for writ of error coram nobis. The Petitioner seeks relief from his premeditated first degree murder conviction. The Petitioner argues that (1) the coram nobis court erred by determining that due process considerations did not toll the statute of limitations; (2) the coram nobis court abused its discretion by applying an incorrect legal standard regarding reasonable diligence in its order and final judgment; (3) the coram nobis court’s grounds for dismissal were erroneous; and (4) the coram nobis court’s assessment of the State’s open file policy was erroneous. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court.

Petitioner, James R. Wilson, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of error coram nobis that was dismissed by the trial court as being time-barred and for failing to allege newly discovered evidence. Petitioner now appeals the denial of his petition. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Following the denial of suppression motions, the defendants, Lucy Caitlin Alford and Jeremie Alford, entered guilty pleas in Franklin County Circuit Court to felony possession of methamphetamine and reserved the right to appeal certified questions of law relating to the sufficiency of the affidavit supporting the search warrant issued in this case.  The defendants assert the affidavit, which was based on information provided by a confidential informant, failed to meet the two-pronged Aguilar-Spinelli test for probable cause, lacked independent police corroboration, and was materially misleading.  The State contends the affidavit was sufficient.  Following our review of the record and pertinent authorities, including the recent Tennessee Supreme Court decision of State v. Jerry Lewis Tuttle, ___S.W.3d ___, No. M2014-00566-SC-R11-CD, 2017 WL 1246855 (Tenn. Apr. 5, 2017), we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Wife filed a complaint for divorce following a fifteen-year marriage.  The trial court granted Wife a divorce, distributed the marital estate, and awarded Wife alimony.  The trial court granted Husband’s request to pay the alimony in solido award over a period of six years, with post-judgment interest payable at 10% interest per annum.  Husband appeals the division of some of the marital assets and debts, the award of alimony in solido, and the post-judgment interest award.  We affirm the trial court’s division of the marital estate and the award of alimony in solido, but we modify the post-judgment interest rate from 10% to 5.50% to conform with the interest on judgments statute, Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-14-121.

Homeowners filed suit for breach of contract and fraud and/or negligent representation against the owners of a restoration business who performed repairs on their house after a fire.  When the defendants failed to respond to or appear at the hearing on the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, the trial court granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs.  The defendants then filed a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60 motion and affidavits stating that they did not receive notice of the hearing on the motion for summary judgment.  The trial court held a hearing on the Rule 60 motion and denied the motion.  Because there is no transcript or statement of the evidence regarding the hearing on the summary judgment motion or on the Rule 60 motion, we must accept the trial court’s findings of fact.  We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s denial of the plaintiffs’ Rule 60 motion.  

This is an appeal from a final decree of divorce. The trial court's final decree of divorce included a division of marital property but failed to adjudicate the issue of alimony. A subsequent order states that the parties “agreed that [Wife’s] claim for alimony in futuro and rehabilitative alimony . . . are dismissed.” The appellate record contains no transcript or statement of the evidence for our review as required by the Tennessee Rules of Appellant Procedure. Accordingly, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s finding. Affirmed and remanded.

This appeal involves an option to purchase real estate. After a bench trial, the circuit court awarded the tenant a judgment for $12,000. Because the trial court did not make sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law to enable meaningful appellate review, we vacate the order and remand for further proceedings.

Defendant, Dominique Greer, was convicted of first degree felony murder and attempted especially aggravated robbery. He received a life sentence for felony murder and eight years for attempted especially aggravated robbery to be served concurrently to the sentence for felony murder. On appeal, Defendant argues: (1) the trial court erred by admitting evidence of a prior robbery; (2) the trial court erred by instructing the jury that it could consider the prior robbery for issues other than intent and identity; (3) the trial court erred by allowing Detective Merritt to testify concerning Defendant’s cell phone records; (4) the trial court erred by overruling Defendant’s motion to suppress; (5) the trial court erred by allowing a constructive amendment to the felony murder indictment; (6) the evidence was insufficient to support Defendant’s felony murder conviction; and (7) there was cumulative error. Following our review, we reverse the judgments of the trial court because the trial court committed reversible error in its final charge to the jury.

I concur in the results reached by the majority but write separately to express a different conclusion regarding the admissibility of evidence of the Defendant’s robbery of Mr. Carroll. The majority holds that the Defendant’s robbery of Mr. Carroll was properly admitted to prove identity and intent for the charged offenses. However, I believe that the probative value of the Defendant’s prior bad act is outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to the Defendant. Thus, the evidence that the Defendant committed a prior robbery should not have been admitted pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b).

The petitioner, Henry Bates, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of aggravated robbery, burglary of a building, and vandalism of $1000 or more, for which he received an effective sentence of forty-two years’ imprisonment. He now appeals the postconviction court’s denial of relief arguing that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to present an alibi witness at trial. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the postconviction court.

The defendant, Westley A. Albright, pled nolo contendere to one count of soliciting a minor in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-528, a Class E felony, for which he received a one-year suspended sentence and deferred judicial diversion.  As a condition of probation, the defendant agreed to participate in therapeutic treatment for the duration of probation or until favorably discharged.  Prior to the conclusion of the one-year suspended sentence, the defendant’s treatment provider discharged him for failure to comply with the goals of his treatment program.  Following service of a probation warrant and a hearing, the trial court revoked the defendant’s deferred diversion and extended his probation for six months to allow for the completion of treatment.  On appeal, the defendant argues: (1) the trial court violated his due process rights by failing to advise him at the time he entered his nolo contendere plea that, as a condition of probation, he would be required to confess to the solicitation of a minor; (2) the trial court violated his due process rights by relying on a probation rule not referenced in the revocation warrant; and (3) the trial court erred when revoking his deferred diversion despite his completion of the objective requirements of the sex offender treatment program.  Upon review, we affirm the findings of the trial court.

The pro se petitioner, Mitchell Nathaniel Scott, appeals the denial of his petition for writ of error coram nobis by the Davidson County Criminal Court, arguing the trial court erred in summarily dismissing the petition because newly discovered evidence exists in his case. The petitioner also calls on this Court to apply the doctrine of stare decisis and ignore the Tennessee Supreme Court holding of Frazier v. State, 495 S.W.3d 246 (Tenn. 2016). After our review, we affirm the summary dismissal of the petition pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

The Defendant, Tommy Lee Collins, Jr., was convicted by a Bedford County Circuit Court jury of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, a Class C felony, evading arrest, a Class D felony, and reckless endangerment, possession of marijuana with the intent to sell, and possession of marijuana with the intent to deliver, Class E felonies. See T.C.A. §§ 39-17-1324 (2014) (employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony), 39-16-603 (2014) (amended 2016) (evading arrest), 39-13-103 (Supp. 2012) (amended 2013) (reckless endangerment), 39-17-417(a)(4) (Supp. 2012) (amended 2014) (possession of a controlled substance). The trial court merged the possession of marijuana convictions and sentenced the Defendant to an effective eight years. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his drug and firearm convictions, (2) the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of the traffic stop and subsequent search of the car he was driving, (3) the prosecutor improperly challenged a juror on the basis of race, (4) the trial court erred by declining to order the prosecutor to disclose the identity of a confidential informant, and (5) the Defendant’s dual convictions for reckless endangerment and evading arrest violated double jeopardy principles. Because we conclude a juror was improperly challenged, we reverse the judgments of the trial court and remand for a new trial.

The Defendant, Patrick Russell Chambers, pleaded guilty in the Blount County Circuit Court in case number C-24053 to possession of contraband inside a penal institution, a Class C felony. See T.C.A. § 39-16-301 (2014). The Defendant also stipulated that his conduct in case number C-20453 violated the conditions of his community corrections sentence relative to a reckless homicide conviction in case number C-20398. The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range III, persistent offender to ten years’ confinement for the contraband conviction and to serve the remainder of his eight-year sentence for the reckless homicide conviction after finding that the Defendant had violated the conditions of his release. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his request for alternative sentencing. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Vanessa Rennee Pinegar, appealed her convictions of one count of facilitation of delivery of 0.5 or more grams of cocaine within a drug-free school zone and two counts of attempted delivery of 0.5 or more grams of cocaine within a drug-free school zone, challenging the denial of her motion to sever the trial of the defendants, certain evidentiary rulings, the jury instructions, the sufficiency of the evidence, and her effective nine-year sentence.  This Court affirmed the convictions and sentence.  The defendant filed an application for permission to appeal to our Supreme Court.  The Tennessee Supreme Court granted the application and remanded the case to this Court for reconsideration of sentencing in light of State  v. Gibson, 506 S.W.3d 450 (Tenn. 2016).  Upon reconsideration, we vacate the defendant’s enhanced sentences under the Drug-Free School Zone Act and remand the matter to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.  In all other respects, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

A Montgomery County Circuit Court Jury convicted the Appellant, Rawney Jean Taylor, of initiating a false report, a Class D felony; criminally negligent homicide, a Class E felony; and reckless endangerment, a Class A misdemeanor, and the trial court sentenced her to three years, two years, and eleven months, twenty-nine days, respectively.  The court ordered that she serve the three- and two-year sentences consecutively for a total effective sentence of five years.  On appeal, the Appellant contends that her three- and two-year sentences are excessive, that the trial court erred by ordering consecutive sentencing, that the trial court erred by denying her request for judicial diversion, and that the trial court erred by denying her request for probation.  Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.