APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Stepmother filed a detainer warrant against Stepson and was awarded possession of the real property in the general sessions court. Stepson appealed to the circuit court, and a bench trial was conducted. The trial court awarded the property to Stepmother. We affirm the trial court’s finding that no resulting trust was proven. Although we affirm the trial court’s finding of unjust enrichment for the improvements on land based on the three-part test under Freeman Indus., LLC v. Eastman Chem. Co., 172 S.W.3d 512, 525 (Tenn. 2005), we reverse the trial court’s award of $37,000.00 to Stepson for the improvements to the property because Stepson failed to prove the correct measure of damages at trial. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

This appeal concerns the termination of a mother’s parental rights to her minor child. The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition in the Juvenile Court for Davidson County (“the Juvenile Court”) seeking to terminate the parental rights of Judith B. (“Mother”) to her minor child Lorenda B. (“the Child”). Mother has alleged throughout this case that there is a satanic conspiracy against her and that the Child is at risk of having her organs harvested for trafficking purposes. After a trial, the Juvenile Court terminated Mother’s parental rights. Mother appeals to this Court. We affirm the grounds of substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan and mental incompetence, but we reverse the grounds of willful failure to support and persistence of conditions. We also affirm the Juvenile Court’s finding that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the Child’s best interest. We affirm, in part, and reverse, in part, the judgment of the Juvenile Court.

The plaintiffs entered into a contract signed by the commissioner of finance for the City of Lebanon to act as the City’s insurance broker for health care benefits. The plaintiffs secured a group health care benefit contract for the City for the period from July 1, 2013 through July 1, 2014. In February 2014, the City informed the plaintiffs that it had appointed another broker and refused to pay the monthly service fees for the remaining months of the contract. The City asserted that the contract was ultra vires because it was not signed by the mayor or approved by ordinance enacted by the city council as required by the City’s charter. The trial court found the contract to be ultra vires, but determined that the City “should be equitably estopped from denying the validity of the agreement” and granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.  

A Davidson County Criminal Court Jury convicted the Appellant, Tazarius Jay Vond Leach, of two counts of aggravated robbery and one count of carjacking.  The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of fifteen years.  On appeal, the Appellant argues that the State’s providing “a hypothetical using the facts of the case” to explain criminal responsibility during voir dire violated his right to a fair trial and impartial jury.  Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Davidson County Grand Jury indicted the Appellant, Michael Dean Hodges, of aggravated child abuse in counts one through three and aggravated child neglect in count four.  After a jury trial, the Appellant was acquitted in count one but convicted as charged in counts two and three and convicted of knowing aggravated assault as a lesser-included offense of aggravated child neglect in count four.  The trial court merged the aggravated assault conviction into the aggravated child abuse convictions and sentenced the Appellant to an effective twenty-five-years in confinement to be served at 100%.  On appeal, the Appellant claimed that the trial court erred by failing to sever the charge of aggravated child abuse in count one from the remaining two counts of aggravated child abuse; that the trial court erred by allowing the jury to hear a portion of his statement in which he admitted to prior bad acts; that the trial court erred by giving the jury a supplemental instruction on “knowingly” that failed to include language about non-accidental conduct; and that cumulative error warranted a new trial.  This court concluded that the trial court erred by allowing the jury to hear that the Appellant had been “in trouble” previously but that the error was harmless; however, we concluded that the Appellant’s conviction of aggravated assault had to be reversed because knowing aggravated assault was not a lesser-included offense of aggravated child neglect.  The Tennessee Supreme Court granted the Appellant’s application for permission to appeal and remanded the case to this court for reconsideration in light of the court’s recent opinion in State v. Howard, 504 S.W.3d 260 (Tenn. 2016), regarding lesser-included offenses.  Upon reconsideration, we again conclude that knowing aggravated assault is not a lesser-included offense of aggravated child neglect as charged in this case and modify the conviction to reckless endangerment.

We granted permission to appeal in this case to address whether a joint tenancy with an express right of survivorship can be severed by the unilateral actions of one of the co-tenants. The owner of the property at issue in this appeal executed a deed conveying the property to herself and to her son in a joint tenancy with right of survivorship. The same grantor later executed a quitclaim deed granting her interest in the property to her grandson (the son’s child). After the grantor died, the son filed a declaratory judgment action against the grandson, claiming that the son was the rightful owner of the property in fee simple as the surviving joint tenant under the first deed. In response, the grandson asserted that the grantor’s second deed severed the joint tenancy, conveyed the grantor’s one-half interest to him, and destroyed the son’s right of survivorship. The trial court granted the son’s motion for summary judgment, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. We reverse. Following the common-law doctrine of severance, we hold that a joint tenancy with an express right of survivorship may be severed by the unilateral action of one of the co-tenants, and that doing so converts the estate into a tenancy in common and destroys the survivorship interests of the original joint tenants. In this case, the grantor’s second deed, conveying her interest in the property to the grandson, severed the joint tenancy and destroyed the son’s right of survivorship, so the son and the grandson own the property in equal parts as tenants in common.

The Court has adopted a majority rule that allows a co-tenant to unilaterally sever a joint tenancy with right of survivorship and convert the estate into a tenancy in common without the knowledge or consent of the other co-tenant. The better rule, followed by other jurisdictions, does not allow a co-tenant to act unilaterally to sever the other co tenant’s interest, thereby protecting the rights and expectations of joint tenants who are conveyed property with a survivorship interest. 

Petitioner, Christopher Locke, pleaded guilty to one count of incest and received a three-year sentence of probation after the trial court denied judicial diversion. State v. Christopher Locke, No. E2010-01965-CCA-R3-CD, 2011 WL 3446442 (Tenn. Crim. App., Aug. 9, 2011), perm. app. denied (Tenn., Nov. 16, 2011). Petitioner appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief as being untimely. Additionally, Petitioner asserts that the trial court erred by failing to conduct an independent inquiry regarding a conflict of interest between trial counsel and post-conviction counsel. Having reviewed the record, the applicable law, and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This case to terminate the parental rights of a father to his daughter is before the court for the second time. The case began when the mother and stepfather filed the petition to terminate the father’s rights and for the stepfather to adopt the child. The petition alleged the grounds of abandonment by failure to visit and support and by engaging in conduct showing a wanton disregard for the welfare of the child, and asserted that termination was in the child’s best interest. After a hearing, father’s parental rights were terminated; Father appealed. This Court vacated the judgment terminating his rights and remanded the case for the trial court to include written findings of fact and conclusions of law and to consider the four months prior to the father’s incarceration in the determination of whether the father had abandoned the child. On remand, the court entered an order which included findings of fact and conclusions of law, and terminated father’s parental rights on the grounds alleged in the petition and upon a finding that termination was in the child’s best interest. The father appeals. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The issue in this workers’ compensation appeal is whether the employer is entitled to summary judgment. The employee filed a claim for workers’ compensation benefits, alleging he injured his foot in the course and scope of his employment. His employer denied the claim, citing a lack of medical proof that the injury was job-related. The Court of Workers’ Compensation Claims denied a motion for summary judgment filed by the employer, finding there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the work injury contributed more than fifty percent in causing the injury. The Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board reversed and dismissed the case, holding that the employee failed to produce sufficient evidence that his foot condition arose primarily out of and in the course and scope of his employment. After careful review, we affirm the decision of the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board. 

The petitioner, Aaron Malone, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction for first degree felony murder. He asserts that the court erred in denying relief because he received the ineffective assistance of counsel and his due process rights were violated by the State’s failing to preserve unedited footage from “The First 48” television show. After review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The Petitioner, Mitchell Garner, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction of aggravated sexual battery and resulting twelve-year sentence. On appeal, the Petitioner claims that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. Based upon the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This appeal involves a challenge to certain decisions made by the probate court pursuant to a petition to ratify the decisions of the estate’s executor. Although we affirm the probate court’s determination that a $250,000.00 debt once owed to the decedent is now extinguished and also affirm its determination that a certain annuity policy should be transferred to the estate, we reverse the probate court’s determination that insurance policies owned by the decedent at her death should be transferred to her grandchildren. Further, we reverse the trial court’s order to the extent that it directs two other annuity policies to be directed to the decedent’s grandchildren. These other two annuities are also assets of the estate that are subject to distribution in accordance with the decedent’s will.

This appeal concerns the proper ownership of a piece of farm property in which the deed recites ownership as one-half to parents and one-fourth each to their two sons. The trial court eventually ruled that the property in dispute was solely owned by parents based on the complaining son’s nonpayment of taxes and awarded full ownership of the property to the parents under the theories of title by prescription and unjust enrichment. We reverse and remand.

The defendant, Yelsin A. Cruz, appeals his Maury County Circuit Court jury conviction of rape of a child, claiming that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress his pretrial statement to the police, that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, and that the 27-year sentence is excessive.  Discerning no error, we affirm.

The plaintiff filed suit alleging discriminatory and harassing practices violative of the Tennessee Human Rights Act. The defendants moved for summary judgment, and the trial court dismissed the plaintiff’s claims, holding that the defendants had negated essential elements of the plaintiff’s claims. On appeal, the plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in failing to allow for additional discovery before ruling on the request for summary judgment. The plaintiff also argues that the trial court failed to address all her claims and that genuine issues of material fact precluded summary judgment. We conclude that the trial court properly granted summary judgment. Therefore, we affirm.

The petitioner, Orlando Malone, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus, which petition challenged his 1999 Bradley County Criminal Court jury convictions of attempted especially aggravated robbery and aggravated robbery.  Discerning no error, we affirm.

The defendant, Charles Macklin, appeals the trial court’s dismissal of his motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 for failure to assert a colorable claim. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Paula Dugger (“Employee”), a home health nurse, was injured in a motor vehicle accident while returning to her home from an attempt to travel to a patient’s residence. Home Health Care of Middle Tennessee (“Employer”) denied her claim, contending that the injury did not occur in the course of her employment. Employee sought temporary benefits from the Court of Workers’ Compensation Claims (“trial court”). The trial court denied her petition, and that denial was affirmed by the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board. Upon remand to the trial court, Employer filed a motion for summary judgment on the issue of compensability. The motion was supported by a set of agreed facts submitted by the parties. The trial court granted Employer’s motion and entered an order dismissing Employee’s claim. Employee appealed directly to the Supreme Court, as permitted by Tennessee Code Annotated sections 50-6-225(a)(1) (2014) and 50-6-239(c)(7) (2014). The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We reverse and remand.

The Petitioner, Casey J. Lawson, pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of a weapon by a convicted felon and theft of property valued at $1,000 or more but less than $10,000.  He timely filed a petition for post-conviction relief; following a hearing on the petition, the post-conviction court denied relief.  On appeal, the Petitioner alleges that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel’s advice to plead guilty was deficient and because trial counsel failed to argue several pending motions before the Petitioner pled guilty.  He also argues that his pleas were unknowing and involuntary because the State coerced him into pleading guilty by moving to revoke his bail and because trial counsel moved to withdraw from the representation.  After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Freddy Mora (“Plaintiff”), pro se, appeals the February 4, 2016 judgment of the Chancery Court for Bradley County (“the Trial Court”) in this suit alleging violations of Tenn. Code Ann. § 66-28-101, et seq., the Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act. Plaintiff’s brief on appeal severely fails to comply with Tenn. R. App. P. 27. We, therefore, find that Plaintiff has waived his issues on appeal. David Vincent and Teresa Vincent (“Defendants”) raise an issue regarding the Trial Court’s award to Plaintiff of attorney’s fees. We find and hold that while the award of attorney’s fees was proper, there is nothing in the record before us on appeal showing any evidence which the Trial Court could have relied upon in determining the amount of attorney’s fees. Nor is there anything in the record showing that the Trial Court considered the factors contained in Rule 8, RPC 1.5 of the Rules of the Supreme Court or the applicable case law in determining the amount of reasonable attorney’s fees. Given all this, we vacate the amount awarded in attorney’s fees and remand this case to the Trial Court for further proceedings to determine the amount of reasonable attorney’s fees to be awarded to Plaintiff.

The defendant, Marcus Boales, appeals from the trial court’s dismissal of his motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 for failure to assert a colorable claim. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Willie Morgan, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and was sentenced to a term of eleven years. On appeal, the defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction and that the trial court erred in excluding testimony about the victim’s compensation fund. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.