APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant, Moriarco Montrell Lee, and his co-defendant, Dequevion Lamar Lee, were indicted by a Madison County Grand Jury for attempted first degree murder and aggravated assault. Following a jury trial, the Defendant was convicted as charged, and the trial court merged the aggravated assault conviction into the attempted first degree murder conviction and sentenced the Defendant to twenty-two years to be served in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court but remand for entry of a judgment form as to count two reflecting that the Defendant’s aggravated assault conviction was merged with count one.

The Petitioner, Eric Bledsoe, appeals as of right from the denial of his petition for postconviction relief, wherein he challenged his conviction for aggravated rape, aggravated burglary, and theft of property valued at $1,000 or more but less than $10,000. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-502; -14-103; -14-403. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that his attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to call potential defense witnesses during trial and failing to adequately investigate the Petitioner’s mental health history. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This is a post-divorce case involving wife’s claims against husband for a portion of his military retirement benefits and husband’s claims against wife for retroactive child support. Wife initiated this action against husband claiming that, pursuant to the parties’ marital dissolution agreement, she was entitled to a percentage of the retirement benefits that husband was receiving from the military, as well as a judgment for a portion of the benefits that had already been paid to husband. Husband then filed a counter-petition against wife requesting that the court enter a judgment against her for back child support. The trial court held that the parties’ martial dissolution agreement did in fact entitle wife to a percentage of husband’s military retirement benefits going forward but that she failed to present the proof required for an award of the benefits husband received prior to trial. The trial court further found that wife owed husband child support and calculated the amount of child support wife owed by using the Child Support Guidelines that were in effect at the time wife’s child support obligation was incurred rather than those in effect at the time of trial. Wife appealed. We reverse the judgment of the trial court with respect to the calculation of wife’s child support obligation and remand with instructions to re-calculate child support using the Child Support Guidelines in effect at the time of trial. We modify the order of the trial court to correct the percentage of the retirement benefits to which wife is entitled. The remainder of the judgment is affirmed. We decline husband’s request for attorney’s fees incurred on appeal.     

The petitioner, Mary L. Vaughn, appeals the denial of her petition for post-conviction relief, which petition challenged her 2014 Hawkins County Criminal Court guilty-pleaded convictions of second degree murder and aggravated child abuse, arguing that she was denied the effective assistance of counsel and that her guilty pleas were not knowingly or voluntarily entered. Discerning no error, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

Defendant, Ronald Turner, appeals his convictions stemming from various drug and firearm offenses. He challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and argues that the criminal gang enhancement of some of his offenses pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-121(b) was unconstitutional in light of State v. Bonds, 502 S.W.3d 118 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2016). Upon review, we determine that the evidence is sufficient to support Defendant’s convictions. However, because Defendant is entitled to retroactive application of the holding in Bonds, we vacate the sentences of the underlying convictions to which the enhancement was applied and remand those convictions for resentencing. Additionally, we conclude that the trial court committed plain error by improperly applying the Drug-Free School Zone Act and remand for resentencing on this basis. We also remand for correction of clerical errors.

After groping his twenty-five-year-old neighbor's crotch, eighty-two-year-old Walter Townsend, the Defendant, entered a plea of nolo contendere to the offense of sexual battery, a Class E felony. The trial court placed the Defendant on judicial diversion pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-313, and deferred prosecution for a period of eighteen months of supervised probation. Significantly, the trial court did not require the Defendant to register as a sexual offender under the Tennessee Sexual Offender and Violent Sexual Offender Registration, Verification and Tracking Act of 2004 (the “Act”), pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated sections 40-39-201 to -218. In this State appeal, the sole issue presented for our review is whether the trial court abused its discretion by not ordering the Defendant to register as a sexual offender. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

The trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights after finding by clear and convincing evidence that (1) Mother failed to substantially comply with the requirements of the permanency plans, (2) Mother’s mental incompetence prevented her from properly caring for the Child, and (3) the conditions which precipitated removal of the Child from Mother’s custody still persisted. The trial court then found by clear and convincing evidence that it was in the child’s best interest to terminate Mother’s parental rights. Mother appealed. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Petitioner, Dennis M. Dykes, appeals from the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief.  After a review, we determine Petitioner waived his issues by failing to present them on direct appeal.  As a result, the judgment of the Circuit Court is affirmed.

Marilyn Miller Tansil (“Employee”) obtained temporary total disability benefits after injuring herself while mopping. Atkinson Enterprises, Inc. (“Employer”) acknowledged a compensable injury, but claimed Employee was not entitled to temporary benefits because she worked for her own company while unable to work for Employer. The trial court found Employee performed only token tasks at her company during her injury period, which did not constitute “work,” and thus, denied Employer’s requested credit against the permanent partial disability award. On appeal, Employer challenges the award of temporary total disability benefits as well as the multiplier used. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this interlocutory appeal, the defendants, Alexander Johnson and Michael F. Williams, challenge the ruling of the Knox County Criminal Court granting the State’s motion to quash subpoenas duces tecum issued to four State’s witnesses. The State challenges that portion of the court’s ruling denying its motion to quash subpoenas duces tecum issued to various electronic communications service providers. Because the State lacks standing to challenge any of the subpoenas issued in this case, we reverse that portion of the court’s ruling granting the State’s motion to quash the subpoenas issued to the witnesses. We affirm that portion of the trial court’s ruling that the State lacks standing to challenge the subpoenas issued to the service providers. In the interest of judicial economy and to facilitate further appellate review, we have examined the preempted issues related to the subpoenas duces tecum issued in this case and have concluded that: (1) although nothing prevents the defendants in this case, generally, from obtaining the type of electronic communications at issue via a subpoena issued under the terms of Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 17 to the witnesses themselves, the defendants have failed to establish entitlement to all of the requested communications as discussed more fully below; and (2) under the terms of the Stored Communications Act, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701 - 2703, the defendants cannot obtain the contents of the electronic communications from any of the service providers via a Rule 17 subpoena duces tecum. Accordingly, the trial court’s November 3, 2015 order relative to the subpoenas duces tecum issued in this case is affirmed in part and reversed in part. The case is remanded to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

On August 2, 2012, an employee sustained a compensable injury when a co-worker ran over the back of his left foot with a forklift. The employee received temporary disability benefits and medical benefits from his employer. The employee’s treating physician assigned a 20% permanent anatomical impairment to his left leg as a result of the injury. The employer sought a second opinion, and after performing a medical records review, the employer’s physician opined that employee had sustained only 5% permanent impairment to his left leg due to the injury. Based on this second opinion, the employer requested an evaluation through the medical impairment registry (“MIR”) program. After examining the employee and reviewing his medical records, the MIR physician also opined that the employee had sustained 5% permanent impairment to his left leg. However, the trial court found the employee had rebutted by clear and convincing evidence the presumption of correctness statutorily attached to the MIR physician’s rating, applied a multiplier of four, and awarded the employee 80% permanent partial disability (“PPD”) to the left leg. The employer has appealed, contending the trial court erred in finding that the employee had rebutted the MIR physician’s impairment rating by clear and convincing evidence and in applying a multiplier of four. The employee, in contrast, contends that the trial court erred in considering the MIR physician’s opinion at all. This appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We reverse and modify the trial court’s judgment and remand to the trial court for entry of an order consistent with this decision.

Employee, a truck driver, fell while climbing into the cab of Employer’s truck, which was parked at Employee’s home. Employer initially accepted the claim as compensable, but later denied it, asserting that Employee was not in the course of his employment when the injury occurred. The trial court found the injury to be compensable and awarded benefits. The trial court also granted a post-trial motion ordering Employer to pay for Employee’s independent medical evaluation (IME). Employer has appealed. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. The order requiring Employer to pay the cost of the IME is reversed. The remainder of the judgment is affirmed.

The petitioner, Jerry Kirkpatrick, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, which petition challenged the petitioner’s Knox County Criminal Court jury conviction of theft of property valued at $1,000 or more but less than $10,000. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Alexander Haydel (“the Petitioner”) pled guilty to two counts of first degree murder and received two consecutive sentences of life without the possibility of parole. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief; the post-conviction court denied the petition, and the Petitioner appealed. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that lead trial counsel’s performance was deficient because “he misled the [Petitioner] in the events leading up to the [Petitioner’s] entering a guilty plea.” The Petitioner asserts that he was prejudiced by lead trial counsel’s deficient performance because absent that advice he would have proceeded to trial. Additionally, the Petitioner argues that his guilty pleas were entered unknowingly and involuntarily due to lead trial counsel’s deficient performance. After a thorough review of the record and applicable case law, we affirm.

In this workers’ compensation case, Charles Kilburn sustained several injuries from a motor vehicle accident. He underwent cervical spine surgery to resolve his neck injury complaints. His authorized physician also recommended lumbar spine surgery to combat his back pain, but that request was denied through the utilization review process. Mr. Kilburn took oxycodone to alleviate his back pain, and his treating physician referred him to a pain management clinic. Six months after the cervical spine surgery, Mr. Kilburn died due to an overdose of oxycodone combined with alcohol. After a bench trial, the chancery court found that the death was compensable. Mr. Kilburn’s employer appealed. The appeal was initially referred to a Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel, but we later transferred the case to the Supreme Court for review. After examining the record, the parties’ arguments, and the applicable law, we reverse the judgment of the chancery court.

Only a person who has a legitimate expectation of privacy in an invaded place has standing to claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment and may seek to have illegally obtained evidence excluded. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133-34 (1978); Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 389 (1968); State v. Willis, 496 S.W.3d 653, 720 (Tenn. 2016); State v. Cothran, 115 S.W.3d 513, 520-21 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2003). Because of his conduct, Defendant is not such a person. I believe that Defendant’s actions in this case fall squarely within the rule established by our supreme court in State v. Ross, 49 S.W.3d 833 (Tenn. 2001). Defendant disclaimed and abandoned whatever interest he may have had in the property, thus losing a subjective expectation of privacy. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.

The Defendant, Joseph Durward Watson II, was charged with possession with the intent to sell more than one-half ounce but less than ten pounds of marijuana. See T.C.A. § 39- 17-417 (2014). He filed a motion to suppress the evidence recovered from the search of the home in which the marijuana was found. The trial court granted the motion, determining that the police exceeded the scope of a levy issued for the collection of unpaid court costs and fines. On appeal, the State contends that the trial court erred by granting the motion to suppress because the Defendant disclaimed any expectation of privacy in the home, depriving him of standing to challenge the search. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Darrell Jennings, filed a petition in the Lake County Circuit Court seeking habeas corpus relief from his first degree felony and second degree murder convictions and resulting life sentence, alleging that he is entitled to relief because he was convicted of an offense that was not alleged in the indictment and because the trial court failed to instruct the jury on lesser-included offenses. The habeas corpus court summarily denied the petition, and the Petitioner appeals. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

This post-divorce appeal concerns the requested modification of a parenting plan designating the father as the primary residential parent and awarding the mother reasonable visitation. The mother filed a petition to modify, alleging that a material change in circumstances necessitated her designation as the primary residential parent. The father objected and filed a motion for contempt for failure to pay child support. Following a hearing, the court held the mother in contempt for failure to pay and denied her request for designation as the primary residential parent. However, the court awarded her additional co-parenting time, finding that a modification of the residential schedule was warranted. The mother appeals. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Warren Hildred, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction of second degree murder and resulting seventeen-year sentence. On appeal, the Petitioner claims that he received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Based upon the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The petitioner, David Enrique Leon, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus, which petition challenged his 2009 Dickson County Circuit Court jury conviction of first degree felony murder. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The petitioner, Cameron Cook, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief from his 2012 Knox County Criminal Court jury convictions of attempted first degree murder and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, for which he received a sentence of 30 years. In this appeal, the petitioner contends only that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Defendant, John Talley, appeals as of right from the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s denial of his motion under Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 to correct an illegal sentence. Defendant contends that the trial court erred by concluding that relief was not available because his illegal sentence had expired. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The maxim, “every man’s house is his castle,” is deeply rooted in our jurisprudence. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 390 (1914). It applies whether the house is a castle or a cottage—a mansion or a mobile home. The right to retreat into the privacy of one’s home and be free from governmental intrusion is a basic tenet of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, section 7 of the Tennessee Constitution. Our homes and adjoining land are protected spaces; governmental officers must have a warrant, absent special circumstances, to intrude onto this private area.