APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The plaintiff is an inmate who filed a claim with the Claims Commission after the Tennessee Department of Correction made the determination that inmates were prohibited from possessing small electric heating appliances known as “hotpots.” He sought compensation for the loss of his hotpot under the Takings Clauses of the Tennessee and U.S. Constitutions.. The Commission dismissed the plaintiff's claim because it did not have subject matter jurisdiction over takings claims involving only personal property. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 9-8-307(a)(1)(V); 12-1-202 (defining “private property” as “real property, or improvements to real property . . . .”). The plaintiff appealed, contending that the definition of “private property” was unconstitutional under the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., --- U.S. ----,135 S. Ct. 2419, 192 L. Ed. 2d 388, (2015), which held that the government is required to pay just compensation under the Takings Clause when it physically takes possession of either real or personal property. We have determined that the Commission did not have authority to decide the plaintiff's facial challenge to the constitutionality of the statute. We have also determined the plaintiff would not be entitled to compensation even if his constitutional challenge to the statute was successful. Consequently, we affirm the dismissal of his claim.

The petitioner, David Alan Hunter, appeals from the post-conviction court's denial of relief from his conviction for first-degree murder and attempted especially aggravated robbery. On appeal, the petitioner argues he received ineffective assistance of counsel due to trial counsel's failure to adequately explain the benefits of accepting a plea agreement despite his assertion of innocence and failure to convey a formal plea offer made by the State. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The plaintiff is an inmate who filed a claim with the Claims Commission after the Tennessee Department of Correction made the determination that inmates were prohibited from possessing small electric heating appliances known as “hotpots.” He sought compensation for the loss of his hotpot under the Takings Clauses of the Tennessee and U.S. Constitutions. The Commission dismissed the plaintiff's claim because it did not have subject matter jurisdiction over takings claims involving only personal property. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 9-8-307(a)(1)(V); 12-1-202 (defining “private property” as “real property, or improvements to real property . . . .”). The plaintiff appealed, contending that the definition of “private property” was unconstitutional under the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., --- U.S. ----,135 S. Ct. 2419, 192 L. Ed. 2d 388, (2015), which held that the government is required to pay just compensation under the Takings Clause when it physically takes possession of either real or personal property. We have determined that the Commission did not have authority to decide the plaintiff's facial challenge to the constitutionality of the statute. We have also determined the plaintiff would not be entitled to compensation even if his constitutional challenge to the statute was successful. Consequently, we affirm the dismissal of his claim.

The plaintiff is an inmate who filed a claim with the Claims Commission after the Tennessee Department of Correction made the determination that inmates were prohibited from possessing small electric heating appliances known as “hotpots.” He sought compensation for the loss of his hotpot under the Takings Clauses of the Tennessee and U.S. Constitutions. The Commission dismissed the plaintiff's claim because it did not have subject matter jurisdiction over takings claims involving only personal property. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 9-8-307(a)(1)(V); 12-1-202 (defining “private property” as “real property, or improvements to real property . . . .”). The plaintiff appealed, contending that the definition of “private property” was unconstitutional under the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., --- U.S. ----,135 S. Ct. 2419, 192 L. Ed. 2d 388, (2015), which held that the government is required to pay just compensation under the Takings Clause when it physically takes possession of either real or personal property. We have determined that the Commission did not have authority to decide the plaintiff's facial challenge to the constitutionality of the statute. We have also determined the plaintiff would not be entitled to compensation even if his constitutional challenge to the statute was successful. Consequently, we affirm the dismissal of his claim.

The plaintiff is an inmate who filed a claim with the Claims Commission after the Tennessee Department of Correction made the determination that inmates were prohibited from possessing small electric heating appliances known as “hotpots.” He sought compensation for the loss of his hotpot under the Takings Clause of the U.S. Constitution. The Commission dismissed the plaintiff's claim because it did not have subject matter jurisdiction over takings claims involving only personal property. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 9-8-307(a)(1)(V); 12-1-202 (defining “private property” as “real property, or improvements to real property . . . .”). The plaintiff appealed, contending that the definition of “private property” was unconstitutional under the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., --- U.S. ----,135 S. Ct. 2419, 192 L. Ed. 2d 388, (2015), which held that the government is required to pay just compensation under the Takings Clause when it physically takes possession of either real or personal property. We have determined that the Commission did not have authority to decide the plaintiff's facial challenge to the constitutionality of the statute. We have also determined the plaintiff would not be entitled to compensation even if his constitutional challenge to the statute was successful. Consequently, we affirm the dismissal of his claim.

Chad Ray Thompson (“the Defendant”) was indicted by the Warren County Grand Jury for one count of first degree premeditated murder, one count of first degree felony murder, and one count of especially aggravated robbery in connection with the death of his cousin, Tracy Allen Martin (“the victim”).  Following a jury trial, the Defendant was convicted of first degree premeditated murder, first degree felony murder, and facilitation of especially aggravated robbery.  On appeal, the Defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence to show premeditation for his first degree premeditated murder conviction and that there was insufficient evidence to prove the underlying felony of especially aggravated robbery for his first degree felony murder conviction.  Upon review, we conclude that the Defendant is not entitled to relief.  Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

The petitioner, William Phillips, Jr., appeals the dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus/motion for Rule 36.1 correction of an illegal sentence, arguing that the trial court imposed an illegal sentence in violation of Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C) by altering the sentence in his negotiated plea agreement, which the trial court accepted prior to the sentencing hearing. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas court dismissing the petition.

The petitioner, Michael D. Ellington, appeals the post-conviction court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his premeditated first degree murder conviction. On appeal, he argues that the post-conviction court erred in denying relief because the State either committed prosecutorial misconduct or he received ineffective assistance of counsel. After review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The defendant, Gregory L. Allen a.k.a. Michael Taylor, appeals as of right from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 motion to correct an illegal sentence. The defendant contends that the trial court erred in concluding that Rule 36.1 relief was not available because the alleged illegal sentence expired prior to the filing of the motion. Following our review, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s Rule 36.1 motion.

The Petitioner, Alvin “A.J.” Waller, Jr., appeals the denial of post-conviction relief for his convictions of especially aggravated kidnapping and aggravated assault. On appeal, he argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. After review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, April Lamb, appeals her Rutherford County Circuit Court jury conviction of aggravated assault, claiming that the evidence was insufficient to sustain her conviction and that the trial court erred by admitting certain evidence.  Discerning no error, we affirm.

The defendant, Mario Cruz Estrada, was convicted of attempted second degree murder for which he received a sentence of twelve years in confinement.  The defendant appeals his conviction challenging the trial court’s denial of his request for a jury instruction on the defenses of self-defense and defense of another and the admission of certain evidence. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

I fully concur in the majority's affirmance on the ground of severe abuse as to Chance D. Because I cannot agree that Foster Parents have shown clear and convincing evidence sufficient to forever sever the parent-child relationship at issue in this case, however, I must respectfully dissent from the majority's decision to reverse the trial court and grant Foster Parents' petition to terminate Mother's parental rights

I fully concur in the majority's affirmance on the ground of severe abuse as to Jude D. Because I cannot agree that Foster Parents have shown clear and convincing evidence sufficient to forever sever the parent-child relationship at issue in this case, however, I must respectfully dissent from the majority's decision to reverse the trial court and grant Foster Parents' petition to terminate Mother's parental rights.

The petitioner, Lamont Johnson, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received effective assistance of counsel at trial. After our review of the record, briefs, and applicable law, we affirm the denial of the petition.

An inmate was found guilty of possession of a deadly weapon when two knives were found in the door of his cell. After exhausting his administrative remedies, the inmate petitioned for a common law writ of certiorari asserting several issues relating to violations of due process and the Uniform Disciplinary Procedures. The trial court granted his petition, denied his discovery request, and dismissed the writ of certiorari. The inmate now appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The petitioner, Christopher Cunningham, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. He argues the post-conviction court erred in finding he received effective assistance of counsel at trial and on direct appeal. The petitioner also asserts his convictions for aggravated robbery violate double jeopardy. Following our review of the record, briefs, and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

I respectfully dissent from the majority’s holding. As the majority notes, a charge against an inmate be proven by a preponderance of the evidence, defined at TDOC Policy No. 502.01(IV)(I) as “[t]he degree of proof which best accords with reason and probability and is more probable than not.” As the majority also notes, the evidence upon which Mr. Hanley’s conviction rested consisted of the two knives and Corporal Story’s statement, the salient portion of which is quoted in the majority opinion. Corporal Story did not testify and the only live witnesses were Mr. Hanley, who denied that the knives were his, and Duane Brooks, an inmate who testified in support of Mr. Hanley’s contention that the knives were left by a previous occupant of the cell.    

I fully concur in the majority's affirmance on the ground of severe abuse as to Gabriella D. Because I cannot agree that Foster Parents have shown clear and convincing evidence sufficient to forever sever the parent-child relationship at issue in this case, however, I must respectfully dissent from the majority's decision to reverse the trial court and grant Foster Parents' petition to terminate Mother's parental rights.

This appeal involves the termination of a father's parental rights. The father is currently serving an eight-year sentence after pleading guilty to two counts of attempted child rape, with the victims being the child at issue and her older half-sister. The trial court terminated the father's parental rights upon finding by clear and convincing evidence that six grounds for termination were proven and that termination was in the best interest of the child. We vacate the trial court's findings as to three grounds but affirm the trial court's findings regarding the remaining three grounds and affirm the best interest finding. We accordingly affirm the trial court's order as modified and uphold the termination of the father's parental rights.

This appeal arises from the change in the designation of the primary residential parent and the modification of a residential parenting schedule. Mother appeals, contending that certain factual findings made by the court are unsupported by the record and that the court erred in restricting her parenting time. The court’s findings are supported by the record and did not abuse its discretion in reducing Mother’s parenting time; accordingly, we affirm the judgment.