APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This appeal arises from the juvenile court's termination of a biological father's parental rights. The juvenile court found clear and convincing evidence of three grounds for termination and that termination of the father's parental rights was in the best interest of the child. After reviewing the record, we conclude that the grounds for terminating parental rights set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(g)(9) and relied upon by the juvenile court were inapplicable to the father in this case. Nevertheless, because there was clear and convincing evidence of two grounds for termination of the father's parental rights and that termination was in the best interest of the child, we affirm.

The Petitioner, Daniel Muhammad, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief in which he challenged his conviction of facilitation of aggravated arson and his sentence of twelve years in prison. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he was denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel. We affirm the post-conviction court‘s denial of relief.

Petitioner, Charles Anderson Clark, appeals from the post-conviction court’s denial of his post-conviction petition for relief. Petitioner alleges that the post-conviction court erred by not considering all of the proof presented in regard to the racial makeup of the jury. Petitioner further contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel due to his trial counsel’s failure to locate certain individuals to serve as witnesses. After review, we conclude that Petitioner has failed to establish that he is entitled to post-conviction relief, and affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Defendant, Charvasea Rodshun Lancaster, appeals his sentences in 11 separate convictions under two case numbers. Defendant entered open guilty pleas in case number 14-191 to one count of burglary and five counts of theft of property in various amounts. In case number 14-193, Defendant entered open guilty pleas to two counts of theft, two counts of vehicle burglary, and one count of aggravated burglary. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed a total effective sentence of ten years in case 14-191 and an effective sentence of 12 years in case 14-193 and ordered the sentences be served consecutively, for a total effective sentence of 22 years. Defendant contends that the trial court erred by imposing partial consecutive sentencing. Having reviewed the record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Luis Guillen, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions of one count of aggravated rape and three counts of aggravated kidnapping and resulting effective thirty-five-year sentence. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. Based upon the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

An undocumented employee sustained a compensable work-related injury and reported the injury to the employer. Two doctors examined the employee, one assigning a 16% medical impairment rating and the other assigning a 24% medical impairment rating. Because of the employee’s undocumented status, the employer did not return the employee to work after the injury. The employee sought workers’ compensation benefits and challenged the constitutionality of the statutory provision potentially limiting his award to one and one-half times the medical impairment rating in such circumstances. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-241(e) (2008 & Supp. 2013). The Attorney General filed an answer defending the constitutionality of the challenged section. The trial court held the challenged statute unconstitutional on the basis of federal preemption and awarded permanent partial disability benefits of 84% to the left arm, or three and one-half times the 24% medical impairment rating. The Attorney General and the employer appealed. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this workers’ compensation case, the trial court found that the employee failed to carry his burden of proving that his knee injury arose out of his employment. On appeal, the employee asserts that the trial court erred in finding that his knee injury did not arise out of his employment. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The defendant, Ellis Johnson, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, and was sentenced to thirteen years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues that: (1) the trial court erred in allowing the victim to testify about her injuries; (2) the trial court erred in ruling that the State could introduce five of his prior convictions for impeachment purposes; (3) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction; and (4) he is entitled to relief due to the cumulative effect of the errors. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal requires us to interpret a version of a juvenile court statute effective prior to July 1, 2016. A juvenile court magistrate held a hearing on competing petitions to modify a parenting plan filed by a child’s parents. The magistrate announced her ruling from the bench at the conclusion of the hearing but did not enter a written order until several days later. Mother, dissatisfied with the magistrate’s ruling, filed a request for a rehearing before a juvenile court judge. Mother filed her request within five days of the entry of the magistrate’s order but ten days after the hearing before the magistrate. The juvenile court concluded that mother’s request for rehearing was untimely and confirmed the magistrate’s findings and recommendations as an order of the juvenile court. Because we conclude that the time for requesting a rehearing ran from the entry of the magistrate’s written order, mother’s request for rehearing was timely. Therefore, we reverse.   

Petitioner, Brian Garrett Wallace, entered an open guilty plea to five counts of attempted especially aggravated exploitation of a minor and one count of attempted sexual battery.  The trial court imposed an effective eighteen-year sentence to be served at 35 percent as a Range II offender which included consecutive sentencing.  On appeal, this Court upheld the sentence.  State v. Brian Garrett Wallace, No. M2013-01172-CCA-R3-CD, 2014 WL 1883704 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 12, 2014).   Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance and that Petitioner’s guilty plea was unknowingly and involuntarily entered.  Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief.  Following a careful review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Christopher Michael Ferrell, was convicted by a jury of second degree murder, a Class A felony.  See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-210.  The trial court imposed a sentence of twenty years’ incarceration to be served at one hundred percent.  In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends (1) that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction, specifically arguing that he should have been acquitted for acting in self-defense or convicted instead of voluntary manslaughter; (2) that the trial court erred in denying his request for a special jury instruction regarding the State’s failure to preserve evidence; (3) that the trial court committed several errors when instructing the jury on self-defense; (4) that the trial court abused its discretion in setting the length of his sentence; and (5) that he is entitled to a new trial based upon cumulative error.  Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Department of Children's Services (“DCS”) filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of the mother and father to their three children. The father was incarcerated in Georgia when the children were determined to be dependent and neglected, and the mother tested positive for illegal drugs and had illegal drugs and drug paraphernalia in her home when the children were removed. DCS developed three permanency plans over the course of eighteen months, with responsibilities set out for each parent. When it appeared that neither parent was in substantial compliance with the third plan, DCS filed a petition to terminate their rights. The trial court found the evidence clearly and convincingly supported the grounds DCS alleged for terminating the parents' rights and determined it was in the children's best interest that their parents' rights be terminated. Both the mother and father appeal the termination. We affirm the trial court's judgment.

The petitioner, William George Cox, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief from his 2008 Davidson County Criminal Court guilty-pleaded convictions of aggravated burglary and theft of property, for which he received an effective sentence of 10 years.  In this appeal, the petitioner contends only that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel.  We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court but remand for correction of clerical errors in the judgment forms.

In this appeal, the defendant, Terry L. Brazzell, challenges the denial of his pre-sentencing motion to withdraw his guilty plea to one count of vehicular homicide and challenges his Range II, 20-year sentence imposed for that conviction.  Discerning no error, we affirm.

This case concerns a constitutional challenge to Tennessee Code Annotated Section 20-12-119(c). When the trial court grants a motion to dismiss pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, Section 20-12-119(c) provides for an award of reasonable attorneys' fees to the dismissed party. In this case, the trial court granted Appellees the statutory maximum of $10,000 in attorneys' fees. Appellant challenged the constitutionality of the statute on the ground that it violated the separation of powers doctrine. The trial court rejected Appellant's challenge, ruling that Tennessee Code Annotated section 20-12-119(c) is remedial in nature and does not violate Article II, section 2 of the Tennessee Constitution. Discerning no error, we affirm

The Petitioner, Daryl Bobo, appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner contends that his trial counsel was ineffective (1) in failing to adequately explain to him the terms of a plea offer made by the State; (2) in failing to adequately meet with and prepare him for trial; and (3) for failing to adequately cross-examine the State’s witnesses. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner, Marvin Davis, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his rape of a child conviction, for which he is serving a twenty-five-year sentence. He contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel and that the post-conviction judge erred in denying the Petitioner’s motion to recuse. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The appellant, David T. Morrow, appeals the summary denial of his Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. The appellant's sentences have expired. He argues, however, that he is entitled to relief because he received concurrent sentences instead of statutorily required consecutive sentences, and the trial court erred in summarily denying his motion without a hearing. Following our review, we conclude the appellant does not state a colorable claim for relief, and we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Grace Ann Blair, was charged in a two-count indictment with driving under the influence (“DUI”) and DUI per se, Class A misdemeanors.  See T.C.A. § 55-10-401(1), (2). She moved to dismiss the charges after discovering that her blood sample was destroyed a little over one year after her arrest.  The trial court granted the dismissal, finding that the sample contained potentially exculpatory evidence which could have shown that the Defendant’s actions were involuntarily undertaken while she was under the influence of Ambien.  The State appeals.  Because we have determined that the Defendant’s due process rights were not violated by the destruction of the sample, we reverse the dismissal of the charges and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

In this parental relocation case, the trial court erred in finding that the mother did not have a reasonable purpose in relocating to another state for her employment. Furthermore, mother's purpose in relocating was not vindictive. Therefore, the judgment of the trial court is reversed.

This appeal arises from the trial court’s entry of a default judgment in favor of the plaintiff. The plaintiff bank filed a complaint seeking a judgment against the defendant on a sworn account. After several attempts, the plaintiff was unable to obtain personal service of process on the defendant and attempted to obtain service of process by mail. The plaintiff’s process server sent the summons by certified mail to the defendant’s residential address, and the mailing was returned marked “unclaimed.” The plaintiff filed proof of service, indicating that service had been properly completed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 4.04(11), and filed a motion for default judgment. A copy of the motion for default judgment was sent by mail to the defendant at the same residential address. The defendant filed a response “by special appearance” opposing the bank’s motion for default judgment based on insufficiency of service of process. Following a hearing, the trial court entered a default judgment in favor of the plaintiff. The defendant appealed. On appeal, we conclude that the trial court entered a default judgment in violation of Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 4.04(10), which expressly provides, “Service by mail shall not be the basis for the entry of a judgment by default unless the record contains a return receipt showing personal acceptance by the defendant[.]” We therefore vacate the trial court’s order entering a default judgment in favor of the plaintiff and remand this matter for further proceedings.  

The primary issue presented is whether the Drug-Free School Zone Act, Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-432, applies when a defendant is convicted of facilitation of an offense listed in Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-417. The defendant was convicted of facilitation of possession with intent to deliver .5 grams or more of cocaine within 1,000 feet of a school. The trial court applied the Act to increase the defendant’s felony classification and to require service of the entire minimum sentence. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the conviction and sentence. State v. Gibson, No. M2014 00598-CCA-R3-CD, 2015 WL 3867567, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 23, 2015). We granted review to address whether the Act applies to a conviction for facilitation and whether the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction. The State concedes the trial court erred by applying the Act to require service of the entire minimum sentence but argues the Act is a separate criminal offense and supports the higher felony classification. Based on the clear language of the Drug-Free School Zone Act, we hold the Act does not apply to a conviction for facilitation. Therefore, the trial court erred by increasing the felony classification and by requiring service of the entire minimum sentence. Further, we hold the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction for facilitation.