APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This appeal arises from the trial court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s complaint based on her failure to comply with the pre-suit notice and certificate of good faith requirements of the Tennessee Health Care Liability Act (“THCLA”). On appeal, the plaintiff contends that she was not obligated to comply with the THCLA’s procedural requirements because her complaint did not assert a health care liability claim. Having reviewed the complaint, we conclude that it asserts two separate and distinct claims: one health care liability claim and one non-health care liability claim. We therefore affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the health care liability claim, vacate the trial court’s dismissal of the non-health care liability claim, and remand the case for further proceedings.  

An X-ray technician sought workers’ compensation benefits for disability arising from migraine headaches she alleged were caused by exposure to chemicals at her workplace. Her employer denied the claim, asserting her condition did not arise out of and in the course and scope of her employment. The trial court held that the employee’s claim was compensable and awarded her permanent and total disability benefits. On appeal, the employer argues that the trial court erred in finding the employee’s claim was compensable and in awarding her permanent and total disability benefits. After careful review, we affirm the judgment.

In this appeal arising from the parties’ divorce, the husband challenges the trial court’s valuation of his interest in a limited partnership, division of the marital estate, awards of transitional alimony and alimony in solido, child support order, and adoption of the wife’s proposed permanent parenting plan. The husband also appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion for a restraining order. We conclude that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s valuation of the husband’s interest in the limited partnership. We also conclude that the trial court did not err in denying Husband’s motion for a restraining order. However, because the trial court failed to provide sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law, we are unable to effectively review the remainder of the issues raised by the husband on appeal. Therefore, we vacate the judgment of the trial court with regard to these remaining issues and remand for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.

This case arises out of a workplace injury. The injured worker and her husband filed this lawsuit asserting various causes of action against numerous defendants. The trial court dismissed one of the defendants upon finding that the defendant was entitled to workers’ compensation immunity. The trial court certified its order of dismissal as final pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 54.02. Plaintiffs appeal, claiming that the defendant waived the affirmative defense of workers’ compensation immunity, that the trial court applied the wrong standard for a motion to dismiss, and that the particular claims asserted are not barred by the exclusive remedy provision of the workers’ compensation law. We affirm.  

A thirteen year-old child slipped off bleacher seats at a middle school and injured his leg when he was using the seats as steps in July 2012.  The child and his parents sued the school for negligence, and the school asserted the defense of comparative negligence.  The trial court applied the Rule of Sevens, concluded the school rebutted the presumption of no capacity for negligence, and determined that the child was solely responsible for his injury.  The trial court also determined that the school was not liable for negligent supervision of the child.  The parents and child appeal, and we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The defendant, Willie Lee Hughes, Jr., appeals both his Williamson County Circuit Court jury conviction of aggravated robbery and his guilty-pleaded conviction of failure to appear, claiming that the trial court erred by failing to exclude his statements to law enforcement officers on the basis that the statements were made during the course of plea negotiations and that the trial court erred by classifying him as a persistent offender.  Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Petitioner, Roosevelt Bigbee, Jr., appeals the dismissal of his habeas corpus petition in which he challenged the legality of his convictions for first degree murder and robbery and his sentences of life for the murder conviction and eleven years for the robbery conviction, to be served consecutively. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the petition was properly dismissed, and we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

The Petitioner, Darien B. Clay, appeals from the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his guilty plea convictions for aggravated robbery, attempted aggravated robbery, two counts of theft of property valued at $1,000 or more but less than $10,000, theft of property valued at $10,000 or more but less than $60,000, aggravated burglary, burglary of a business, and statutory rape, for which he received an effective thirteen-year sentence. On appeal, he contends that the post-conviction court erred in denying relief on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim and that the court erred in determining that the Petitioner’s guilty plea was knowingly and voluntarily entered. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This is the second appeal of this property dispute concerning a mother's reservation of a life estate in property conveyed to her son pursuant to a warranty deed. The mother initially brought suit against the son to enforce her right to possession. She later sought to amend her complaint in an attempt to attack the validity of the deed. Before ruling upon the motion to amend, the trial court granted summary judgment based upon the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations for ejectment actions. This court reversed in Long v. Creekmore, No. E2012-01453-COA-R3-CV, 2013 WL 1320515 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 28, 2013). Upon remand, the trial court denied the motion to amend the complaint and dismissed the action following the death of the mother and son. The administrator of the mother's estate appeals. We affirm the trial court.

This appeal concerns the validity of a warranty deed in which the decedents conveyed a parcel of property for the benefit of a church. The deed contained a reversionary clause requiring the property to revert back if no longer used for the benefit of the church. The same parcel was included in another deed that did not contain a reversionary clause but was recorded before the original deed. The church listed the property for sale approximately 67 years later. The decedents' heirs filed suit. The defendants sought summary judgment, claiming that ownership of the property was established through the deed recorded first. The court granted summary judgment. We affirm.

Following a jury trial, the Defendant, Nicole Pamblanco, was convicted of aggravated child neglect and criminally negligent homicide.  She now appeals as of right, challenging (1) the sufficiency of the evidence by claiming that the State failed to establish the requisite mental state of knowing for her aggravated child neglect conviction and (2) the trial court’s erroneous instruction to the jury during voir dire that, if she were found guilty on both counts, those counts would merge.  Following our review, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support her aggravated child neglect conviction and that the jury instruction error was harmless.  Therefore, the trial court’s judgments are affirmed.

The plaintiff filed this action alleging medical malpractice against a physician who examined the plaintiff five days after injury to her shoulder, as well as the facility wherein the physician practiced. The plaintiff alleged, inter alia, that the defendant physician failed to properly diagnose a fracture dislocation in her shoulder, causing a delay in appropriate treatment. The plaintiff‘s subsequent treating physician opined in his deposition and via affidavit that if the plaintiff‘s injury had been diagnosed earlier, the plaintiff would likely have avoided an extensive surgical procedure, resultant infection stemming from such surgery, and residual impairment to her shoulder. The trial court excluded this testimony as speculative, granting summary judgment in favor of the defendant physician and hospital. The plaintiff has appealed. We determine that the trial court erred in excluding the causation evidence as speculative. We therefore vacate the court‘s grant of summary judgment in favor of the co-defendants.

The plaintiff in a breach of contract action filed a motion to enforce a settlement agreement allegedly agreed to by the defendant. The defendant argued that there was no acceptance of the plaintiff's settlement offer; rather, the defendant contended that she responded to the plaintiff's offer with a counter-offer, which she revoked prior to its acceptance. The trial court found that the parties had entered into an enforceable settlement agreement but denied the plaintiff‟s request for attorney's fees. Discerning no error, we affirm.

After her husband passed away in 2013, Rose Letsinger filed a petition in the trial court seeking letters of administration for his estate. First Choice Community Credit Union filed a claim against the estate for an unpaid credit card balance. Letsinger1 excepted to the claim and filed a motion to dismiss the claim, asserting that the Credit Union had failed to comply with Tenn. Code Ann. § 30-2-307 (Supp. 2012) by failing to attach an itemized statement of its claim. The trial court agreed. It held that the Credit Union had failed to include an itemized statement. Accordingly, it dismissed the claim. The Credit Union filed a motion to alter or amend, arguing that it had filed with its claim what appears to be the deceased's last monthly statement. It contended that its filing satisfied the itemized statement requirement. The trial court denied the motion. The Credit Union appealed. Later, it filed a motion to dismiss its appeal. We granted the motion. Following this, Letsinger filed a motion seeking to compel the Credit Union to disburse to the estate the funds in the deceased's account with the Credit Union. The trial court granted the motion. The Credit Union appeals. We affirm.

The Department of Children's Services filed a petition in July 2015 to terminate the parental rights of M.G.H. (Father) with respect to his child, M.E.T. (the child). The trial court found clear and convincing evidence of grounds supporting termination for Father due to abandonment by an incarcerated parent and persistence of conditions. The court also found, by the same standard of proof, that termination is in the best interest of the child. Father appeals. We affirm the trial court's holding as modified.

Plaintiff Christopher Dylan Thompson ingested several doses of a liquid form of a drug, which he says was estazolam, before reporting to work for his employer, defendant Best Buy Stores, L.P. At work, he appeared tired and slow, and a manager told him to clock out and end his shift early. On his way home, plaintiff was involved in a car accident. He brought this negligent entrustment action, alleging that defendant breached a duty by not stopping him from leaving his place of employment in his own vehicle. The trial court granted defendant summary judgment, holding defendant “had no duty to prevent [plaintiff] from leaving the premises driving his own vehicle,” and relying on Lett v. Collis Foods, Inc., 60 S.W.3d 95 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001), a factually similar case decided by this Court. We affirm.

The Petitioner, Bruce Mendenhall, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions of three counts of solicitation to commit first degree premeditated murder and resulting effective thirty-year sentence.  On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel.  Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Petitioner, David Chardwick Wooten, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief in which he alleged ineffective assistance of counsel at trial.  More specifically he contends that trial counsel failed to present favorable evidence and witnesses on his behalf at trial.  After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This appeal arises from a dispute over vacation benefits. Richard Michelhaugh and John Williams (“Plaintiffs”), employees of Y-12 in Oak Ridge, filed suit in the Circuit Court for Anderson County (“the Trial Court”) against the contractor, Consolidated Nuclear Security, LLC (“CNS”), running their work site. Plaintiffs alleged that CNS deprived them of earned vacation time by changing the vacation policy mid work-year. CNS filed a Rule 12 motion to dismiss, which the Trial Court granted. Plaintiffs appeal to this Court. We find and hold that Plaintiffs alleged in their complaint that they were deprived of earned vacation time, that Plaintiffs’ allegations were sufficient to withstand CNS’s motion to dismiss, and that, therefore, the Trial Court erred in granting CNS’s motion to dismiss. We reverse the judgment of the Trial Court and remand this case for further proceedings.

At issue is whether a taxpayer’s sales are properly classified as “retail sales” or “wholesale sales” under the Business Tax Act, Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 67-4-701 to -730, and Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 1320-04-05-.47. Following an audit, the Tennessee Department of Revenue determined that the taxpayer misclassified its sales as “wholesale sales,” when they should have been classified as “retail sales,” and assessed the taxpayer with $74,088.10 in tax liability. After paying the assessment, the taxpayer filed suit seeking a refund. The chancery court held that the sales in question were “retail sales” within the context of the statute and denied the request for a refund. We conclude that the business activities were properly classified as retail sales; therefore, we affirm the judgment of the chancery court.

Petitioner, the interim city manager for the City of Mount Pleasant, Tennessee, filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment that the votes of two commissioners to terminate his employment were void due to a conflict of interest. He contends their votes were void because ethics complaints filed by Petitioner against the two commissioners were pending at the time of the vote. The trial court dismissed the petition for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6), upon the finding that the petition failed to allege facts which would show that the commissioners had a personal financial interest in the outcome of the vote on Petitioner’s employment. Petitioner appealed; we affirm.

The Defendant, Prentis Lee, appeals his convictions for two counts of rape and his resulting ten-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his statement to police officers; (2) the failure to preserve a record of the preliminary hearing mandated dismissal of the charges or a new preliminary hearing; (3) the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions; (4) the trial court erred in limiting defense counsel's cross-examination of various witnesses; (5) the trial court erred in admitting victim impact evidence; (6) the trial court erred in allowing the State to present rebuttal witnesses who remained in the courtroom during the trial; (7) the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on assault as a lesser-included offense of rape; (8) his sentence is excessive; and (9) the cumulative effect of the errors requires a new trial. Based upon our review of the record, the parties' briefs, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This case represents the consolidated appeals of Defendants Deshun Hampton, Matthew Tyler, and Devonta Hampton. The three Defendants, having entered open guilty pleas to various felonies, challenge only the trial court‘s sentencing decisions, including its decision to impose partially consecutive sentences. The trial court sentenced Mr. Tyler to an aggregate sentence of sixty-six years, Mr. Deshun Hampton to an aggregate sentence of fifty-five years, and Mr. Devonta Hampton to an aggregate sentence of thirty-two years. Mr. Deshun Hampton and Mr. Tyler, who were between fifteen and sixteen years old at the time of the crimes, assert that their sentences amount to de facto life sentences and are therefore in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. They also challenge the application of certain enhancement and mitigating factors. All three Defendants challenge the trial court‘s sentencing decisions, asserting that the trial court abused its discretion in imposing partially consecutive sentences. We conclude that the sentences at issue, while lengthy, allow for a meaningful opportunity for release and do not run afoul of the Eighth Amendment, and we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Jessica Marie Myers, appeals from the Greene County Criminal Court’s denial of her petition for post-conviction relief from her convictions for first degree murder and reckless endangerment, for which she is serving an effective life sentence. The Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred in denying relief on her ineffective assistance of counsel claims. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.