APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant, Kevin Ladell Grandberry, was indicted for first-degree premeditated murder, murder in the perpetration of a felony, especially aggravated robbery, attempted first degree murder, employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, felon in possession of a weapon, and theft between $1000 and $10,000. Following trial, a jury found the defendant guilty of murder in the perpetration of a felony, especially aggravated robbery, aggravated assault, felon in possession of a weapon, and theft between $1000 and $10,000. The trial court sentenced the defendant to an effective sentence of life without the possibility of parole plus 27 years in confinement. On appeal, the defendant argues the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. After review, we affirm the defendant's convictions, but remand to the trial court for entry of amended judgments reflecting, per the sentencing hearing transcripts, that the sentences in Counts 2 and 3 are to be served concurrently.

Terry Arnold (“Employee”) filed suit against Courtyard Management Corporation (“Employer”), alleging that she sustained a compensable injury to her neck on August 18, 2012. Employer provided medical and temporary partial disability benefits for a period of time. The last payment for medical treatment was issued on April 29, 2013. Employee requested additional medical treatment on May 5, 2014. Employer denied the claim based on the one-year statute of limitations. Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-203(b) , (c). Employee filed a request for assistance with the Department of Labor (“Department”) on May 7, 2014, and a request for benefit review conference (“BRC”) on May 13, 2014. The Department issued a “Benefit Review Report” on May 30, 2014. This action was filed on November 19, 2014. Employer filed a motion for summary judgment asserting that the claim was barred by the applicable statutes of limitation. The trial court denied Employer’s motion but granted Employer’s subsequent request for an interlocutory appeal. The Tennessee Supreme Court granted Employers’ application and referred the appeal to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We reverse the judgment.

Defendant, Joseph A. Colwell, Sr., appeals after being convicted by a jury of two counts of rape and two counts of incest and receiving an effective sentence of twenty years.  Upon our review, we determine that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Defendant to a twenty-year sentence.  Consequently, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

Two dentists filed this action against the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County (“Metro”) under the Governmental Tort Liability Act to recover damages caused by the allegedly dangerous condition of the sewer and stormwater system behind their office. The trial court dismissed all of the plaintiffs’ claims. We have concluded that the trial court erred in several respects. The trial court erred in concluding that the combined line did not present a dangerous condition pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-29-204(a), and in applying Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-205(a)(1) to the dentists’ claims. Moreover, the trial court erred in concluding that Metro did not have a duty to repair a known dangerous condition in the combined line. We further find that the trial court erred in concluding that the dentists were not at fault in constructing the addition to their office. We agree with the trial court that some of the plaintiffs’ claims are barred by the statute of limitations and the Act of God defense.

The appellee brought a detainer warrant against the appellant. The general sessions court granted the warrant and the appellant appealed to the circuit court, but did not post the required bond. The circuit court dismissed the case and the appellant appealed. We find that appellant’s brief does not meet the argument and citation requirements of Tenn. R. App. P. 27(a)(7) and, therefore, consider appellant’s issues waived. The circuit court’s decision is affirmed.

The defendant, Jermaine Carpenter, appeals the summary dismissal of his motion, filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1, to correct what he believes to be an illegal sentence imposed for his 2004 Sullivan County Criminal Court jury convictions. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The defendant, Christopher Demotto Linsey, was indicted for tampering with evidence, possession of cocaine with intent to sell or deliver, simple possession of marijuana, possession of heroin, and simple possession of alprazolam. After trial, a jury found the defendant guilty of felony tampering with evidence and misdemeanor simple possession of marijuana, for which he received an effective twelve-year sentence. On appeal, the defendant argues the evidence was insufficient to support the trial court’s decision to deny his request for a renunciation jury instruction with respect to the tampering with evidence charge. The State concedes the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support the defendant’s tampering with evidence conviction and asserts the jury instruction question has been pretermitted. Upon review, we agree with the State. We affirm the defendant’s conviction for simple possession of marijuana and reverse and vacate the defendant’s conviction for tampering with evidence.

The defendant, Johnny Malcolm Vinson, was convicted of aggravated assault in violation of an active order of protection pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-102(c). On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction arguing that conflicting testimony exists regarding his use of a deadly weapon and that the State failed to prove he acted with intent. After our review, we conclude that the defendant’s arguments are without merit. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The plaintiff, acting pro se, filed a complaint in this health care liability action without attaching a certificate of good faith.  Several defendants filed motions to dismiss based on the missing certificate.  The plaintiff responded to the motions and filed a notice of voluntary nonsuit.  Some of the defendants objected to the voluntary dismissal, arguing the complaint should be dismissed with prejudice.  The trial court dismissed the plaintiff’s claims against the non-objecting defendants without prejudice but dismissed the plaintiff’s claims against the objecting defendants with prejudice.  The plaintiff appealed all of the court’s dismissal orders on numerous grounds.  Upon review, we conclude that Rule 41.01 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure afforded the plaintiff the right to a voluntary dismissal without prejudice as to all defendants.  Accordingly, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.  

Surgeon brought suit against a hospital alleging multiple causes of action, two of which were dismissed upon the hospital’s motion for dismissal for failure to state a claim for relief. Pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-12-119(c), the hospital filed a motion seeking recovery of costs and attorneys’ fees related to the dismissal of the two claims; the trial court granted the motion.  Plaintiff appeals.  We find no error in the award and, accordingly, affirm the judgment.

This appeal requires us to consider whether the plaintiff can bring a declaratory judgment action against the Tennessee State Election Commission in chancery court.  We have reviewed the relevant authorities and have determined the plaintiff is not entitled to a declaratory judgment under the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act or the Declaratory Judgment Act.

The Defendant, James Walter Morgan, was found guilty by a Hamblen County Criminal Court jury of theft of property valued at $500 or less, a Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. § 39-14-103 (2014). The trial court sentenced the Defendant to eleven months, twenty-nine days of supervised probation. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his request for judicial diversion. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Oscar C. Wells, appeals the summary dismissal of his motion, filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1, to correct what he believes to be an illegal sentence imposed for his 2002 Shelby County Criminal Court jury conviction of first degree murder. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The defendant, Jeremy Jones, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of attempted first degree murder, a Class A felony; aggravated assault, a Class C felony; employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, a Class C felony; and convicted felon in possession of a firearm, a Class C felony. The trial court imposed an effective term of twenty-five years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions; (2) the trial court failed to ensure an impartial jury venire; and (3) he is entitled to relief due to cumulative error at trial. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. However, we remand for entry of a corrected judgment in Count 3 to check the box indicating that the defendant was found guilty in that count.

In this divorce action, Penny Arvidson Richards (Wife) argues that the trial court’s judgment granting her a divorce and incorporating the parties’ marital dissolution agreement (MDA) should be set aside. Among other things, Wife alleges that she signed the MDA under duress and/or while she lacked the requisite mental capacity to do so. The trial court ruled that Wife failed to prove her defenses to the enforcement of the MDA. Wife appeals. We affirm.

A Maury County jury found the Defendant, Guy B. Bernal, guilty of rape.  The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I offender to twelve years in the Tennessee Department of Correction.  On appeal, the Defendant asserts that: (1) his right against self-incrimination was violated when the trial court did not conduct a proper Momon hearing; (2) the convicting evidence is insufficient; and (3) his twelve-year sentence is excessive.  After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Kimberly E. Lapinsky (“Plaintiff”) appeals the order of the Chancery Court for Sevier County (“the Trial Court”) granting summary judgment to Janice E. Cook, Kevin D. Cook (“the Cooks”) and Brenda Brewster (“Brewster”) in this lawsuit that arose from the sale of a house by the Cooks to Plaintiff. Plaintiff raises issues on appeal with regard to whether the Trial Court erred in granting summary judgment and whether the Trial Court erred in failing to allow Plaintiff to conduct additional discovery prior to ruling on the motions for summary judgment. The Cooks raise an issue regarding whether the Trial Court erred in denying their motion for attorney’s fees pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-18-109. We find and hold that the Trial Court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow further discovery, that the defendants made properly supported motions for summary judgment, and that Plaintiff failed to show that there is a genuine disputed issue of material fact. As the Cooks and Brewster made properly supported motions for summary judgment and are entitled to summary judgment, we affirm the grants of summary judgment. We further find and hold that the Trial Court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for attorney’s fees.

A jury found the Defendant, Roy Daniel Mayo II, guilty of one count of attempted burglary, a Class A misdemeanor; one count of possession of burglary tools, a Class A misdemeanor; and one count of evading arrest while operating a motor vehicle, a Class E felony.  The trial court imposed an aggregate sentence of six years in prison.  The Defendant does not challenge his misdemeanor convictions.  On appeal, he asserts that his evading arrest conviction should be reversed because the trial court’s jury instructions did not require the jury to find that the Defendant’s flight took place while he was operating the motor vehicle.  Given the facts surrounding the Defendant’s conviction, in particular the proof regarding whether his flight was by means of a vehicle or on foot, we conclude that the jury instructions failed to fairly submit the legal issues and misled the jury as to the applicable law and that the error was not harmless.  We accordingly reverse the Defendant’s felony evading arrest conviction, and we remand for new trial on that charge.

This appeal arises from the trial court’s determination that it was without jurisdiction, following a prior appeal in the same matter, to act upon a motion seeking to alter or vacate an order entered after remand. The administrator ad litem for the third-party plaintiff has appealed from the trial court’s order determining that it lacked jurisdiction to act on her motion following remand. We determine that the trial court did possess jurisdiction to act on pending motions following the remand from the appellate courts. We therefore vacate the trial court’s order and remand this case for further proceedings. We also vacate the trial court’s order granting sanctions against the administrator ad litem for filing her motion to alter or vacate.

The Defendant, James Shettles, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of aggravated assault, a Class C felony, for which he is serving a four-year workhouse sentence on probation. See T.C.A. § 30-13-102 (Supp. 2012) (amended 2013). On appeal he contends that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction, (2) the trial court erred in admitting a recording of a 9-1-1 call, and (3) the trial court erred in failing to remove a juror. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The custodians of a child filed a petition in Greene County Circuit Court to terminate the parental rights of the Father to the child, who had resided with the Custodians since birth; at the time of the hearing on the petition, the Father was incarcerated in Florida. Following a three-day hearing extending over one month, the court entered an order holding that Father failed to visit or support the child within the four months preceding his incarceration and terminating Father’s rights on the grounds of abandonment. Father appeals, asserting that the conduct of the hearing denied him his due process right to meaningfully participate in the termination proceeding and that the record does not support the determination that he willfully failed to visit or support his child. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this case, two former members of a dissolved church filed a petition seeking permission to sell the improved real property formerly occupied by the church and donate the money to a nonprofit Bible school or, in the alternative, to convey the property directly to the school. The petitioners filed suit against unknown former members of the church and obtained permission to serve the unknown respondents by publication in a local newspaper. After publication of the action, no responsive pleadings were filed, and the petitioners obtained a default judgment. Before the default judgment became final, a descendant of the original owners of the real property filed a motion to set aside the default judgment and dismiss the petition based on insufficient service of process. The court granted the motion, set aside the default judgment, and dismissed the petition with regard to the descendant. On appeal, the petitioners argue: (1) the chancery court erred in finding constructive service insufficient; (2) that the descendant waived his objections to service of process by filing a notice of appearance; and (3) that the descendant should be estopped from setting aside the judgment because he delayed asserting his rights. Upon review of the record, we conclude that service of process on the descendant was insufficient and that the descendant’s conduct did not preclude him from setting aside the void judgment. Therefore, we affirm the decision of the chancery court.