APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

In this post-divorce action, the mother sought modification of the father’s child support obligation due to a material change of circumstances. The trial court increased the father’s child support obligation but declined to order such modification effective as of the date the mother filed her petition to modify. The mother has appealed. Having determined that the trial court erred in failing to modify the father’s child support obligation effective as of the date of the petition’s filing, we reverse the trial court’s judgment in that regard and remand for entry of a modified judgment retroactive to the date the mother filed the petition. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects.

This appeal is from a final decree of divorce. The wife challenges several of the trial court’s rulings regarding the grounds for the divorce, the division of marital property, the parenting plan, the calculation of child support and educational expenses, and attorney’s fees. For the following reasons, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.     

This is a post-foreclosure action in which the lender seeks to recover a deficiency judgment, interest, and the costs of collection. In their answer, the borrowers asserted that the loan was a nonrecourse debt; thus, they were not liable for the deficiency. Alternatively, they asserted that the property sold at foreclosure for an amount materially less than its fair market value. Following a bench trial, the trial court concluded that the loan was a full recourse debt as to both borrowers. This determination was based on the finding, inter alia, that all parties intended the borrowers to be personally liable. The trial court also concluded that the lender was entitled to a deficiency judgment, finding that the borrowers failed to overcome the rebuttable presumption that the foreclosure sale price was equal to the fair market value of the property at the time of the foreclosure sale. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 35-5-118. The trial court awarded the lender a judgment of $640,783.41, plus interest and attorney’s fees, against the borrowers jointly and severally. As the foregoing indicates, our review is benefited by the trial court’s Tenn. R. Civ. P. 52.01 findings of facts and conclusions of law, which disclose the reasoned steps by which the trial court reached its ultimate conclusion and enhance the authority of the trial court’s decision. Having reviewed the trial court’s findings of fact in accordance with Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d), we have concluded that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s findings and that the trial court identified and properly applied the applicable legal principles. For these reasons, we affirm.

Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this pain management case, the employee received pain management treatment for more than ten years for a work-related injury pursuant to a judgment entered in November 2003. In April 2015, the employee’s treating physician advised him that he was retiring and moving to Florida, prompting the employee to contact his employer’s insurance carrier, who provided him with a panel of pain specialists two days later. The treating physician then made a referral to a different clinic to continue the employee’s treatment, so the employee declined to select a doctor from the panel while the insurance carrier declined to authorize the referred clinic. The employee filed a motion in the Circuit Court for Giles County, seeking to compel the insurance carrier to authorize treatment by the clinic. The trial court granted the motion and awarded attorney’s fees and travel expenses for a trip to Florida by the employee to see his previous physician. The insurance carrier has appealed, asserting that the trial court erred by granting the employee’s motion. We reverse in part and affirm in part the judgment of the trial court.

Plaintiffs appeal from the trial court’s order denying their motion to enforce two offers of judgment offered serially by the defendant. Because the trial court improperly certified its judgment as final pursuant to Rule 54.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, we dismiss this appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  

Following a jury trial, the Defendant, Brandan Dane Windrow, was convicted of aggravated assault involving the use or display of a deadly weapon, a Class C felony, and vandalism of property valued at $1,000 or more but less than $10,000, a Class D felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-102; -14-408; -11-105. He received a total effective sentence of fourteen years to be served at thirty-five percent. On appeal, he contends that the evidence was insufficient to prove that he acted intentionally or knowingly. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

In 2015, the Defendant, Kevin O’Donnell Stone, pleaded guilty to violating his probation in case numbers 2011-CR-486 and 2011-CR-103 and to possession of cocaine in case number 2013-CR-528. The trial court revoked the Defendant’s probation and ordered him to serve the balance of his three-year sentence in confinement. The trial court also sentenced the Defendant to a concurrent sentence of five years of incarceration for the possession of cocaine conviction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it ordered him to serve his sentences in confinement instead of ordering an alternative sentence. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable authorities, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

The Defendant, Sharod Winford Moore, appeals as of right from his jury conviction for first degree premeditated murder. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-202. On appeal, the Defendant contends: (1) that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction; (2) that the trial court erred in overruling his motion for change of venue; (3) that the trial court erred in denying his request to present evidence of the victim’s propensity for violence; (4) that the trial court erred in denying his request to charge the jury with Tennessee Pattern Jury Instruction 42.09(a), designating Jason McCollum as an accomplice as a matter of law; (5) that the trial court erred in allowing an “incompetent” witness, Clifford Watkins, to testify; (6) that the trial court erred in denying a request to cross-examine Mr. Watkins regarding a previous arrest and subsequent determination by the Middle Tennessee Mental Health Institute that he was incompetent to stand trial; (7) that the trial court erred in denying his pre-trial motion to keep the State from eliciting testimony that the Defendant was a member of the Vice Lords gang; (8) that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct during closing argument “by misstating [the] law concerning the definition of reasonable doubt”; and (9) that the District Attorney General’s Office committed a Brady violation by providing defense counsel with “redacted ‘exculpatory’ witness statements,” foreclosing counsel’s ability to determine whether those “witness[es] could provide exculpatory testimony.” Following our review, we determine that the Defendant’s failure to timely file a motion for new trial results in waiver of all issues except for sufficiency of the evidence. Furthermore, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support the Defendant’s conviction. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

In this probate action, the executrix proposed to distribute the decedent’s real and personal property in a manner that she claimed was in accordance with the decedent’s Last Will and Testament (“Will”). One beneficiary, one of the decedent’s three adult children, objected, claiming that the decedent had granted her an option to purchase one parcel of real property owned by the decedent. The trial court determined that the real property in question was an asset of the probate estate and that the executrix could administer it in accordance with the decedent’s Will. The trial court also determined that a settlement agreement executed by the decedent’s three children precluded the claim of an option to purchase. The beneficiary appealed. Pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 30-2-301, we vacate the trial court’s denial of the beneficiary’s requests for an inventory and accountings and remand for further proceedings. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects.

In this post-divorce action, Vanessa Young Colley (“Mother”) filed a petition for modification of the Permanent Parenting Plan (“Parenting Plan”) entered in connection with the parties’ Marital Dissolution Agreement (“MDA”) seeking to change the decision-making authority with regard to educational decisions for the parties’ minor children. After a hearing, the Circuit Court for Davisdon County (“the Trial Court”), inter alia, modified the Parenting Plan to change joint decision-making with regard to education to Mother having sole decision-making authority with regard to education. John S. Colley, III (“Father”) appeals the decision of the Trial Court raising issues with regard to the change in decision-making authority, the denial of Father’s petition for recusal, and the award to Mother of attorney’s fees, among other things. We find and hold that some of Father’s issues seek an advisory opinion, and we refuse to address those issues. With regard to the issue of recusal, we find no error in the Trial Court’s resolution of this issue. We further find and hold that Mother proved a material change in circumstances justifying a change in decision-making authority with regard to education and further proved that it was in the children’s best interest for Mother to have sole decision-making authority with regard to education. We, therefore, affirm.

This is a negligence case involving the alleged sexual assault of a six-year-old boy by another six-year-old boy in the bathroom of an elementary school. The trial court determined that the Appellee school district was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law because the assault was not foreseeable. We conclude that there are disputes of material fact, which preclude the grant of summary judgment. Accordingly, we reverse and remand.

This case involves a purportedly forged deed. Appellant appeals the trial court’s decision to set aside a quit claim deed that was allegedly executed in favor of Appellant by his now deceased grandfather. The trial court found the signature on the deed was forged and not that of the grandfather. In so ruling, the trial court applied the preponderance of evidence standard. Because the correct standard is clear and convincing evidence, we vacate and remand to the trial court for further proceedings.

Defendant, Richard Wayne Ferguson, pled guilty to twenty-seven felonies and three misdemeanors for property-related crimes committed in November and December of 2014. As a result, he was sentenced to an effective sentence of twenty-seven years as a Range I, standard offender. Defendant appeals his convictions, arguing that the sentences imposed by the trial court are excessive. After a review, we determine that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Defendant to an effective sentence of twenty-seven years.

This appeal arises from an age discrimination lawsuit brought under the Tennessee Human Rights Act ("THRA"). Paul M. Martin ("Martin") sued his former employer Perma-Chink Systems, Inc. ("Perma-Chink") in the Circuit Court for Knox County ("the Trial Court"). Martin alleged that he had been fired as a sales representative for Perma-Chink because of his age, then 60. The matter was tried before a jury, which returned a verdict in favor of Martin. Perma-Chink filed an appeal to this Court, and Martin raises his own issues on appeal. Perma-Chink argues, among other things, that the Trial Court erred in admitting a chart ("the Chart") containing raw data of employee ages at their date of termination, and that Martin failed to prove a prima facie case of age discrimination. We, inter alia, affirm the age discrimination judgment for Martin.

A jury convicted Michael Smith (“the Defendant”) of aggravated assault, committed by violating a protective order, and evading arrest. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of ten years, eleven months, and twenty-nine days’ incarceration. The Defendant appealed his convictions and sentences, which the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. State v. Smith, No. W2013-01190-CCA-R3-CD, 2014 WL 3954062, at *21 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 13, 2014). The Defendant then requested permission to appeal to this Court, alleging the following errors: (1) the trial court’s failure to require the State to make an election of offenses; (2) the insufficiency of the indictment; (3) the trial court’s refusal to allow the Defendant to sit at counsel table; (4) the trial court’s ruling that, should he elect to testify, the Defendant could be impeached with prior convictions; (5) the trial court’s denial of a mistrial after allowing a witness to testify about a different criminal proceeding against the Defendant; (6) the admission of the victim’s testimony about the Defendant’s prior bad acts; and (7) the trial court’s failure to confine the flight instruction to the aggravated assault charge. We granted the Defendant’s request for permission to appeal. Upon our review of the record and the applicable law, we hold that the State’s failure to elect an offense as to the aggravated assault charge resulted in plain error. Accordingly, we reverse the Defendant’s conviction for aggravated assault and remand the matter to the trial court for a new trial on that charge. We affirm the Defendant’s conviction for evading arrest.  

This is a termination of parental rights case. The Department of Children’s Services filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of B.L.R. (Father) with respect to his child, M.B.R. (the Child). The trial court found clear and convincing evidence of four grounds supporting termination. The court also found, by the same quantum of proof, that termination is in the best interest of the Child. Father appeals. We affirm.

The appellant, Jessica Tramel, pled guilty in the Washington County Criminal Court to theft of property valued $60,000 or more and received an eight-year sentence to be served in confinement. The trial court also determined that she owed $193,314.64 restitution. On appeal, the appellant claims that the trial court erred by denying her request for alternative sentencing and by applying only one-half of an insurance company's payment to the victim to the amount of restitution. Based upon the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Plaintiff appeals the summary dismissal of this action based on the statute of frauds and judicial estoppel, the award of expenses and attorney’s fees as a discovery sanction, and the award of discretionary costs. In April 2005, Carlene Elrod, now deceased, signed four quitclaim deeds conveying real property in fee simple to her grandson, Michael Petty. In April 2011, Mrs. Elrod filed a verified complaint to set aside the conveyances on tort grounds including mistake, fraud, and deceit, claiming she was under the influence of prescription medications at the time of the conveyances, which deprived her of the mental capacity to contract. Mrs. Elrod died while the action was pending and her estate was substituted as plaintiff. The estate filed an amended complaint in which it dropped all tort claims and asserted a breach of contract claim. Specifically, the estate alleged that the conveyances were based on an oral contract pursuant to which Mr. Petty agreed to pay all rental income from the properties to Mrs. Elrod until her death, and that Mr. Petty honored this agreement for five years but breached the agreement by retaining all rental income thereafter. Following discovery, the defendants, Mr. Petty and his wife, filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial court summarily dismissed the complaint finding: (1) the claims were barred by the Tennessee Statute of Frauds because they were based on a purported oral contract pertaining to the transfer of real property, and (2) the claims were barred by the doctrine of judicial estoppel given the factual inconsistencies between the initial verified complaint and the amended complaint. The court also assessed expenses and attorney’s fees against the plaintiff as a sanction for failing to comply with discovery, and discretionary costs. We affirm the grant of summary judgment based on the statute of frauds. We also affirm the award of expenses and attorney’s fees pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 37.01 and discretionary costs pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 54.04.

In this divorce action, Husband contends the trial court erred by denying his request for “assistance of an attorney,” in valuing his minority partnership interest in a real estate venture, in the division of the marital estate, by ordering the sale of real estate without assuring the sale would be for fair market value, by awarding Wife transitional alimony, and by awarding Wife her attorney’s fees. We affirm. 

Suit to enforce restrictive covenants in a residential subdivision. The homeowners association filed suit alleging that a resident was conducting commercial activity in violation of the restrictive covenants. The trial court granted the association’s motion for summary judgment in part, enjoining the resident from conducting the activity and awarding the association attorneys fees. On appeal, the resident seeks a reversal of the determination that the activity in which she was engaged violated the covenant; the association appeals the denial of summary judgment on the additional ground on which the motion was based. Finding no error, we affirm the trial court in all respects.   

This appeal involves a visitor to a county courthouse who slipped and fell on ice in the parking area. Because the portion of the parking area where the visitor fell was owned by the city, the visitor filed suit against the city under the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act. Following a bench trial, the trial court dismissed the suit, finding that the city did not breach a duty of care to the visitor. The trial court also found that, even if there had been a breach of duty, the visitor was more than fifty percent at fault for his injuries. The visitor appeals, claiming that the trial court’s written order does not accurately reflect its oral ruling, that the city breached a duty of care by creating a dangerous condition that it did not remedy in a reasonable manner and time, and that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s factual finding that he was more than fifty percent at fault. We affirm.  

This appeal concerns several issues relative to a divorce. We agree with the trial court that Mother is a candidate for rehabilitative alimony. We reverse the trial court as to the duration of the award, however, reducing the award to eight years. We also vacate the trial court’s ruling with regard to the amount of the alimony award and remand to the trial court for reconsideration of Father’s ability to pay alimony consistent with his other obligations. Finally, we reverse the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees anticipated to be incurred on appeal and vacate the trial court’s award of all of Mother’s requested attorney’s fees, instead remanding to the trial court for a determination of only those fees attributable to child custody and child support. All other issues are affirmed. 

Employee brought action against former Employer alleging wrongful termination under the Tennessee Disability Act (“TDA”), Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-50-103; the Tennessee Human Rights Act (“THRA”), Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 4-21-101–102; impermissible disclosure of medical information in violation of the TDA; breach of contract; and misrepresentation in violation of the Tennessee Employment Security Law, Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-7-711. The trial court granted the Employer’s motion to dismiss all claims, and the Employee appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

This case arises from the dismissal after trial of a petition to terminate the parental rights of a mother and father. The juvenile court concluded that, although the Department of Children's Services had proven grounds for terminating the parents' rights, termination was not in the best interest of the children. On appeal, we find the Department of Children's Services did not prove by clear and convincing evidence statutory grounds for termination of the father's rights. We further find clear and convincing evidence supports only two statutory grounds for terminating the mother's rights. Because clear and convincing evidence does not support a finding that termination would be in the children's best interest, we affirm the decision of the juvenile court to dismiss the petition to terminate parental rights.

The Defendant, Quadarius Deshun Martin, was convicted by a Madison County jury of two counts of aggravated assault, a Class C felony. See T.C.A. § 39-13-102. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed an effective sentence of five years in the Tennessee Department of Correction (TDOC). On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court misapplied the statutory enhancement and mitigation factors and improperly denied him an alternative sentence. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.