APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Defendant, Robert Merle Coblentz, was charged with one count of sexual exploitation of a minor. This is an interlocutory appeal filed by the State from the trial court's order granting Defendant's motion to suppress evidence obtained from his computer pursuant to a search warrant. Upon our review of the record and relevant caselaw, we hold that the search warrant authorized the search of Defendant's computer despite the fact that he was not named in the search warrant or affidavit as an occupant of the residence to be searched or as an owner of the items to be seized. We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for further proceedings.

Following a jury trial, Antonio Henderson ("Defendant Henderson") and Marvin Dickerson ("Defendant Dickerson") (collectively, "the Defendants" or "both Defendants") were each convicted of one count of especially aggravated robbery (Count 1), one count of attempted second degree murder (Count 2), two counts of attempted aggravated robbery (Counts 3 and 4), one count of aggravated assault (Count 5), and one count of employing a firearm during the commission of or attempt to commit a dangerous felony (Count 6). The trial court imposed partially consecutive sentences for both Defendants and sentenced Defendant Henderson to an effective forty-one years‘ incarceration and Defendant Dickerson to an effective thirty-seven years‘ incarceration. In this consolidated direct appeal, both Defendants claim the evidence was insufficient to support their convictions for each count of the indictment. As to the conviction of especially aggravated robbery, both Defendants assert that the victim‘s serious bodily injury had to precede or be contemporaneous with the taking in order to constitute especially aggravated robbery. Additionally, both Defendants contend the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury as to certain lesser included offenses and in its instructions as to the elements of unlawful employment of a firearm. Additionally, Defendant Henderson claims the trial court erred in sustaining the State‘s objection during Defendant Henderson‘s closing argument and in sentencing him to serve partially consecutive sentences. Upon review, we conclude that the trial court committed reversible error when it failed to make any factual findings to support its order that Defendant Henderson‘s sentence in Count 1 run consecutively to his sentences in Counts 2 and 6, and we reverse and remand the case for resentencing on the alignment of Count 1 with Counts 2 and 6 of Defendant Henderson‘s sentence. As to the sufficiency of the evidence concerning the conviction for especially aggravated robbery, we reject the Defendants‘ argument that a victim must suffer serious bodily injury before or contemporaneous to the taking of property, and we hold that the evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for especially aggravated robbery because the taking of property was accomplished with a deadly weapon and serious bodily injury was suffered by the victim in connection with the taking. We affirm the judgments of the trial court in all other respects.

Defendant, Jeremy Glen Nichols, pleaded guilty to the vehicular homicides of A.D. (Count 1) and Teri Ann David (Count 2), the aggravated vehicular homicides of Teri Ann David (Count 3) and A.D. (Count 4), driving under the influence of an intoxicant (DUI)(Count 5), third offense DUI (Count 6), failure to yield resulting in death (Count 7), driving on a revoked license (DORL) (Count 8), DORL with a prior DUI (Count 9), and fourth offense DORL (Count 10). The trial court imposed an effective sentence of 44 years, 11 months, and 29 days. On appeal, Defendant argues that his sentence is excessive. After a thorough review, we affirm the sentence imposed by the trial court. However, we remand the case to the trial court for entry of separate judgment forms for each conviction, including those that must be merged, in light of the supreme court's order in State v. Marquize Berry, No. W2014-00785-SC-R11-CD, slip op. at 5 (Tenn. Nov. 16, 2015)(order granting Tenn. R. App. P. Rule 11).

This case involves termination of the parental rights of a mother to her four children. After investigating a report of drug exposure, the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) obtained emergency temporary custody of the children. Ten months after the children were removed from the mother’s home, DCS filed a petition to terminate the mother’s parental rights on the grounds of abandonment by willful failure to support and failure to establish a suitable home, substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan, and persistence of conditions. The juvenile court found all grounds were established by clear and convincing evidence and that termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the children’s best interests. The mother appeals both the grounds for termination and that termination was in the children’s best interests. The mother also argues her due process rights were violated because the court admitted testimony by deposition. Although we conclude that the proof was less than clear and convincing that the mother willfully failed to support her children, we affirm the termination of parental rights. 

The Petitioner, Essam Eshak, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief as untimely.  He asserts that the statute of limitations should be tolled in the interest of justice because trial counsel had an actual conflict of interest by simultaneously representing the Petitioner and his co-defendant and should not have assisted the Petitioner in entering a guilty plea.  After review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The majority opinion adverts to the possibilities that the defendant's arrest had already become a fait accomplis when the behavior that gave rise to the resisting charges occurred and that two convictions of resisting arrest may have violated principles of double jeopardy. The majority notes that the defendant has raised neither of these issues and has, accordingly, waived our consideration of the same.

The Defendant, Billy Applegate, was indicted for one count of driving under the influence (DUI); one count of DUI per se; one count of leaving the scene of an accident resulting in damage to property adjacent to a highway; one count of driving a motor vehicle with an expired registration; and two counts of resisting arrest. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-16-602, 55-4-104, -10-105, -10-401. Following a jury trial, the Defendant was acquitted of the DUI, DUI per se, and leaving the scene of an accident charges. The jury convicted the Defendant of driving with an expired registration and both resisting arrest charges. The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of six months' incarceration to be served at seventy-five percent. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends (1) that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his resisting arrest convictions; and (2) that the trial court erred in denying the Defendant's request for alternative sentencing. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Defendant, Dewey Burton, Jr., appeals his conviction for aggravated child neglect, raising the following issues: (1) whether the child neglect statute is unconstitutionally vague; (2) whether the jury instructions inadequately explained the mens rea requirement; (3) whether the trial court erred by permitting the medical expert to offer an opinion as to an ultimate issue; and (4) whether the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

A Tipton County jury convicted the Defendant, Shaun Royal Hill, of rape, and the trial court sentenced him to fifteen years in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction; (2) the trial court erred when it admitted the Defendant's phone records into evidence; (3) the Defendant was prejudiced by the jury venire and the jury selection process; (4) the trial court erred when it failed to instruct the jury regarding the collection and preservation of evidence; (5) the trial court erred when it allowed the State to impeach a witness through another witness's testimony; (6) the trial court erred when it restricted the Defendant's cross-examination of the victim; (7) the State made improper comments throughout trial; and (8) the trial court erred when it sentenced him. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

The Appellant, Marcus O. Hill, appeals as of right from the Maury County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his several motions, wherein he alleged that he was falsely imprisoned due to the improper restructuring of his plea agreement by the Tennessee Department of Correction (“TDOC”).  The gravamen of the Appellant’s complaint is with the TDOC’s alignment of his sentences in violation of the terms of his plea agreement.  After a review of the record, we affirm.

Ex-wife sued ex-husband, mortgage company, title company, and attorney alleging causes of action for fraud, negligent misrepresentation, promissory estoppel, breach of contract, negligence, and civil conspiracy. Pursuant to the terms of a postnuptial agreement, a residence purchased in Collierville, Tennessee was to be ex-wife's separate property. Ex-wife alleged that ex-husband failed to deed the property to her as agreed in the postnuptial agreement. She further alleged that he forged or caused to be forged her name on loan documents for the Collierville residence, which were then “falsely notarized” by the attorney. Defendants asserted multiple defenses and filed motions to dismiss and for judgment on the pleadings. We have determined that the trial court properly dismissed all of the plaintiff's claims for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Plaintiff's damages were the result of her failure to pay the mortgage on the Collierville residence, which caused the Arkansas divorce court to hold her in contempt and to order the property sold at auction. Even if we assume that all of the allegations of the plaintiff's complaint are true, these allegations fail to make out a claim for relief.

Interlocutory appeal in suit brought by healthcare corporations to recover costs for emergency medical services rendered to patients participating in Defendant’s insurance plans. We conclude that the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”) preempts plaintiffs’ state-law cause of action based on implied-in-law contract; that we are without subject matter jurisdiction to rule on whether Plaintiffs should be deemed to have exhausted the insurance company’s appeals process and therefore decline to consider whether summary judgment should have been granted on the defense of failure to exhaust administrative remedies; that Plaintiff is not entitled to relief under an implied-in-law contract cause of action as to those plans which are not governed by ERISA based upon the duties imposed on the parties by state and federal law; that the insurance company should have been granted summary judgment on certain coverage claims arising from plans not governed by ERISA because Plaintiffs failed to exhaust grievance procedures; that Tenn. Code Ann. § 56-7-110(b) does not bar coverage claims; and that 47 coverage claims were improperly included in this lawsuit and should have been dismissed on summary judgment. Accordingly, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and vacate in part the lower court’s order and remand for further proceedings.

Following the trial court’s dismissal of their complaint, the plaintiffs filed a motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Rule 60.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure (“Rule 60.02”). The trial court found no basis for setting aside the judgment under Rule 60.02 and denied the motion. The plaintiffs appealed. We affirm.

This is a legal malpractice case. Appellees, who are licensed attorneys, represented Appellants in the underlying lender's liability lawsuit. Following dismissal of all defendants in the underlying litigation, Appellants' filed a complaint for legal malpractice against Appellees. The trial court dismissed the legal malpractice case, inter alia, on the ground that the one-year statute of limitations for legal malpractice claims had expired. Tenn. Code Ann. §28-3-104(c)(1). Affirmed and remanded.

This appeal arises over a dispute regarding the terms of a trust. Bruce Chapman Bower (“Decedent”) died having executed a trust (“the Trust”), the primary asset of which was a lake house. Decedent's son, Christopher R. Bower (“Successor Trustee”), served as Successor Trustee. Decedent's widow, Denise Bower (“Widow”), objected to the appointment of Successor Trustee, and the parties engaged in litigation over various terms of the Trust. The Probate Court for Sevier County (“Trial Court”) found that, under the Trust, Widow was entitled to exclusive use of the lake house as well as payments of $2,000 per month. Successor Trustee appealed to this Court. We reverse the judgment of the Trial Court in its interpretation of the terms of the Trust. We also modify the Trial Court's award of attorney's fees to Widow. The judgment of the Trial Court is modified, in part, and reversed, in part.

The defendant, Sergei A. Novikov, appeals his Wilson County Criminal Court bench conviction of criminal trespass, claiming that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction.  Discerning no error, we affirm.

Ross Pruitt (“the Defendant”) appeals the Blount County Circuit Court’s order revoking his probation and imposing the balance of his two-year sentence for aggravated statutory rape. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering him to serve the balance of his sentence in confinement as opposed to split confinement with the added condition that his internet access be monitored and restricted while on probation. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Plaintiff appeals the summary dismissal of his claims for malicious prosecution, false imprisonment, and negligent supervision. Plaintiff was arrested and subsequently indicted for two criminal offenses based on statements given to police by two of Defendant’s employees at the Tractor Supply Company store in Lenoir City, Tennessee. When the criminal case went to trial, one of the charges was dismissed on the day of trial, and the jury found the defendant not guilty of the other charge. Thereafter, Plaintiff commenced this action asserting several claims. Following discovery, Defendant filed a motion to summarily dismiss all claims. The trial court granted the motion as to three of the claims: malicious prosecution, false imprisonment, and negligent supervision. The plaintiff appealed. We affirm the dismissal of the false imprisonment claim. As for the claims for malicious prosecution and negligent supervision, we have determined that material facts are disputed. Therefore, we reverse the dismissal of the claims for malicious prosecution and negligent supervision and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

The Defendant, Adam Christopher Butler, was convicted by a Madison County Circuit Court jury of vandalism of property valued at $1000 or more. See T.C.A. § 39-14-408 (2014) (amended 2015). The trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective four years on community corrections. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction and (2) the trial court erred in excluding testimony relative to the victim's accusations against another person. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

At issue is whether a trial court may award attorney’s fees that relate to a petition for criminal contempt when the contempt arises in the context of a child support proceeding. Mother filed a post-divorce petition asserting that Father was in criminal contempt for failing to satisfy his support obligations along with a petition seeking a judgment for child support arrearages and attorney’s fees. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court found Father guilty of one count of criminal contempt and found that Mother was entitled to a judgment for the unpaid child support. When Mother submitted her application for attorney’s fees, Father objected arguing that an award of attorney’s fees for the prosecution of the criminal contempt petition would violate his rights under Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-9-103(b) and Article VI, Section 14 of the Tennessee Constitution. Following a hearing, the court awarded Mother her attorney’s fees related to the child support judgment pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-103(c), which award is not at issue in this appeal. The court also awarded Mother the attorney’s fees she incurred in pursuit of the criminal contempt petition pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-103(c) because “the criminal contempt [petition] served a dual purpose of preserving the power and vindicating the dignity and authority of the law and the Court as well as collecting substantial amounts of child support for the benefit of the minor children.” While we recognize that a criminal contempt petition may serve as the catalyst for a delinquent parent to satisfy his or her child support obligations, the purpose of criminal contempt is to uphold the court’s authority, not to enforce the private rights of a party. Moreover, the criminal contempt statute, Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-9-103(b), expressly limits the punishment that a court may award, and it makes no provision for the recovery of attorney’s fees. Because attorney’s fees incurred in a petition for criminal contempt are not provided for by statute or other rule and the purpose of criminal contempt is to uphold the court’s authority, not to enforce the private rights of a party, we reverse the award of attorney’s fees related to the petition for criminal contempt. 

The petitioner sought a writ of mandamus to compel the district attorney general to furnish him with copies of records pertaining to his criminal case. The trial court dismissed the petition, finding that the district attorney general named in the petition had retired, that the statute did not require delivery of records to an incarcerated petitioner, and that the records had been provided in discovery and were no longer available to produce for inspection. The petitioner appeals. We affirm.

Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights, asserting that the evidence does not sustain the grounds of abandonment by failure to support and persistence of conditions as found by the court and does not support the finding that termination of Mother’s rights was in the child’s best interest. Finding that the record clearly and convincingly supports the grounds found by the court, as well as the finding that termination of Mother’s rights is in the child’s best interest, we affirm the judgment.

This appeal involves the termination of a mother's parental rights. The trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that the mother abandoned her four-year-old son by willfully failing to visit him and that it was in the best interest of the child to terminate the mother's parental rights. The mother appeals. We affirm.

The Defendant-Appellant, Larsheika Hill, entered a “best-interest” guilty plea on October 10, 2014, to the delivery of .5 grams or more of cocaine.  Prior to sentencing, Hill filed a motion to withdraw her guilty plea, alleging that her attorney coerced her into pleading guilty.  After a hearing, the trial court denied the motion.  On appeal, Hill contends that the trial court erred in denying her motion to withdraw her guilty plea.  Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is a Rule 3 appeal of an order requiring the Appellant to post security for the care of three horses. Appellant was charged with cruelty to horses and ordered to post security for the care of the horses pending the resolution of her criminal charges. Appellant appealed. We determine that this is a criminal matter and therefore dismiss this appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.