APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Petitioner, LaJeanra E. Polk, filed a petition in the Montgomery County Circuit Court, seeking post-conviction relief because her counsel was ineffective.  The post-conviction court denied the petition, and the Petitioner appeals.  Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This appeal involves the termination of a mother's parental rights to five minor children. Following a bench trial, the trial court found that clear and convincing evidence existed to support the termination of her rights on the statutory ground of the persistence of conditions which led to removal. The court further found that termination was in the best interest of the children. The mother appeals. We affirm.

The Defendant-Appellant, June Ann Wascher, entered a guilty plea to driving under the influence (DUI) in exchange for an eleven-month and twenty-nine day probationary sentence, after service of forty-eight hours in jail. As a condition of her plea, Wascher reserved a certified question of law challenging the denial of her motion to suppress, which was based upon an alleged unconstitutional seizure. Following our review, we reverse and vacate the judgment of the trial court and dismiss the case.

The Defendant, Delarris Jones, also known as Cedrick Jones, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of attempt to commit second degree murder, a Class B felony; aggravated assault, a Class C felony; employing a firearm during commission of a dangerous felony, a Class C felony; possessing a firearm as a person convicted of a felony involving the use of violence, a Class C felony; and possessing a firearm as a person convicted of a felony drug offense, a Class D felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-210(a)(1) (2014) (second degree murder); 39-13-102(a)(1)(iii) (Supp. 2011) (amended 2013, 2015) (aggravated assault); 39-17-1324 (2014) (employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony); 39-17-1307(b)(1)(A), (B) (Supp. 2012) (amended 2014) (felon in possession of a firearm); 39-12-101(a) (2014) (criminal attempt). The Defendant received an effective forty-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Terry Butler, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of tampering with evidence, a Class C felony, three counts of official misconduct, a Class E felony, and two counts of official oppression, a Class E felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-16-503 (2014) (evidence tampering), 39-16-402 (2014) (official misconduct), 39-16-403 (2014) (official oppression). The trial court merged the three counts of official misconduct and sentenced the Defendant to an effective four years to be served on five years' probation. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions, (2) the indictment for Count 3, official misconduct, was defective, and (3) the trial court erred in denying judicial diversion. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Sammie Lee Taylor, was convicted in 1994 of first degree felony murder, especially aggravated kidnapping, especially aggravated robbery, and aggravated sexual battery and received an effective sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole plus sixty-two years. In 2015, the Defendant filed a motion pursuant to Tennessee Criminal Procedure Rule 36.1 requesting the correction of illegal sentences. The trial court summarily dismissed the motion for failure to state a colorable claim. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by dismissing the motion. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This accelerated interlocutory appeal results from the trial court’s denial of Appellant’s motion for recusal. Because Appellants’ did not provide the mandatory affidavit in support of their motion for recusal as required by Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B, we affirm the judgment of the trial court

In this health care liability action, this Court granted the defendants' application pursuant to Tenn. R. App. P. 10 to address two issues. We have determined that: (1) the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”) does not preempt Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121(f); and (2) the trial court erred in denying the defendants' petition for a qualified protective order pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121(f) because it is undisputed that the defendants complied with the procedural requirements of subsection (f), and the plaintiff did not file an objection as permitted under the statute. We, therefore, reverse the trial court's decision and remand for the entry of a qualified protective order.

The Petitioner, John A. Jones, III, appeals the Bradley County Criminal Court's summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief for the petition's being filed outside the one-year statute of limitations. Based upon the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the dismissal of the petition.

In this post-divorce co-parenting action, the father filed a petition requesting modification of the parties’ permanent parenting plan and a finding of contempt against the mother in the Montgomery County Chancery Court which had entered the parties’ divorce decree. In response to the father’s petition, the mother filed a motion requesting that the trial court find Tennessee to be an inconvenient forum and that the court either dismiss the case or transfer it to Florida. Since entry of the divorce judgment, the mother and the parties’ minor child had resided in Florida. The father moved to Alaska at some point after entry of the divorce decree. The father filed a response objecting to the mother’s motion and asserting that Tennessee was not an inconvenient forum. Pursuant to the Uniform Child Custody and Jurisdiction Enforcement Act (“UCCJEA”), see Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-6-201, et seq., the trial court ultimately dismissed the father’s petition, determining that Tennessee was an inconvenient forum because no party resided in Tennessee, the mother’s alleged actions occurred in Florida, and the evidence necessary to resolve the issues would be unavailable in Tennessee. The father appeals, stating that the trial court erred in determining Tennessee to be an inconvenient forum and thereby dismissing his action. We affirm the trial court’s determination that Tennessee is an inconvenient forum. However, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-6-222(c), we reverse the dismissal of the father’s petition and remand to the trial court for issuance of a stay and imposition of conditions the court may consider just and proper.

The appellant, American Bonding Company, appeals the Williamson County Circuit Court’s order granting partial exoneration from the final forfeiture of a $200,000 bond and ordering the company to forfeit $75,000 of the bond.  On appeal, the appellant argues that it is entitled to full exoneration of the forfeited bond because law enforcement requested that the company not attempt to apprehend the subject of the bond.  Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal arises from an accident involving an automobile and a pedestrian that occurred in Anderson County. The pedestrian's insurer, as subrogee of the pedestrian, filed the instant action, alleging that the defendant driver should be held liable for negligence and negligence per se. Following a bench trial, the trial court assessed liability against the driver and awarded the pedestrian's insurer $50,000.00 in damages. The driver timely appealed. On appeal, the driver filed a statement of the evidence, approved by the trial court, that contains insufficient evidence to support the trial court's judgment. We therefore reverse the trial court's judgment.

This interlocutory appeal requires review of a ruling on a motion in limine in a personal injury case. Prior to trial, the plaintiffs submitted expert testimony from a treating physician to establish the reasonableness of their claimed medical expenses. The defendants filed a motion in limine seeking to exclude evidence of what they deemed ―unreasonable‖ medical expenses. They argued that the Tennessee Supreme Court‘s decision in West v. Shelby County Healthcare Corporation, 459 S.W.3d 33 (Tenn. 2014), established a new standard in Tennessee for determining the reasonable amount of medical expenses as a matter of law. The trial court granted the defendants‘ motion in limine, thus excluding the testimony of the treating physician. For the following reasons, the trial court‘s order is reversed and this matter is remanded for further proceedings.

This is a post-divorce case. Father appeals the trial court‘s decision not to hold Mother in contempt for failure to provide court-ordered insurance coverage for the child. Father also appeals the trial court‘s division of the child‘s uncovered medical bills and seeks reimbursement for monthly payments he made toward the child‘s insurance premiums while Mother failed to provide coverage. In addition, Father appeals the trial court‘s order requiring him to provide insurance for the child past the age of majority based on the child‘s medical disability and the judgment entered against him for Mother‘s attorney‘s fees. We conclude that Father is entitled to a credit for those insurance premiums he paid to Mother during the period of time the child was enrolled in TennCare. We reverse the trial court‘s order on attorney‘s fees. The order is otherwise affirmed.

A 59-year old plaintiff who lost his job as a chemical operator, after working in that position for over 37 years, applied for the position of general operator with another company. Twelve individuals were hired by the other company, all of whom were younger than the 59-year old, and most of whom were less experienced. The plaintiff filed an age discrimination complaint against the company. The case was tried by a jury, and the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, awarding him compensatory damages of $100,000. The trial court awarded the plaintiff front pay in addition to the compensatory damage award. The company appealed, and we affirm the trial court's judgment.

Following a jury trial, the Defendant, Carroll Renee Crews, was convicted of selling dihydrocodeinone, a Class D felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-417. The trial court imposed a sentence of twelve years’ incarceration to be served at sixty percent. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain her conviction. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Sullivan County jury found the Petitioner, Dennis L. Rose, guilty of one count of first degree premeditated murder and two counts of aggravated assault. On appeal, this Court affirmed the Petitioner's sentences and convictions. State v. Dennis Lee Rose, No. E2010-00734-CCA-R3-CD, 2012 WL 335548, (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, Feb. 1, 2012), perm. app. denied (Tenn. May 21, 2012). The Petitioner filed a post-conviction petition and the post-conviction court denied relief following a hearing. On appeal, the Petitioner maintains that: (1) the post-conviction court erred when it denied his motion to recuse the District Attorney General's office in light of his post-conviction allegation of prosecutorial misconduct; (2) he received the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial; and (3) the post-conviction court erred in denying him relief on the basis of prosecutorial misconduct. We affirm the post-conviction court's judgment.

I fully concur with the majority opinion by my learned colleague based upon existing case law, which we are bound to follow as an intermediate appellate court. I write separately to express my concerns relating to modern billing practices of medical providers and their effect upon present-day personal injury litigation . Were it not for existing case law which we are bound to follow as an intermediate appellate court, I would apply the West rationale to personal injury litigation.

The Defendant, Amerius Julian Harris, pleaded guilty to possession with the intent to sell of .5 grams or more of cocaine and possession of a Schedule VI drug with intent to sell, and the trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective sentence of twelve years, suspended to supervised probation except for 180 days.  A violation of probation warrant was issued, and the trial court revoked the Defendant’s probation and ordered service of the balance of the sentence in confinement.  The Defendant appeals, asserting that the trial court’s decision to fully revoke his probation sentence was “too harsh.”  We affirm the trial court’s judgment and remand for entry of a corrected revocation order in case number 12-0280.

The Defendant, Wendi Hope Tunny, appeals as of right from the Sevier County Circuit Court’s denial of her request for judicial diversion and order that she serve her five-year sentence in split confinement following her guilty-pleaded conviction for theft of property valued at $10,000 or more but less than $60,000, a Class C felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-14-103; -13-105(a)(4). On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by failing to consider all of the applicable factors for judicial diversion and by failing to conduct a proper weighing of those factors. Following our review, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The defendant, Marcus Levy, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of first degree premeditated murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. On appeal, the defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction and that the trial court erred in allowing the State to enter the witness statements of three witnesses into evidence at trial. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this second appeal involving the instant divorce action, the wife appeals the trial court's enforcement of an enhanced judgment lien on behalf of her former counsel and the court's inclusion of certain tractor tires within the farm equipment previously awarded to the husband in the final judgment for divorce. Having determined that the record contains no proof of notice to the wife of the hearing at which the trial court awarded the enhanced judgment lien, we vacate the portion of the judgment enforcing the enhanced portion of the attorney's lien. We remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion, including an evidentiary hearing addressing enforcement of the enhanced portion of the attorney's lien with notice to include the wife's former counsel. We affirm the trial court's judgment in all other respects.

The Petitioner, Michael Tyrone Gant, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief.  He argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel based on trial counsel’s failure to present evidence on his behalf that would have established both his innocence and the victim’s bias.  Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Inmate appeals the dismissal of his claim that funds awarded to him as a result of a claim he filed with the Tennessee Claims Commission were incorrectly applied to his overdrawn inmate trust account. Finding that the application of the funds in this manner did not violate the pertinent statutes, we affirm the judgment of the Commission.