APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This appeal arises from a termination of parental rights. The Tennessee Department of Children‘s Services ("DCS") filed a petition in the Juvenile Court for Knox County ("the Juvenile Court") seeking to terminate the parental rights of Remus W. ("Father") to his five children ("the Children"). After a trial, the Juvenile Court found that the grounds of wanton disregard, persistent conditions, and severe child abuse had been proven against Father by clear and convincing evidence, and that termination of Father‘s parental rights was in the Children‘s best interest. Father appeals. We reverse the judgment of the Juvenile Court as to the grounds of wanton disregard and persistent conditions. We affirm the Juvenile Court as to the ground of severe child abuse and as to its best interest determination. Having reversed the Juvenile Court as to only two of the three grounds found for termination, we, therefore, affirm the judgment of the Juvenile Court terminating Father‘s parental rights.

The trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that Father had committed severe child abuse by knowingly exposing his three minor children to methamphetamine. Father appealed the trial court's decision to admit positive drug tests for the children into evidence and the trial court's finding of severe child abuse. We affirm.

This is an appeal from an order denying summary judgment. The appellee signed a YMCA membership application and release agreement prior to tripping and falling on a sidewalk in front of the YMCA. The appellee filed suit, alleging negligence. The YMCA then filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming that the appellee expressly assumed the risk of her injuries. The trial court denied the YMCA’s motion for summary judgment but granted a motion for interlocutory appeal. We reverse the trial court’s order denying summary judgment and remand with instructions to enter summary judgment.      

This is an appeal of the trial court’s award of alimony. Husband appeals the trial court’s decision to award alimony in futuro as well as the amount of alimony awarded. We vacate both the trial court’s award of alimony in futuro and the amount awarded.

This is a divorce case. Prior to the parties’ marriage, Husband started a used car dealership with his father. Husband continued to operate the business after he and his wife were married. Husband bought his father’s interest in the company after the marriage and became the sole owner. After the parties separated, the business’s value continued to increase. Husband filed for divorce, citing irreconcilable differences. The trial court granted the divorce, and the parties agreed that the business was marital property at the time of the marriage. The trial court found that Wife did not substantially contribute to the business after the parties separated and that any increase in its value was Husband’s separate property. We reverse the trial court’s finding that the business was separate property after the parties separated, modify the judgment to reflect this reversal, and affirm in all other respects.
 

This is a negligence case. Appellee, an elevator maintenance company, contracted with building owner to provide maintenance service for the building’s elevators. Plaintiff was injured when one of the elevators allegedly did not level properly, causing her to fall as she was exiting the elevator. Plaintiff and her husband brought suit against the building’s owner, the building’s management company, and Appellee. Appellee filed a motion for summary judgment, which the trial court granted. Appellants appeal.
 

The Defendant, James Allen Perry, pled guilty to fifty-nine counts of especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor, a Class B felony; three counts of statutory rape by an authority figure, a Class C felony; and one count of sexual exploitation of a minor, a Class D felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-532, -17-1003, -17-1005. The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of 106 years. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in imposing partially consecutive sentences. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Doris A. Whaley, appeals the Washington County Criminal Court's denial of her petition for post-conviction relief from her conviction of first degree premeditated murder and resulting life sentence. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that she received the ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel failed to present medical evidence that would have shown she was physically incapable of killing the victim. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Amy Denise Franklin’s (“the Defendant”) probation officer filed an affidavit alleging that she had violated five rules of probation and had absconded. Following a hearing, the trial court revoked her probation and ordered her to serve the balance of her sentence in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering her to serve her sentence in confinement without considering alternatives to incarceration. After a review of the record and applicable law, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Marcus Anthony Pearson (“the Petitioner”) filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging several claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.  After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief.  On appeal, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, Donald Keith Watts, a/k/a “Duck,” was convicted of rape and sentenced to eight years at 100%.  On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for mistrial because of an allegedly improper argument by the State and that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the verdict.  Following our review, we affirm the judgment of of the trial court.

This appeal arises from a zoning and land use dispute. The defendants applied to rezone most of the property at issue from Agricultural to Planned-Residential and sought approval of a development plan for a multi-dwelling project consisting of 312 apartment units. They also requested a Use-Permitted-on-Review approval for a marina on a portion of the property that would remain zoned as Agricultural. At issue before us are three separate actions taken by Knox County legislative and administrative bodies in relation to the requests, specifically: (A) the County Commission’s rezoning of the property from Agricultural to Planned-Residential at 1to 5 dwelling units per acre; (B) the Board of Zoning Appeals’ approval of the development plan for 312 apartment units; and (C) the Board of Zoning Appeals’ denial of the marina proposal. The trial court upheld the actions. We affirm.

A Knox County jury convicted the Defendant-Appellant, Paul Clifford Moore, Jr., of three counts of second degree murder. See T.C.A. § 39-13-210(a)(1). The trial court imposed three fifteen-year sentences and ordered two of the three sentences served consecutively for an effective sentence of thirty years in confinement. On appeal, Moore argues (1) the trial court erred in instructing the jury that state of passion produced by adequate provocation is an essential element of the offense of voluntary manslaughter that must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt; (2) the trial court erred in instructing the jury that it must determine whether the State had proven the element of state of passion beyond a reasonable doubt; (3) the sequential jury instructions prevented the jury from ever returning a verdict of voluntary manslaughter in his case; (4) the trial court abused its discretion in admitting eyewitness testimony that Moore threatened to kill victim Amber Snellings; (5) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions; (6) the trial court abused its discretion in imposing partially consecutive sentences; and (7) the cumulative effect of these errors violated his due process rights. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This is a zoning dispute arising out of a trash-collection business being operated in an agricultural-residential zone. The county planning and zoning commission determined that the business did not comply with existing zoning. The business owner sought review before the board of zoning appeals and, when the board affirmed the commission’s decision, filed a petition for certiorari review in chancery court, which held that the board’s action was not arbitrary and was supported by material evidence. We affirm the judgment of the chancery court.

After a long-term marriage, the wife obtained a divorce based on the husband’s inappropriate marital conduct. The trial court determined the value of the marital property, divided the marital estate, and awarded the wife both alimony in futuro and alimony in solido. The husband appealed, arguing the court erred in valuing his ownership interests in three general partnerships, in dividing the marital estate, and in awarding the wife alimony. After reviewing the extensive record in this case, we affirm the trial court’s decision.

After a long-term marriage, the wife obtained a divorce based on the husband’s inappropriate marital conduct. The trial court determined the value of the marital property, divided the marital estate, and awarded the wife both alimony in futuro and alimony in solido. The husband appealed, arguing the court erred in valuing his ownership interests in three general partnerships, in dividing the marital estate, and in awarding the wife alimony. After reviewing the extensive record in this case, we affirm the trial court’s decision.

This case involves the distribution of assets in a testamentary trust. The decedent’s will provided for her real property to be left in a trust established for the benefit of her children and grandchildren. After the will was admitted to probate, the trustee filed a petition seeking judicial authorization to sell the property to avoid reoccurring expenses and prevent waste. One of the beneficiaries submitted a response in which he asserted that he and all of the other beneficiaries opposed selling the property. Following a hearing, the trial court entered an order in which it held that the will granted the trustee unrestricted authority to sell the property without judicial authorization if, in her best judgment, doing so would be in the beneficiaries’ best interest. The beneficiary appealed. We affirm.  

Father appeals the termination of his parental rights on the grounds of abandonment. The lack of a transcript prevents us from determining whether sufficient evidence supported the termination and denies Father proper appellate consideration of his claims. We therefore vacate the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

Defendant, Stevie Michael Irwin, Jr., was found guilty of two counts of rape of a child, two counts of attempted rape of a child, one count of aggravated sexual battery, and one count of incest. On appeal, Defendant challenges the failure of the State to properly elect offenses; the sufficiency of the evidence for the rape and attempted rape convictions; dual convictions for rape of a child in Counts One and Three as violating his right to due process; and his sentence as excessive. After a review of the record, and in light of the recent supreme court holding in State v. Qualls, 428 S.W.3d 1 (2016), we affirm the convictions and sentences.

This appeal arises out of a premises liability case involving a plaintiff who fell while exiting an auto parts store. The trial court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment. We affirm and remand for further proceedings

This is a termination of parental rights case. In May 2015, the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition in Sevier County Juvenile Court seeking to terminate the parental rights of the child’s father. The juvenile court found by clear and convincing evidence that termination was appropriate on the following grounds: (1) abandonment by willful failure to support; (2) severe child abuse; and (3) persistence of conditions. The juvenile court also found by clear and convincing evidence that termination was in the child’s best interests. Father appealed. We hold that the record does not contain clear and convincing evidence to support termination on the grounds of abandonment for willful failure to support and persistence of conditions, and we reverse as to those grounds for termination.

The petitioner, Demarcus Keyon Cole, acting pro se, appeals the post-conviction court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing he received ineffective assistance of counsel. After review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

This case involves a taxpayer’s claim to a sales tax deduction under Tennessee Code Annotated § 67-6-507(e) for bad debts associated with private label and co-branded credit card programs. After an audit, the Tennessee Department of Revenue disallowed taxpayer’s bad debt deductions and assessed additional tax. Taxpayer paid the assessment and filed a claim for a refund, which was denied. Taxpayer sued the Commissioner of the Department of Revenue (“Commissioner”) in chancery court, seeking a declaration that it was entitled to the bad debt sales tax deduction and a monetary judgment for the additional assessed tax. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the chancery court granted the Commissioner’s motion, holding the taxpayer was not entitled to claim the deduction. We affirm.
 

This is the second appeal of this case involving the distribution of a marital estate. Appellant appeals the order denying him relief pursuant to Rule 60.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure (Rule 60.02). Because the appellate record contains no transcript or statement of the evidence conveying an accurate and complete account of what transpired as required by the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, we conclude that the findings made by the trial court were based upon sufficient evidence. Affirmed and remanded.

The defendant, David Anderson Hatcher, appeals the revocation of the probationary sentence imposed for his Blount County Circuit Court conviction of aggravated burglary. Discerning no error, we affirm.