APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This accelerated interlocutory appeal results from the trial court’s denial of Appellant’s motion for recusal. Because Appellants’ did not provide the mandatory affidavit in support of their motion for recusal as required by Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B, we affirm the judgment of the trial court

In this health care liability action, this Court granted the defendants' application pursuant to Tenn. R. App. P. 10 to address two issues. We have determined that: (1) the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”) does not preempt Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121(f); and (2) the trial court erred in denying the defendants' petition for a qualified protective order pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121(f) because it is undisputed that the defendants complied with the procedural requirements of subsection (f), and the plaintiff did not file an objection as permitted under the statute. We, therefore, reverse the trial court's decision and remand for the entry of a qualified protective order.

The Petitioner, John A. Jones, III, appeals the Bradley County Criminal Court's summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief for the petition's being filed outside the one-year statute of limitations. Based upon the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the dismissal of the petition.

In this post-divorce co-parenting action, the father filed a petition requesting modification of the parties’ permanent parenting plan and a finding of contempt against the mother in the Montgomery County Chancery Court which had entered the parties’ divorce decree. In response to the father’s petition, the mother filed a motion requesting that the trial court find Tennessee to be an inconvenient forum and that the court either dismiss the case or transfer it to Florida. Since entry of the divorce judgment, the mother and the parties’ minor child had resided in Florida. The father moved to Alaska at some point after entry of the divorce decree. The father filed a response objecting to the mother’s motion and asserting that Tennessee was not an inconvenient forum. Pursuant to the Uniform Child Custody and Jurisdiction Enforcement Act (“UCCJEA”), see Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-6-201, et seq., the trial court ultimately dismissed the father’s petition, determining that Tennessee was an inconvenient forum because no party resided in Tennessee, the mother’s alleged actions occurred in Florida, and the evidence necessary to resolve the issues would be unavailable in Tennessee. The father appeals, stating that the trial court erred in determining Tennessee to be an inconvenient forum and thereby dismissing his action. We affirm the trial court’s determination that Tennessee is an inconvenient forum. However, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-6-222(c), we reverse the dismissal of the father’s petition and remand to the trial court for issuance of a stay and imposition of conditions the court may consider just and proper.

The appellant, American Bonding Company, appeals the Williamson County Circuit Court’s order granting partial exoneration from the final forfeiture of a $200,000 bond and ordering the company to forfeit $75,000 of the bond.  On appeal, the appellant argues that it is entitled to full exoneration of the forfeited bond because law enforcement requested that the company not attempt to apprehend the subject of the bond.  Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal arises from an accident involving an automobile and a pedestrian that occurred in Anderson County. The pedestrian's insurer, as subrogee of the pedestrian, filed the instant action, alleging that the defendant driver should be held liable for negligence and negligence per se. Following a bench trial, the trial court assessed liability against the driver and awarded the pedestrian's insurer $50,000.00 in damages. The driver timely appealed. On appeal, the driver filed a statement of the evidence, approved by the trial court, that contains insufficient evidence to support the trial court's judgment. We therefore reverse the trial court's judgment.

This interlocutory appeal requires review of a ruling on a motion in limine in a personal injury case. Prior to trial, the plaintiffs submitted expert testimony from a treating physician to establish the reasonableness of their claimed medical expenses. The defendants filed a motion in limine seeking to exclude evidence of what they deemed ―unreasonable‖ medical expenses. They argued that the Tennessee Supreme Court‘s decision in West v. Shelby County Healthcare Corporation, 459 S.W.3d 33 (Tenn. 2014), established a new standard in Tennessee for determining the reasonable amount of medical expenses as a matter of law. The trial court granted the defendants‘ motion in limine, thus excluding the testimony of the treating physician. For the following reasons, the trial court‘s order is reversed and this matter is remanded for further proceedings.

This is a post-divorce case. Father appeals the trial court‘s decision not to hold Mother in contempt for failure to provide court-ordered insurance coverage for the child. Father also appeals the trial court‘s division of the child‘s uncovered medical bills and seeks reimbursement for monthly payments he made toward the child‘s insurance premiums while Mother failed to provide coverage. In addition, Father appeals the trial court‘s order requiring him to provide insurance for the child past the age of majority based on the child‘s medical disability and the judgment entered against him for Mother‘s attorney‘s fees. We conclude that Father is entitled to a credit for those insurance premiums he paid to Mother during the period of time the child was enrolled in TennCare. We reverse the trial court‘s order on attorney‘s fees. The order is otherwise affirmed.

A 59-year old plaintiff who lost his job as a chemical operator, after working in that position for over 37 years, applied for the position of general operator with another company. Twelve individuals were hired by the other company, all of whom were younger than the 59-year old, and most of whom were less experienced. The plaintiff filed an age discrimination complaint against the company. The case was tried by a jury, and the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, awarding him compensatory damages of $100,000. The trial court awarded the plaintiff front pay in addition to the compensatory damage award. The company appealed, and we affirm the trial court's judgment.

Following a jury trial, the Defendant, Carroll Renee Crews, was convicted of selling dihydrocodeinone, a Class D felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-417. The trial court imposed a sentence of twelve years’ incarceration to be served at sixty percent. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain her conviction. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Sullivan County jury found the Petitioner, Dennis L. Rose, guilty of one count of first degree premeditated murder and two counts of aggravated assault. On appeal, this Court affirmed the Petitioner's sentences and convictions. State v. Dennis Lee Rose, No. E2010-00734-CCA-R3-CD, 2012 WL 335548, (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, Feb. 1, 2012), perm. app. denied (Tenn. May 21, 2012). The Petitioner filed a post-conviction petition and the post-conviction court denied relief following a hearing. On appeal, the Petitioner maintains that: (1) the post-conviction court erred when it denied his motion to recuse the District Attorney General's office in light of his post-conviction allegation of prosecutorial misconduct; (2) he received the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial; and (3) the post-conviction court erred in denying him relief on the basis of prosecutorial misconduct. We affirm the post-conviction court's judgment.

I fully concur with the majority opinion by my learned colleague based upon existing case law, which we are bound to follow as an intermediate appellate court. I write separately to express my concerns relating to modern billing practices of medical providers and their effect upon present-day personal injury litigation . Were it not for existing case law which we are bound to follow as an intermediate appellate court, I would apply the West rationale to personal injury litigation.

The Defendant, Amerius Julian Harris, pleaded guilty to possession with the intent to sell of .5 grams or more of cocaine and possession of a Schedule VI drug with intent to sell, and the trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective sentence of twelve years, suspended to supervised probation except for 180 days.  A violation of probation warrant was issued, and the trial court revoked the Defendant’s probation and ordered service of the balance of the sentence in confinement.  The Defendant appeals, asserting that the trial court’s decision to fully revoke his probation sentence was “too harsh.”  We affirm the trial court’s judgment and remand for entry of a corrected revocation order in case number 12-0280.

The Defendant, Wendi Hope Tunny, appeals as of right from the Sevier County Circuit Court’s denial of her request for judicial diversion and order that she serve her five-year sentence in split confinement following her guilty-pleaded conviction for theft of property valued at $10,000 or more but less than $60,000, a Class C felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-14-103; -13-105(a)(4). On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by failing to consider all of the applicable factors for judicial diversion and by failing to conduct a proper weighing of those factors. Following our review, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The defendant, Marcus Levy, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of first degree premeditated murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. On appeal, the defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction and that the trial court erred in allowing the State to enter the witness statements of three witnesses into evidence at trial. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this second appeal involving the instant divorce action, the wife appeals the trial court's enforcement of an enhanced judgment lien on behalf of her former counsel and the court's inclusion of certain tractor tires within the farm equipment previously awarded to the husband in the final judgment for divorce. Having determined that the record contains no proof of notice to the wife of the hearing at which the trial court awarded the enhanced judgment lien, we vacate the portion of the judgment enforcing the enhanced portion of the attorney's lien. We remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion, including an evidentiary hearing addressing enforcement of the enhanced portion of the attorney's lien with notice to include the wife's former counsel. We affirm the trial court's judgment in all other respects.

The Petitioner, Michael Tyrone Gant, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief.  He argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel based on trial counsel’s failure to present evidence on his behalf that would have established both his innocence and the victim’s bias.  Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Inmate appeals the dismissal of his claim that funds awarded to him as a result of a claim he filed with the Tennessee Claims Commission were incorrectly applied to his overdrawn inmate trust account. Finding that the application of the funds in this manner did not violate the pertinent statutes, we affirm the judgment of the Commission.  

Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights as to her three biological children. The trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights on the grounds of abandonment by an incarcerated parent and persistent conditions. The trial court also found that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the children’s best interest. We have reviewed the trial court’s findings as to the grounds for termination and the best interests of the children, and we conclude that they are supported by clear and convincing evidence and therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, Quantel Taylor, appeals from the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief following remand from the Tennessee Supreme Court. See Taylor v. State, 443 S.W.3d 80 (Tenn. 2014). In his post-conviction petition, Petitioner alleged, in part, that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to interview his three co-defendants. Petitioner subpoenaed the co-defendants to testify at the post-conviction hearing. The post-conviction court granted the State's motion to quash subpoenas for the co-defendants, who were incarcerated. A panel of this court concluded that the post-conviction court erred, but held that the error was harmless under the circumstances. Quantel Taylor v. State, No. W2012-00760-CCA-R3-PC, 2013 WL 6228151 (Tenn. Crim. App., Nashville, April 29, 2013). Our supreme court reversed the decision of this court, holding that the post-conviction court committed prejudicial error by granting the State's motion to quash because the post-conviction court applied an incorrect legal standard. Taylor, 443 S.W.3d at 86. The court remanded the case for reconsideration of the motion to quash under the proper standard. On remand, the post-conviction court denied the State's motion to quash, and all three co-defendants were subpoenaed for an evidentiary hearing. Two of Petitioner's co-defendants, Allen and Bricco, refused to take the stand. The third co-defendant, Spivey, took the stand and refused to testify. The post-conviction court denied post-conviction relief. Petitioner appealed. We conclude that he has failed to establish that he is entitled to post-conviction relief. The judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

Defendant, Travis Tate, appeals from his convictions of second degree murder, attempted voluntary manslaughter, and employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony and from his effective sentence of forty years. Defendant raises the following issues on appeal: (1) whether there was sufficient evidence to support the convictions; (2) whether the trial court erred by admitting hearsay evidence at trial; (3) whether the trial court inaccurately advised Defendant during the Momon hearing; (4) whether the trial court erred by refusing to instruct the jury on self-defense; (5) whether the trial court erred by instructing the jury to correct its verdict on employment of a firearm; and (6) whether the trial court abused its discretion during sentencing. We affirm the judgments of the trial court with respect to the first two convictions, but we modify the judgment with respect to the employment of a firearm conviction.

The defendant pled guilty on March 21, 2013, to one count of the theft of $1,000 or more, a Class D felony, and one count of the theft of $60,000 or more, a Class B felony. The defendant was given an effective ten-year sentence, all of which was to be served on probation. As part of his probation, the defendant was required to complete two hundred hours of community service work and was forbidden to sell securities or to work in the financial services or insurance business. On April 26, 2014, the defendant’s probation officer signed a violation of probation affidavit alleging that the defendant was terminated from his community service program for noncompliance. On May 22, 2014, a second affidavit was issued, averring that the defendant violated the special condition forbidding him from working in the financial services industry when he attempted to solicit investors for a project. The trial court held a hearing on three separate days over the course of four months, and the court ultimately concluded that the defendant had violated the terms of his probation. The trial court revoked the defendant’s probation and ordered him to serve one year of his sentence in confinement, to be followed by a new probationary period. The defendant appeals, asserting that his due process rights were violated because the terms of his probation were unconstitutionally vague, because the evidence did not establish a violation of his probation, because he was given inadequate notice of the violation, and because the trial court’s written findings were inadequate. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A jury in the Maury County Circuit Court convicted the Appellant, Denny K. Reynolds, of simple possession of cocaine. The trial court sentenced the Appellant to eleven months and twenty-nine days in the Maury County Jail. On appeal, the Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence sustaining his conviction. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Bobby Lee Miles, Jr., pleaded guilty in 1999 to aggravated burglary and received a three-year sentence.  On October 21, 2015, the Defendant filed a Rule 36.1 motion to correct an illegal sentence, alleging that the pretrial credit on the judgment form is incorrect.  The trial court summarily dismissed the motion, and the Defendant appeals the dismissal, maintaining that his sentence is illegal.  After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the trial court properly dismissed the Defendant’s motion to correct his sentence.