APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Marc Baechtle, of rape of a child, aggravated sexual battery, and rape. The trial court dismissed the convictions for aggravated sexual battery and rape based upon the statute of limitations and sentenced the Defendant to twenty-five years for the rape of a child conviction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it: (1) denied his motion to suppress his statement to police; (2) denied his motion to dismiss based upon a violation of the prompt notification requirement of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers; and (3) denied his motion for a bill of particulars. The Defendant also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Delshun Jones, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of first degree premeditated murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. On appeal, he argues: (1) that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction; (2) the State committed prosecutorial misconduct during voir dire and rebuttal closing argument; (3) the trial court erred in allowing testimony and evidence of cell phone records into evidence; and (4) the trial court erred in allowing an inmate to testify despite the inmate and the defendant's having a defacto attorney-client relationship. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Michael Marks, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in finding that he received effective assistance of trial counsel. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

In a joint trial, Defendants Giovoanne Treymane Johnson and Rakeem Rashan Jones were convicted of first degree felony murder, second degree murder, and especially aggravated robbery. As to each, the trial court merged the second degree murder conviction into the felony murder conviction and imposed a sentence of life imprisonment. As to the convictions for especially aggravated robbery, each defendant was sentenced to twenty-five years, with the sentences to be served consecutively to the sentence for the felony murder conviction. On appeal, Defendant Jones argues that (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to sever the defendants for trial; (2) the evidence is insufficient to sustain the convictions; (3) the trial court erred both in the length and manner of service of the sentences; and (4) the court erred in denying his motion for mistrial. Defendant Johnson argues on appeal that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the convictions and that the trial court erred in ordering that the sentences be served consecutively. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Divorce proceeding in which Husband contends that the trial court erred in dividing the marital assets and debts, in setting parenting time, and determining that Wife is the economically disadvantaged spouse. Wife contends that the court erred in not ordering Husband to formulate and sign the letter of instruction transferring assets from his IRA account; in not awarding a higher amount in transitional alimony; in failing to designate a party to be responsible for processing the qualified domestic relation orders for two retirement accounts; and in granting the divorce based on Husband’s Amended Complaint for divorce. Wife asks this court to impose restrictions on Husband’s ability to initiate future litigation. Finding no error, we affirm the trial court.  

A homeowner alleges that a mortgage company promised her favorable terms to induce her to refinance her mortgage but the actual loan did not contain the terms discussed. She further alleges that company representatives led her to believe, after she received copies of some of the loan documents, that the discrepancy in the loan terms was a “mistake” that would be corrected. The homeowner filed this case against several entities, including the mortgage company. In the order at issue in this appeal, the trial court granted the defendants summary judgment on all of the homeowner’s causes of action and on their counterclaim. We have concluded that the trial court properly granted summary judgment on the claim for violation of the Truth in Lending Act. With regard to the homeowner’s claims for intentional and negligent misrepresentation, we find that there remain genuine issues of material fact and that the trial court therefore erred in granting summary judgment.     

Employee of the Tennessee Department of Correction filed an administrative appeal challenging the termination of his employment. The board of appeals reduced the termination to a fourteen-day suspension. On appeal to the trial court, the chancery court ruled that the burden of proof was improperly allocated to the Tennessee Department of Correction in the hearing before the board of appeals. We reverse the decision of the chancery court and conclude that the board of appeals properly allocated the burden to the Tennessee Department of Correction. We further conclude that no substantial and material evidence in the record exists to support the board of appeals’ finding that the employee committed negligence in the performance of his duties. We also reverse the board of appeals’ decision denying the employee’s request for attorney’s fees in the prosecution of his appeal to the board of appeals and remand to the board of appeals for a determination of those fees. 

This appeal arises out of the Tennessee Health Services and Development Agency’s decision to grant a certificate of need to a company to acquire and operate a linear accelerator; the decision was opposed by another company that operated a linear accelerator. After a contested case hearing, an administrative law judge issued an initial order holding that the certificate of need should not have been granted. On the applicant’s appeal, the agency reviewed the initial order and reversed it. The company which contested the application filed a petition for review in chancery court, where the Chancellor reversed the agency’s decision, finding that it was not based on substantial and material evidence. On appeal to this court, we conclude that substantial and material evidence existed to support the agency’s decision to issue the certificate of need. We therefore reverse the order of the chancery court and remand the case for entry of an order affirming the agency’s decision.  

This is a legal malpractice action in which the plaintiff alleged that the defendant attorney failed to conform to the applicable standard of care in drafting a prenuptial agreement. The trial court granted the defendant attorney's motion for summary judgment. The plaintiff appeals. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

The Defendant, Jessie R. Bailey, entered a guilty plea to possession of 0.5 gram or more of cocaine with the intent to sell. The Defendant was sentenced to serve eight years. In a separate case, the Defendant pleaded guilty to facilitation of second degree murder and was sentenced to serve eight years concurrently to the sentence in the cocaine possession case. Approximately sixteen years after the judgments were filed, the Defendant filed motions pursuant to Tennessee Criminal Procedure Rule 36.1 requesting that the trial court correct illegal sentences. The trial court summarily denied the motions. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Brian Christopher Dunn (“the Defendant”) was convicted of initiation of the process to manufacture methamphetamine and driving with a suspended, cancelled, or revoked license—6th offense.  On appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for initiation of the process to manufacture methamphetamine.  Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Shelby County jury found the Defendant, Christopher Brown, guilty of one count of first degree premeditated murder and three counts of aggravated assault. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the trial court erroneously admitted evidence of prior bad acts under Rule 404(b) of the Tennessee Rules of Evidence and that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his convictions. Following a thorough review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Defendant, Preston Rashad Royal, pled guilty to thirteen counts of burglary of an automobile and received an effective sentence of six years to be served on supervised probation after one year of confinement in the custody of the Tennessee Department of Correction (“TDOC”). Defendant argues that his sentence is illegal because it directly contravenes Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-122(a). The State concedes error. We conclude that Defendant’s sentence is illegal, vacate the judgments of the trial court, and remand the case for a new sentencing hearing.

The defendant, Billy Ramer, pled guilty to one count of sexual battery for crimes committed against his granddaughter. The trial court denied judicial diversion, and the defendant appeals. We conclude that the defendant’s appeal was not timely filed and that the interest of justice, having been served by the denial of diversion, does not demand that we waive the time for filing a notice of appeal. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed. We remand the case for correction of the judgment form.

The Defendant, Anmichael Leonard, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of theft of property valued at $1000 or more but less than $10,000, a Class D felony, identity theft, a Class D felony, and fraudulent use of a credit card, a Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. §§ 39-14-103 (2014) (theft of property); 39-14-150 (2012) (identity theft); 39-14-118 (2014) (unauthorized use of a credit or debit card). The trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective twenty-four years. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient support his convictions. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Petitioner, Jeffery L. Vaughn, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. Petitioner asserts that he received ineffective assistance of counsel when trial counsel failed to convey a favorable plea offer, failed to file a motion to suppress text messages, and failed to adequately prepare Petitioner to testify. Upon our review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner, Michael Kent Walker, appeals the Putnam County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2012 convictions for selling Schedule I and Schedule II controlled substances in a drug-free zone, for which he received an effective sentence of twelve years.  The Petitioner contends that his guilty plea was unknowing and involuntary based upon erroneous advice from trial counsel regarding the amount of jail credit to which he was entitled.  We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This is a termination of parental rights case. F.N.M. (the child) was born out of wedlock while her biological father, W.C.G. (father), was incarcerated. Shortly after the child’s birth, A.M.M. (mother) gave the child’s physical custody to individuals, who would later choose to be the prospective adoptive parents. Soon thereafter, mother surrendered her parental rights to the child. The prospective adoptive parents filed a petition for adoption and termination of father’s parental rights. Father opposed the adoption and filed a petition to establish paternity. After a hearing, the trial court found father to be the child’s biological parent; but it also found that there is clear and convincing evidence supporting termination of his parental rights. Furthermore, the court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that termination is in the child’s best interest. Father appeals. We modify the trial court’s judgment. As modified, the judgment terminating father’s rights is affirmed. 

I agree with the majority that the prospective adoptive parents, S.L.D. and B.W.D., failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that W.C.G. (“Father”) acted with wanton disregard for the child’s welfare within the meaning of Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-102(1)(A)(iv) (2015).  I also agree with the majority’s interpretation of Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(g)(9)(A) (2015).  However, in my view, our Supreme Court has interpreted Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(g)(9)(A) differently, and therefore, I am constrained by that interpretation to respectfully dissent.          

This appeal involves an inmate's petition for writ of certiorari, in which he challenged a decision of the prison disciplinary board finding him guilty of drug possession. After reviewing the record of the disciplinary hearing, the trial court dismissed the inmate's petition. We affirm.

Because I cannot agree with the majority’s conclusion that the evidence was sufficient to corroborate the accomplice’s testimony implicating the Defendant in the crime, and, because I similarly disagree with the conclusion that the trial court’s admission of Mr. Taylor’s prior consistent statement was harmless error, I respectfully dissent.

We granted permission to appeal to determine whether a customer who seeks to challenge monthly rates charged by its sewer service provider must exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit. The plaintiff apartment complex filed this action individually and as a class representative, arguing that the monthly charge assessed by the defendant water and wastewater treatment authority is unlawful. In response, the defendant asserted that a customer who seeks to dispute the rates charged must first follow the administrative procedures provided in the Utility District Law of 1937, Tennessee Code Annotated sections 7-82-101 to –804 (2015). On this basis, the water and wastewater treatment authority sought dismissal of the lawsuit for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The trial court dismissed the lawsuit for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, and the Court of Appeals reversed. We hold that the administrative procedures in Part 4 of the Utility District Law of 1937 do not apply to a rate challenge filed by an individual customer against a water and wastewater treatment authority, so we agree with the Court of Appeals that the trial court erred in dismissing the lawsuit for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. We affirm the remainder of the Court of Appeals’ decision, except that we vacate the trial court’s alternative ruling on class certification and remand that issue to the trial court for reconsideration.

The defendant, Victoria Monquette Orr, appeals her conviction for theft of property over $1,000 but less than $10,000, a Class D felony.  On appeal, the defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to sustain her conviction and that the trial court erred in admitting the prior consistent statement of a witness.  Following our review of the briefs of the parties, the record, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Kelcey Z. Williams, appeals from the post-conviction court's denial of relief from his conviction for second degree murder. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty plea was not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, Christopher Bailey, was convicted of one count of rape of a child, a Class A felony. On appeal, he argues that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction; that the trial court erred by admitting evidence of uncharged sexual conduct; that the trial court erred by preventing him from impeaching a witness with evidence of the witness's prior convictions; and that the trial court erred by excluding evidence of the victim's prior sexual abuse. Following our thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.