APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Petitioner, Joe Ross, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court's judgment pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we grant the State's motion and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Susan Jo Walls, was convicted by a jury of being criminally responsible for the first-degree premeditated murder of her husband and of conspiring with others to commit said murder.  The trial court imposed an effective sentence of life imprisonment for these convictions.  In this direct appeal, the Defendant argues that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support her convictions; (2) the trial court erred in allowing late-night jury deliberations; (3) the trial court erred by denying her motion to suppress an involuntary statement made to law enforcement; (4) the trial court failed to properly sanction the State for its untimely disclosure of certain phone records; (5) the trial court abused its discretion by denying her motion for a mistrial or to strike a witness’s testimony based on an alleged Jencks Act violation; and (6)the trial court erred by modifying the jury instructions in response to a jury question that was presented after deliberations had commenced.[1]  Because we conclude that the trial court erred by allowing jury deliberations to continue into the late-night hours, we reverse the judgments of the trial court and remand this case for a new trial.

The defendant, William Pillars, appeals his Franklin County Circuit Court jury convictions of rape of a child and aggravated sexual battery, claiming that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions, that the trial court erred by improperly admitting and excluding certain evidence, that the trial court erred by admitting into evidence the defendant’s prior convictions, and that the sentence imposed was excessive.  Discerning no error, we affirm.

A Rutherford County jury convicted the Defendant, Mark Tracy Looney, of four counts of rape of a child, one count of felony child abuse, and one count of misdemeanor child abuse.  The trial court ordered the Defendant to serve an effective sentence of fifty years in prison.  On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the trial court erred when it: (1) denied his motions for mistrial; (2) denied his motion to suppress his pretrial statements; (3) refused to grant a new trial based upon the State’s failure to provide a recorded statement by the victim; (4) admitted inadmissible testimony from an expert witness; (5) allowed a witness to refresh her memory by viewing a video recording; (6) determined that the evidence against him is sufficient to sustain his convictions; (7) failed to grant a mistrial in light of a juror’s failure to disclose exposure to pretrial publicity; and (8) ordered consecutive sentencing.  After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

We granted permission to appeal in this case to determine whether a capital defendant, via a petition for writ of error coram nobis, may obtain a hearing to determine whether he is ineligible to be executed because he is intellectually disabled. The Petitioner, Pervis Tyrone Payne, was convicted in 1988 of two first degree murders, and the jury imposed the death sentence for each murder. In 2001, this Court held that the federal and state constitutions prohibit the execution of individuals who are intellectually disabled. Van Tran v. State, 66 S.W.3d 790, 812 (Tenn. 2001). The Petitioner asserts that he meets the statutory definition of intellectually disabled, but he has not yet been afforded an evidentiary hearing on his claim. In this proceeding, he has sought to establish his right to such a hearing via a claim of error coram nobis. The trial court denied relief without a hearing, and the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed with one judge dissenting. We hold that the Petitioner is not entitled to relief under a claim of error coram nobis. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

Appellants petitioned for grandparent visitation pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated Section 36-6-306. After a trial, Appellants were awarded visitation consisting of one weekday per month, the entire day of December 26, and four hours on each of the two children's birthdays. Appellants appeal from the trial court's order, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion by not awarding them more visitation. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Defendant, Quinton Bonner, appeals the trial court's denial of a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. However, we remand the matter for entry of judgment forms in Counts 2, 3, and 4.

Defendants Devonte Bonds, Thomas Bishop, Jason Sullivan, and Brianna Robinson were tried jointly and convicted of attempted second degree murder, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. The jury found that the underlying offenses committed by Defendants Bonds, Bishop, and Sullivan constituted criminal gang offenses, and they received enhanced punishment under Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-121. All of the defendants raise multiple procedural and evidentiary issues with regard to the guilt phase of the trial on the underlying offenses. Defendants Bonds, Bishop, and Sullivan also raise several issues regarding their criminal gang enhancements. Defendants Bishop and Sullivan each raise an issue with regard to their sentencing. After an exhaustive review of the record, we ascertain no error in the guilt phase of the trial on the underlying offenses. Accordingly, the trial court‘s judgment as to Defendant Robinson is affirmed. However, because the subsection of the criminal gang enhancement statute employed by the State violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and is facially unconstitutional, we reverse the judgments of the trial court as to Defendants Bonds, Bishop, and Sullivan, vacate the criminal gang enhancements, and remand for modification of the judgments and a new sentencing hearing on the underlying offenses of attempted second degree murder, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony.

Mexican car crash victims filed this lawsuit in Tennessee against the manufacturer of the subject vehicle and the manufacturer of its tires. The original lawsuit was dismissed by this Court in 2003 under the doctrine of forum non conveniens. A separate lawsuit was filed in Mexico but ultimately dismissed. The plaintiffs then filed this action in Tennessee. As the case progressed, the parties disputed whether Tennessee law or Mexican law applies to the substantive issues in this case. The trial court ruled that Mexican law applies. The plaintiffs were granted an interlocutory appeal to this Court pursuant to Rule 9 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. On appeal, the plaintiffs argue that Tennessee law should apply to the substantive issues in this case because it has the most significant relationship to the litigation. The defendants argue that the choice-of-law issue was resolved in our 2003 opinion and should not be reconsidered due to the doctrine of collateral estoppel. Alternatively, they argue that Mexico has the most significant relationship to the litigation, and therefore, its law should apply. For the following reasons, we conclude that this Court’s determination in our 2003 decision regarding the applicable choice-of-law is entitled to preclusive effect. Accordingly, as we concluded in 2003, Mexican law will govern the substantive issues in this case. The trial court’s order is affirmed as modified and remanded for further proceedings.      

A Shelby County jury convicted the Petitioner, Ronnie Henry, of four counts of aggravated robbery and four counts of robbery, and the trial court sentenced him to seventy years in prison. The Petitioner appealed his conviction and sentence, and this Court affirmed his convictions and remanded the case on a sentencing issue. See State v. Ronnie Henry, No. W2006-00344-CCA-R3-CD, 2008 WL 450459, at *5 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Feb. 19, 2008), perm. app. denied (Tenn. 2008). The Petitioner was resentenced on remand and his sentence was affirmed on appeal. State v. Ronnie Henry, No. W2009-00089-CCA-R3-CD, 2009 WL 3103823, at *5 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Sept. 28, 2009), no Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application filed. In 2010, the Petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief. The post-conviction court appointed counsel who filed an amended petition for post-conviction relief alleging that the Petitioner had received the ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court held a hearing on the petition and denied relief. We affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

This appeal arises from a dispute over the meaning of the term “owner” as it relates to Tenn. Code Ann. § 13-21-103, part of the Slum Clearance and Redevelopment Act (“the Act”). The Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County (“Metro”) sued various defendants in the Chancery Court for Davidson County (“the Trial Court”) to recover costs associated with the demolition of certain property in Nashville. Regions Bank (“Regions”), the mortgagee of record and a defendant in the case, argues that while it is an owner under other sections of Tenn. Code Ann. § 13-21-103, it is not an owner under the statute as relates to demolition costs and thus is not liable for Metro’s demolition costs. The Trial Court granted Regions’ motion for judgment on the pleadings, thereby dismissing Metro’s lawsuit. Metro appeals to this Court. We hold that under Tenn. Code Ann. § 13-21-101, “owner” is defined explicitly to include mortgagees of record, that the language is unambiguous, and that the Trial Court erred in dismissing Metro’s lawsuit. We reverse the judgment of the Trial Court and remand this case to the Trial Court for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

Plaintiff appeals from a defense verdict in a medical malpractice action. Plaintiff alleged that the one of the defendants, a general radiologist, deviated from the standard of care by failing to diagnose and report that a pacemaker lead had perforated the decedent’s heart. The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether the trial court erred by denying Plaintiff’s motion to strike the testimony of the defendants’ expert witness who testified that the defendant radiologist complied with the standard of care. Plaintiff insists that the expert did not know the applicable standard of care; therefore, his testimony should have been stricken. The defendants insist the expert witness was qualified to provide standard of care opinions for a general radiologist and that the trial court correctly instructed the jury to weigh his testimony along with that of other expert witnesses who testified. Finding no error with the trial court denying Plaintiff’s motion to strike, we affirm.

Because I conclude that Tennessee Code Annotated § 13-21-103(6) (2011) does not permit assessments of costs or actions for costs against a mortgagee, I respectfully dissent from the reversal. Relying on the definition of the word “owner” found in the Slum Clearance and Redevelopment Act (the “Act”), see Tenn. Code Ann. § 13-21-101(4) (2011), the majority concludes that a mortgagee may be assessed the cost of removal or demolition of a structure unfit for human occupation or use. As required when called on to construe a statute, the majority begins by looking to the words of the Act. See Waldschmidt v. Reassure Am. Life Ins. Co., 271 S.W.3d 173, 176 (Tenn. 2008). In my view, however, the majority then fails “to construe the[] words in the context in which they appear in the statute and in light of the statute’s general purpose.” Lee Med., Inc. v. Beecher, 312 S.W.3d 515, 526 (Tenn. 2010).

The defendant, Willie Jones, appeals his Shelby County Criminal Court jury convictions of second degree murder and being a felon in possession of a firearm, claiming that the trial court erred by admitting certain witness testimony and by excluding other witness testimony, by refusing to instruct the jury on self-defense, and by limiting his cross-examination of certain witnesses. In addition, the defendant claims that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction of second degree murder, that the trial court erred by imposing consecutive sentencing, and that the cumulative effect of these errors prevented him from receiving a fair trial. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Pro se petitioner, Michael Williams, appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court's summary dismissal of his motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that the trial court erred in summarily dismissing his motion. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Michael Mullins, pleaded guilty in the Knox County Criminal Court to aggravated assault, a Class C felony, and received a three-year sentence. See T.C.A. § 39-13-102 (Supp. 2009) (amended 2010, 2011, 2013, 2015). The trial court granted the Defendant's request for judicial diversion and ordered him to pay more than $8000 in restitution. After a probation violation report and warrant were filed with the trial court, the court determined that the Defendant violated the conditions of his release, revoked the Defendant's judicial diversion, and sentenced him to three years' enhanced probation. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) because the parties had a plea agreement regarding the disposition of the probation violation, the trial court erred by allowing the State to rescind the agreement and by not providing the Defendant the opportunity to choose between requiring the State to specifically perform the agreement and withdrawing his guilty plea to the probation violation, (2) the trial court's failure to consider his corrective actions during the two years the probation violation proceedings were pending violated his right to a speedy trial, (3) the court erred by holding a judicial diversion revocation proceeding before holding a probation violation proceeding, and (4) the court erred during its restitution determinations. We affirm the judgment of the trial court and dismiss the Defendant's appeal relative to restitution pursuant to the mootness doctrine.

Appellant, Patricia Tarver, appeals the trial court’s revocation of her probation, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering her to serve her original sentence in confinement. Because there is substantial evidence to support the trial court’s finding that Appellant violated the terms and conditions of her probation, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by revoking Appellant’s probation and executing the underlying sentence. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The petitioner, Gerry Tallant, appeals from the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his premeditated first degree murder conviction. He argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because counsel failed to argue in the motion to suppress that: (1) he was arrested on the murder charge although the officers lacked probable cause; (2) he was detained for a custodial interrogation although the officers lacked probable cause; and (3) he was seized without reasonable suspicion. After review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The defendant, Jonathan Casey Bryant, pleaded guilty in the Warren County Circuit Court to promoting the manufacture of methamphetamine, reserving as a certified question of law whether the evidence obtained following a traffic stop should have been suppressed because it arose from his illegal detention.  Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal concerns a post-divorce modification of child custody. Randall Charles Harrell (“Father”) filed a petition against his ex-wife Chassity Necole Harrell (“Mother”) in the General Sessions Court for Wilson County (“the Trial Court”) to modify the permanent parenting plan concerning the parties’ two minor children. Father sought to be designated primary residential parent based, in part, upon Mother’s alleged drug abuse and instability. After a hearing, the Trial Court found a material change in circumstances, designated Father the primary residential parent, and entered a new parenting plan accordingly. Mother appeals to this Court, arguing, among other things, that the Trial Court erred in finding a material change of circumstances and in considering the unsworn testimony of the children. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the Trial Court in its entirety.

The Defendant, Eric D. Crenshaw, pleaded guilty to theft of property valued at $10,000 or more but less than $60,000, a Class C felony, evading arrest, a Class E felony, theft of property valued at $500 or less, a Class A misdemeanor, possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor, and driving on a revoked license, a Class B misdemeanor. See T.C.A. §§ 39-14-103 (2014) (theft), 39-16-603 (2014) (evading arrest), 39-17-425 (2014) (unlawful drug paraphernalia), 55-50-504 (2012) (driving on a revoked license). Pursuant to the plea agreement, the Defendant would receive concurrent sentences as a Range I, standard offender, with the length and the manner of service of the sentences to be determined by the trial court. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to serve six years for the felony theft conviction, two years for the evading arrest conviction, eleven months, twenty-nine days for the misdemeanor theft conviction, eleven months, twenty-nine days for the possession of drug paraphernalia conviction, and six months for the driving on a revoked license conviction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by (1) denying him alternative sentencing and (2) imposing excessive fines for his felony theft and evading arrest convictions. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Shawn Christopher Sales, pleaded guilty in the Rutherford County Circuit Court to robbery, and the trial court sentenced him as a career offender to serve fifteen years with release eligibility at 60%. The trial court ordered that the Petitioner serve 163 days in confinement and the remainder of his sentence on community corrections. The trial court later revoked the Petitioner’s community corrections sentence and ordered that he serve his sentence in confinement. This Court affirmed the revocation on appeal. State v. Shawn C. Sales, M2013-01510-CCA-R3-CD, 2014 WL 806316 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Feb. 28, 2014), no Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application filed. The Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus relief, contending that his judgment is void because his sentence is illegal. The habeas corpus court summarily dismissed the petition finding that the Petitioner had failed to satisfy the procedural requirements and had failed to prove he was entitled to habeas corpus relief. After review, we affirm the habeas corpus court’s judgment.

The Defendant, Mark Tiger, was convicted by a Madison County Circuit Court jury of aggravated assault, a Class C felony. See T.C.A. § 39-13-102 (2014). The trial court sentenced the Defendant to five years' confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction and (2) the trial court erred during sentencing. We affirm the Defendant's conviction.

Petitioner, Andre Davis, was convicted of voluntary manslaughter by a Shelby County jury and sentenced to fourteen and one-half years in incarceration. His first appeal was denied. State v. Andre Davis, No. W2007-01442-CCA-R3-CD, 2008 WL 4831230, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 5, 2008), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Mar. 16, 2009). Petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief which led to the grant of a delayed appeal based on trial counsel's failure to file a motion for new trial. Petitioner was permitted to file a motion for new trial. The motion was denied, and Petitioner was again denied relief on appeal. Andre Davis v. State, No. W2011-00373-CCA-R3-CD, 2012 WL 5970932, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 29, 2012), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Apr. 10, 2013). Petitioner then sought post-conviction relief again. After a hearing, the petition was denied. On appeal, Petitioner challenges the post-conviction court's denial of relief. After a review, we determine Petitioner has failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he is entitled to relief. Accordingly, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

Appellant, Heather Renee McCollum, stands convicted of first degree premeditated murder and arson, for which she received consecutive sentences of life in prison and five years, respectively. Challenging her convictions and sentence alignment, she raises the following issues in this appeal: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to support her convictions; (2) whether her arson conviction should be set aside based upon the “physical facts” rule; and (3) whether the trial court erred in aligning her sentences consecutively. Upon our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.