APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This second appeal of this post-divorce case concerns the husband's continued occupation of the marital residence. Upon remand, the trial court imposed a rental obligation upon the husband and established a reserve price for the auction sale of the residence. We modify the court's decision to reflect an imposition of rent that conforms to the marital dissolution agreement. We affirm the decision in all other respects.

In this post-conviction case, we clarify the appropriate prejudice analysis for ineffective assistance of counsel claims arising from the failure to properly request jury instructions on lesser-included offenses where, as here, the jury was given no option to convict of any lesser-included offense. The jury convicted the petitioner as charged of one count of aggravated burglary and multiple counts of aggravated rape, especially aggravated kidnapping, and aggravated robbery in connection with a home invasion. On direct appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the convictions and declined to address the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on lesser-included offenses because the petitioner’s trial counsel did not request the instructions in writing as required by statute. Thereafter, the post-conviction court denied relief. On appeal, a majority of the Court of Criminal Appeals granted a new trial on the especially aggravated kidnapping charges based on ineffective assistance of counsel. We hold that the Court of Criminal Appeals erred in concluding that the petitioner was prejudiced by his trial counsel’s failure to request a jury instruction on aggravated kidnapping as a lesser-included offense of especially aggravated kidnapping. We conclude that no reasonable probability exists that a properly instructed jury would have convicted the petitioner of any of his asserted lesser-included offenses instead of the charged offenses. Because the petitioner suffered no prejudice, he did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel as to any of his convictions. We reverse the Court of Criminal Appeals’ judgment granting a new trial on the especially aggravated kidnapping charges and reinstate the post-conviction court’s judgment denying relief on these convictions. We further hold that the Court of Criminal Appeals properly affirmed the denial of post-conviction relief on the petitioner’s other convictions.  

This is an appeal under the Administrative Procedures Act. After the Tennessee Department of Health mailed notice to a physician of alleged violations of the Tennessee Medical Practice Act, the physician retired his Tennessee medical license. Unsatisfied, the Department of Health filed a notice of charges. After a hearing at which the physician did not appear, the Tennessee Board of Medical Examiners revoked the physician’s medical license and placed conditions on any future application by the physician for a medical license in Tennessee. The physician appealed to the chancery court, which affirmed the decision of the Board of Medical Examiners. On appeal to this Court, the physician challenges whether the Board possessed personal jurisdiction over him and sufficiency of service of the notice of charges. The physician also argues that his due process rights were violated and that the Board of Medical Examiners lacked authority to revoke a retired medical license. We affirm.      

Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and a deceased family member, sued the City of Fayetteville and others for wrongful death and personal injuries resulting from an automobile accident involving a stolen police car. Plaintiffs alleged a police officer negligently failed to secure a suspect after placing her in the police car. The suspect then stole the police car, drove away at a high rate of speed, and collided with the plaintiffs’ vehicle. The City moved to dismiss on the grounds that it was immune from suit based upon the public interest doctrine, and the trial court granted the motion. We affirm the dismissal.

The mother of two minor children filed a petition on May 5, 2014, in the Chancery Court of Rutherford County seeking an order of protection against the children’s father for her benefit and for the benefit of their two minor children. When the petition was filed, the parties were operating under a parenting plan from Wisconsin state courts, and the Chancery Court of Rutherford County exercised only temporary emergency jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-6-201 to -243. The chancery court granted the petition pending an evidentiary hearing. Unfortunately, the matter stalled for eleven months due to pending criminal charges against the father arising out of the same incident. Following the evidentiary hearing in April 2015, the trial court extended the order of protection as to the mother but dismissed the petition as to the children on the finding the children were not in any danger. Mother appealed. At oral argument, both parties informed the court that custody modification proceedings were ongoing in Tennessee and that the parenting plan had been temporarily modified pending discovery and a full hearing. The only issues on appeal pertain to the welfare of the parties’ two minor children. The chancery court now has jurisdiction over the order of protection, which was filed two years ago, and exclusive, continuing jurisdiction over the parenting plan; therefore, the chancery court is responsible for ruling on all current issues concerning the welfare of the children. For these reasons, we conclude the limited issues on appeal are moot because we are unable to provide meaningful relief. Our ruling on the order of protection could conflict with recent rulings by the chancery court that are based on current events, as distinguished from the singular incident on appeal that is now two years old. Therefore, the appeal is dismissed. 

Following a jury trial, Defendant, LaKeith Moody, was convicted of first degree premeditated murder and first degree felony murder of the victim, with whom Defendant had a long-time romantic relationship. He received a sentence of life imprisonment. On appeal, Defendant argues that (1) the trial court erred by admitting acts of prior domestic violence committed by Defendant against the victim; (2) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; and (3) the trial court failed to merge Defendant's convictions for premeditated and felony murder into one judgment for first degree murder. After a thorough review, we affirm the convictions for first degree premeditated murder and felony murder and remand the case for entry of corrected judgment forms noting merger of the two convictions as set forth herein.

The petitioner, Ann Dodd, appeals the Williamson County Criminal Court’s denial of her petition to expunge the record of her 2009 Williamson County General Sessions Court guilty-pleaded conviction of simple possession of cocaine.  Because we conclude that the petitioner failed to satisfy the requirements of Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-32-101(g), we affirm the trial court’s order.

The petitioner, Huston Foley Lloyd, Jr., appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief, and the State concedes that summary dismissal was improper.  Because the petitioner stated a colorable claim for post-conviction relief, the post-conviction court erred by summarily dismissing the petition.  Accordingly, the judgment of the post-conviction court is reversed, and the case is remanded for an evidentiary hearing on the petitioner’s claims.

Petitioner adoption service filed a petition to terminate Father's parental rights, alleging several grounds under Tennessee Code Annotated Section 36-1-113(g)(9)(A) and abandonment pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated Section 36-1-113(g)(1). The trial court denied the petition, finding no grounds to support termination. Based upon the Tennessee Supreme Court's holding in In re Bernard T., 319 S.W.3d 586 (Tenn. 2010), that the grounds contained within Section 36-1-113(g)(9)(A) cannot apply to putative biological fathers, we affirm the trial court's denial of termination on those grounds. We also affirm the trial court's finding that Petitioner failed to prove abandonment pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated Section 36-1-113(g)(1) by clear and convincing evidence.

Following a jury trial, the Defendant, Roy Thomas Rogers, was convicted of initiating the manufacture of methamphetamine, a Class B felony; promoting the manufacture of methamphetamine, a Class D felony; possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor; and criminal impersonation, a Class B misdemeanor. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-16-301, -17-425, -17-433, -17-435. The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of twelve years. On appeal, the Defendant contends (1) that the trial court erred by admitting evidence from a garbage bag found near his residence and (2) that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions. However, the Defendant failed to timely file his motion for new trial, and, subsequently, his notice of appeal. Because we conclude that the interest of justice does not require us to hear the appeal, we dismiss it as untimely.

The defendant, Ricky Flamingo Brown, appeals the summary dismissal of his motion, filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1, to correct what he believes to be an illegal sentence.  Because the grounds for relief raised by the defendant have been previously determined and because the defendant failed to state cognizable grounds for relief under Rule 36.1, the interests of justice do not require the waiver of the timely filing of the notice of appeal in this case.  Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.

The appellant, Brenda Haynes Jackson Claughton, pled guilty in the Dickson County Circuit Court to two counts of felony theft and received concurrent, four-year sentences to be served on supervised probation.  The trial court also ordered that she pay $36,000 restitution.  On appeal, the appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking probation for her failure to pay restitution when the evidence shows that she had no ability to pay it.  Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Two years after he left work for the employer, an employee alleged that he sustained a compensable hearing loss. He died prior to filing suit. His estate subsequently filed this action. The employer denied that the condition was work-related and also asserted that the claim was barred by the applicable statute of limitations. The trial court found for the estate and awarded benefits. The employer has appealed, and the appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We conclude that the action was barred by the statute of limitations and reverse the judgment.

Automobile insurance company brought action to recover from the defendant payments made under the policy to its insured and her passenger for personal injuries and property damage resulting from an automobile accident between the insured and the uninsured Defendant’s daughter. Judgment was entered in favor of company in the amount of $20,575.00, which was reduced by 20% to $16,460.00 in accordance with the court’s apportionment of 20% fault to the policy holder. Defendant appeals the denial of his motion to dismiss, the award of damages, and the allocation of fault.
 

The defendant, Charles Owens, filed an unsuccessful Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 motion to correct an illegal sentence, the alleged illegality being that he was not present, either in person or by video, at his sentencing.  He asks that his conviction and sentence be declared illegal and void.  The trial court concluded, without a hearing, that the motion failed to state a colorable claim for relief, and this appeal followed. Following our review, we affirm the dismissal of the motion, pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

Christinia Davis (“Wife”), Terran Denise Davis (“Terran”), and Taylor Ann Davis (“Taylor”) appeal the April 17, 2015 order of the General Sessions Court for Bount County Probate Division (“Probate Court”) upholding the Last Will and Testament of Terry Paul Davis (“the Will”). Wife, Terran, and Taylor raise an issue regarding whether the Probate Court erred in finding that the presumption of undue influence arising out of the proven confidential relationship between Terry Paul Davis (“Deceased”) and Olive K. Davis (“Davis”) was rebutted by clear and convincing evidence. We find and hold that although a confidential relationship was proven between Deceased and Davis, clear and convincing evidence was proven to rebut the presumption of undue influence. We, therefore, affirm.

The defendant, Tyler Fitzgerald Raybon-Tate, pled guilty to five counts of aggravated burglary; one count of theft of property valued at $10,000 or more; two counts of theft of property valued at $500 or less; one count of carjacking; one count of kidnapping; two counts of felony evading arrest in a motor vehicle; and one count of driving on a suspended license.  The defendant had agreed to be sentenced as a Range II offender, and the court was to determine the alignment of the sentences.  Subsequently, the court imposed eight-year sentences for each of the five counts of aggravated burglary; seven years for the theft of property over $10,000; eleven months and twenty-nine days for each of the two counts of theft of property $500 or less; seventeen years for carjacking; nine years for kidnapping; three years for one evading arrest charge and six years for the other; and six months for driving on a suspended license.  Concluding that the defendant had an extensive record of criminal behavior and was a dangerous offender, the trial court ordered that the sentences for the carjacking conviction and for two aggravated burglaries be served consecutively, for a total effective sentence of thirty-three years.  The defendant appealed, arguing that consecutive sentences should not have been imposed, for he was not a dangerous offender.  Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This is a termination of parental rights case, focusing on Benjamin A., the minor child (“the Child”) of Brent H. (“Father”) and Brandice A. (“Mother”). The Child was taken into protective custody by the Tennessee Department of Children's Services (“DCS”) on November 4, 2010, upon investigation of a spiral fracture to his right arm and suspected child abuse. On December 17, 2013, DCS filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Father. Mother previously had surrendered her parental rights to the Child in June 2013 and is not a party to this appeal. Following a bench trial, the trial court found that statutory grounds existed to terminate the parental rights of Father upon its finding by clear and convincing evidence that Father had (1) abandoned the Child by willfully failing to provide financial support, (2) abandoned the Child by failing to provide a suitable home, and (3) failed to substantially comply with the reasonable responsibilities and requirements of the permanency plans. The court further found by clear and convincing evidence that termination of Father's parental rights was in the Child's best interest. Father has appealed. Having determined that, as DCS concedes, the element of willfulness was not proven by clear and convincing evidence as to Father's failure to support the Child, we reverse the trial court's finding regarding the statutory ground of abandonment through failure to support. We affirm the trial court's judgment in all other respects, including the termination of Father's parental rights to the Child.

The Defendant-Appellant, Tiffany Clegg, appeals the trial court’s revocation of her probation and reinstatement of her effective eight-year sentence in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant-Appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by reinstating a sentence of full confinement. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is a termination of parental rights case. The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition seeking to terminate the mother’s parental rights with respect to the minor child. The juvenile court found that statutory grounds existed to terminate the mother’s parental rights upon its finding by clear and convincing evidence that the mother (1) abandoned the child by her willful failure to visit, (2) abandoned the child by her willful failure to provide a suitable home, (3) failed to substantially comply with the requirements of the permanency plans, and that (4) the conditions that led to the child’s removal still persisted. The juvenile court further found by clear and convincing evidence that termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the child’s best interests. Having thoroughly reviewed the record and considered the arguments presented on appeal, we affirm the juvenile court’s judgment in all respects.  

I must respectfully dissent from the majority's Opinion, and I believe Tennessee should adopt the preemption rule. In my view, once an employer has admitted respondeat superior liability for an employee's negligence, it is improper to allow a plaintiff to proceed against the employer on a negligent hiring or negligent supervision theory of liability.

This Rule 10 appeal stems from a vehicular accident involving a minor child who was struck by a van driven by the employee of a children's daycare. The child's mother filed suit alleging negligence against the employee-driver of the vehicle and asserted claims for negligent hiring, negligent retention, and negligence per se against the driver's employers. The mother also averred that she should recover punitive damages based on the conduct of the Defendants. The employers, the individual owners of the daycare, admitted vicarious liability for the negligence of their employee and moved for partial summary judgment on the direct negligence claims asserted against them. They argued that it was improper to proceed against them on an independent theory of negligence when they had already admitted vicarious liability. The employers, along with the employee-driver, also sought summary judgment with respect to the punitive damages claim. Although the trial court granted the employers' motion with respect to the direct negligence claims, it denied the motion with respect to the claim for punitive damages. On appeal, we reverse the trial court's dismissal of the direct negligence claims asserted against the employers and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

The Defendant, James Holmes, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of first degree premeditated murder, felony murder during the attempt to perpetrate a robbery, attempted especially aggravated robbery, attempted first degree murder, attempted carjacking, and employing a firearm during the attempt to commit a dangerous felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-202(a) (2014) (first degree murder), 39-13-202(b) (2014) (first degree felony murder), 39-13-403 (2014) (especially aggravated robbery), 39-12-101 (2014) (criminal attempt), 39-13-404 (2014) (carjacking), 39-17-1324(i)(1) (2014) (dangerous felony), 39-17-1324(b) (2014) (employing a firearm during the attempt to commit a felony). On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions. We affirm the judgments of the trial court and remand for correction of the judgments.

The Defendant-Appellant, Dana N. Yearwood, appeals the trial court’s revocation of her probation and reinstatement of her effective five-year, eleven-month, and twenty-nine day sentence in the Department of Correction.  In this appeal, Yearwood argues that the trial court improperly reinstated a sentence of confinement without consideration of her presentence report and improperly revoked her probation. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I concur fully in the majority’s decision in this case. I write separately solely to express my opinion that inasmuch as this action was initiated subsequent to July 1, 2011, the standard of review for summary judgment delineated in Tennessee Code Annotated § 20-16-101 (Supp. 2015) applies. See Rye v. Women’s Care Ctr. of Memphis, MPLLC, 477 S.W.3d 235, 249 (Tenn. 2015) (noting that in contrast to the action in Rye, which was initiated in 2009, Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-16-101 “applies to actions filed on or after July 1, 2011.”) (citing Act of May 20, 2011, ch. 498, 2011 Tenn. Pub. Acts § 3 at 471). The statute provides: