APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This appeal concerns a conflict of law choice between Tennessee and Florida law. James R. Sterchi, Jr. (―Mr. Sterchi‖) sued L. Basil Savard (―Mr. Savard‖) in the Circuit Court for Bradley County (―the Trial Court‖) for the wrongful death of Mr. Sterchi’s mother Rosalind Savard (―Mrs. Savard‖) in a car accident in Florida.1 Mr. Savard filed a motion for summary judgment. Florida law prevents Mr. Sterchi from pursuing his claim while Tennessee law does not. All interested parties were domiciled in Tennessee. The Trial Court held that Florida law applies and granted Mr. Savard’s motion for summary judgment. Mr. Sterchi filed an appeal to this Court. We hold that under ―the most significant relationship‖ test as adopted by our Supreme Court in Hataway v. McKinley, 830 S.W.2d 53 (Tenn. 1992), Tennessee has the more significant relationship to the occurrence and parties in this case, and, therefore, Tennessee substantive law applies to Mr. Sterchi’s wrongful death action. We reverse the judgment of the Trial Court.

This appeal involves a Rule 60 motion to set aside an agreed order on the basis that the petitioner withdrew his consent to the agreement prior to the entry of the agreed order. The trial court denied the Rule 60 motion. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.     

Following a jury trial, the Defendant, John Russell Giles, Jr., was convicted of premeditated first degree murder and sentenced to imprisonment for life. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-202. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends (1) that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction; (2) that the trial court erred “in refusing to fashion a remedy” for alleged discovery violations made by the State; (3) that the trial court admitted in violation of Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b) evidence that, the day before the murder, the Defendant had conducted internet searches for and visited pornographic websites depicting women being raped; (4) that one of the State's witnesses “perjured himself,” and the trial court did not allow the witness to be recalled for further cross-examination; and (5) that the State was allowed to argue a time of death that differed from the time of death provided in the bill of particulars. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Following a jury trial, the Defendant, Michael Orlando Freeman, was convicted of attempted second degree murder, as a lesser included offense of attempted first degree murder; aggravated assault by infliction of serious bodily injury; and attempted aggravated rape by use of a deadly weapon. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-202, -13-102, -13-502. He was acquitted of especially aggravated kidnapping. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-305. The Defendant received an effective sentence of twelve years as a Range I, standard offender with release eligibility at thirty percent. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support each of his convictions; (2) the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss based on the State's failure to preserve evidence pursuant to State v. Ferguson, 2 S.W.3d 912 (Tenn. 1999); (3) the prosecutor committed prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument, which prejudiced the outcome of his trial; and (4) the trial court erred in denying his motion for a new trial. Following our review, we conclude that the Defendant's issues are without merit, and the judgments of the trial court are affirmed in all respects.

In 2013, the Defendant, James Daniel Cruze, II, pleaded guilty to sale of a Schedule II controlled substance, and the trial court sentenced him to ten years, to be served at 35%, suspended after the service of 365 days. In 2015, the Defendant's probation officer filed a probation violation report in which he alleged that the Defendant had absconded, thereby violating several of the rules of his probation. After a hearing, the trial court revoked the Defendant's probation and ordered him to serve the balance of his sentence in confinement. On appeal the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it ordered that he serve his sentence as a result of what he deems “minor infractions” of his probation. We affirm the trial court's judgment.

This is a termination of parental rights case. The case proceeded to trial on the amended petition of the Department of Children's Services seeking to terminate on multiple grounds the parental rights of L.M. to his children, K.F.R.T., L.E.M.R., and B.A.M.R. (collectively the children). The trial court dismissed the petition after a bench trial, finding and holding that DCS “ha[d] failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence any ground sufficient to justify termination of [father's] parental rights.” Whittney N.L. Good, guardian ad litem for the children, appeals. We reverse because we hold that the evidence clearly and convincingly shows that father is guilty of a pattern of criminal conduct “exhibit[ing] a wanton disregard of the child[ren].” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-102(1)(A)(iv) (2014). We find clear and convincing evidence that it is in the best interest of the children to terminate father's parental rights.

Appellant appeals the trial cour's grant of Appelle's complaint for declaratory judgment and the trial court's denial of Appellant's counter-complaint for injunctive relief. After Appellee filed notice with Appellant of his intent to leave Appellant's employ and join a competing appraisal firm, Appellant sought to enforce the non-competition provision of the parties' agreement. Appellee then filed for a declaratory judgment that the non-competition provision was unenforceable. The trial court determined that there were no special facts present over and above ordinary competition or any legitimate protectable business interests to warrant enforcement of the non-competition agreement. Appellant appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm and remand.

Defendant, Branden Michael Toth, appeals after a jury found him guilty of one count of theft of property valued at $60,000 or more and five counts of theft of property valued at $10,000 or more. Defendant was sentenced to an effective sentence of twelve years in incarceration. On appeal, Defendant challenges the trial court‘s failure to charge lesser-included offenses, the trial court‘s handwritten notations on the verdict forms, the trial court‘s failure to dismiss Count 4 of the indictment, the sufficiency of the evidence, and his sentence. After a review, we determine that the trial court dismissed the original Count 5, renumbered the remaining counts of the indictment (Count 7 became Count 6, Count 6 became Count 5) and submitted Count 4 to the jury on a lesser-included offense. Consequently, we affirm the convictions. On remand, the trial court should correct the judgment form in Count 3 to reflect a conviction of theft of property valued at $60,000 or more, hold a hearing on restitution, and correct the offense dates in Counts 5 and 6 to December 16, 2009 and January 2, 2010, respectively. Accordingly, the convictions are affirmed and remanded.

This post-divorce appeal concerns the mother’s petition to modify the residential schedule in an agreed parenting plan. Following a hearing, the trial court found that a material change in circumstances had occurred that necessitated a change in the plan. The court modified the plan by order and further required the parties to attend parenting classes and mediation before seeking further relief from the court. The mother appeals. We affirm the court’s modification of the plan. We reverse the requirement imposed upon the parties to attend parenting classes before seeking further relief from the court. We remand for entry of a permanent parenting plan and child support worksheet.

I concur fully in the majority’s decision in this case. I write separately only to express my opinion that the appropriate summary judgment standard to be applied by Tennessee courts now is as set forth in Rye v. Women’s Care Center of Memphis, MPLLC, ___ S.W.3d ___, 2015 WL 6457768 (Tenn. 2015), rather than Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-16-101. I believe our Supreme Court intended for the retroactive application of Rye when it stated: “In civil cases, judicial decisions overruling prior cases generally are applied retrospectively.” Rye, ___ S.W.3d at ___n.9, 2015 WL 6457768 at *35 n.9. While there may be very little, if any, difference between the summary judgment standard as set forth in Rye and as contained in Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-16-101, I believe Rye sets the standard and is controlling on the courts of this State.

This action concerns the decedent’s purchase of several investment products from the defendants. Following the decedent’s death, his daughter filed suit, alleging violations of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, codified at 47-18-101, et. seq., breach of contract, promissory fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of fiduciary duty. The defendants sought summary judgment. The court granted summary judgment, finding that the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act claims were untimely and that the evidence was insufficient to establish the other claims without consideration of parol evidence and inadmissible hearsay testimony. The daughter appeals. We affirm.

This appeal concerns a mother’s petition to set aside an order terminating her parental rights and permitting the adoption of her minor children. The mother alleged that the order is void for lack of personal jurisdiction because service of process was ineffective. The trial court denied the petition. The mother appeals. We hold that the order is void for lack of personal jurisdiction. We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand this case for further hearing to determine whether exceptional circumstances justify the denial of relief in accordance with Turner v. Turner, 473 S.W.3d 257 (Tenn. 2015).

The Defendant, Bobby Lynch, was convicted by a Knox County Criminal Court jury of third offense simple possession or casual exchange of a controlled substance, a Class E felony. See T.C.A. § 39-17-418 (2010) (amended 2014). The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a career offender to six years' confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by denying him alternative sentencing. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Marvin E. Potter, Jr., was convicted by a Washington County Criminal Court jury of two counts of premeditated first degree murder, for which he is serving consecutive life sentences. On appeal, he contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions, (2) the trial court erred in admitting hearsay evidence as statements of co-conspirators, (3) the trial court erred in denying the Defendant's motion for a mistrial due to an absent material witness, and (4) the State's use of visual aids during closing argument constituted prosecutorial misconduct. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Anthony Blake Wisdom, was convicted by a Davidson County Criminal Court jury of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony. See T.C.A. § 39-13-402(a)(1) (2014). The Defendant was sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender to fourteen years. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner currently is serving an effective seventy-year sentence following his 2013 guilty pleas to fifty counts of especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor, ten counts of rape of a child, and seventeen counts of aggravated rape of a child. Following an unsuccessful petition for post-conviction relief based upon the alleged ineffectiveness of trial counsel, Billy Jack Cook v. State, No. M2014-00616-CCA-R3-PC, 2015 WL 2445868, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 22, 2015), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Aug. 12, 2015), he filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, which appears to be a confusing and convoluted rehash of his post-conviction petition, claiming this time that his trial counsel had “[m]ade up evidence along with the state DA to get [a] guilty plea” and, without providing any details, that his “due process rights were violated.” He has appealed the trial court’s order denying the petition because he had failed to show that the judgments were facially void. Following our review, we affirm the denial of relief, pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

A Davidson County jury convicted the Defendant, Timothy Damon Carter, of theft of property valued over $60,000 and of being a felon in possession of a handgun.  The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a career offender to a total effective sentence of thirty years in confinement.  On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the trial court erred when it determined that he had forfeited his right to counsel; (2) the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress evidence seized from his vehicle; (3) the trial court erred when it determined that the State had not committed a Brady violation; (4) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction for theft of property valued over $60,000; (5) the trial court erred when it admitted into evidence a business record and an out-of-court statement pursuant to hearsay exceptions; (6) the trial court erred when it declined to bifurcate the felon in possession of a weapon charge; and (7) the trial court erred when it limited the Defendant’s ability to call witnesses to testify.  After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

A Rutherford County Circuit Court Jury convicted the appellant, Matthew Whitehair, of two counts of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony; one count each of incest, statutory rape by an authority figure, and sexual battery by an authority figure, Class C felonies; five counts of attempted incest, a Class D felony; two counts of sexual battery, a Class E felony; and one count of assault, a Class A misdemeanor.  After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced him to an effective eight-year sentence to be served at 100% followed by seven years on supervised probation.  On appeal, the appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions, that the trial court improperly limited cross-examination of the victim pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Evidence 412; that the trial court improperly allowed a nurse practitioner to testify as an expert; that the State committed prosecutorial misconduct; that the verdict as to count seventeen, sexual battery by an authority figure, was not unanimous; that defense counsel should have been allowed to review the victim’s case file from the Department of Children’s Services (DCS); that the appellant’s convictions of aggravated sexual battery must be reduced to child abuse because aggravated sexual battery is not a lesser-included offense of the charged offense of rape of child; and that cumulative error warrants a new trial.  Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

I must respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion in this case that the lawsuit refiled by Plaintiff Circle C Construction is timely under the savings statute, Tennessee Code Annotated § 28-1-105(a).

The Petitioner, Armand E. Booker, Jr., appeals the Knox County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2014 guilty pleas to especially aggravated kidnapping, aggravated burglary, aggravated robbery, aggravated assault, employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, attempt to commit aggravated robbery, and custodial interference and his effective fifteen-year sentence. The Petitioner contends that (1) his guilty pleas were involuntary and unknowing and (2) he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The issue we address is whether the savings statute applies to save an action that was filed within the extended statute of limitations set by a tolling agreement, was voluntarily nonsuited, and was refiled within one year, but after the extended statute of limitations in the tolling agreement. The trial court granted summary judgment, ruling that the case was not timely filed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the tolling agreement precluded application of the savings statute. We hold that the party filing the suit complied with the tolling agreement by filing the first suit within the extended statute of limitations set by the agreement. The savings statute applies to save the action; therefore, the refiled suit was timely filed. We reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand this case to the trial court.

In 1997, the defendant, Ivan Charles Marable, pled guilty to burglary and two charges of possession of a controlled substance. He claims that, although the offenses were committed serially, with the second and third committed while he was on bond, he pled to concurrent three-year sentences. He does not dispute that these sentences have expired. Now an inmate in a federal penitentiary, he filed a motion pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 to correct his alleged illegal sentences and to award jail credits. The trial court granted the motion for an evidentiary hearing but ordered that it would not be held until after the defendant’s release from federal prison. The defendant appealed this order and sought to have a hearing after which he would be allowed to withdraw his pleas of guilty. Based upon the decision of our supreme court in State v. Adrian R. Brown, --- S.W.3d ---, No. E2014-00673-SC-R11-CD, 2015 WL 7748275 (Tenn. Dec. 2, 2015), which was released while the appeal was pending in this matter, we reverse the order of the trial court granting a hearing on the defendant’s motion and direct that his motion be dismissed because the 1997 Tennessee sentences of which he complains have expired.

The defendant, Bruce Lee Robinson, pled guilty in 1999 to first degree felony murder and was sentenced to life imprisonment. In 2015, he filed a motion pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1, claiming that his sentence was illegal. The trial court disagreed, dismissing the motion after concluding that it did not present a colorable claim. We agree and affirm the dismissal of the motion, pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.