APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Defendant, Thomas A. Isbell, was convicted of aggravated child abuse after his infant son was brought to Maury Regional Hospital with a spiral fracture of the left humerus.  As a result of the conviction, Defendant was sentenced to fifteen years in incarceration as a Range I, standard offender and ordered to serve 100% of the sentence pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-501(i)(1) and (2)(K).  He appeals both his conviction and sentence.  After a review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I concur in all portions of the majority opinion except the conclusion that the trial court did not violate the holding in Mitchell v. U.S., 526 U.S. 314 (1999).  In Mitchell, the Supreme Court held, 

By holding [the defendant’s] silence against her in determining the facts of the offense at the sentencing hearing, the [trial court] imposed an impermissible burden on the exercise of the constitutional right against compelled self-incrimination.

Id. at 330.

Following a jury trial, Doug Harold Morrison (“the Defendant”) was convicted of theft of property valued at $1,000 or more but less than $10,000.  On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred when it failed to instruct the jury as to the lesser included offense of attempted theft of property.  Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Michael Wayne Davis (“the Petitioner”) appeals from the dismissal of his untimely filed petition for post-conviction relief.  The Petitioner argues that principles of due process require tolling the statute of limitations to file his petition.  Because the record does not justify tolling the statute of limitations, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

In 2005, the petitioner pled guilty as a career offender to two counts of facilitation of first degree murder, a Class A felony, and he was sentenced to serve an effective sentence of sixty years in prison. On May 22, 2015, the petitioner filed a petition for the writ of habeas corpus, asserting that the trial court lacked jurisdiction because, while his crimes took place in Hancock County, his guilty pleas were entered in Greene County. The trial court dismissed the petition, and the petitioner appeals. On review, we conclude that the judgments are facially valid, and we affirm the dismissal of the petition.

The Defendant-Appellant, Kevin Butler, was convicted by a Rutherford County jury of aggravated robbery and sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender to fourteen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction.  The sole issue presented for our review is whether the trial court erred in allowing the State to engage in prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument.  Upon review, it is necessary to remand this matter for entry of an amended judgment which reflects the sentence as stated in the trial court’s order denying the motion for new trial.  In all other respects, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Plaintiff, a member of a Limited Liability Company that sells insurance products to credit union members, filed this declaratory judgment action seeking a determination that the LLC’s operating agreement does not require him to make a “telemedicine counseling” business opportunity available to the LLC. The operating agreement requires members to “disclose and make available to [the LLC] each and every business opportunity that is within the scope and purpose of [the LLC] . . . .” However, “no such disclosure or offer shall be required with respect to business opportunities that are not within the scope and purpose of [the LLC].” The trial court granted Plaintiff summary judgment, finding that the undisputed facts demonstrated that the “scope” of the LLC’s business was selling insurance and that the telemedicine opportunity was not an insurance product. We have determined that the parties intended “scope” to have its ordinary meaning and that the undisputed facts show that the scope of the LLC’s business at the relevant time was the sale of insurance products and the telemedicine counseling business opportunity is not an insurance product. Consequently, we affirm.

Plaintiff filed a public records request for tax study documents. The request was denied, and Plaintiff filed a lawsuit for access to the records. The trial court denied access to the records, and Plaintiff appealed. This Court has determined that the plain language of Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-1-1701(6)’s definition of “tax administration” encompasses the documents in question and that Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-1-1702(a) makes “tax administration information” confidential. The trial court is affirmed.
 

The Defendant-Appellant, Joshua Sammy Steadman, appeals the trial court’s order revoking his community corrections sentence. He argues that the trial court abused its discretion in revoking his community corrections sentence and ordering him to serve his original sentence in confinement. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Appellant, Carlos Campbell, stands convicted of two counts of aggravated assault, for which the trial court sentenced him to an effective term of six years' incarceration. On appeal, appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions and that his statement to the police should have been suppressed. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Petitioner, Jordan Mansfield Looper, pleaded guilty to attempted second degree murder, and the trial court sentenced him to twelve years in confinement.  State v. Jordan Mansfield Looper, No. M2012-02523-CCA-R3-CD, 2013 WL 4647629, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 26, 2013).  Petitioner unsuccessfully appealed his twelve-year sentence.  Id.  Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief, and he now appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of relief.  Petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel when his trial counsel “abandoned” his case and when trial counsel told him that he would receive probation during sentencing.  Petitioner further argues that these errors, in addition to his grief after viewing pictures of the victim’s injuries for the first time, resulted in his guilty plea not being knowingly and voluntarily entered.  Following our thorough review of the record, the parties’ briefs, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

I respectfully dissent from the majority’s holding that the evidence preponderates against the findings of the trial court, thereby finding the Defendant’s warrantless arrest was sufficiently supported by probable cause.  I agree with the trial court that the facts and circumstances known to the officer at the time of the arrest were not sufficient to lead a prudent person to believe that the Defendant committed or was committing a DUI offense.

The defendant, Anthony John Silva, was arrested on suspicion of driving while intoxicated.  He filed a motion to suppress the evidence, which the trial court granted.  The State now appeals, arguing that the defendant’s arrest was sufficiently supported by probable cause.  Following our review of the briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we reverse the judgment of the trial court granting the defendant’s motion to suppress, and we remand for further proceedings.

In August 2013, Roscoe Graham (“the Petitioner”) was convicted of aggravated sexual battery and sentenced to ten years' incarceration. Thereafter, he filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which was denied after a hearing. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by: (1) failing to assert a viable defense; (2) coercing the Petitioner to waive filing of a motion for new trial and direct appeal; and (3) operating under an actual conflict of interest. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

In conjunction with the entry of a nolo contendere plea to first offense driving under the influence (“DUI”), Defendant, Alex Hardin Huffstutter, reserved a certified question for appeal pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2)(A) in which he asked this Court to determine whether Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-313 excluded DUI as an offense for which judicial diversion was available.  On appeal, this Court determined that the question was not dispositive and dismissed the appeal.  State v. Alex Hardin Huffstutter, No. M2013-02788-CCA-R3-CD, 2014 WL 4261143, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 28, 2014), no perm. app. filed.  Subsequently, Defendant filed a motion in the trial court seeking reconsideration of his eligibility for judicial diversion.  The trial court considered the motion and issued an order denying relief.  Defendant appeals the denial of the motion to reconsider.  After a review, we determine that the appeal is not properly before this Court.  Consequently, the appeal is dismissed.

The petitioner, Quinton Sanders, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, the petitioner argues that the post-conviction court failed to make adequate findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding one of his claims, and he argues that trial counsel was ineffective. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Prior to his indictment, the defendant entered into a written and signed plea agreement with the State in general sessions court, where he waived his right to a preliminary hearing and presentment to the grand jury and indicated he intended to plead guilty to one count of aggravated burglary. After the matter was transferred to criminal court but before the court could accept the plea agreement, the State indicated that it would refuse to abide by the terms. The defendant was ultimately granted a preliminary hearing and indicted, and he then entered an open guilty plea to one count of aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, one count of vandalism of property valued at $10,000 or more, a Class C felony, and one count of theft of property valued at $1,000 or more, a Class D felony. The trial court sentenced the defendant to serve four years on supervised probation for each conviction, with all the sentences to be served concurrently. In entering his guilty pleas, the defendant reserved a certified question of law asking this court to decide whether a written plea agreement, executed in general sessions court, was binding on the State prior to its acceptance by the criminal court. We conclude that the certified question is not dispositive of the defendant‘s aggravated burglary conviction, and accordingly dismiss the appeal of that offense. We further hold that such an agreement is not enforceable absent detrimental reliance by the defendant, and we conclude that the trial court did not err in remanding for a preliminary hearing and indictment rather than granting the defendant specific performance of the agreement. The judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

Donte Dewayne Watson, the Defendant, was sentenced to eight years on community corrections under the supervision of the Davidson County Drug Court Program (“DCIV”).  Following the issuance of a warrant alleging violations of the drug court agreement order and an amended warrant alleging as an additional ground an arrest for a criminal offense, the Defendant filed a request that his case be transferred back to the court that sentenced him to drug court.  The criminal court judge, who also presided over DCIV, denied the request.  Following a hearing, the criminal court revoked community corrections, resentenced the Defendant to nine years, and ordered the sentence to be served in the Department of Correction.  Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court revoking the Defendant’s community corrections.

Plaintiff filed a health care liability action against multiple healthcare providers but did not comply with the statutes governing healthcare liability actions. Defendants filed motions to dismiss and for summary judgment. The trial court granted the motions. Plaintiff appeals, and finding no error, we affirm.

Buyers of unimproved real property seek rescission of a Lot/Land Purchase and Sale Agreement on the ground of mutual mistake. Buyers purchased the property for the purpose of constructing a house. It is undisputed that at the time of contracting, Buyers and Sellers believed the property was suitable for that purpose. One week after obtaining the necessary building permits and commencement of construction, Buyers were informed by the county that the property was substantially below the required Base Flood Elevation (“BFE”) and that construction must cease immediately. Buyers halted construction and hired a professional engineer to address the issue. Based on unique drainage and flooding concerns, the engineer concluded that the property was not suitable for construction of a residential building and it had not been suitable for such purpose since the land was subdivided in 1999. After Buyers sued for rescission of the contract, both parties filed motions for summary judgment. The trial court found that when the contract was entered into the property was suitable for construction of a house and it only became unsuitable due to the subsequent action of the county in setting the BFE. Therefore, the court concluded there was no mutual mistake of fact. Based on this finding the court granted Sellers’s motion for summary judgment and summarily dismissed the complaint. Buyers appeal. We conclude that, at the time of contracting, the parties were operating under a mutual mistake as to a contemporaneously verifiable fact; nevertheless, the contract assigned the risk of mistake to Buyers. Therefore, rescission on the ground of mutual mistake is not available. Accordingly, we affirm.

Certiorari proceeding in which an inmate seeks review of a disciplinary proceeding finding him guilty of assault on another inmate. Petitioner asserts that the disciplinary board violated various Tennessee Department of Correction regulations in the conduct of the hearing and that the trial court erred in dismissing the petition. Finding no error, we affirm the decision of the trial court.

The petitioner, Courtney Wesley, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2013 Shelby County Criminal Court jury convictions of aggravated burglary and theft of property valued at $1,000 or more, alleging that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. Discerning no error, we affirm.

A Davidson County jury found the Defendant, Antonio M. Crockett, guilty of first degree felony murder, for which the Defendant received a life sentence. On appeal from his conviction, the Defendant contends that (1) the trial court erred in denying the Defendant’s motion to sever his case from that of his co-defendant; (2) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction; (3) the trial court erred in admitting the statement of the victim under the dying declaration hearsay exception; and (4) the trial court erred in ordering the Defendant’s life sentence to be served consecutively to a prior sentence. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Donquise Tremonte Alexander, pleaded guilty pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement to second degree murder and received a thirty-year sentence. More than three years later, the Defendant filed a motion pursuant to Tennessee Criminal Procedure Rule 36.1 requesting that the trial court correct an illegal sentence because his sentence exceeds the sentencing range for a Range I offender convicted of a Class A felony. The trial court summarily dismissed the motion after determining that the Defendant knowingly and voluntarily pleaded guilty and agreed to a sentence outside the appropriate sentencing range pursuant to Hicks v. State, 945 S.W.2d 706 (Tenn. 1997). On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in dismissing his motion. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Timothy L. Diggs, Sr., appeals the Montgomery County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for aggravated child abuse and felony murder and his effective life sentence. The Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred by denying relief on his due process and ineffective assistance of counsel claims. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.