APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant, Poncho Juan Delgado, appeals as of right his jury conviction for first degree premeditated murder. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-202. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the State failed to prove the element of premeditation. The State responds that ample evidence of premeditation was presented. Following our review, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to establish premeditation, and we therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Phillip K. Adams, was indicted by the Williamson County Grand Jury for driving under the influence of an intoxicant (DUI), driving while his blood alcohol concentration was .08 percent or more (DUI per se), and DUI, second offense.  Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of DUI second offense and sentenced to 11 months and 29 days, to be suspended after serving 60 days in confinement.  On appeal, Defendant contends that: 1) the trial court erred by not allowing Defendant to present the expert testimony of his co-worker Travis Adams at trial; 2) the trial court erred by not allowing Defendant to testify as an expert witness at trial; and 3) the trial court deprived Defendant of his right to due process by preventing him from presenting a defense.  Having reviewed the record before us and the briefs of the parties, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion.  Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The petitioner, Martez D. Matthews, was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment.  His conviction was affirmed following his direct appeal.  State v. Deangelo M. Moody and Martez D. Matthews, No. M2011-01930-CCA-R3-CD, 2013 WL 1932718, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 9, 2013), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Oct. 17, 2013).  Subsequently, he filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis.  The basis for the petition was the claim by a co-defendant, who pled guilty to second degree murder for the killing which resulted in the petitioner’s conviction, that the petitioner was not involved in the crime.  Following an evidentiary hearing at which the co-defendant testified that the petitioner did not kill the victim, the court concluded the witness was not truthful in his testimony.  Accordingly, the court denied the petition.  Following our review, we affirm the order denying the petition.

The defendant, Kenneth Lee Boles, was convicted by a Bedford County jury of the introduction of a controlled substance into a penal institution and the possession of a controlled substance in a penal institution, both Class C felonies.  After merging the counts into a single conviction, the trial court sentenced the defendant as a Range II, multiple offender to ten years in the Department of Correction.  On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred by not allowing him to present the testimony of his expert witness and by not instructing the jury on the defense of necessity.  Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Mother appeals from the trial court’s post-divorce determination that a modification of the parenting plan to designate Father as the primary residential parent of their children was in the children’s best interest. Mother contends the trial court erred in considering statements of the parties’ child made outside of court. Mother also contends the trial court erred in its application of the best interests factors set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-6-106. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I concur in the majority Opinion's ruling with regard to the modification of the parties' parenting plan to allow Father more time with the child. I must, however, dissent from the majority's holding that the trial court did not err in modifying Mother's child support obligation, where no pleadings were filed notifying Mother that the issue would be tried, no opportunity to conduct discovery on the issue, and no opportunity to present evidence to the trial court concerning modification of child support. For this reason, I must respectfully file this partial dissent from the majority Opinion.

This case involves the trial court‘s post-divorce modification of a parenting plan and modification of the parents‘ respective child support obligations. The trial court granted Appellee/Father‘s petition to modify the minor child‘s residential parenting schedule to give Appellant/Mother and Appellee/Father equal residential parenting time with the child under Tennessee Code Annotated Section 36-6-101(a)(2)(C). After modifying the residential parenting schedule, the trial court also modified the parties‘ respective child support obligations. Mother appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm and remand.

This appeal arises from a construction dispute. Appellants/Homeowners brought suit against Appellee/Builder. Appellants claim that Appellee built their home on uncontrolled fill material, which caused excessive cracking in the garage and the driveway. Appellee contends that Appellants' home was built on virgin soil, rather than fill material as alleged by Appellants. Both sides proffered expert testimony to prove the cause of the cracks. The trial court found Appellee's expert credible and concluded that the home was built on virgin soil. Because the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court's finding on this issue, we affirm this finding. However, we vacate the trial court's award of discretionary costs to Appellees in the amount of $9,210.60 and remand for reconsideration in light of our opinion.

Daniel G. Lewis, the employee, was a cable technician who made a claim for workers' compensation benefits from Comcast, the employer, after he fell from a pole during a climbing recertification procedure. The employer provided medical care and paid temporary disability benefits but denied that the employee had sustained a permanent impairment or disability. Ultimately, the trial court awarded 70% permanent partial disability. The employer appeals, contending that the trial court erred by excluding evidence about the employee's history of drug abuse and by awarding permanent disability benefits. Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, the appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this termination of parental rights case, paternal great-aunt and great-uncle, who were named ―primary residential parents' of a minor child, filed a petition to terminate the parents' rights to their daughter on the grounds of persistence of conditions that led to removal, severe abuse, abandonment by failure to visit, and abandonment by failure to support. The trial court held that grounds did not exist for termination and returned the child to the custody of the parents. We have reviewed the record and affirm the trial court‘s findings with respect to persistent conditions and abandonment by failure to visit. However, we have determined that the trial court erred in excluding evidence of alleged sibling abuse in rendering its decision that the grounds of severe abuse were not proven. In addition, we hold that there is clear and convincing evidence that the parents abandoned the child by failing to support her in the four months preceding the filing of the petition. Finally, we affirm the trial court‘s holding with respect to attorney‘s fees. Therefore, having found that the trial court erred in failing to consider evidence of alleged sibling abuse and that a ground exists for termination, we remand the case for the trial court to consider whether the ground of severe abuse, as defined by Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(4) is proven by clear and convincing evidence and whether termination of parental rights is in the child‘s best interest.

In this termination of parental rights case, paternal great-aunt and great-uncle, who were named ―primary residential parents' of a minor child, filed a petition to terminate the parents' rights to their daughter on the grounds of persistence of conditions that led to removal, severe abuse, abandonment by failure to visit, and abandonment by failure to support. The trial court held that grounds did not exist for termination and returned the child to the custody of the parents. We have reviewed the record and affirm the trial court‘s findings with respect to persistent conditions and abandonment by failure to visit. However, we have determined that the trial court erred in excluding evidence of alleged sibling abuse in rendering its decision that the grounds of severe abuse were not proven. In addition, we hold that there is clear and convincing evidence that the parents abandoned the child by failing to support her in the four months preceding the filing of the petition. Finally, we affirm the trial court‘s holding with respect to attorney‘s fees. Therefore, having found that the trial court erred in failing to consider evidence of alleged sibling abuse and that a ground exists for termination, we remand the case for the trial court to consider whether the ground of severe abuse, as defined by Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(4) is proven by clear and convincing evidence and whether termination of parental rights is in the child‘s best interest.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Stanley Blue, of facilitation of first degree premeditated murder, attempted second degree murder, and reckless endangerment. Following a grant of post conviction relief and a remand for resentencing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective term of forty-six years as a Range III, persistent offender. The Defendant challenged the length of his sentence on appeal, and this Court reversed the Defendant's sentences for attempted second degree murder and reckless endangerment. We remanded the case for a new sentencing hearing regarding these two convictions and affirmed all other judgments of the trial court. State v. Stanley Blue, No. W2013-00437-CCA-R3-CD, 2014 WL 1464177, at *9 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, April 14, 2014). On remand, the trial court conducted a sentencing hearing and imposed a total effective sentence of forty-four years. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the trial court erred when it imposed consecutive sentences. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court's judgments.

The Defendant-Appellant, Bradley Cox, was convicted by a Henderson County jury of one count of aggravated sexual battery and two counts of rape of a child. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective sentence of 37 years' confinement, to be served at 100% as a violent offender. On appeal, the Defendant argues that (1) he is entitled to a new trial based upon the State's failure to timely disclose certain exculpatory evidence, and (2) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Shannon Dixon, was convicted by a Marion County Circuit Court jury of aggravated assault, a Class C felony, and was sentenced to five years, suspended to probation after service of twelve months of incarceration.  On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in:  (1) denying his request for a special jury instruction that a pellet gun was not a deadly weapon per se for purposes of the aggravated assault statute, and (2) not applying as a mitigating factor at sentencing that he acted under strong provocation.  After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Karlos D. McMahon (“the Petitioner”) pleaded guilty to several counts of sale of cocaine in case numbers 17268 and 17478.  Subsequent to entering his guilty pleas, the Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of counsel.  After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied the petition.  Upon a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Employee alleged that he sustained an injury to his lower back while lifting a heavy grate in the course of his work. Employer provided medical care, but denied that he had sustained a permanent injury. The trial court awarded permanent disability benefits. The employer has appealed, contending that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s findings concerning causation, permanency, and impairment. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We reverse and dismiss.    

The defendant, Shelton Pope, appeals his Shelby County Criminal Court jury conviction of theft of property valued at more than $500 but less than $1,000. On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court erroneously denied his motion for a mistrial in response to the jury’s being exposed to improper influence and that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the criminal court.

The defendant, Michael Bland, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of first degree premeditated murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. On appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and argues that the trial court erred by not giving his requested accomplice instruction to the jury, by instructing the jury on the law of criminal responsibility, and by overruling his objection to the opinion testimony of a police officer regarding his honesty. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is an appeal from the trial court's order granting Appellee's motion for judgment on the pleadings in a breach of contract case. After the trial court granted Appellee's motion, Appellant filed a notice of appeal pro se. Due to deficiencies in Appellant's brief, we are unable to address the issues she raises on appeal. We therefore affirm.

This post-divorce appeal concerns the mother's notice of intent to relocate to Pennsylvania with the parties' minor children. The father responded by filing a petition in opposition to the requested relocation. Following a hearing, the trial court granted the father's petition. The mother appeals. We reverse the decision of the trial court.

This is a termination of parental rights case in which the Tennessee Department of Children's Services filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Christee R. and Matthew R. to two of their minor children. Following a bench trial, the trial court found that clear and convincing evidence existed to support the termination of each parent's parental rights on the statutory grounds of persistence of conditions and mental incompetence and that termination of their rights was in the best interest of the children. The parents appeal. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

J.L.W. (Mother) appeals from the order terminating her parental rights to her minor daughter, M.P.H. (the Child). Based on evidence of Mother’s drug abuse, the Department of Children’s Services (DCS) removed the Child from Mother’s custody and placed her in foster care. The Child was later adjudicated dependent and neglected. Eighteen months after the Child’s removal, DCS filed a petition to terminate each of her parents’ rights. After a trial, the court granted the petition. As to Mother, the court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that (1) multiple grounds for termination exist, and (2) termination is in the Child’s best interest. Mother challenges each of these determinations. We affirm.

This case arises from a non-contact accident between a John Deere crop sprayer and a school bus. The sprayer, which is insured by Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Company as subrogee of the owner, Appellee Kenneth L. Couch, was driven by Mr. Couch‘s employee, Cameron Martin. The school bus, which is owned by Appellant Jackson Madison School System Board of Education, was driven by its employee, Lawrence Davis. The trial court held that Mr. Davis was negligent in failing to appreciate the situation so as to ―take reasonable action to avoid an accident.‖ We conclude that the evidence preponderates against the trial court‘s finding of negligence on the part of Mr. Davis. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for entry of judgment in favor of Appellant.

On August 6, 2011, Carrie Coggins and her husband Joel R. Coggins (Plaintiffs) visited a patient at Wellmont Holston Valley Medical Center (Hospital). While there, Mrs. Coggins tripped and fell, sustaining serious injuries. Plaintiffs filed suit and alleged that Mrs. Coggins tripped over a feeding tube that, according to Plaintiffs, had been negligently left near her friend’s bed in such a way as to create a dangerous condition. Before they filed suit, Plaintiffs served Hospital with pre-suit notice of their intent to file. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121 (2012). Hospital filed a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment. The trial court granted Hospital summary judgment. The court held that (1) Plaintiffs’ action was an ordinary negligence action based on premises liability, not a health care liability action; and (2) Plaintiffs could not rely upon (a) Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121(c), which extends the applicable statutes of limitations and repose for 120 days when pre-suit notice is properly given, or (b) Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121(e), which provides that “[i]n the event that a complaint is filed in good faith reliance on the extension of the statute of limitations or repose granted by this section and it is later determined that the claim is not a health care liability claim, the extension of the statute of limitations and repose granted by this section is still available to the plaintiff.” We agree with the trial court’s holding that Plaintiffs’ claim sounds in ordinary negligence under a premises liability theory.

This is a post-divorce parent relocation case. Robert Todd Heilig (Father) notified Heather Dawn Lyons Bevil, formerly Helig (Mother) of his intent to move with the parties' minor son from Chattanooga to Toccoa, Georgia, about three and a half hours away, in order to assume new employment. Mother opposed the move and filed a petition asking the trial court to disallow it. Mother alleged that the parties were spending substantially equal intervals of time with the child, and that the move was not in the best interest of the child. The trial court, applying the parent relocation statute, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-108 (2014), found that Father was spending substantially more time with the child than Mother, and held that Mother “failed to prove that the relocation does not have a reasonable purpose, that the relocation would pose a threat of specific and serious harm to [the child] or that the Father's motive is vindictive.” The trial court allowed Father to relocate with the child. Mother appeals, raising the issue of whether the trial court erred in its calculation of the parties' respective parenting time, and whether it should have found such time “substantially equal.” We affirm.