APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A Knox County Criminal Court Jury convicted the petitioner, Shaun Alexander Hodge, of first degree premeditated murder, and the trial court imposed a life sentence. Subsequently, the petitioner filed a petition for a writ of error coram nobis, arguing that he was entitled to a new trial based upon the recantation of a State witness. After an evidentiary hearing, the coram nobis court denied the petition, and the petitioner appeals. Based upon our review of the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court.

This is an appeal from an order certified by the Trial Court as a final judgment pursuant to Rule 54.02 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. The Notice of Appeal was filed more than thirty (30) days from the date of entry of the judgment. The appellee, The Greene County Partnership, has filed a motion to dismiss this appeal based upon the untimely filing of the Notice of Appeal. Because the Notice of Appeal was not timely filed, we have no jurisdiction to consider this appeal and grant the motion to dismiss.

In a plea agreement encompassing several cases, the Defendant, Michael Anthony Smith, pleaded no contest to one count of theft of property valued over $1,000, one count of sale of a Schedule II drug, one count of sale of a Schedule IV drug, and one count of theft of property valued less than $500. In exchange for his plea, the State dismissed several charges against him. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective sentence of nine years to be served on supervised probation. It also ordered that he successfully complete the 23rd Judicial Drug Court Program and pay restitution. Subsequently, the Defendant’s probation officer filed a warrant, alleging that he had ceased to participate in the 23rd Judicial Drug Court Program. At a hearing, the Defendant admitted the violation, and the trial court revoked his probation and ordered him to serve the remainder of his sentence in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it ordered him to serve his sentence in confinement. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

In this interlocutory appeal, Susan Gail Stephens (“the Defendant”) challenges the prosecutor‟s denial of her application for pretrial diversion. She asks this court to remand the case to the prosecutor with instructions that the Defendant be granted pretrial diversion. She also asks us to instruct the prosecutor to grant pretrial diversion nunc pro tunc to the Defendant‟s 2012 update to her application for pretrial diversion. Upon review, we find that there is no substantial evidence in the record to support the denial of pretrial diversion. Accordingly, we reverse the order of the trial court and remand the case to the trial court with instructions that the Defendant be granted pretrial diversion upon the terms and conditions of the diversion to be established by the trial court. However, we decline to instruct that pretrial diversion be granted nunc pro tunc to 2012.

Because the order appealed is not a final judgment, we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

Defendant, Vickie1 Lynn Perry, appeals her convictions for first degree murder and robbery, arguing: 1) that there is insufficient evidence to establish that she killed the victim while committing felony robbery; 2) that the State introduced improper evidence; 3) that the trial court improperly admitted evidence of a specific instance of conduct to impeach Defendant‟s character for truthfulness; and 4) that the State made improper remarks during its closing argument. After careful review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The appellant, Terrance E. Kindall, appeals the Rutherford County Circuit Court’s revoking his community corrections sentence for carjacking and ordering that he serve the balance of his sentence in confinement. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the appellant was statutorily ineligible for community corrections. Therefore, the appellant’s community correction sentence is vacated, and the case is remanded to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the illegal sentence was a bargained-for element of the appellant’s plea agreement.  

Rodney Jeffries, the Defendant, appeals the summary dismissal of his Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 motion to correct what he believes to be an illegal sentence. Discerning no error, we affirm the summary dismissal of his motion.

Gary Hamilton (“the Defendant”) seeks interlocutory review of the district attorney general‟s denial of his application for pretrial diversion and the trial court‟s affirmance of that denial. The Defendant, a former teacher‟s assistant, was charged with assault after engaging in an altercation with a student at the school where he was employed. The district attorney general denied the Defendant‟s application for pretrial diversion. The Defendant filed a petition for writ of certiorari to the trial court, challenging the denial, and the trial court upheld the district attorney general‟s decision. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the district attorney general abused his discretion in denying pretrial diversion and that the trial court erred when it found no abuse of discretion. Upon review of the record and applicable law, we hold that the trial court did not properly review the district attorney general‟s decision to deny pretrial diversion. Additionally, although the district attorney general considered all the relevant pretrial diversion factors and did not consider any irrelevant factors, the record does not contain substantial evidence supporting the denial of pretrial diversion. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the trial court and remand with instructions that the Defendant be granted pretrial diversion.

I must respectfully dissent from the majority's opinion. While I agree with the majority that amendments to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-2-101 do not govern enforcement of Section 50-2-107, I disagree with the court‟s interpretation of section 107 itself, and I further disagree with this Court's holding in Owens.

This is an interlocutory appeal pursuant to Rule 9 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. In March 2014, Plaintiff food server/bartender filed an action alleging, in relevant part, that Defendants violated Tennessee Code Annotated § 50-2-107 by failing to pay her and other similarly situated employees all of the gratuities that they earned. Plaintiff further alleged that Defendants caused the gratuities to be shared with non-tipped employees. The trial court dismissed Plaintiff‘s claim under § 50-2-107 upon determining that the section does not permit a private cause of action in light of amendments to § 50-2-101 in 2013. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

This appeal arises from a custody dispute in the Juvenile Court of Tipton County. Because the order appealed from is not a final judgment, we dismiss the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

We granted this extraordinary appeal to determine whether, in this declaratory judgment action, the death-sentenced inmates' claims challenging the constitutionality of a 2014 statute that designated electrocution as an alternative method of execution and the constitutionality of electrocution as a means of execution should be dismissed as unripe. Because the death-sentenced inmates are not currently subject to execution by electrocution and will not ever become subject to execution by electrocution unless one of two statutory contingencies occurs in the future, their claims challenging the constitutionality of the 2014 statute and electrocution as a means of execution are not ripe. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's decision denying the defendants' motion to dismiss, dismiss the death-sentenced inmates' electrocution claims as unripe, and remand this matter to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this decision.

The petitioner, Phillippe Rogers, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief from his 2008 Davidson County Criminal Court jury convictions of both conspiracy to sell and possession with intent to sell 300 grams or more of cocaine, claiming that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel.  Discerning no error, we affirm.

Action Chiropractic Clinic, LLC brought suit against Prentice Delon Hyler and Erie Insurance Exchange to recover $5,010.00 as payment for chiropractic services. The trial court granted Erie Insurance Exchange’s motion for summary judgment. We granted review to determine whether the “Assignment of Rights” to Action Chiropractic Clinic as a health care provider executed by Mr. Hyler was a proper assignment. Upon a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we conclude that the document in this case was not an effective assignment. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

A railroad employee who was diagnosed with lung cancer filed suit against the railroad under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, alleging that the railroad had negligently exposed him to asbestos, diesel exhaust fumes, and radioactive materials, all of which were contributing causes to his illness. The employee also alleged that the railroad was negligent per se by violating pertinent safety statutes or regulations. When the employee died prior to trial, his wife was substituted as plaintiff. By special verdict, the jury awarded the plaintiff $8.6 million, finding that the employee’s cancer and subsequent death were caused not only by the railroad’s negligence but also by its negligence per se. The jury also found that the employee was sixty-two percent at fault due to his history of cigarette smoking. After the return of the verdict, the trial court instructed the jury that because of its finding that the railroad had violated safety regulations, the Federal Employers’ Liability Act did not allow for a reduction of the amount of damages based upon the employee’s contributory fault, meaning that the plaintiff would receive the entire $8.6 million. The jury then deliberated for an additional eight minutes and returned with an amended verdict awarding the plaintiff $3.2 million “at 100%.” The trial court entered judgment on the amended verdict but later granted a new trial and entered an order of recusal. A substitute judge granted the railroad’s motion for summary judgment after excluding the plaintiff’s expert proof on the issue of causation. On appeal by the plaintiff, the Court of Appeals reversed the summary judgment and remanded with directions for the original trial judge to review the evidence and enter judgment on either the original $8.6 million verdict or the amended $3.2 million verdict. We hold that the plaintiff’s expert proof was properly admitted at trial, but that the original judge erred by granting the railroad’s motion for a new trial based on evidentiary and instructional issues, and committed prejudicial error in assessing the amount of damages to be awarded. Under these circumstances, the appropriate remedy is to remand for a new trial as to damages only.