APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Appellant, Tarojee M. Reid, pleaded guilty to theft of property valued at $1,000 or more but less than $10,000, and as part of the plea, the parties agreed to submit the issue of restitution to the trial court.  Following the hearing, the trial court ordered that appellant pay $6,895 in restitution to the victim.  Appellant now challenges that order on the following grounds:  (1) the trial court failed to order a presentence report prior to the restitution hearing; (2) the trial court failed to make specific findings with regard to appellant’s ability to pay restitution; and (3) the trial court improperly included the value of property that was not listed in the indictment when some items of property were specifically listed.  Following our review, we reverse the award of restitution and remand for another restitution hearing consistent with this opinion.

The Petitioner, Rodney Bates, appeals the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that the trial court erred by summarily dismissing his motion. The State concedes that this case should be reversed and remanded to the trial court. Upon review, we reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand the case for further proceedings.

The Defendant, William Brian Brown, pleaded guilty to one count of theft of property valued more than $10,000, and one count of vandalism valued over $1,000. In accordance with the plea agreement, the trial court placed the Defendant on judicial diversion for six years, to be served on supervised probation. The Defendant agreed to pay restitution to the victims at a minimum of $250 per month. Almost a year later, the State filed a motion to set aside and terminate the order of judicial diversion, which the trial court granted. The trial court revoked the Defendant's judicial diversion, held a sentencing hearing, and sentenced the Defendant to serve an effective sentence of five years of probation and to pay $100 per month in restitution. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court did not follow proper procedure when it revoked his judicial diversion and that the trial court erred when it revoked his judicial diversion. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the trial court's judgments.

The primary issue presented is whether a health care liability case must be dismissed because the plaintiff sent the health care defendants pre-suit notice of the claim via a commercial carrier, FedEx, instead of using certified mail, return receipt requested, through the United States Postal Service. The defendants moved for summary judgment, asserting that the plaintiff failed to comply with the requirements of Tennessee Code Annotated sections 29-26-121(a)(3)(B) and (a)(4) (2012). The defendants did not allege they failed to receive notice or were prejudiced by the plaintiff’s method of service. The trial court dismissed the complaint, holding that strict compliance with the manner and proof of service requirements of Tennessee Code Annotated sections 29-26-121(a)(3)(B) and (a)(4) was required. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that substantial compliance was sufficient to satisfy the statutory content requirements of the notice, but that the plaintiff’s failure to send the notice by certified mail constituted deficient service. We hold that the manner and proof of service prescribed by Tennessee Code Annotated sections 29-26-121(a)(3)(B) and (a)(4) may be achieved through substantial compliance. The defendants received notice and were not prejudiced by the manner of service. Therefore, the use of FedEx to deliver the notice and the filing of proof of service with the complaint constituted substantial compliance with the manner and proof of service requirements of the pre-suit notice statute. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.

Plaintiff, a former inmate with the Tennessee Department of Correction, filed suit in the Tennessee Claims Commission against the State of Tennessee for monetary damages. Plaintiff alleged that the State held him in custody longer than the term of his sentence and improperly applied certain sentence-reducing credits. He titled his cause of action as one for “negligent care, custody, and control” of which he asserted the Claims Commission had jurisdiction pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated Section 9-8-307. The State filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that plaintiff's claim was one for the “negligent deprivation of statutory rights,” and that the relevant statutes did not provide a private right of action. The Claims Commission granted the State's motion to dismiss. Plaintiff appealed. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This appeal arises from a divorce proceeding. The trial court designated the mother as primary residential parent of the parties' young son in its temporary and permanent parenting plans. After a subsequent hearing, the trial court found the mother in criminal contempt of the permanent parenting plan for failing to engage in joint decision-making with Father on certain issues. The trial court fined the mother fifty dollars and ordered both parties to pay their own attorney's fees. The father appeals, raising various issues regarding the parenting plans and the contempt proceedings. We affirm.

P. Michael Huddleston (Plaintiff) brought this action against his former business partner, Kenneth L. Harper, and also against Jerry L. Hurst, the person to whom Plaintiff sold his one-half interest in the partnership. Plaintiff alleged that the primary asset of the partnership is a large building in Maryville, and that Defendants fraudulently concealed the fact that partnership had filed an insurance claim for damage to the buildings roof. The insurance claim was an asset that turned out to be worth over one million dollars. The insurance company paid this amount to the partnership shortly after Plaintiff sold his interest. Plaintiff claimed that Defendants fraudulently represented that the value of the building was about a million dollars less than its actual value because of the damage to the roof. As a consequence, Plaintiff alleged that he was fraudulently induced to sell his one-half interest for substantially less than its actual value. Plaintiff also alleged that partner Harper fraudulently endorsed Plaintiff's name to a check from the insurance company without his permission, and that the Defendants committed promissory fraud by inducing Plaintiff to endorse a second insurance check with the promise “to make things right with” him.

Linda Russell brought a Federal Employers Liability Act action against Illinois Central Railroad Company to recover for the death of her husband from throat cancer; she alleged the cancer was caused by Mr. Russell‘s exposure to carcinogens while he worked in the Illinois Central maintenance shops in Memphis, Tennessee. A jury found in her favor and awarded damages of $4,255,000.00; on Defendant‘s motion to offset the judgment in the amount of medical expenses paid on behalf of Mr. Russell, the trial court reduced the judgment to $3,335,685.00. On appeal, Illinois Central asserts the trial court erred in admitting the causation opinions of three of Plaintiff‘s medical experts; in approving the jury‘s finding of causation; in making certain evidentiary rulings prior to and during trial; and in denying Defendant‘s post-trial motions based on the statute of limitations and Plaintiff‘s counsel‘s alleged violations of pretrial rulings. In her cross appeal, Mrs. Russell appeals the reduction of the verdict. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the trial court

Housing units belonging to the property owners were cited by a city official for condemnation. The property owners appealed to the city’s Board of Adjustments and Appeals. After the board agreed with the city official and condemned the property, the property owners filed a petition for common law writ of certiorari seeking judicial review of the board’s decision. The trial court determined that the decision of the board was supported by material evidence and was neither arbitrary nor capricious. The property owners appeal. We affirm.

Plaintiff appeals the dismissal of her complaint on a motion for judgment on the pleadings. The complaint stemmed from a foreclosure on plaintiff‘s home. Plaintiff claimed that the foreclosing lender had no right to enforce the deed of trust because the underlying promissory note had been "sold into a securitized trust contemporaneously with the origination of the loan." She also alleged certain irregularities in connection with the foreclosure sale. For the reasons explained below, we affirm the dismissal of the complaint.

This is the second appeal arising from the parties’ divorce and post-divorce filings. In the first appeal, we affirmed the division of marital property and the parenting schedule but reversed the award of child support and remanded with instructions to impute Mother’s income based on the minimum wage. We reversed the award of alimony in solido and remanded with instructions to award Mother rehabilitative alimony in an amount and for a duration to be determined by the trial court. We also found that Mother was entitled to recover attorney’s fees incurred in the first appeal in an amount to be determined by the trial court. Prior to conducting hearings on remand, both parties filed petitions and motions with the trial court seeking additional relief in a variety of forms, including petitions to modify the parenting plan. Upon conclusion of the hearings on remand, the trial court set child support, awarded Mother rehabilitative alimony for 39 months at $800 a month, denied both parents’ petitions to modify the parenting plan, and awarded Mother $2,600 for attorney’s fees incurred in the first appeal. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the trial court in all respects.

The Defendant, Frederick Anderson, was convicted of two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping; three counts of aggravated robbery; one count of aggravated burglary; two counts of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony; and one count of possession of a firearm with the intent to go armed during the commission of a dangerous felony. He received an effective sentence of sixty years’ incarceration. The Defendant raises the following issues on appeal: (1) whether the trial judge should have recused himself from the Defendant’s sentencing; (2) whether the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the charge of especially aggravated kidnapping as mandated by State v. White, 362 S.W.3d 559 (Tenn. 2012); (3) whether the trial court erred by not merging the Defendant’s convictions for aggravated robbery, especially aggravated kidnapping, and employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous offense; (4) whether the trial court erred in permitting the State to introduce excerpts of the jailhouse phone calls between the Defendant and his wife; (5) whether the trial court erred in sentencing the Defendant to an effective sixty years’ incarceration; and (6) whether the cumulative effect of the errors deprived the Defendant of a fair trial. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Frederick Anderson, was convicted of two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping; three counts of aggravated robbery; one count of aggravated burglary; two counts of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony; and one count of possession of a firearm with the intent to go armed during the commission of a dangerous felony. He received an effective sentence of sixty years’ incarceration. The Defendant raises the following issues on appeal: (1) whether the trial judge should have recused himself from the Defendant’s sentencing; (2) whether the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the charge of especially aggravated kidnapping as mandated by State v. White, 362 S.W.3d 559 (Tenn. 2012); (3) whether the trial court erred by not merging the Defendant’s convictions for aggravated robbery, especially aggravated kidnapping, and employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous offense; (4) whether the trial court erred in permitting the State to introduce excerpts of the jailhouse phone calls between the Defendant and his wife; (5) whether the trial court erred in sentencing the Defendant to an effective sixty years’ incarceration; and (6) whether the cumulative effect of the errors deprived the Defendant of a fair trial. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Corey Alan Bennett, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief without the opportunity to present evidence at a hearing. The petitioner pled guilty to two counts of attempted especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor and four counts of aggravated stalking. Pursuant to the plea agreement, he received a ten-year Range I sentence in the Department of Correction. The petitioner filed an untimely post-conviction petition asserting an involuntary guilty plea based on the ineffective assistance of counsel and newly discovered evidence in the form of recanted testimony of a witness. He contends that the post-conviction court erred in its summary dismissal because due process requires that he be afforded a hearing. Following review of the record, we affirm the dismissal of the petition.

The Petitioner, Terry L. Glenn, appeals the Lauderdale County Circuit Courts summary dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief from his 1989 convictions for first degree burglary and grand larceny and his effective twenty-five-year sentence. He contends that the judgments are void. We affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

The appeal in this divorce litigation presents issues regarding proper valuation of the parties' business, proper division of marital assets, alimony, child support, attorney's fees, and court costs. The parties were married for seventeen years, with three children being born of the marriage. The husband is a dentist, who started his own practice during the parties' marriage. Much of the testimony at trial focused upon the proper value to be assigned to this marital asset. The trial court adopted the value assigned by the wife's expert of $430,376. The trial court then ordered that all of the marital assets be divided equally between the parties. Further, the trial court awarded Wife rehabilitative alimony, transitional alimony, and alimony in solido. The husband has appealed the trial court's final judgment. We reverse the trial court's valuation of the dental practice, and we remand this matter to the trial court for a proper determination of the value of such asset. The trial court will also be required to redistribute the parties' marital assets as necessary, in accordance with its redetermined valuation of this asset, in order to effectuate the trial court's decision to make an equal division of marital property between the parties.

I concur in the majority’s opinion with the sole exception that I cannot agree with the majority that the amount of alimony in futuro awarded to Wife should be increased from $500 per month after eight years to $2,288. I agree with the majority that the transitional alimony must be changed to another type of alimony to comply with Tennessee law, and that the only other type that fits under the statutes is alimony in futuro. My only disagreement is with the majority’s sua sponte changing of the amount ordered by the trial court.

The Defendant, Kassy Janikowski, pleaded guilty to second degree murder, and agreed to a sentence of thirty years, to be served at 100%. The Defendant filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1, which the trial court summarily dismissed. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it dismissed her motion because her sentence contravenes the Tennessee Criminal Sentencing Reform Act of 1989. After review, and for the reasons stated below, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The petitioner, Christopher M. Mimms, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his Montgomery County Circuit Court jury convictions of the sale of .5 grams or more of cocaine and the sale of .5 grams or more of cocaine within a drug-free school zone, claiming that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel.  Discerning no error, we affirm.

Suit against the Sheriff and Deputy Sheriff of White County, as well as White County, to recover damages for Plaintiff’s asserted causes of action for negligence, negligent infliction of emotional distress, invasion of privacy, false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, and violations of the Tennessee Constitution, arising out of her arrest and incarceration. The Defendants sought summary judgment on the grounds, inter alia, that the Governmental Tort Liability Act and public duty doctrine barred certain of the claims against the County and that the claims against the Sheriff and Deputy Sheriff were barred by the Governmental Tort Liability Act and by common law qualified immunity. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the case. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is a personal injury action in which Plaintiff sued Defendant for injuries he sustained as a result of a two-vehicle accident. The jury allocated fifty percent of the fault for the accident to each party, and the trial court entered judgment on the jury's verdict. On appeal, Plaintiff argues that the jury was not fair and impartial and that the evidence presented does not support the jury's verdict. We affirm.

The appellant, Roger Gordon Brookman, Jr., filed a motion in the Davidson County Criminal Court, seeking expunction of dismissed charges. The trial court denied the motion, and the appellant appeals. Upon review, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for expunction of the charges.

Appellant Joshua L. Carter was convicted in case 2011-B-1648 of the sale of less than .5 grams of cocaine in a drug-free zone, a Class B felony; possession with the intent to sell or deliver more than .5 grams of cocaine in a drug-free zone, a Class A felony; simple possession of marijuana, a Class A misdemeanor; and evading arrest, a Class A misdemeanor.  As a Range II, multiple offender, his effective sentence in case 2011-B-1648 was forty years.  Appellant Carter was convicted in case 2011-D-3013 of felony murder; attempted especially aggravated robbery, a Class B felony; and voluntary manslaughter, a Class C felony that the trial court merged with the felony murder conviction.  For these offenses, appellant Carter received an effective life sentence, consecutive to his effective forty-year sentence in case 2011-B-1648.  Appellant McLemore was convicted in case 2011-D-3013 of facilitation of especially aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and facilitation of felony murder, a Class A felony.  Appellant McLemore, as a Range III, persistent offender, received an effective sentence of fifty years.  On appeal, appellant Carter argues that evidence was insufficient to support his convictions in both cases and that in case 2011-D-3013, the trial court erred under Tennessee Rule of Evidence 609 by allowing the State to impeach him with a prior conviction for selling drugs.  Appellant McLemore argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions.  Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

I concur with the majority of the well-written majority opinion.  However, based upon my reading of State v. Waller, 118 S.W.3d 368 (Tenn. 2003), I reach a different conclusion  only as to the admissibility of the appellant’s 2005 conviction for selling 0.5 grams or less of a Schedule II controlled substance and its probative value for impeachment purpose.  As the Waller court observed, a prior drug conviction does “not involve dishonesty or false statement as contemplated by Rule 609.”  Id. at 371.  In concluding that “prior felony drug convictions are, at best, only slightly probative” of a defendant’s credibility, the court recognized that it had “previously rejected a per se rule that permits impeachment by any and all felony convictions.”  Id. at 373, 371.  Therefore, I conclude that appellant Carter’s prior conviction was minimally, if at all, probative as to his credibility and that the probative value did not outweigh its prejudicial effect.  As a result, I would have ruled it inadmissible.  However, I conclude that the error in admitting the conviction was harmless, as appellant Carter has not shown that the error “more probably than not affected the judgment” or resulted “in prejudice to the judicial process.”  State v. Rodriguez, 254 S.W.3d 361, 372 (Tenn. 2008).