APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This case involves a dispute arising from services provided by the appellee, CIC Services, LLC (“CIC”), a creator and manager of “captive” insurance companies, to the appellant corporation, SRM Group, Inc. (“SRM”).  SRM hired CIC to form and manage two captive insurance companies to serve SRM in risk management, and the parties memorialized their relationship in two management agreements, one for each of the newly formed captive insurance companies.  When CIC subsequently ended its contractual relationship with SRM for cause, SRM demanded arbitration pursuant to the arbitration clauses contained in the agreements.  The arbitrator dismissed all of SRM’s claims.  CIC then demanded a second arbitration, seeking attorney’s fees, expenses, and costs incurred during the first arbitration and stating claims for breach of contract and fraudulent inducement against SRM.  The second arbitrator ultimately awarded to CIC $261,487.04 in attorney’s fees, expenses, and costs incurred during the first arbitration proceeding, pursuant to the indemnity clauses in the parties’ management agreements, and $137,337.50 in attorney’s fees, expenses, and costs because CIC was the substantially prevailing party in the second arbitration.  When SRM did not respond to CIC’s demand for payment of this award, CIC moved for confirmation of the award in the Shelby County Circuit Court (“trial court”).   SRM responded by filing a motion with the trial court to modify or vacate the award.  After the parties fully briefed the issues, the trial court confirmed the award in full and concomitantly denied SRM’s motion to modify or vacate.  SRM timely appealed.  Upon review, we  affirm the trial court’s confirmation of the arbitration award, determining that because appellant Suresh Prabhu voluntarily participated in both arbitrations without raising objection to the potential attachment of liability against him as an individual, Mr. Prabhu and SRM have waived objection to the attachment of individual liability to Mr. Prabhu.  We further determine that the trial court properly denied SRM’s motion to vacate the award because the second arbitrator acted within her discretion to direct the arbitration procedure and SRM has failed to show any of the criteria necessary to meet the high standard for vacatur pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act or the Commercial Rules of the American Arbitration Association.

A Hamblen County jury convicted Defendant, Raymond D. Arwood, of one count of sexual
exploitation of a minor involving more than fifty images. The trial court imposed a
sentence of ten years as a Range II, multiple offender to be served in confinement. On
appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion to
suppress certain photographs and that the evidence was insufficient to support his
conviction. After reviewing the record and briefs of the parties, and considering the
applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The pro se petitioner, Dan E. Durrell, appeals the Knox County Criminal Court’s summary
dismissal of his motion to correct an illegal sentence filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of
Criminal Procedure 36.1. Discerning no error, we affirm.

In this appeal from the termination of parental rights, the mother does not challenge the
grounds for terminating her rights. Rather she argues that the evidence was less than clear
and convincing that termination was in the child’s best interest. After a review of both the
statutory grounds for termination and the best interest determination, we affirm.

This appeal arises from a conservatorship proceeding. The issues on appeal concern the assessment of the fees of the attorney ad litem in the amount of $1,060. The trial court assessed the fees against the petitioners and the respondent, jointly and severally. The petitioners appeal, contending that, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 34-1-125, the court had no discretion but to assess the fees of the attorney ad litem against the respondent. The petitioners and the estate of the respondent also challenge the assessment of the fees against the respondent on other grounds. We have determined that the trial court was statutorily required to assess the fees of the attorney ad litem against the respondent and that it lacked the discretion to assess the fees against the petitioners. We have also determined that the petitioners have no standing to challenge the assessment of the fees against the respondent and that the issues raised by the estate of the respondent lack merit. Thus, we reverse the assessment of the fees of the attorney ad litem against the petitioners but affirm the assessment of the fees against the respondent.

A Fayette County jury convicted the Defendant, Archie Lee Meeks, of aggravated assault
with a deadly weapon, assault by offensive touching, and aggravated criminal trespass, and
the trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of ten years. On appeal, the Defendant
contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions. After review, we
affirm the trial court’s judgments.

Defendant, Jeffrey Wayne Seidel, challenges the denial of his pre-sentencing motion to
withdraw his guilty plea to second offense driving under the influence (“DUI”). Defendant
contends the trial court abused its discretion by failing to consider the factors set out by our
supreme court in State v. Phelps, 329 S.W.3d 436, 447 (Tenn. 2010), and that he established
a “fair and just reason” to permit the withdrawal of his guilty plea. After a thorough review
of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Douglas R. Roach, was convicted of ten counts of especially aggravated
kidnapping and received an effective twenty-five-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant
argues that the evidence was insufficient to establish that he committed especially
aggravated kidnapping because the evidence did not show that he accomplished the
kidnappings through use or display of a deadly weapon or that he used the victims as
hostages or human shields. The State responds that the evidence was sufficient to support
his convictions. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Charles Jonathan Murphy, was convicted by a Henderson County Circuit Court jury of two counts of rape, a Class B felony, and was sentenced by the trial court as a Range I, standard offender to ten years for each conviction, with the sentences to be served consecutively, for a total effective sentence of twenty years at 100 % in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the convictions and that the trial court erred in sentencing him by misapplying an enhancement factor and ordering consecutive sentences. Based on our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal concerns the ownership of property used by the defendant but owned by her
father and stepmother. The plaintiff stepmother secured a writ of possession from the
general sessions court once her husband passed away. The defendant appealed to the
circuit court, which ruled that the property at issue belonged to the plaintiff. We affirm.

A Knox County jury found the Defendant, Geoffrey Ian Paschel, guilty of aggravated
kidnapping, domestic assault, and interference with emergency communications. He was
sentenced to eighteen years as a Range II, multiple offender. On appeal, the Defendant
argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. He also argues that
(1) the trial court abused its discretion by twice denying a mistrial following improperly
admitted evidence; (2) the trial court misapplied enhancement factors and placed too much
weight on the testimony of his ex-wife in sentencing; and (3) the cumulative impact of the
errors warrants a new trial. Upon review, we respectfully affirm the trial court’s judgments.

In this matter concerning the interpretation of a will, John Moon and Shannon Moon (“John” and “Shannon”) (“Claimants,” collectively) filed a claim in the Chancery Court for Hamilton County (“the Trial Court”) against the estate of their late sister, Mary Hutcheson Moon Ballard(“Mary”).1 Arthur Ballard (“Arthur”), Mary’s husband, filed an exception to the claim. Mary’s grandmother, Elise Chapin Moon (“Elise”), had established a trust for her grandchildren, including Mary. It is Claimants’ position that a bloodline provision in Elise’s will (“the Moon Will”) excludes spouses of grandchildren from receiving trust proceeds. The Trial Court, having put certain questions to a jury, ruled in favor of Arthur. Claimants appeal. We hold that once Mary received the funds from the trust, which dissolved in 2016, the funds were hers outright and no longer subject to the will’s “bloodline” restriction. We hold further that the Trial Court erred by putting questions to a jury when the case was resolvable as a matter of law. However, the error was harmless. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court.

This is an appeal of a modification to a permanent parenting plan. Dawn Rushing
Strickland (“Mother”) filed a motion to modify the permanent parenting plan governing
the custody and visitation of two children from her prior marriage to Stephen Rushing
(“Father”). The Chancery Court for Hamblen County (“Trial Court”) granted the motion
and modified the permanent parenting plan to designate Mother the primary residential
parent and grant her 265 co-parenting days and Father 100 co-parenting days. Father has
appealed. Upon our review of the final order, we conclude that the Trial Court
erroneously considered Mother’s gender in determining that a material change in
circumstance had occurred affecting the children’s best interest and that its finding that
the best interest factors did not favor one parent over the other demonstrates that Mother
failed to carry her burden of proof. We accordingly reverse the Trial Court’s
modification of the permanent parenting plan. Mother’s request for attorney’s fees on
appeal is denied.

This appeal concerns a claim of negligence. Rex Sullivan, individually and in his capacity as the Administrator Ad Litem for his deceased wife (“Plaintiff”),1filed a complaint in the Rhea County Circuit Court (“the Trial Court”), seeking damages from James Carden and Carden Trucking Company (“Defendants”)for injuries Plaintiff suffered in a November 2018 car accident. Plaintiff alleged that his accident was caused by Defendants’ failure to remove excessive mud they had deposited onto the rural road he drove on. The Trial Court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants. Plaintiff appeals. We affirm the Trial Court’s grant of summary judgment with respect to Plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages, which Plaintiff has not appealed. Otherwise, given the existence of genuine issues of material fact such as how much mud was deposited on to the road and the foreseeability of the risk of injury, we reverse the judgment of the Trial Court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

Pro se Petitioner, Bruce Parks, Jr., appeals the Bradley County Criminal Court’s summary
dismissal of his motion to correct an illegal sentence, filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of
Criminal Procedure 36.1. Because the Petitioner’s claim that the State failed to give notice
of enhancement factors or its intent to seek consecutive sentencing is not cognizable in a
Rule 36.1 motion, we affirm the trial court’s summary dismissal of the motion to correct
an illegal sentence.

This is an appeal from a final order entered on July 6, 2023. The Notice of Appeal was not
filed with the Appellate Court Clerk until August 11, 2023, more than thirty days from the
date of entry of the order from which the appellant is seeking to appeal. Because the Notice
of Appeal was not timely filed, we have no jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her children. Upon our review, we
conclude that the record contains clear and convincing evidence to support the grounds for
termination and that termination was in the best interest of the children.

Following his convictions for felony murder, especially aggravated robbery, and especially
aggravated kidnapping, the Petitioner, Mario Donte Keene, filed a petition for postconviction
relief. The Petitioner alleged that his confession was unconstitutionally
admitted into evidence during his trial. He also asserted that he was denied the effective
assistance of counsel when his trial counsel failed to cross-examine a witness and failed to
present an expert to testify that he did not have the physical ability to commit the crimes.
After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied the petition. On appeal, we respectfully
affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Robert Lee Adams, Jr., was convicted in the Tipton County Circuit Court
of attempted second degree murder and received a sentence of thirty years in confinement.
On appeal, he contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction. Upon
review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Tyler Hemmingway, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court
jury of aggravated sexual battery and sentenced by the trial court as a Range I, standard
offender to eight years at 100 percent in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On
appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and argues that the trial
court abused its discretion by allowing the State to introduce a photograph of the
Defendant’s bedroom that showed a pornographic poster on the wall. Based on our review,
we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, Darius Patterson, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing that
the post-conviction court erred in finding that he received the effective assistance of
counsel at trial. Following our review of the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we
affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, David Eugene Dunlap, Alias, appeals his Knox County Criminal Court jury
convictions of possession with intent to sell or deliver .5 grams or more of
methamphetamine in a drug-free zone, possession of a firearm after having been convicted
of a crime of violence, possession of a firearm with intent to go armed during the
commission of a dangerous felony, simple possession of marijuana, and possession of drug
paraphernalia, arguing that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence,
that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for possession with intent to
sell or deliver, and that the trial court erred by declining to sentence him under the amended
Drug-Free Zone statute. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Defendant, Desmond Anderson, was convicted of three offenses in 2013, and the trial
court sentenced the Defendant to serve an effective sentence of twenty years consisting of
concurrent sentences of varying lengths. The trial court awarded pretrial jail credit on
Count 1 but did not do so in Counts 2 or 3. The Defendant later filed a motion pursuant to
Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36 seeking to have appropriate pretrial jail credit
awarded on all concurrent sentences. The trial court summarily denied the motion,
concluding that the request was an administrative matter for the Tennessee Department of
Correction. The Defendant appealed, and the State concedes error. We agree. We
respectfully vacate the trial court’s order and remand the case for entry of corrected
judgments in Counts 2 and 3 to award appropriate pretrial jail credit on all concurrent
sentences.

The Defendant, Raffell M. Griffin, Jr., was convicted by a jury of conspiracy to possess
with the intent to sell or deliver more than twenty-six grams of cocaine in a drug-free
zone, a Class B felony, and first degree premeditated murder. See T.C.A. §§ 39-17-
417(c) (2018) (subsequently amended) (possession of a controlled substance), 39-12-103
(2018) (conspiracy), 39-13-202(a)(2) (2018) (subsequently amended) (first degree
murder). The jury found that the Defendant committed a criminal gang offense,
enhancing by one level the felony classification of the convictions. See id. § 40-35-121
(2019) (subsequently amended) (gang enhancement). The trial court imposed a twentyfive
year sentence for the conspiracy conviction, to be served consecutively with a life
sentence for the murder conviction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the
evidence is insufficient to support the Defendant’s conviction for first degree murder; (2)
the trial court erred in admitting hearsay evidence; (3) the trial court erred by allowing
Investigator Philip Jinks to testify as an expert in gang investigations; (4) the trial court
failed to conduct an adequate investigation of alleged juror misconduct; and (5) the trial
court failed to apply mitigating factors in sentencing. We affirm the judgments of the
trial court.

After a car accident, a plaintiff sued a defendant, but never served him with process.  Almost two years later, the defendant moved to dismiss the case as time-barred.  The plaintiff opposed the dismissal and moved for an enlargement of time to serve the defendant.  The court denied the requested enlargement and dismissed the case.  We affirm.