APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The March 9, 2023 order from which the appellant has appealed was not effectively
entered. Therefore, there is no final appealable judgment, and this Court lacks jurisdiction
to consider this appeal.

Tennessee’s Durable Power of Attorney for Health Care Act, Tennessee Code Annotated sections 34-6-201 to -218, includes a provision for limited statutory immunity from civil liability, under certain conditions, for health care providers who rely in good faith on health care decisions made by an apparent agent on a principal’s behalf. Id. § -208. Tennessee’s Health Care Decisions Act, Tennessee Code Annotated sections 68-11-1801 to -1815, includes a similar provision for limited statutory immunity from civil liability, under certain conditions, for health care providers who comply in good faith with health care decisions made by an apparent agent on a principal’s behalf. Id. § -1810. The health care decision in this case is the execution of an arbitration agreement with admission to a nursing home. The agreement was signed by an agent under a durable power of attorney for health care executed several years earlier. After the resident’s death, his estate filed a wrongful death lawsuit against the nursing home on negligence theories. On appeal from the trial court’s denial of the defendant nursing home’s motion to compel arbitration, we hold that the nursing home does not meet the requirements for limited statutory immunity from civil liability under either the Durable Power of Attorney for Health Care Act or the Health Care Decisions Act. Consequently, the trial court did not err in considering evidence on whether the principal had the requisite mental capacity to execute the durable power of attorney for health care. We overrule the holding on the immunity provision in the Durable Power of Attorney for Health Care Act, Tennessee Code Annotated section 34-6-208, in Owens v. National Health Corporation, 263 S.W.3d 876, 889 n.4 (Tenn. 2007), to the extent it is inconsistent with this opinion. We affirm the trial court, reverse the Court of Appeals, and remand to the Court of Appeals.

A father appeals the termination of his parental rights to his child. The juvenile court
terminated parental rights on the grounds of failure to provide a suitable home, substantial
noncompliance with the permanency plan, persistence of conditions, and failure to manifest
an ability and willingness to assume custody or financial responsibility for his child. The
court also determined that termination was in the child’s best interest. We agree and affirm.

A foster mother filed a petition to terminate parental rights and adopt a minor child. This appeal concerns the rights of a putative father who signed a Voluntary Acknowledgment of Paternity asserting that he was the biological father of the minor child. We have determined that the foster mother had standing to challenge the VAP, and we affirm the trial court’s decision disestablishing the putative father’s status as legal father.

Mother appeals the trial court’s order dismissing her petition for civil contempt and
awarding Father a money judgment and his attorney’s fees. Because the trial court failed
to conduct an evidentiary hearing, we conclude that there was no evidence before it from
which to make a ruling. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of the trial court and remand
with instructions to conduct an evidentiary hearing on all issues in this case.

The Defendant, Jessie Lee Short, was convicted by a Hardin County Circuit Court jury of
two counts of false imprisonment, a Class A misdemeanor, and three counts of assault, a
Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-302(a) (2018) (subsequently amended) (false
imprisonment); 39-13-101(a)(2) (2018) (assault). The trial court imposed concurrent
sentences of eleven months, twenty-nine days in confinement at 75% service. On appeal,
the Defendant contends that he was deprived of his right to equal protection under the law
when the State exercised a peremptory challenge against a black prospective juror without
articulating a valid race-neutral reason. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A tenured teacher appealed his dismissal for insubordination, neglect of duty, and
unprofessional conduct. Among other things, he argued that the decision of the Board of
Education lacked evidentiary support. After a de novo review, the trial court affirmed the
Board’s decision. We conclude that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial
court’s factual findings. And the record supports the teacher’s dismissal for
insubordination, neglect of duty, and unprofessional conduct. So we affirm.

The Defendant, Sarah N. Eakes, pleaded guilty to one count of child neglect, and the trial court sentenced her to serve eighteen months in confinement and denied her request for both an alternative sentence and judicial diversion. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it denied her requests for an alternative sentence and judicial diversion, and she asks this court to enter an order granting both. The State concedes that the trial court failed to consider or weigh the relevant factors in its denial, but it asks this court to remand the case for a new sentencing hearing. After review, we reverse the trial court’s judgment and grant judicial diversion. The matter is remanded to the trial court for the imposition of the conditions, and term of judicial diversion, with the term not to exceed eighteen months.

Petitioner, Mark Anthony Clemmons, appeals as of right from the Wilson County Criminal
Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, wherein he challenged his guiltypleaded
convictions for possession with intent to sell not less than one-half ounce nor more
than ten pounds of marijuana; possession with intent to sell a Schedule III controlled
substance (dihydrocodeinone); and two counts of sale of not less than one-half ounce nor
more than ten pounds of marijuana, for which the trial court imposed an effective twentyseven-
year sentence. On appeal, Petitioner asserts that he received ineffective assistance
of counsel based upon trial counsel’s failure to explain the consequences of entering an
open plea. Following our review, we affirm.

A plaintiff obtained a default judgment against a corporation. Ten months later, the plaintiff moved to pierce the corporate veil and enforce the judgment against an alleged alter ego of the corporation. The trial court denied the motion. Because the judgment was final and the alleged alter ego was never made a party to the action, we affirm.

This appeal involves judicial review of the denial of approval to expand a private
construction and demolition waste landfill. The board overseeing the metropolitan
government’s solid waste management plan denied the application for expansion, finding
that expansion of the landfill was inconsistent with the waste management plan. The
operator of the landfill filed a petition for review in the Chancery Court for Davidson
County, arguing that the board failed to act within ninety days of receiving the application,
followed an uncertified plan, and lacked substantial and material evidence to support the
denial. The chancery court affirmed the board’s denial, and the operator has appealed. We
have determined that the operator waived its arguments regarding the plan’s certification
status by failing to raise those arguments before the board. We affirm the trial court’s
decision in all other respects.

In this case of first impression, the State appeals the trial court’s sentencing hearing order
that the Defendant’s two life sentences be served concurrently after he was determined to
be ineligible for the death penalty due to intellectual disability pursuant to Tennessee Code
Annotated section 39-13-203(g) (Supp. 2021) (subsequently amended). The State argues
that the consecutive alignment of the Defendant’s original sentences remained final and
that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider manner of service. The Defendant
responds that the trial court had jurisdiction to sentence him, including determining the
manner of service of his sentences, and did not abuse its discretion in imposing concurrent
life sentences. After considering the arguments of the parties, the rules of statutory
construction, and other applicable legal authority, we conclude that the trial court properly
acted within its discretion in conducting a hearing to determine the manner of service of
the Defendant’s life sentences. Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed

This appeal involves the disbursement of settlement proceeds proffered by an insurance company in resolution of a claim against it. The plaintiff is the surviving spouse of the decedent, who was killed when she was struck by a vehicle while riding her bicycle. The plaintiff filed a wrongful death action against the vehicle’s driver and the driver’s parents, all of whom were subsequently dismissed from the lawsuit following a settlement unrelated to this appeal. Within the same action, the plaintiff asserted a claim against his and the decedent’s insurer for negligent misrepresentation and negligent failure to procure insurance. The insurer had previously paid a pre-suit settlement to the plaintiff related to uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage. In the complaint, the plaintiff alleged that the insurer had misrepresented additional coverage under an “umbrella policy,” leading the plaintiff and decedent to believe they were covered while failing to actually reinstate the umbrella policy when it had been temporarily cancelled months before the decedent’s death. The plaintiff and the insurer eventually reached a confidential settlement. To facilitate the release of claims by both the plaintiff and the decedent’s estate and upon the estate’s motion, the trial court entered an agreed order allowing the estate to intervene. The plaintiff then filed a motion to disburse the settlement proceeds to him, and the estate filed an intervening complaint and opposition to the plaintiff’s motion, asserting that the estate was entitled to one hundred percent of the settlement proceeds related to the umbrella policy claim. Following a hearing, the trial court entered an order granting the plaintiff’s motion to disburse the settlement proceeds to him upon finding that the cause of action against the insurer had not vested in the decedent prior to her death. The court subsequently denied the estate’s motion to alter or amend the judgment. The estate has appealed. Determining that the cause of action against the insurer was based in tort, rather than wrongful death, and accrued to the decedent at the time of her fatal injuries, we conclude that the right to the resulting settlement proceeds belongs to the decedent’s estate. We therefore reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand for entry of an order granting disbursal of the settlement funds to the estate.

The notice of appeal in this case was not timely filed. Therefore, this Court lacks
jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

The Defendant, Demarcus Taiwan Russell, Jr., was convicted by a Greene County Criminal
Court jury of driving under the influence (“DUI”), simple possession of marijuana, driving
on a suspended license, and speeding. He was sentenced by the trial court to an effective
term of 11 months, 29 days, suspended to supervised probation after service of two days in
the county jail. On appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for his DUI
conviction and argues that the State made an improper closing argument. Based on our
review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The State appeals the trial court’s order granting the motion of the defendant, Mark David Bond, to suppress evidence seized during the search of his vehicle after a drug detection canine indicated the presence of narcotics during a sweep around the perimeter of the vehicle. The State challenges the trial court’s conclusion that the canine’s reaction was unreliable due to the canine’s inability to distinguish between the odor of illegal marijuana and the odor of legal hemp. After review, we reverse the trial court’s order granting the defendant’s motion to suppress, reinstate the indictment against the defendant, and remand to the trial court for further proceedings.

I have the privilege to join the majority’s well-reasoned opinion in significant part.
The majority concludes that the evidence is sufficient to uphold the Defendant’s conviction
for DUI. I agree. The standard of review controls the analysis, and it requires us to view
the evidence in the light most favorable to the State to discard all countervailing evidence.
State v. Weems, 619 S.W.3d 208, 221 (Tenn. 2021). Using this standard, I agree that a
rational trier of fact could find that the essential elements of the crime were proven beyond
a reasonable doubt.

Because “[t]here is absolutely no doubt that wrongful foreclosure can be raised as
an affirmative defense to an unlawful detainer action brought by the purchaser of property
in foreclosure[,]” Davis v. Williams, No. E2010-01139-COA-R3-CV, 2011 WL 335069, at
*3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 2011), no appl. perm. appeal filed (citations omitted), I
respectfully dissent. The reasoning behind this defense is evident—to protect those who
are wrongfully foreclosed upon from losing their home. The Hances availed themselves
of the defense of wrongful foreclosure, just as Tennessee law provides. The Hances’
wrongful foreclosure lawsuit against Nationstar is still pending.1 While I cannot know the
future outcome of the wrongful foreclosure lawsuit, neither can the majority. Under the
majority’s holding, the decision in the wrongful foreclosure suit is immaterial. The Hances
could prevail in their wrongful foreclosure lawsuit against Nationstar and still be ejected
from their home by JCR leaving them with the hollow “victory” of attempting to collect
on a money judgment against Nationstar. Their home would be lost to them despite their
win. Such a result would be deeply unjust and contrary to longstanding Tennessee
precedent that wrongful foreclosure is a defense to a detainer action.

Plaintiffs brought suit alleging breach of contract and the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing against the mortgage servicer of their loan. The mortgage servicer sought summary
judgment on two grounds: (1) an absence of privity and (2) its actions did not violate any
provision of the contract. The Plaintiffs conceded that the mortgage servicer’s actions did
not violate any specific term of the contract and indicated their suit exclusively relied on a
claim predicated upon breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The trial court
granted summary judgment in favor of the mortgage servicer. The trial court
acknowledged but declined to rule upon the mortgage servicer’s privity argument and
instead granted summary judgment based on its conclusion that a breach of the covenant
of good faith and fair dealing cannot occur in the absence of a breach of a specific term of
the contract. The Plaintiffs appealed. We affirm the trial court’s grant of summary
judgment on the ground that there is no privity of contract between the Plaintiffs and the
mortgage servicer.

Appellant filed this action against his local election commission seeking to prevent a candidate from being placed on the ballot of the August 4, 2022 Robertson County election for circuit court clerk. We dismiss this appeal as moot.

This is an appeal from a final order entered on November 23, 2022. The Notice of Appeal
was not filed with the Appellate Court Clerk until June 27, 2023, more than thirty days
from the date of entry of the order from which the appellant is seeking to appeal. Because
the Notice of Appeal was not timely filed, we have no jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

This is a post-divorce dispute. Two primary issues are presented, whether the trial court
erred by (1) holding the mother in civil contempt for violating the Permanent Parenting
Plan and the Parental Rights Statute and (2) reversing the Shelby County Divorce Referee’s
ruling regarding the father’s child support obligations. For the reasons set forth below, we
reverse the findings of contempt as well as the ruling setting aside the Divorce Referee’s
ruling and remand with instructions to reinstate the Order Confirming the Divorce
Referee’s Ruling.

This is an appeal from the trial court’s denial of a petition for emergency custody and its
sua sponte entry of a joint mutual restraining order between the parents involved in a
custody dispute. We affirm.

The Defendant, Deshaun Ward, appeals from the Rutherford County Circuit Court’s revocation of the probation that he had received for his negotiated plea to reckless vehicular homicide and two counts of vehicular assault. On appeal the Defendant contends that he did not receive the effective assistance of counsel at his probation revocation hearing. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal concerns the enforcement of a restrictive covenant. A number of property owners (“Plaintiffs”) in the German Creek Cabin Site Subdivision sued fellow property owner Julia Cris Stevens (“Defendant”) in the Circuit Court for Grainger County (“the Trial Court”) seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. Plaintiffs sought to prevent Defendant from completing a 400 square foot structure on her lot as it would constitute a second dwelling on the original lot in contravention of a restrictive covenant. The Trial Court ruled in Plaintiffs’ favor, ordering Defendant to remove the structure and granting permanent injunctive relief. Defendant appeals. She argues, among other things that it is inequitable to require her to remove the structure. She also contends that it is not a dwelling. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the Trial Court.