APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Petitioner, Johnny Young, contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial – citing multiple bases supporting his contention – and on appeal – citing counsel’s failure to file a motion for new trial – and asks this court to either grant him a new trial or a delayed appeal. After reviewing the record and the applicable authorities, we conclude that counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion for new trial and, therefore, grant the Petitioner a delayed appeal.

The Defendant, Jeffery Scott Hutchinson, was convicted by a Bedford County jury of one count of initiating a process intended to result in the manufacture of methamphetamine, one count of promoting the manufacture of methamphetamine, and two counts of simple possession of methamphetamine.  He was thereafter convicted by a separate Bedford County jury of failure to appear.  At a consolidated sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed an effective eighteen-year sentence for all of these convictions.  In this direct appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to support a jury’s finding that he knowingly failed to appear and that the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentencing.  Finding no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This is a termination of parental rights case in which the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services filed a petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights to her three children. The trial court found that clear and convincing evidence existed to support the termination of Mother’s parental rights on the statutory grounds of abandonment for failure to visit and provide support and failure to comply with the requirements contained in the permanency plans. The court further found that termination of her rights was in the best interest of the Children. Mother appeals. We affirm the trial court’s termination of Mother’s parental rights.

Defendant, Robert Brian King, was convicted by a Davidson County jury of assault.  As a result, he was sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days in incarceration, to be served on supervised probation after the service of ten days in incarceration.  Defendant was also ordered to pay restitution to the victim.  After the denial of a motion for new trial, Defendant appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence and the trial court’s decision to exclude testimony on the basis that it constituted hearsay.  After our review, we determine that the evidence was sufficient to support the assault conviction where the jury weighed the credibility of the State’s witnesses and accredited their testimony.  Further, we determine that the trial court erred in excluding testimony as hearsay when the statements were not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted but to prove their effect on the hearer.  However, we determine the error was harmless.  Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Appellant, Kenneth Brown, was convicted of one count of first degree premeditated murder, twelve counts of criminal attempt to commit first degree murder, twelve counts of aggravated assault, one count of employment of a firearm during a dangerous felony, and one count of reckless endangerment. The trial court merged the attempted murder and aggravated assault convictions. He was sentenced to life imprisonment plus 308 years. On appeal, appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his murder and attempted murder convictions and argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress his confession. Following our careful review of the record, the applicable law, and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal arises from a boundary line dispute. The parties contest the location of the common boundary line between their respective properties. Appellees argue that the boundary line lies at the center of the creek that runs between the parties’ properties. Appellants contend that the boundary lies on the creek’s east bank. Both sides proffered expert testimony to prove the boundary location. The trial court found Appellees’ expert credible. Based on the testimonies of Appellees’ expert and their predecessor in title, and the deeds submitted into evidence, the court determined that the boundary line was located along the centerline of the creek. The trial court also awarded damages to Appellees based on Appellants’ removal of timber from the disputed area. Appellants appeal. Because the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s findings, we affirm and remand.

This appeal arises from a decision by the Davidson County Chancery Court dismissing inmate’s petition for declaratory judgment. Inmate was convicted of second degree murder and sought a declaratory order from the Tennessee Department of Correction (“TDOC”) claiming he was eligible for parole and requesting a parole hearing date. The request was denied, so inmate filed a petition for declaratory judgment with the Davidson County Chancery Court, arguing that he was entitled to a parole hearing and mandatory parole pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-28-115(b)(1) and -117(b). The State filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim based on Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-501. The trial court granted the State’s motion, and this appeal followed. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

Appellants appeal from the trial court’s decision to grant partial summary judgment to the Appellee. After reviewing the record, we find that the trial court failed to state the legal grounds on which it was granting summary judgment as required by Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 56.04. Consequently, this Court cannot proceed with our review and must vacate the order at issue.

This post-divorce appeal concerns Mother’s request to relocate to Alabama with the Parties’ minor child. Father objected to the move and responded by filing a petition to modify the parenting plan in which he opposed Mother’s requested relocation and requested designation as the Child’s primary residential parent. Following a hearing, the trial court granted Mother’s request to relocate and revised the parenting plan to reflect the change in visitation as a result of the relocation. Father appeals. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

The Defendant, Narceus Cox, pleaded guilty to one count of unlawful possession of a controlled substance, Oxycodone, with intent to sell. The trial court denied the Defendant’s request for judicial diversion and sentenced him to a three-year sentence involving split confinement. The Defendant asserts that the trial court erred when it denied his application for judicial diversion. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

This action involves the constitutionality of a city ordinance regulating beer sales by establishments operating twenty-four hours a day. In June 2006, the defendant city amended its beer ordinance, which previously had required restaurants serving beer and other alcoholic beverages to serve no alcohol between the hours of 3:00 a.m. and 8:00 a.m. on weekdays and 3:00 a.m. and 12:00 noon on Sundays. Pursuant to the amended code section, no establishment remaining open for business of any type between the hours of 3:00 a.m. and 8:00 a.m. is permitted to simultaneously maintain a beer permit. The plaintiff restaurant is located within a hotel in Chattanooga and serves a wide variety of food items twenty-four hours a day. Upon its opening in 2004 and subsequent reopening in April 2006, pursuant to the unamended version of the city code, the restaurant served beer during the hours allowed. The restaurant continued to serve beer until it received a letter alleging a code violation from the Chattanooga Police Department in June 2011. Following a mandatory appearance before the Chattanooga Beer Board, the restaurant surrendered its beer permit. The restaurant brought this action in the trial court, alleging that the city code subsection at issue violated the restaurant’s substantive due process rights pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and article 1, section 8 of the Tennessee Constitution. The trial court ruled in favor of the city, finding, inter alia, that the code subsection was rationally related to a legitimate government interest. The restaurant appeals. Because we determine that the code subsection is not rationally related to a legitimate government interest, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and grant the restaurant’s request for a judgment declaring the subsection to be constitutionally invalid. We remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Appellant, Phalanda D. Falls, entered a guilty plea to evading arrest, a Class D felony, and driving with a suspended license, a Class B misdemeanor, and received an effective sentence of four years. Following a hearing to determine her request for alternative sentencing, the trial court denied the motion and ordered appellant to serve her sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction. This appeal follows. Upon our review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This is an appeal from an order resolving the claim for damages made by the appellee, Tommy Williams, in the Original Complaint. However, the order did not resolve the counterclaim filed by the appellant, Adrian A. Armitage, and Albert L. Armitrage. Because the order appealed from does not resolve all claims raised in the proceedings below, we dismiss this appeal for lack of a final judgment.

The defendant, Joseph Scott Morrell, appeals his Washington County Criminal Court jury conviction of third offense driving under the influence (“DUI”), claiming that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, that the verdict of the jury was not unanimous, and that the trial court should have dismissed the indictment or declared a mistrial following the State’s improper commentary during closing argument. Discerning no error, we affirm.

A physician was charged with failing to report a reckless driving conviction on his medical license renewal application. Following a contested case hearing before an administrative agency, the physician’s medical license was placed on probation for five years. The physician sought judicial review, arguing the agency’s sanction was disproportionate to what he represented was merely a mistake. The trial court affirmed the agency’s decision, and the physician appealed. We affirm the trial court’s decision.

This appeal arises from a decision by the Tennessee Board of Probation and Parole (“the Board”) to deny inmate parole at his initial parole review hearing. Inmate was convicted of nine counts of aggravated sexual battery and was denied parole due to the seriousness of his crimes and the likelihood thathe would commit similar crimes again if released. Inmate filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, arguing that the Board exceeded its jurisdiction, was illegally comprised, and acted arbitrarily and capriciously. The trial court dismissed the petition with prejudice, and this appeal followed. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

The defendant was indicted for driving under the influence of an intoxicant (“DUI”), DUI per se, simple possession, leaving the scene of an accident, and DUI (second offense) after his vehicle struck a utility pole and small building.  The defendant refused law enforcement’s request to test his blood in order to determine his blood alcohol content.  The defendant’s blood was taken pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-10-406(f)(2) (2012) and without a warrant, despite his refusal to submit to testing.  The defendant moved to suppress evidence of his blood alcohol content, alleging that his Fourth Amendment rights had been violated and that Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-10-406(f)(2) was unconstitutional.  The trial court granted the motion to suppress, concluding that the statute was unconstitutional.  The State sought and was granted permission to appeal, arguing that the blood was taken under exigent circumstances and that the implied consent law functioned to satisfy the consent exception to the warrant requirement.  After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the blood draw violated the defendant’s right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures because it was not conducted pursuant to an exception to the warrant requirement, and we affirm the suppression of the evidence.  We determine that, although the blood draw was taken pursuant to the statute, the statute did not dispense with the warrant requirement and is therefore not unconstitutional as applied to the defendant.

Appellant, Barry Lamont Price, appeals the denial of his petition for writ of error coram nobis in which he challenged his 1991 guilty plea to three counts of the sale of cocaine, one count of driving on a revoked license, and one count of obtaining money by false pretenses and his effective ten-year sentence. We affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

This case involves the modification of a parenting plan. The trial court reduced Father’s time with the parties’ children to four hours of supervised time every other weekend. The trial court so limited the Father’s parenting time as a result of his intentional interference with the children’s relationship with Mother. Father appeals the trial court’s modification of the parenting schedule. In addition, he claims the trial court erred by: (1) limiting Father’s communication with the children; (2) refusing Father’s request to retain an expert to rebut testimony by an expert Mother and Father initially agreed would provide a recommendation about parenting time; (3) excluding certain portions of his treating physician’s testimony; (4) requiring the children to continue counseling sessions with a psychologist; (5) terminating Father’s participation in educational decisions for the children; (6) instituting a permanent injunction against Father; (7) finding Father guilty of six counts of criminal contempt; (8) finding Father in civil contempt; (9) denying Father’s requests to reopen the proof to present newly discovered evidence; and (10) awarding Mother $678,933.05 in attorneys’ fees and discretionary costs. We reverse the judgment of the trial court finding Father in civil contempt. We affirm the judgment in all other respects.

The Petitioner, Vernon Motley, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of postconviction relief from his conviction for first degree premeditated murder and his sentence of life imprisonment. On appeal, he argues that the State’s Brady violation rendered counsels’ assistance ineffective. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Petitioner, David Freeman Clay, appeals from the trial court’s denial of his petition for postconviction relief following an evidentiary hearing. Petitioner sought post-conviction relief from his convictions of two counts of sexual battery and three counts of assault, based upon his assertions that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal. In his appeal Petitioner asserts that the trial court erred by ruling that trial counsel did not provide ineffective assistance of counsel. After a thorough review we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this interlocutory appeal by the State, the State challenges the trial court’s suppression of the results of blood alcohol testing conducted on the defendant’s blood pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-10-406(f)(2) (Supp. 2012), claiming that the trial court erred by declaring Code section 55-10-406(f)(2) unconstitutional and by ruling that no exception to the warrant requirement existed to justify the warrantless taking of the defendant’s blood.  Because Code section 55-10-406(f)(2) does not mandate the warrantless taking of a blood sample, the trial court erred by declaring the statute unconstitutional, and that portion of the judgment is reversed.  Because no exception to the warrant requirement justified the warrantless taking of the defendant’s blood in this case, however, we affirm the trial court’s order suppressing the results of blood alcohol testing conducted on the sample.

The Defendant, Jonathan Casey Bryant, pled guilty to promotion of the manufacture of methamphetamine.  As part of the plea agreement, the Defendant reserved a certified question of law challenging the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress the evidence resulting from his traffic stop.  However, the Defendant failed to file any document specifying the certified question presented.  Because the Defendant failed to properly reserve the certified question, the appeal is dismissed.

The petitioner, Lonnie Lanorris Holland, Jr., appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of post-conviction relief from his 2012 guilty-pleaded conviction of second degree murder.  In the petition for post-conviction relief, the petitioner claimed that his guilty plea was unknowing or involuntary and stemmed from the ineffective assistance of his counsel.  Because the record supports the post-conviction court’s denial of relief, we affirm its order.

The defendant, Andrea Kelly Jones, appeals her Class D felony, guilty-pleaded convictions of two counts of vehicular assault entered by the Dekalb County Criminal Court.  The trial court ordered that the agreed four-year sentence be served in the Tennessee Department of Correction.  On appeal, the defendant challenges the trial court’s denial of a sentencing alternative to incarceration.  We affirm the manner of service of the sentences imposed by the trial court.