APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Appellant, Willie Duncan, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of especially aggravated kidnapping, especially aggravated robbery, aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. On appeal, Appellant raises several issues: 1) the indictment for the charge of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony is defective for failing to name the underlying felony; 2) the jury instructions on the charge of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony were improper; 3) the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support the convictions; 4) a statement about Appellant’s juvenile record requires a new trial under plain error review; 5) the trial court abused its discretion by imposing excessive sentences; and 6) the trial court abused its discretion by imposing partially consecutive sentences. Upon review of the record, we find that the evidence is sufficient to support Appellant’s convictions, that the statement about Appellant’s juvenile record does not constitute plain error, and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Appellant. However, we find that the indictment for employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony is fatally flawed for failing to name the predicate felony. We also note a clerical error on the judgment form for the charge of aggravated robbery which requires remand for the entry of a corrected judgment. Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s judgments in part, reverse and dismiss in part, and affirm and remand in part.

Appellant, Rodregus Carter, was convicted by a Shelby County jury for aggravated burglary and theft of property valued over $1,000. The trial court sentenced Appellant as a Range III, Persistent Offender to thirteen years for the aggravated burglary conviction and twelve years for the theft of property conviction, to be served concurrently, for a total effective sentence of thirteen years. After the denial of a motion for new trial, Appellant presents the following issues on appeal: (1) whether the trial court improperly denied the motion to suppress his statement; (2) whether the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions; (3) whether the trial court improperly admitted the testimony of the victim with regard to her health condition; (4) whether the trial court improperly sentenced Appellant as a Range III, Persistent Offender; and (5) whether Appellant’s sentence was excessive. After a review of the record and applicable authorities, we determine that Appellant’s issues are without merit. Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

This is an appeal from a Restraining Order entered on May 20, 2014. The Notice of Appeal was not filed until June 20, 2014, thirty-one (31) days after the date of entry of the Restraining Order. Because the Notice of Appeal was not timely filed, we have no jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

In this divorce action, Wife appeals the trial court’s valuation of Husband’s ownership interest in three businesses, determination of Husband’s income, division of marital assets, duration of rehabilitative alimony awarded to her, amount of child support Husband was ordered to pay, and the amount of attorney’s fees awarded to her. We determine that the trial court accepted the calculation of a $134,085.00 promissory note as a liability for one business co-owned by Husband but failed to require value of the same amount as a note receivable for the business collecting payment on the debt, owned 50% by Husband. We therefore increase the trial court’s valuation of the business collecting payment on the debt by one-half the amount of the applicable note receivable, or $67,042.50. We also determine that the trial court erred by attributing to Husband the full liability for the third business, a limited liability company in which Husband owns a one-half interest. We accordingly reduce the allocation for that liability by one-half, or $45,689.50, increasing the total modification of the value of Husband’s net assets awarded by the trial court by the amount of $112,732.00. We award to Wife 48% of this increase, or $54,111.36, commensurate with what we determine to be the trial court’s equitable distribution of marital property, and we remand for a determination regarding the proper method of distribution for this additional award to Wife. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects.

The Petitioner, Courtney Watkins, appeals from the denial of post-conviction relief by the Criminal Court for Shelby County. He was convicted of especially aggravated robbery and sentenced to twenty-three years’ imprisonment in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that the post-conviction court erred in denying his motion for continuance. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Brenda Judy Moss, pled guilty to theft over $60,000, a Class B felony, with the trial court to determine the length and manner of the sentence.  The trial court subsequently ordered a ten-year split confinement sentence, with the Defendant to serve one year in jail followed by nine years of supervised probation.  The Defendant asserts that the sentence is excessive and that split confinement was improper based upon the facts of the case.  After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Appellant, Richard Cleophus Smith, was indicted by presentment by the Knox County Grand Jury for felony murder, first degree murder, attempted first degree murder, employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, evading arrest by motor vehicle, evading arrest, aggravated assault, reckless endangerment, leaving the scene of an accident involving injury, driving while privilege suspended, and failure to provide proof of financial responsibility. At the conclusion of a jury trial, the jury found Appellant guilty of all charges except aggravated assault for which he was found guilty of the lesser included offense of reckless endangerment. The trial court sentenced Appellant to an effective sentence of life plus twenty-six years. On appeal, Appellant argues that: (1) the evidence was insufficient; (2) that the trial court constructively amended the presentment charging driving while license suspended, after jeopardy attached by instructing the jury on the offense of driving without a license in possession; (3) that the trial court erred in denying Appellant’s request for a special jury instruction; (4) that the trial court erred in allowing the testimony of two officers; (5) the trial court erred in denying his request for notes and memoranda generated by State witnesses when generating their reports; and (5) the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentences. We have thoroughly reviewed the record on appeal. We affirm all judgments except the judgment for driving without a license in possession which must be dismissed because the trial court constructively amended the presentment by giving the contested jury instruction.

Appellant, Curtis Taylor, was indicted by the Shelby County Grand Jury in a multi-count indictment for first degree murder (Count 1), attempted first degree murder (Count 2), possession of a firearm after having been convicted of a felony (Count 3), and use of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony (Count 4). After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of voluntary manslaughter in Count 1, and was convicted of the offenses as charged in Counts 2 through 4. According to the judgment forms, Appellant was sentenced to ten years in Count 1, fifteen years in Count 2, four years in Count 3, and ten years in Count 4, for a total effective sentence of thirty-five years. However, the transcript of the sentencing hearing reflects a sentence of two years in Count 3, but the same total effective sentence. After the denial of a motion for new trial, Appellant presents the following issues for our review on appeal: (1) whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain the conviction for voluntary manslaughter; and (2) whether the trial court properly sentenced Appellant. After a review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the judgments and sentences. However, because the judgment forms do not accurately reflect the sentence as imposed by the trial court during the sentencing hearing, the matter is remanded for entry of corrected judgments to reflect that Appellant was sentenced to two years in Count 3, possession of a firearm after having been convicted of a felony, and that the sentences in Counts 1, 2, and 4 are to run consecutively to each other but concurrently to the sentence in Count 3, for a total effective sentence of thirty-five years. Accordingly, the matter is affirmed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Pursuant to the terms of a negotiated plea agreement, Petitioner, Robert Lewis Webb, pled guilty to first-degree murder, aggravated rape, aggravated burglary, and aggravated robbery, and was sentenced to an effective life sentence without the possibility of parole. Petitioner subsequently filed an untimely pro se petition for post-conviction relief. He asserted, among other things, that the guilty plea was involuntary. Appointed counsel filed an amended petition, alleging that the statute of limitations should be tolled due to a new constitutional ruling, Petitioner’s mental incompetence, and misconduct on the part of Petitioner’s trial attorney. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition without an evidentiary hearing. Petitioner appealed. The State concedes that Petitioner is entitled to a hearing on whether the statute of limitations should be tolled. We determine that the post-conviction court erred by summarily dismissing the petition without an evidentiary hearing to determine whether due process requires that the statute of limitations be tolled. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Petitioner, Michael Williams, was convicted of rape in 2001 by a Shelby County jury. As a result, he was sentenced as a violent offender to serve thirty years in incarceration. Petitioner’s conviction was affirmed on direct appeal. See State v. Michael Williams, No. W2001-01925-CCA-R3-CD, 2002 WL 1349520 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, June 20, 2002). Appellant subsequently sought post-conviction relief. The petition for postconviction relief was denied. See Michael Williams v. State, No. W2005-01810-CCA-R3- PC, 2006 WL 3371404 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Nov. 20, 2006), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. Mar. 19, 2007). Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in Hardeman County, alleging that the 2001 judgment is void because he was sentenced as a career offender. The habeas corpus court denied relief, dismissing the petition without a hearing after determining that Petitioner’s sentence had not expired. After a review of the record, we conclude that the habeas corpus court properly dismissed the petition for relief where Petitioner failed to show that the judgment was void or that his sentence had expired. For those reasons, the judgment of the habeas corpus court is affirmed.

The Petitioner, Stacy Lee Fleming, appeals the Tipton County Circuit Court’s denial of postconviction relief from his conviction for delivery of .5 grams or more of cocaine. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant-Appellant, Richard Griffis, was convicted by a Madison County jury of theft of property valued at $1,000 or more but less than $10,000, a Class D felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-14-103, -105 (2012). The trial court sentenced him as a Range I, standard offender to four years’ incarceration, suspended to supervised probation. The sole issue presented for our review is whether the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Lakeith Humphrey, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of post-conviction relief from his conviction for first degree premeditated murder and his sentence of life imprisonment. On appeal, he argues that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to challenge the legal accuracy of the special jury instruction regarding premeditation given at trial. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Daniel Mosby, appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s order revoking his community corrections sentence. The Defendant previously entered a guilty plea to aggravated burglary and, pursuant to the plea agreement, was sentenced to 10 years to be served in the community corrections program with credit for time served. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in revoking his community corrections sentence and ordering him to serve his original sentence in confinement. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal involves water service by one utility district to a neighboring utility district. The plaintiff utility district provided water service to the defendant neighboring utility district for many years pursuant to a series of contracts. The last contract included a date certain on which the contract expired. Before the expiration date, the defendant neighboring utility district agreed to begin purchasing its water from a different provider upon expiration of the water service contract with the plaintiff. The plaintiff filed this lawsuit seeking, inter alia, to enjoin the defendant provider and the neighboring utility district from entering into a contract for water services. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant neighboring utility district and denied the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, holding that the defendants were permitted to contract for water services. It then dismissed all remaining claims against the defendants. The plaintiff now appeals. We affirm the decision of the trial court in all respects.

This is an appeal from a Restraining Order entered on May 20, 2014. The Notice of Appeal was not filed until June 20, 2014, thirty-one (31) days after the date of entry of the Restraining Order. Because the Notice of Appeal was not timely filed, we have no jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights contending the evidence is insufficient for this court to appropriately review the testimony in the trial court because a portion of the evidentiary record is set forth in a statement of the evidence. We have determined the record is sufficient for proper appellate review because the entirety of Mother’s testimony is set forth in a verbatim transcript of the evidence, in which Mother admits knowing she had a duty to support her child, that she had the capacity to provide support during the relevant period, and she failed to do so. Thus, the record contains sufficient evidence to establish the ground of abandonment by failing to support the child. The evidence also supports the trial court’s finding that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the child’s best interest. We, therefore, affirm the termination of Mother’s parental rights.

In this divorce action, Wife appeals the trial court’s valuation of Husband’s ownership interest in three businesses, determination of Husband’s income, division of marital assets, duration of rehabilitative alimony awarded to her, amount of child support Husband was ordered to pay, and the amount of attorney’s fees awarded to her. We determine that the trial court accepted the calculation of a $134,085.00 promissory note as a liability for one business co-owned by Husband but failed to require value of the same amount as a note receivable for the business collecting payment on the debt, owned 50% by Husband. We therefore increase the trial court’s valuation of the business collecting payment on the debt by one-half the amount of the applicable note receivable, or $67,042.50. We also determine that the trial court erred by attributing to Husband the full liability for the third business, a limited liability company in which Husband owns a one-half interest. We accordingly reduce the allocation for that liability by one-half, or $45,689.50, increasing the total modification of the value of Husband’s net assets awarded by the trial court by the amount of $112,732.00. We award to Wife 48% of this increase, or $54,111.36, commensurate with what we determine to be the trial court’s equitable distribution of marital property, and we remand for a determination regarding the proper method of distribution for this additional award to Wife. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects.

Plaintiff in a premises liability action appeals from the trial court’s finding that she was more than fifty percent at fault for her injury. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Lessor sued lessees for failure to payrent and received a default judgment in general sessions court. Lessee appealed to circuit court and filed a counterclaim for failure to maintain the premises and make repairs. The trial court found for lessor.  Lessees appealed. Due to the lack of a transcript or a proper statement of the evidence, we must affirm.

This appeal arises out of contentious post-divorce proceedings. The parties had equal parenting time with their three sons. Both parents filed a petition to modify the parenting plan and sought to be named primary residential parent. The parties also filed competing petitions for contempt. Following a five-day trial, the trial court named Father the primary residential parent of the oldest son, but it continued the parties’ equal parenting arrangement for the two younger sons. The trial court found Father guilty of two counts of criminal contempt. The court also made an award of attorney’s fees to Mother. Both parties appeal. We dismiss the appeal of the contempt order for lack of a final judgment. We affirm the custody order, vacate the award of attorney’s fees, and remand for further proceedings

Father appeals the termination of parental rights to his child. The maternal grandparents obtained custody of the child shortly after her birth due to evidence of drugs in the child’s bloodstream. When the child was one year of age, Father was incarcerated and remained so two years later when the maternal grandparents filed a petition for termination of parental rights. The juvenile court found statutory grounds for termination of Father’s parental rights and concluded that it was in the child’s best interest to terminate Father’s parental rights. On appeal, Father argues that the evidence did not support the juvenile court’s conclusion that termination of Father’s parental rights is in the child’s best interest. We disagree and affirm the juvenile court’s termination of Father’s parental rights.

This appeal arises from the trial court’s grant of summary judgment and imposition of discovery sanctions. A bank sued holders of an assumption agreement for default, and the holders of the assumption agreement filed a counter-claim against the bank requesting rescission of the assumption agreementduetothe bank’s alleged negligentmisrepresentation of the existence of flood insurance on the property as well as a misrepresentation regarding the value of the property. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the bank and imposed discovery sanctions against the holders of the assumption agreement. Finding no genuine issues of material fact, we affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment. In addition, we have reviewed the record and cannot say the trial court abused its discretion

This post-divorce appeal concerns a parenting plan that provided for equal time between the Parents, who subsequently filed competing petitions to modify, claiming that a material change in circumstances necessitated a change in the parenting plan. The trial court found that a change in circumstances had not yet occurred but awarded Mother approximately 12.5 days of additional parenting time after deciding that the Child should attend school in Mother’s county. Father appeals. We affirm the trial court’s decision.

We granted permission to appeal to determine whether a governmental fund established in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated sections 29-20-401 to -408 (2012), which allows governmental entities to pool resources in order to address liabilities created under the Governmental Tort Liability Act, is subject to the uninsured motorist coverage requirements of Tennessee Code Annotated sections 56-7-1201 to -1206 (2008). We hold that such funds are statutorily exempt from the insurance statutes and therefore the requirements of the uninsured motorist statute do not apply. Accordingly, we affirm the Court of Appeals’ judgment upholding the trial court’s decision granting summary judgment to Tennessee Risk Management Trust and remand to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this decision.