APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant, Somer D. Wild, was indicted for driving under the influence, a Class A misdemeanor. After the trial court denied her motion to suppress the legality of the traffic stop, the defendant pled guilty to the offense and was sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days, suspended following the service of forty-eight hours in jail. As part of her plea of guilty, the defendant reserved as a certified question of law the legality of the traffic stop of her vehicle. Following our review of the record and the video recording of the traffic stop, we conclude that the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of conviction and dismiss the indictment.

The pro se petitioner appeals the summary dismissal of his motion to correct an illegal sentence, per Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. Following our review of the parties' briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we find the petitioner’s motion stated a colorable Rule 36.1 claim for review of illegal sentences. Therefore, we reverse the trial court's summary dismissal and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The defendant appeals the sentence imposed for conviction of attempted voluntary manslaughter and aggravated assault. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Plaintiff brought this action against Defendants for fraud, constructive fraud, negligent misrepresentation, civil conspiracy, unjust enrichment, and violation of the Tennessee Securities Act, codified at Tennessee Code Annotated section 48-1-101, et seq. The claims arose out of the purchase of asset-backed securities that were later deemed unmarketable, causing a significant financial loss to Plaintiff. Defendants filed motions to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12.02(6), arguing that the claims were untimely, that Plaintiff failed to plead its claims with particularity, and that the losses were caused by general market conditions. Nonresident Defendants also objected to the court’s personal jurisdiction. The trial court dismissed the complaint. Plaintiff appealed the dismissal to this court, and we affirmed the
dismissal against Nonresident Defendants for lack of personal jurisdiction but reversed the dismissal for failure to state a claim as to the remaining defendants. In so holding, this court found that consideration of matters outside the pleadings pertaining to the running of the statute of limitations converted the motions to dismiss into one for summary judgment, thereby requiring remand of the entire case for further discovery. The remaining defendants filed an application for permission to appeal. The Tennessee Supreme Court granted the application and remanded the case for “consideration of the trial court’s alternative basis of dismissal of [the] complaint, i.e., the failure to state a cause of action or state a claim for which relief can be granted (other than on the basis of the running of the applicable statutes
of limitations or repose).” Upon remand, we reverse the decision of the trial court.

This is a termination of parental rights case in which the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services filed a petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights to the Child. The trial court found that clear and convincing evidence existed to support the termination of Mother’s parental rights on several statutory grounds and that termination of her rights was in the Child’s best interest. Mother appeals. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

Joseph M. Tipton, P.J., concurring in part; dissenting in part.

I respectfully disagree with the majority opinion’s conclusion that this court may consider the State’s appeal of the trial court’s granting judicial diversion as an appeal as of right pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(c)(4), but I believe the court can accept the appeal pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 10 as an extraordinary appeal.  In this regard, I agree with the majority opinion’s conclusion that the trial court erred in granting judicial diversion.

A Cheatham County jury convicted the Defendant, Iris A. Jones, of driving under the influence (“DUI”), first offense, and vehicular assault.  The Defendant filed an application seeking judicial diversion.  The trial court merged the DUI conviction into the vehicular assault conviction and granted the Defendant’s motion for judicial diversion.  On appeal, the State contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it found that the Defendant was eligible for judicial diversion.  After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we conclude that the Defendant is not a “qualified defendant” for judicial diversion.  Accordingly, the case is reversed and remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Appellant, Lona Parker, was indicted for and convicted of theft of property valued at more than $1,000 but less than $10,000, a Class D felony. The trial court sentenced him to twelve years in the Tennessee Department of Correction as a career offender. He now appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Appellant, Marcus Moore, entered guilty pleas without recommended sentences to two counts of burglary of a building, a Class D felony. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed sentences of twelve years as a career offender for each count to be served consecutively to each other. Appellant now challenges the trial court’s alignment of his sentences. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal involves the execution of documents in furtherance of the property division in a divorce decree. The parties were divorced many years ago. To carry out the property division, the final decree of divorce ordered the parties to execute copyright assignments. Twenty-five years later, the ex-husband filed this action to compel the ex-wife to execute the copyright assignments. The ex-wife argued that the action was barred by the ten-year statute of limitations applicable to an action on a judgment. Relying on Jordan v. Jordan, 147 S.W.3d 255 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004), the trial court held that execution of the documents was a ministerial act to effectuate the property division in the divorce decree and was not execution on a judgment, so the action was not barred by the statute of limitations. After the ex-wife still failed to execute the copyright assignment documents, the trial court designated the clerk of the court to act for the ex-wife to execute them, pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 70. The ex-wife appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The parties in this case are competitors. The defendant company opened a branch in Nashville and began competing with the plaintiff; the defendant company hired employees away from the plaintiff and it allegedly worked with a now-former employee of the plaintiff to obtain plaintiff’s confidential information.  The plaintiff filed suit alleging, among other things, breach of the fiduciary duty of loyalty by unlawfully recruiting, aiding and abetting such breach,and conspiracyto unlawfully recruit. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants,finding the plaintiff’s claims preempted by the Tennessee Uniform Trade Secrets Act (“TUTSA”). We affirm in part and reverse in part and we remand for further proceedings. Specifically, we find preempted by TUTSA, Ram Tool’s common law breach of fiduciary duty/loyalty claim–and its derivative claims–insofar as they are based upon the misappropriation of trade secrets. However, we find Ram Tool’s common law breach of fiduciary duty/loyalty claim–and its derivative claims–insofar as they are not grounded in the misappropriation of trade secrets, are not preempted by TUTSA; summary judgment was improperly granted as to these claims.

The appellant, Emmett Lamon Roseman, pled guilty to possession of marijuana, the sale of crack cocaine, the delivery of crack cocaine, and three counts of failure to appear.  The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of twenty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction.  On appeal, the appellant challenges the length of the sentences and the imposition of consecutive sentencing.  Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

In 2010, the Petitioner, Joseph Kindred, pleaded guilty to multiple counts involving conspiracy to sell drugs within a school zone, and the trial court sentenced the Petitioner to sixteen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. In 2013, the Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus relief, which was summarily dismissed by the habeas corpus court. On appeal, the Petitioner alleges that the habeas corpus court erred when it dismissed his petition, contending that the trial court did not have the jurisdiction or authority to sentence him for the conspiracy convictions because he was not indicted for conspiracy. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the habeas court’s judgment.

Stevie Gibson (“the Defendant”) was convicted by a jury of two counts of second degree murder and one count of aggravated robbery. The trial court merged the two murder convictions and sentenced the Defendant to serve an effective term of thirty-seven years’ incarceration. In this direct appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and his sentence. Upon our thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

We granted permission to appeal to determine whether article I, section 21 of the Tennessee Constitution requires a government to compensate a property owner for a regulatory taking of private property. We hold that article I, section 21 encompasses regulatory takings in the same manner as the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals dismissing the property owners’ complaint alleging a state constitutional regulatory takings claim and remand this matter to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this decision.

The Board of Professional Responsibility instituted a lawyer disciplinary proceeding against an attorney based on complaints it received from a judge and opposing counsel regarding the attorney’s disruptive behavior during trial proceedings. A hearing panel found that the attorney had violated several Rules of Professional Conduct and suspended him from the practice of law for sixty days. On appeal, the Chancery Court for Shelby County affirmed the hearing panel’s finding that the attorney had violated several ethical rules but reversed the suspension, instead recommending a public censure. The Board of Professional Responsibility appealed to this Court. We reverse the Chancery Court’s reduction of discipline and reinstate the hearing panel’s imposition of a sixty-day suspension.

Demarcus Ant-Juan Nelson (“the Defendant”) pleaded guilty to possession with intent to sell .5 grams or more of a substance containing cocaine within 1000 feet of a school. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to twenty years’ incarceration. The plea agreement provided for reservation of a certified question of law as to whether the Defendant’s seizure was lawful. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we conclude that the Defendant is entitled to no relief. However, we remand this matter to the trial court for entry of corrected judgment orders indicating that count two was dismissed. In all other respects, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
 

The Defendant, Jimmy Dale Qualls, was convicted by a Hardeman County Circuit Court jury of thirty-seven counts of sexual battery by an authority figure, Class C felonies. See T.C.A. § 39-13-527 (2010). The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I, standard offender to five years for each conviction and ordered partial consecutive sentences. The thirty-seven counts were separated into seven groups for sentencing purposes. Group A contained counts 1 through 6, Group B contained Counts 7 and 8, Group C contained Counts 9 through 14, Group D contained Counts 15 though 20, Group E contained Counts 21 through 26, Group F contained Counts 27 through 32, and Group G contained Counts 33 to 37. The court ordered each group to run consecutively to each other, for an effective thirty-five-year sentence. The court further ordered the effective thirty-five-year sentence. On appeal, he contends that the State failed to make a proper election of the offenses and that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions. We conclude that the State failed to make an adequate election of the offenses, and we reverse the judgments of the trial court and remand the case for a new trial.

The Defendant, Phillip Smith, was convicted by a Chester County jury for rape of a child, for which he received a sentence of 25 years to be served in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction and that he is entitled to a new trial due to prosecutorial misconduct. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Juvenile court entered a default order against mother of minor child declaring the parentage of father and ordering a permanent parenting plan. We have determined that this order is void due to improper notice. We have further determined that the juvenile court erred in ordering the attachment of the minor child, who was living with mother in California.

The employee was injured in a motor vehicle accident while at work. He claimed permanent injury to his left elbow and left shoulder. The trial court found that his left elbow was permanently injured but that his left shoulder was not permanently injured. The employee has appealed, contending that the trial court erred by not finding that the left shoulder was permanently injured, by not awarding additional temporary disability benefits, and by failing to order surgery for his left shoulder. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The employee fell at work and suffered a lower back injury. She received medical treatment, including two back surgeries, over a period of years. The trial court awarded permanent disability benefits based on the employee’s back injury and a bladder and bowel dysfunction that developed during her subsequent treatment. Her employer’s insurer has appealed, asserting that the trial court erred by adopting one medical expert’s disability rating over
another, by finding that the bladder and bowel dysfunction was caused by the work-related injury, and by awarding benefits in excess of the one and one-half times impairment cap because the employee voluntarily resigned. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law in accordance with Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the
judgment of the trial court.

The appellant (“Mother”) appeals from an order of the trial court entered on February 24, 2014, which partially granted the Petition and Amended Petition to Modify filed by the appellee (“Father”) in this post-dissolution proceeding. The February 24, 2014 order stated that “any other issues not addressed in this Agreed Order are reserved for further hearing upon motion of either party, including but not limited to, whether or not Father owes retroactive child support.” It is clear that the order appealed from does not resolve all issues raised in the proceedings below. The Notice of Appeal also was filed more than thirty (30) days from the date of entry of the February 24, 2014 order. As a result of these jurisdictional defects, we have no jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

The Defendant, Fred Arnold McMahan, pled guilty to multiple felony drug offenses, and the trial court sentenced him to a fifteen-year Community Corrections sentence, consecutive to a ten-year prison sentence in another criminal case. In July 2013, the Defendant’s Community Corrections officer filed an affidavit alleging that the Defendant had violated his Community Corrections sentence by failing to report for intake, and, after a hearing, the trial court ordered the Defendant to serve the remainder of his sentence in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it revoked his Community Corrections sentence because there was insufficient evidence presented to support the revocation. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we conclude that the trial court did not err when it revoked the Defendant’s Community Corrections sentence, and we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

This dispute concerns a contract for the sale of real property. Believing the seller was impairing the buyer’s ability to close on time in order to sell the property under contract to someone else, the buyer filed this action to enjoin the seller from transferring the property to another and to require the seller to provide documentation necessary to close. The buyer also asserted claims for specific performance of the contract, breach of contract, and conspiracy against the seller, as well as claims for tortious interference with the contract and conspiracy against another defendant. The trial court found that the seller’s discussions with another potential buyer were merely to have a “back-up plan” in the event the buyer did not close; nevertheless, the court granted injunctive relief by extending the deadline to close the sale by thirty days and enjoined the seller from selling the property to another in the interim. One week later, the sale closed. The plaintiff then amended its complaint to limit its claims to breach of contract against the seller, and tortious interference with a contract and conspiracy against the seller and the party alleged to have tortiously interfered with the contract. The defendants filed motions to dismiss for failure to state claims for which relief could be granted pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6). The trial court found that the seller did not breach the contract because the property was conveyed to the plaintiff pursuant to the terms of the contract and the delay in closing was not a breach of the contract. The court dismissed all other claims but for the conspiracy claims and declared the order a final appealable judgment pursuant to Tenn. R. App. P. 54.02. The plaintiff appealed. Finding no error, we affirm.