APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant, Jeffery Newton, was convicted by a Marion County Circuit Court jury of attempt to commit aggravated assault, a Class D felony. See T.C.A. § 39-13-102 (2010). The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I, standard offender to two years and nine months with thirty days to serve in confinement and the remainder to serve on probation. On appeal, he contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction, (2) the trial court erroneously denied his motion to dismiss the indictment, (3) the trial court erred during jury instructions, and (4) his sentence is excessive. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The issue in this slip-and-fall premises liability case is whether the trial court correctly granted summary judgment to the defendants. Petros Goumas (“plaintiff”), the fiancé of the daughter of defendants Jimmy Mayse and wife, Barri Mayse, was staying at the defendants’ house for an extended visit. Plaintiff was working outside in the yard, helping to clear away dead brush and trees from the property, when he stepped on a rock, slipped, fell, and broke his arm. The trial court held that plaintiff presented no proof that the rock (1) was in any way unusual or posed any particular danger, (2) was hidden or concealed, or (3) created any kind of defective or dangerous condition. The court concluded that there was no proof of a known or foreseeable unreasonable risk of injury created by the condition of defendants’ property. Consequently, the court held, as a matter of law, that defendants owed no duty to plaintiff. He appeals. We affirm.

Following a jury trial in 2008, Petitioner, Kenneth Allen, was ultimately convicted of two Class B felony cocaine offenses and two Class C felony cocaine offenses. He was sentenced to serve an effective sentence of thirty years as a career offender. The trial court ordered the effective thirty-year sentence to be served consecutively to an unrelated sentence of ten years for additional drug convictions for which his probation had been revoked. See State v. Kenneth Gregory Allen, No. M2009-00070-CCA-R3-CD (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 24, 2010). Petitioner filed a post-conviction petition attacking his 2008 convictions. After an evidentiary hearing the trial court denied relief. Petitioner has appealed arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. After a thorough review we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
 

Petitioner, Christopher Rodney Butler, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief in which he alleged ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. More specifically he contends that (1) trial counsel failed to “solicit” the testimony of Albert Sweat; (2) trial counsel failed to depose the State’s witnesses prior to trial; and (3) trial counsel failed to obtain video surveillance footage from the cameras at the “Mix Factory in Jackson, Tennessee showing that he had been approached by a young black man, who drove him to the purported crime scene.” After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that Petitioner has failed to show that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel, and we accordingly affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A Davidson County Grand Jury returned an indictment against Defendant, Henry Wayne Russell, charging him in Counts One, Three, and Five with rape; and in Counts Two, Four, and Six with statutory rape by an authority figure. After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty as charged in the indictment. The trial court merged the convictions in Count Two with Count One; Count Four with Count Three; and Count Six with Count Five. The trial court imposed a sentence of fifteen years for each count of rape as a Range II offender for a total effective sentence of thirty years. On appeal, Defendant argues that: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for statutory rape by an authority figure; (2) the trial court erred by denying his motion under Tenn. Rule Evid. 412 to allow evidence of C.L.’s sexual behavior; (3) the trial court erred by advising Defendant that the State would be permitted to cross-examine him concerning his prior felony drug convictions; (4) the trial court erred by allowing a forensic social worker to testify concerning the victim’s medical history; (5) the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of attempted rape; and (6) the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentencing. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

V.H. (“Mother”) appeals the order terminating her parental rights to her four minor children, S.H., R.L.R. III., M.B and K.C.B. (“Children”). The Children were placed in the temporary custody of the Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) based on allegations of lack of supervision, physical abuse, and Mother’s drug use. The Children were subsequently adjudicated as being dependent and neglected. After a trial, the court found that there was clear and convincing evidence to establish the existence of multiple grounds for termination and that termination was in the best interest of the Children. Mother appeals. She challenges the court’s denial of her motion to continue the trial and its best interest determination. We affirm.

Mother appeals the trial court’s denial of her petition to modify child support. We reverse and remand for entry of a judgment setting child support in accordance with this opinion and for an award of attorney fees to Mother.

The defendant was convicted by a jury of reckless homicide, first degree (felony) murder and two counts of facilitation of attempted first degree murder. These convictions all sprang from an incident in which shots were fired at three men in a car during an attempted robbery. To establish the defendant’s identity as the murderer the State introduced evidence at trial of a separate carjacking and shooting committed by the defendant and an accomplice several hours prior to the homicide. The defendant, who had pled guilty to the attempted first degree murder of the carjacking victim prior to trial on the instant charges, asserts on appeal that the two incidents were subject to mandatory joinder and that he could not be tried for the charges in the present indictment after he had pled guilty to the attempted first degree murder. He also appeals the trial court’s decision to admit the evidence of the carjacking, the trial court’s limits on cross-examination of a witnesses, the trial court’s evidentiary decisions regarding hearsay, and the trial court’s denial of a mistrial. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that there was no error and we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This is a post-divorce action involving a modification of the defendant’s child support obligation. Because the order from which the plaintiff appealed adjudicated fewer than all of the claims of the parties, it was not a final appealable order pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(a). We must therefore dismiss this appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Former tenant of an apartment complex whose lease was terminated for an alleged breach sued alleging violations of the Tennessee Human Rights Act, Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-21-101 et seq. Specifically, the former tenant contends the defendant failed to make reasonable accommodations in violation of Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-21-601(b)(2)(B); she also contends it intentionally discriminated against her due to her disabilities in violation of Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-21-311(e). The defendant denied all claims and moved for summary judgment contending the plaintiff could not establish essential elements of her claims;it also contended it terminated the lease on legitimate, nondiscriminatory grounds. The trial court summarily dismissed the complaint, finding there were no genuine issues of material fact as to whether the landlord violated the Tennessee Human Rights Act. We affirm.

The petitioner, Walter Ware, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Based upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This is a termination of parental rights case. Father’s parental rights were terminated on the grounds of Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(9)(A)(vi), failure to establish/exercise paternity; Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(1), abandonment for willful failure to visit; Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-113(g)(2), substantial non-compliance with a permanency plan; and Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(3), persistent conditions. We reverse in part and we affirm in part; we affirm the termination of Father’s parental rights to Aiden W.

The petitioner, Crystle D. Rutherford, appeals the summary dismissal of her pro se petition for post-conviction relief as untimely. In June 2010, she pled guilty to two counts of facilitation of first degree premeditated murder and one count of especially aggravated robbery. She is currently serving a total effective sentence of fifty years in the Department of Correction. In March 2013, the petitioner filed a pro se petition alleging multiple grounds for post-conviction relief. The post-conviction court summarily dismissed the petition as untimely. On appeal, the petitioner addresses only her asserted grounds for relief, and she fails to address the finding of untimeliness. Following our review of the record, we affirm the dismissal of the petition for post-conviction relief.

The defendant, Mitchell Nathaniel Scott, entered a plea of guilty to one count of aggravated child abuse. Prior to a sentencing hearing, the defendant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, which the trial court denied. On appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion because he provided sufficient evidence to demonstrate a “fair and just reason” that would justify the withdrawal of his guilty plea. After a review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Ronald W. Damon, was convicted by a Rutherford County Circuit Court jury of two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, Class A felonies; aggravated robbery, a Class B felony; aggravated burglary, a Class C felony; and conspiracy to commit aggravated burglary, a Class D felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-305 (2010) (especially aggravated kidnapping), 39-13-402 (2010) (aggravated robbery), 39-14-403 (aggravated burglary), 39-12-103 (2010) (criminal conspiracy). The trial court sentenced the Defendant to consecutive terms of twenty-three years as a violent offender for each of the especially aggravated kidnapping convictions, eleven years as a Range I, standard offender for aggravated robbery, nine years as a Range II, multiple offender for aggravated burglary, and seven years as a Range II, multiple offender for conspiracy to commit aggravated burglary. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion for a judgment of acquittal or a new trial, (2) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions, (3) the court erred in allowing an eight-day break in the trial between the proof and the closing arguments, (4) the court erred in excluding the testimony of a 9-1-1 operator regarding one of the victim’s statements, (5) the court erred in admitting testimony about a letter he wrote, (6) the court erred in admitting evidence of his prior bad acts, (7) the court erred in allowing the State to play portions of a video recording of his pretrial statement, (8) the court erred in allowing a jail inmate to testify without being subject to cross-examination about the truthfulness or falsity of his prior testimony in another matter, (9) the court erred in admitting testimony about his financial problems despite the witness’s lack of personal knowledge, (10) the court erroneously admitted evidence in his first trial that resulted in a hung jury but would have resulted in an acquittal if the evidence had not been admitted, and (11) the court erred during sentencing. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Julie Fuller a.k.a. Julie Cole, appeals the trial court’s denial of her motion for correction of an illegal sentence and/or reduction of sentence. On August 9, 2012, the defendant pleaded guilty to theft of property over $10,000, a Class C felony. The defendant was sentenced as a persistent offender to serve ten years at thirty percent. On appeal, the defendant argues that her sentence was illegal and that the trial court erred and abused its discretion by failing to modify it. Following a review of the record, we reverse the trial court’s denial of the motion and remand to correct the judgment.

In this divorce action, Father appeals the denial of his motion to suspend Mother’s parenting time and the decision to lower Mother’s child support; he also requests that this court modify the residential parenting schedule. Mother appeals the trial court’s calculation of the number of days she exercises parenting time in determining the amount of child support she was ordered to pay. Finding that the court erred in its calculation of Mother’s residential time, we vacate the award of child support and remand for recalculation; in all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.

The Defendant, William Matthew Black, was convicted by a Davidson County Criminal Court jury of second degree murder, a Class A felony. See T.C.A. § 39-13-210 (2010). The trial court imposed a Range I sentence of nineteen years’ confinement as a violent offender. On appeal, he contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction, (2) the trial court erred by admitting into evidence his police statement, (3) the trial court erred by permitting the State to strike potential jurors on the basis of race, and (4) the trial court erred by failing to include aggravated assault in the jury instructions. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Madison County jury convicted Petitioner, Newt Carter, of aggravated rape and aggravated burglary. He received an effective sentence of twenty years to be served at 100 percent incarceration for the aggravated rape to be served consecutively to five years to be served at thirty percent incarceration for the aggravated burglary. State v. Newt Carter, No. W2009-00600-CCA-R3-CD, 2010 WL 2349207, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, June 11, 2010), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. Nov. 12, 2010). Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief. After holding evidentiary hearings on the petition, the post-conviction court denied the petition. Petitioner appeals the denial of the petition and argues that he was afforded ineffective assistance of counsel. We have reviewed the record on appeal and conclude that the post-conviction court correctly denied the petition. Therefore, we affirm the denial of the petition for post-conviction relief.

The petitioner, Junior P. Samuel, appeals the post-conviction court’s summary dismissal of his petition for relief as time-barred. The petitioner is currently serving an effective thirty-two year sentence in the Department of Correction following his convictions for five counts of rape and one count of sexual battery by an authority figure in 2008. In April 2013, the petitioner filed the instant pro se petition for post-conviction relief alleging that he was denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court summarily dismissed the petition after concluding that it was filed outside the statute of limitations. On appeal, the petitioner contends that the dismissal was improper because due process required tolling the statute of limitations. Specifically, he contends that he was mislead by appellate counsel into believing that appellate counsel was continuing the appellate process following the denial of the direct appeal. Following review of the record, we affirm the dismissal of the petition.

A Madison County jury convicted the Defendant, Danny R. Mays, of felony evading arrest, reckless driving, driving on a cancelled, suspended or revoked license, leaving the scene of an accident, violation of the registration law, criminal trespass, vandalism, and possession of marijuana. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective sentence of eight years. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions for felony evading arrest, reckless driving, driving on a cancelled, suspended or revoked license, and possession of marijuana. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable authorities, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

Appellant, Justin Shelton, was indicted by the Lincoln County Grand Jury on two counts of reckless endangerment and two counts of vandalism. Appellant pled guilty and was sentenced to two years on each count for a total effective sentence of eight years. The trial court suspended the sentences and ordered Appellant to probation. Subsequently, a probation violation warrant was filed which alleged that Appellant had not reported to his probation officer; failed to pay fines; and failed to provide proof of employment. Petitioner also pled guilty to another offense. At a hearing, Petitioner pled guilty to the probation violation. The trial court ordered Appellant to serve the balance of his sentence in incarceration. Appellant appeals. After a review of the record and authorities, we determine that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking Appellant’s probation as there was evidence to support the conclusion of the trial court that a violation of the conditions of probation occurred. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

In this consolidated appeal, the defendants, Alvin Brewer and Patrick Boyland, stand convicted of multiple crimes in two separate cases. In case number 11-02360, defendant Brewer was convicted by a jury of two counts of false imprisonment, two counts of robbery, one count of aggravated burglary, and one count of assault. Defendant Boyland was convicted of two counts of false imprisonment, one count of robbery, one count of facilitation of robbery, one count of aggravated burglary, and one count of assault. Each received effective twenty-eight year sentences as Range II multiple offenders. In this case, both have raised the following issues for review on appeal: (1) whether the trial court erred by failing to charge criminal attempt to the jury when the proof of a completed robbery was controverted and not overwhelming; (2) whether the trial court erred by improperly commenting on the evidence by referring to the home residents as “victims” in the jury charge; (3) whether there is sufficient evidence to support the convictions; and (4) whether the trial court erred in failing to force the State to make an election as to the aggravated assault charge when the proof presented showed two separate assaults. Following review, we have concluded that no reversible error has been established and affirm the judgments and resulting sentences. However, the judgment for facilitation of robbery in Count 4 for defendant Boyland incorrectly indicates that he was convicted of a Class C felony. In actuality, it should reflect conviction of a D felony, and we remand for entry of a corrected judgment form. In case number 11-02361, the defendants incurred multiple convictions. Defendant Boyland was convicted of especially aggravated kidnapping, aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and three counts of facilitation of aggravated assault. During the motion for new trial hearing, the trial court granted a motion for judgment of acquittal with regard to the especially aggravated kidnapping conviction. Following a sentencing hearing, defendant Boyland was sentenced to an effective forty-eight year sentence. Defendant Brewer was convicted of especially aggravated kidnapping, aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and three counts of aggravated assault. As with defendant Boyland, the trial court granted a motion for judgment of acquittal with regard to the especially aggravated kidnapping conviction, and defendant Brewer was sentenced to an effective forty-eight year sentence in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendants argue: (1) that the employing a firearm offense is void for failure to allege a predicate felony; (2) alternatively, that the firearm conviction should be reversed because the trial court improperly instructed the jury and provided improper verdict forms; (3) that the trial court erred in allowing a witness to testify in violation of rule 404(b); (4) that the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions; (5) that the trial court erred in refusing to merge the conviction for aggravated robbery with the convictions for aggravated assault and facilitation of aggravated assault, respective to each defendant, in violation of double jeopardy protections; (6) alternatively, that if merger is not applicable, then the trial court erred in failing to compel an election for the aggravated assault and facilitation of aggravated assault; and (7) that the trial court erred in allowing Mr. Clarence Mann to testify when his name was not endorsed on the indictment. Additionally, the State raises an issue for appeal, that being that the trial court erred in granting the motion for judgment of acquittal with regard to the especially aggravated kidnapping convictions of both defendants. Following review, the convictions for each defendant for employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony are reversed. Moreover, we have determined that the court did erroneously refuse to merge defendant Boyland’s conviction for facilitation of aggravated assault and defendant Brewer’s conviction for aggravated assault into their respective aggravated robbery convictions. Moreover, the judgment of conviction form for defendant Brewer’s aggravated assault conviction in Count 8 fails to specify a release eligibility. Additionally, the trial court’s granting of motions for judgment of acquittal as to the charge of especially aggravated kidnapping for both defendants is reversed, and the judgments should be re-instated. As such, the case is remanded for sentencing on the especially aggravated kidnapping convictions and for further proceedings and actions necessary in accordance with this opinion. The convictions and sentences are affirmed in all other respects.

In this post-divorce action, Mother and Father both sought to modify the child support obligation of Father. The trial court, inter alia, found that Father had an annual income of $65,000 and held that there had been a significant variance. The court raised Father’s child support obligation to $233.00 per month, applied a downward deviation of $83.00, and ordered support to continue past age 21 for one of the children due to her disabilities. Father appeals, contending that the court erred in its calculation of his income. We affirm the method used to determine Father’s income; we vacate the child support obligation and remand for a redetermination of the support amount.

Husband in divorce proceeding appeals numerous issues relating to the trial court’s administration of the trial and valuation and division of marital property. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment.